Abstract: A Symmetric Approach to Axiomatizing Quantifiers and Modalities -- The Knowing Mathematician -- “Conservative” Kripke Closures -- Frege, Le?niewski, and Information Semantics on the Resolution of Antinomies -- De Finetti’s Probabilism -- Probability Functions and Their Assumption Sets — The Binary Case -- Logic and Reasoning -- Paradoxes -- Referential and Nonreferential Substitutional Quantifiers -- Foundations for Analysis and Proof Theory -- Chameleonic Languages -- Relational Model Systems: The Craft of Logic -- Realizability and Intuitionistic Logic.

Abstract: The more traditional approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology continue as well, and probably will continue as long as there are skillful practitioners such as Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, and th~ir students. Finally, there are still other approaches that address some of the technical problems arising when we try to provide an account of belief and of rational choice. - These include efforts to provide logical frameworks within which we can make sense of these notions. This series will attempt to bring together work from all of these approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology in the belief that each has something to add to our understanding. The volumes of this series have emerged either from lectures given by authors while they served as honorary visiting professors at the City College of New York or from conferences sponsored by that institution. The City College Program in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology oversees and directs these lectures and conferences with the financial aid of the Association for Philosophy of Science, Psychotheraphy, and Ethics. MARTIN TAMNY RAPHAEL STERN PREFACE The papers in this collection stem largely from the conference 'Foun­ dations: Logic, Language, and Mathematics' held at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York on 14-15 November 1980.

Abstract: I. The Philosophical Situation: A Critical Appraisal -- 1: The ‘standard’ account of meaning -- 2: ‘Meaning variance’ and ‘incommensurability’ -- II. The Scientific Situation: An Historical Analysis -- 3: Faraday’s ‘lines of force’ -- 4: Maxwell’s ‘Newtonian aether-field’ -- 5: Lorentz’ ‘non-Newtonian aether-field’ -- 6: Einstein’s ‘field’ -- III. The Making of Meaning: A Proposal -- 7: Meaning in scientific practice.

Abstract: Einstein often expressed the sentiment that "the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility," and that science is the means through which we comprehend it. However, nearly every­ one - including scientists - agrees that the concepts of modem physics are quite incomprehensible: They are both unintelligible to the educated lay-person and to the scientific community itself, where there is much dispute over the interpretation of even (and especially) the most basic concepts. There is, of course, almost universal agreement that modem science quite adequately accounts for and predicts events, i. e. , that its calculations work better than those of classical physics; yet the concepts of science are supposed to be descriptive of 'the world' as well - they should enable us to comprehend it. So, it is asked, and needs tobe"asked: Has modem physics failed in an important respect? It failed with me as a physics student. I came to physics, as with most naIve students, out of a desire to know what the world is really like; in particular, to understand Einstein's conception of it. I thought I had grasped the concepts in classical mechanics, but with electrodynamics confusion set in and only increased with relativity and quantum mechanics. At that point I began even to doubt whether I had really understood the basic concepts of classical mechanics.

Abstract: May We Identify Reduction and Explanation of Theories ? -- Restriction and Embedding -- Anomalies of Reduction -- Ontological Reduction in the Natural Sciences -- Explanation of Theories and the Problem of Progress in Physics -- Reduction, Interpretation and Invariance -- Reduction and Evolution — Arguments and Examples -- Limiting Case Correspondence between Physical Theories -- Contact Structures, Predifferentiability and Approximation -- Tangent Embedding — A Special Kind of Approximate Reduction -- A Logical Investigation of the Phlogiston Case -- Utilistic Reduction in Sociology: The Case of Collective Goods -- Intertheory Relations in Growth Economics: Sraffa and Wicksell -- Possible Approaches to Reduction in Economic Theory -- Why Language ? -- On the Comparison of Classical and Special Relativistic Space-Time -- Space-Time Geometries for One-Dimensional Space -- Quantum Theory as a Factualization of Classical Theory -- Classical and Non Classical Limiting Cases of Quantum Logic -- Bell’s Inequalities and the Reduction of Statistical Theories -- Name Index.

Abstract: Introductory Remarks to the Symposium on Hegel and the Sciences -- The Scholar, the Liberal Ideal, and the Philosophy of Science -- I. The Sciences -- Conceptual Analysis and Scientific Theory in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature (with Special Reference to Hegel’s Optics) -- A Comment on Buchdahl’s Paper -- The Chemical System of Substances, Forces and Processes in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature and the Science of His Time -- Hegel and the Celestial Mechanics of Newton and Einstein -- The Hegelian Treatment of Biology and Life -- More Comments on the Place of the Organic in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature -- Hegel and the Organic View of Nature -- Hegel’s Philosophical Understanding of Illness -- On Hegel’s Significance for the Social Sciences -- Hegel’s Conception of Psychology -- II. Philosophy and Methodology of Science -- The Dialectical Structure of Scientific Thinking -- Is the Progress of Science Dialectical? -- Some ‘Moments’ of Hegel’s Relation to the Sciences -- Hegel’s ‘Deduction of the Concept of Science’ -- Theory and Praxis and the Beginning of Science -- The First American Interpretation of Hegel in J. B. Stallo’s Philosophy of Science -- III. Dialectics and Logic -- Hegel’s Logic from a Logical Point of View -- The Dynamics of Hegelian Dialectics, and Non-Linearity in the Sciences -- Mathematical Dialectics, Scientific Logic and the Psychoanalysis of Thinking [Comment on Kosok and Gauthier] -- Comments on Kosok’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Logic -- Bibliographical Note -- Index of Names.

Abstract: To the scientists and philosophers of our time, Hegel has been either a ne­ glected or a provocative thinker, a source of irrelevant dark metaphysics or of complex but insightful analysis. His influence upon the work of natural scientists has seemed minimal, in the main; and his stimulus to the nascent sciences of society and to psychology has seemed to be as often an obstacle as an encouragement. Nevertheless his philosophical analysis of knowledge and the knowing process, of concepts and their evolutionary formation, of rationality in its forms and histories, of the stages of empirical awareness and human practice, all set within his endless inquiries into cultural formations from the entire sweep of human experience, must, we believe, be confronted by anyone who wants to understand the scientific consciousness. Indeed, we may wish to situate the changing theories of nature, and of humankind in nature, within a philosophical account of men and women as social practi­ tioners and as sensing, thinking, feeling centers of privacy; and then we will see the work of Hegel as a major effort to mediate between the purest of epistemological investigations and the most practical of the political and the religious. This book, long delayed to our deep regret, derives from a Symposium on Hegel and the Sciences which was sponsored jointly by the Hegel Society of America and the Boston University Center for Philosophy and History of Science a decade ago.

Abstract: Aesthetic Enjoyment and Poetic Sense. Poetic Sense: The Irreducible in Literature -- Movement in German Poems -- Why be a Poet? -- The Field of Poetic Constitution -- The Poet in the Poem: A Phenomenological Analysis of Anne Sexton’s ‘Briar Rose (Sleeping Beauty)’ -- Nature, Feeling, and Disclosure in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens -- “Fallings from us, Vanishings ...”: Composition and the Structure of Loss -- Poetic Thinking to Be -- From Helikon to Aetna: The Precinct of Poetry in Hesiod, Empedokles, Hölderlin, and Arnold -- What Can the Poem Do Today? The Self-Evaluation of Western Poets after 1945 -- Poetry as Essential Graphs -- The Shield and the Horizon: Homeric Ekphrasis and History -- The Myth of Man in the Hebraic Epic -- On Medieval Interpretation and Mythology -- The Epic Element in Japanese Literature -- A Long Day’s Journey into Night: The Historicity of Human Existence Unfolding in Virginia Woolf’s Fiction -- The Existential Sources of Rhetoric: A Comparison Between Traditional Epic and Modern Narrative -- Metaphor and the Flux of Human Experience -- The Literary Diary as a Witness of Man’s Historicity: Heinrich Böll, Karl Krolow, Günter Grass, and Peter Handke -- The French Nouveau Roman: The Ultimate Expression of Impressionism -- The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music: Claudel, Milhaud and the Oresteia -- Tragedy and the Completion of Freedom -- Hardy’s Jude: The Pursuit of the Ideal as Tragedy -- Values and German Tragedy 1770–1840 -- La Destinée de la tragédie dans la culture Islamique -- Toward a Theory of Contemporary Tragedy -- The Re-emergence of Tragedy in Late Medieval England: Sir Thomas Malory’s Morte Darthur -- Tragical, Comical, Historical -- The Denial of Tragedy: The Self-Reflexive Process of the Creative Activity and the French New Novel -- Tragic Closure and the Cornelian Wager -- Intuition in Britannicus -- Myth and Tragic Action in La Celestina and Romeo and Juliet -- Du désordre à l’ordre: le rôle de la violence dans Horace -- The Act of Writing as an Apprehension of the Enigma of Being-in-the-World -- The Truth of the Body: Merleau-Ponty on Perception, Language, and Literature -- Fiction and the Transposition of Presence -- The Structure of Allegory -- Literary Impressionism and Phenomenology: Affinities and Contrasts -- Phenomenology and Literary Impressionism: The Prismatic Sensibility -- Un modèle d’analyse dy texte dramatique -- The Problem of Reading, Phenomenologically or Otherwise -- Index of Names.

Abstract: 1: Theory of Science and Theory of Law -- Synopsis -- Recent Trends in the Philosophy of Science -- Legal Dogmatics as a Scientific Paradigm -- Paradigms in Legal Dogmatics Towards a Theory of Change and Progress in Legal Science -- Pragmatic Metatheory for Legal Science -- On Making Implicit Methodologies Explicit -- 2: Ontology and Epistomology in Legal Science -- Synopsis -- Ought, Reasons, Motivation, and the Unity of the Social Sciences: The Meta-theory of the Ought-Is Problem -- Legal Data. An Essay about the Ontology of Law -- Pluralis Juris -- Changes of Paradigm in the Law -- Legal Norms: a Transformational Approach -- Epistemology and Validity in Law -- Is Law a System of Enactments? -- The Concept of “Fact” in the Physical Sciences and in Law -- 3: Objectivity and Rationality of Legal Justification -- Synopsis -- Objectivity in the Social Sciences -- Objectivity and Rationality in Lawyer’s Reasoning -- Coherence in Legal Justification -- Paradigms of Justifying Legal Decisions -- Monism, Pluralism, Relativism and Right Answers in the Law -- Discovery and Justification in Science and Law -- Reasons and Causes in Connection with Judicial Decisions -- 4: Technical Rationality in the Law -- Synopsis -- Legal Rationality Among Different Types of Rationality -- Paradigms of Legal Research; Empirical Science and Legal Dogmatics -- Goal Reasons in Common Law Cases — Are They Predictive? -- Teleological Construction of Statutes -- Reason, Law and History -- The Rule of Law in Legal Reasoning -- 5: Some Special Topics Concerning Rationality and Legitimacy in the Law -- Synopsis -- An Ubiquitous Paralogism in Legal Thinking -- Power of Tolerance — On the Legitimacy of a Legal System -- Sir Edward Coke’s Legal Conservatism -- Popper’s Criterion of Refutability in the Legal Context -- 6: Criticism and Developments in Particular Areas of the Law: Property, Contracts, and Torts -- Synopsis -- Theory Choice and Contract Law -- Trends in Legal Science Relating to Contracts and Torts -- The Economics of Trade Laws -- 7: Interdisciplinary Bridges between Legal Research and Other Sciences -- Synopsis -- On Bridging the So-Called Gap Between Normative Legal Dogmatics and Empirical-Theoretical Social Science -- Towards an Interdisciplinary Theory of Law -- Legal Science and Hermeneutic Point of View -- Legal Theory and Social Science -- Integration Between Legal Research and Social Science -- 8: Analysis of Legal Norms and Juristic Propositions -- Synopsis -- Karl Olivecrona’s Theory of Legal Rules as Independent Imperatives -- Norms of Competence in Scandinavian Jurisprudence -- A Tentative Analysis of Two Juristic Sentences -- 9: Logical and Preference-Theoretical Structures in the Law -- Synopsis -- Automated Analysis of Legislation -- Rights and Practical Possibilities -- Requirements, Urgency, and Worth -- The Property Right of Sweden Today — Or a Requiem over an Outdated Way of Argueing -- List of Participants -- Index of Names.

Abstract: I. Physical time and the problem of its structure -- I.1 Introduction -- I.2 The order structure of time -- I.3 The topological structure of time -- I.4 The metrical structure of time -- I.5 Conclusion -- Notes -- II. The geometrical nature of physical time: parameter time and coordinate time -- II.1 Introduction -- II.2 Parameter and coordinate -- II.3 Parameter and coordinate time in Newtonian physics -- II.4 Parameter and coordinate time in Einsteinian physics -- II.5 The geometrical nature of time in quantum mechanics -- II.6 Translation of the space and time into the spacetime formalism and vice versa -- II.7 The geometrical nature of time and dynamics -- II.8 Parameter versus coordinate time in the study of time; some philosophical issues -- Notes -- III. Time asymmetry -- III.1 Arrow of time: time asymmetry and time flow -- III.2 Time asymmetry -- III.3 (Ir)reversibility and the time reversal operator T* -- III.4 Time asymmetry and temporal orientability -- Notes -- IV. Thermodynamical time asymmetry and the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics -- IV. 1 Introduction -- IV. 2 The mechanical program -- IV. 3 The thermodynamical program -- IV. 4 Discussion -- Notes -- Epilogue -- Name index.

Abstract: Reflections on Change -- I. Historical Dimensions -- The Mechanical Philosophy and Its Problems: Mechanical Explanations, Impenetrability, and Perpetual Motion -- Ghosts in the World Machine: A Taxonomy of Leibnizian Forces -- The Notion of Experimental Physics in Early Eighteenth-Century France -- Some Pragmatic Aspects of the Methodology of Johann Heinrich Lambert -- Classical Wage Theory and the Causal Complications of Explaining Distribution -- Genetic Epistemology in the Context of Evolutionary Epistemology -- II. Conceptual Considerations -- Truthlikeness, Realism, and Progressive Theory-Change -- In Praise of Cumulative Progress -- Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology -- Scientific Discovery and Theory-Confirmation -- Meaning, Acceptance, and Dialectics -- Extraterrestrial Science.

Abstract: I. Philosophical Analysis in Argentina -- I. Philosophical Analysis in Argentina -- Normative Knowledge and Truth -- Legal Principles and Legal Positivism -- Logic and the Hypothetical-Deductive Method -- The Limits of the Enforcement of Morality Through the Criminal Law -- On the Inconsistency of Meinong’s Ontology -- Meaning, Force and Explicit Performatives -- II. Philosophical Analysis in Mexico -- II. Philosophical Analysis in Mexico -- Existential Quantifiers and Guiding Principles in Physical Theories -- (Simple) Qualities and Resemblance -- Theory of Descriptions, Meaning and Presupposition -- Ethics and the Language of Morality -- The Private Language Argument -- III. Philosophical Analysis in Brazil -- III. Philosophical Analysis in Brazil -- Philosophy, Common Sense, and Science -- Decidability and Cognitive Significance in Carnap -- Natural Conjectures -- IV. Philosophical Analysis in Other Latin American Countries -- IV. Philosophical Analysis in Other Latin American Countries -- Popper’s Solution to the Problem of Induction -- On the Concept of Reason -- Appendix: Latin Americans Residing in the United States and Canada / Jorge J. E. Gracia -- Biographical Notes -- Index of Proper Names.

Abstract: Historians of Latin American philosophy have paid relatively little attention to the development of philosophical analysis in Latin America. There are two reasons for this neglect: First, they have been primarily concerned with the forma tive period of philosophical development, in particular with the so called "founders" of La ti n American philosophy. And second. philosophical analysis did not become a noticeable philosophical trend in Latin America until recent years. True. a nunber of Latin American philosophers took notice of Moore. Russell. the members of the Vienna Circle and other important figures in the analytic movement qui te early. But these were isolated instances that lacked the sustained effort and broad base indispensible to make a serious impact in the development of Latin American philosophy. That has changed now. There are not only good numbers of philosophers who work within the analytic tradition, but also some journals and institutes dedicated to the analytic mode of philosophizing. It is. therefore. most appropriate to publish a collection of articles which would introduce the reader of philosophy to the most representative analytic material produced so far in Latin America. Indeed. it is not only appropriate. but also necessary. since most of the published analytic literature to date is scattered in various journals, sometimes of difficult access. Moreover, not all that has been published is representative of the best already produced and of the potential that the movement has in Latin America.

Abstract: Scientific Realism and Incommensurability: Some Criticisms of Kuhn and Feyerabend -- How To Be a Good Philosopher of Science: A Plea for Empiricism in Matters Methodological [Commentary on Burian] -- Feedback, Selection, and Function: A Reductionistic Account of Goal-Orientation -- Philosophy of Science 2001 -- The Dethroning of the Philosophy of Science: Ideological and Technical Functions of the Metasciences -- Comments on Jost Halfmann’s ‘Dethroning of the Philosophy of Science: Ideological and Technical Functions of the Metasciences’ -- Philosophy of Science and the Origin of Life -- Sociobiology, Anti-Sociobiology, Epistemology, and Human Nature -- Substance and Its Logical Significance -- Tracking Down the Misplaced Concreton in the Neurosciences -- Does Popper’s Conventionalism Contradict his Critical Rationalism? Objections against Popper in German Philosophy and Some Metacritical Remarks -- How to Explore the History of Ancient Mathematics? -- Nature on Trial: The Case of the Rooster that Laid an Egg -- Reflections on ‘Nature on Trial’ -- Toward the Vindication of Friedrich Engels -- Bibliography of the Writings of Benjamin Nelson -- Name Index.

Abstract: This selection of papers that were presented (or nearly so!) to the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science during the seventies fairly re­ presents some of the most disturbing issues of scientific knowledge in these years. To the distant observer, it may seem that the defense of rational standards, objective reference, methodical self-correction, even the distin­ guishing of the foolish from the sensible and the truth-seeking from the ideological, has nearly collapsed. In fact, the defense may be seen to have shifted; the knowledge business came under scrutiny decades ago and, indeed, from the time of Francis Bacon and even far earlier, the practicality of the discovery of knowledge was either hailed or lamented. So the defense may be founded on the premise that science may yet be liberating. In that case, the analysis of philosophical issues expands to embrace issues of social interest and social function, of instrumentality and arbitrary perspective, of biological constraints (upon knowledge as well as upon the species-wide behavior of human beings in other relationships too), of distortions due to explanatory metaphors and imposed categories, and of radical comparisons among the perspectives of different civilizations. Some of our contributors are frankly programmatic, showing how problems must be formulated afresh, how evasions must be identified and omissions rectified, but they do not reach their own completion.

Abstract: I. General -- A. Bibliographies -- B. Handbooks and General Works -- C. Collections of Various Articles, Commemoration Volumes, Congress Papers, etc. -- D. Catalogues, Museum Collections and Museology -- E. Applied Sciences, Restoration Techniques, Dating Methods and Material Analysis -- II. India and the Regions within its Cultural Influence -- A. 1. General -- A. 2. Activities of Museums and Activities of Societies -- B. Relations with other Cultural Regions -- III. The Indian Subcontinent -- A. General -- B. Archaeology -- C. Historical Studies -- D. Arts -- IV. Regions within the Sphere of Indian Cultural Influence -- A. General -- B. Sri Lanka (Ceylon) -- C. South-East Asia -- D. Indonesian Archipelago -- E. Afghanistan and Central Asia -- F. Nepal -- G. Tibet -- V. Commemorative and Obituary Notices.

Abstract: I Spontaneity Of Life, Individualization, Beingness -- Harmony in Becoming: The Spontaneity of Life and Self-Individualization -- Toward a More Comprehensive Concept of life -- Confucian Methodology and Understanding the Human Person -- Heidegger’s Quest for the Essence of Man -- A Comparative Study of Lao-tzu and Husserl: A Methodological Approach -- II Human Faculties of Life -- Mind and Consciousness in Chinese Philosophy: A Historical Survey -- Transcendental Consciousness in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology -- Life-world and Reason in Husserl’s Philosophy of Life -- Consciousness and Body in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: Some Remarks Concerning Flesh, Vision, and World in the Late Philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty -- Language, Consciousness, and Mind in Neo-Confucian Philosophy: The Crossbow Pellet -- Conscience and Life: The Role of Freedom in Heidegger’s Conception of Conscience -- III Life, Morality and Inwardness -- A Reevaluation of Confucius -- Conscience, Morality and Creativity -- Confucian Moral Metaphysics and Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology -- The Concept of Tao: A Hermeneutical Perspective -- Phenomenology in T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen Buddhism -- Chinese Buddhism as an Existential Phenomenology -- A Critical Reflection on the Methods of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and the Idea of Contextualization in Religious and Theological Studies -- IV The Locus of Art In Life -- The Tenets of Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics in a Philosophical Perspective -- The Literary Work and Its Concretization in Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics -- The Writer as Shaman -- A Glimpse of the Fundamental Nature of Japanese Art -- A Phenomenological Perspective of Theodore Roethke’s Poetry -- Virginia Woolf’s Theory of Reception -- The Aesthetic Interpretation of life in The Tale of Genji -- Index Of Names.

Abstract: To introduce this collection of research studies, which stem from the pro­ grams conducted by The World Phenomenology Institute, we need say a few words about our aims and work. This will bring to light the significance of the present volume. The phenomenological philosophy is an unprejudiced study of experience in its entire range: experience being understood as yielding objects. Experi­ ence, moreover, is approached in a specific way, such a way that it legitima­ tizes itself naturally in immediate evidence. As such it offers a unique ground for philosophical inquiry. Its basic condition, however, is to legitimize its validity. In this way it allows a dialogue to unfold among various philosophies of different methodologies and persuasions, so that their basic assumptions and conceptions may be investigated in an objective fashion. That is, instead of comparing concepts, we may go below their differences to seek together what they are meant to grasp. We may in this way come to the things them­ selves, which are the common objective of all philosophy, or what the great Chinese philosopher Wang Yang Ming called "the investigation of things". It is in this spirit that the Institute's programs include a "cross-cultural" dialogue meant to bring about a profound communication among philosophers in their deepest concerns. Rising above artificial cultural confinements, such dialogues bring scholars, thinkers and human beings together toward a truly human community of minds. Our Institute unfolds one consistent academic program.

Abstract: I Linguistic Preliminaries -- II Actives and Passives -- III Reference -- IV Coherence -- V Hypostasis -- VI Knowledge -- VII Knowing How -- VIIII Various Uses -- IX Conditions -- X A Position to Know -- XI Analysis -- XII Skepticism -- XIII A Safe Position -- XIV Demons, Angels and Miracles -- XV Risk and Gravity -- Kreb’s Epilogue -- Notes.

Abstract: THIS ESSAY was begun a long time ago, in 1962, when I spent a year in Rome on a Guggenheim Fellowship. That twenty one years were required to complete it is owing both to the character of the theory presented and to my peculiar habits of mind. The theory presented is a coherence theory of knowledge: the con­ ception of coherence is here dominant and pervasive. But considera­ tions of coherence dictate an attention to details. The fact of the matter is that I get hung up on details: everything must fit, and if it does not, I do not want to proceed. A second difficulty was that all the epistemological issues seemed too clear. That may sound weird, but that's the way it is. I write philosophy to make things clear to myself. If, rightly or wrongly, I think I know the answer to a question, I can't bring myself to write it down. What happened, in this case, is that I finally became persuaded, in the course of lecturing on epistemology to under­ graduates, that not everything was as clear as it should be, that there were gaps in my presentation that were seriously in need of filling.

Abstract: 1. The Nature of Science -- 2. How is Philosophy Possible as a Science? -- 3. Notes on Popper as Follower of Whewell and Peirce -- 4. The Evolution of Knowledge -- 5. Scientific Progress -- 6. The Growth of Theories: Comments on the Structuralist Approach -- 7. Truthlikeness, Realism, and Progressive Theory-Change -- 8. The Growth of Knowledge in Mathematics -- 9. Realism, Worldmaking, and the Social Sciences -- 10. Finalization, Applied Science, and Science Policy -- 11. Paradigms and Problem-Solving in Operations Research -- 12. Remarks on Technological Progress -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This collection brings together several essays which have been written between the years 197 5 and 1983. During that period I have been occupied with the attempt to find a satisfactory explicate for the notion of tnithlike­ ness or verisimilitude. The technical results of this search have partly appeared elsewhere, and I am also working on a systematic presentation of them in a companion volume to this book: Truthlikeness (forthcoming hopefully in 1985). The essays collected in this book are less formal and more philos­ ophical: they all explore various aspects of the idea that progress in science is associated with an increase in the truthlikeness of its results. Even though they do not exhaust the problem area of scientific change, together they constitute a step in the direction which I find most promising in the defence of critical scientific realism. * Chapter 1 appeared originally in Finnish as the opening article of a new journal Tiede 2000 (no. 1 I 1980) - a Finnish counterpart to journals such as Science and Scientific American. This explains its programmatic character. It tries to give a compact answer to the question 'What is science?', and serves therefore as an introduction to the problem area of the later chapters. Chapter 2 is a revised translation of my inaugural lecture for the chair of Theoretical Philosophy in the University of Helsinki on April 8, 1981. It appeared in Finnish inParnasso 31 (1981), pp.

Abstract: One / Epistemological Foundations of the Dialectical Theory of Meaning -- I. General Logical Problems of Constructing a Theory of Meaning -- II. Categories of Objective Reality -- III. Symbols -- IV. Objective Experience -- V. Concepts and Other Categories of Thought -- Two / Analysis of Meaning -- VI. Meaning as a Complex of Relationships -- VII. Mental Meaning -- VIII. Objective Meaning -- IX. Linguistic Meaning -- X. Practical Meaning -- Three / Meaning and Communication -- XI. The Genesis of Signs and Meaning -- XII. General Definition of Meaning: The Interrelationships of the Individual Dimensions of Meaning -- XIII. Conditions of Effective Communication -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This prize monograph was a pioneering work among Marxist philosophers, East and West, twenty-five years ago. To our mind, the work would have been received with respect and pleasure by philosophers of many viewpoints if it had been known abroad then. Now, revised for this English-language editiJn by our dear and honored colleague Mihailo Markovic, it is still admirable, still the insightful and stimulating accomplishment of a pioneering philosophical and scientific mind, still resonating to the three themes of technical mastery, humane purpose, political critique. Markovic has always worked with the scientific and the humanist disci­ plines inseparably, a faithful as well as a creative man oflate twentieth century thOUght. Reasoning is to be studied as any other object of investigation would be: empirically, theoretically, psychologically, historically, imaginatively. But the entry is often through the study of meaning, in language and in life. In his splendid guide into the work before us, his Introduction, Markovic shows his remarkable ability as the teacher, motivating, clarifying, sketching the whole, illuminating the detail, Critically situating the problem within a practical understanding of the tool oflanguage.

Abstract: Creativity and Criticism in Science and Politics -- The Social Base of Scientific Theory and Practice -- Transcendental Realism and Rational Heuristics: Critical Rationalism and the Problem of Method -- How to Accept Fallible Test Statements? Popper’s Criticist Solution -- Logical Strength and Demarcation -- Xenophanes: A Forerunner of Critical Rationalism? -- The Social Roots of Modern Egalitarianism -- Explication and Implications of the Placebo Concept -- Analytic and Synthetic Philosophy -- Ethical Problems in Science Communication -- A Philosophical Conception of Finality in Biology -- The Justification of Scientific Progress -- Against Induction: One of Many Arguments -- The Problem of Ideology and Critical Rationalism -- Poincaré versus Le Roy on Incommensurability -- On Early Forms of Critical Rationalism -- Gerard Radnitzky: From Positivism, via Critical Theory, to Critical Rationalism -- Notes on Contributors -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This remarkable collection of essays, diverse but united by the theme of critical reasoning, testifies to the attention and respect paid by the authors to the philosophical career of Gerard Radnitzky. We, too, greet Professor Radnitzky for his decades of intellectual labor devoted to the establishment of rational analysis of human problems. Not least of his concerns has been to understand what it is to be rational, to disentangle the apparently rational and the genuine, to separate dogma from justified belief, to cherish imagination while seeking its test. If Radnitzky has long been known for his careful elaboration of the spectrum of modem approaches to epistemology, those who have gathered to celebrate his work in this volume will also be widely known for their own writings on this matter of critical methodology. Their signposts (or are they warning lights?) will be familiar to thoughtful philosophers and scientists, and they appear as queries as we read these papers: the rational heuristic and the irrational heuristic? accepting the fallible? differing societies but one rational cognitive practice? accepting evidence which is placebogenic? choosing among the incommensurables? what remains of the logic of demarcation? purpose in nature? progress of science? rationality in politics? a humane reasonableness and a critical rationalism? Gunnar Andersson sets the focus well for the reader. We need not choose between dogmatism and relativism, he argues. And then he tells the political lesson: we might avoid both anarchy and despotism.

Abstract: Physical Theory and Experiment -- Two Dogmas of Empiricism -- Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes -- Some Fundamental Problems in the Logic of Scientific Discovery -- Background Knowledge and Scientific Growth -- The Duhemian Argument -- A Comment on Grünbaum’s Claim -- Scientific Revolutions as Changes of World View -- Grünbaum on ‘The Duhemian Argument’ -- Quine, Grünbaum, and the Duhemian Thesis -- Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification -- Duhem, Quine and a New Empiricism -- Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes -- Is it never Possible to Falsify a Hypothesis Irrevocably? -- The Rationality of Science (From‘Against Method’) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex­ perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'crucial experiments' provide supporting empiri­ cal evidence for one theory while providing conclusive evidence against another. However, in 1906 Pierre Duhem argued that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambiguous and therefore that there are no crucial experiments; one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than auxiliary or background hypotheses which experiment has falsified. w. V. Quine has concurred in this judgment, arguing that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi­ vidually but only as a corporate body". Some philosophers have thought that the Duhem-Quine thesis gra­ tuitously raises perplexities. Others see it as doubly significant; these philosophers think that it provides a base for criticism of the foundational view of knowledge which has dominated much of western thought since Descartes, and they think that it opens the door to a new and fruitful way to conceive of scientific progress in particular and of the nature and growth of knowledge in general.

Abstract: I: Introduction -- 1. The Object of this Study -- 2. The Significance of this Study -- 3. Some Difficulties -- 4. On Method -- 5. The Questions -- II: First Historical Approach: Positivism and Neopositivism -- 1. The Notion of Positivism -- 2. The History of Early Positivism (pre-1921) -- 3. The History of Neopositivism (post-1921) -- III: Second Historical Approach: Notions of Philosophy and Relationships to Positivism in Marx, Engels and the Earlier Soviet Philosophers (up to World War II) -- l.Marx -- 2. Engels -- 3. Lenin -- 4. From Lenin to Stalinism -- IV: The Soviet Critique of Neopositivism -- 1. Systematic Background -- 2. Historical Background -- 3. Igor Sergeevi? Narskij -- 4. Vladimir Sergeevi? Švyrev -- 5. Pavel Vasil’evi? Kopnin -- 6. Various other Soviet Authors -- 7. Outcome -- V: Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The nrst of the people to be thanked for their help during the composition of this work is Professor I.M. Bochenski, under whom I had the good fortune to study for an extended period of time. Without his help, it is doubtful that this work would have been writt"l1 at all. Among the other professors who helped along the way, I would like to cite in particular Professors A.F. Utz, M.D. Philippe and N. Luyten of the University of Fribourg. Many friends were present at the birth of the ideas contained in this book. By naming K.G. Ballestrem, T.l. Blakeley and M.F. Gagern, I do not want to slight any of the rest. It was A. Spiekermann in Hollinghofen who saw to it that other preoccupations did not rob me of all the time needed for the study of the subject-matter and to the composition of this treatise. Of particular help in getting sources from the libraries of the world were Miss Lifschitz of the Institute of East-European Studies and Mr. Uldry of the Cantonal Library in Fribourg, Switzerland. Finally, my patient typist, Mrs. Frey in Munster, deserves special mention for her beautiful work.

Abstract: Analytical Table of Contents -- 1: The Theory-ladenness of Observation -- 2: An Examination of Some Arguments and Criteria for Radical Meaning Variance -- 3: The Methodological Undesirability of Adopting a Position of Radical Meaning Variance -- 4: The Comparability of Scientific Theories.

Abstract: In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con­ sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in­ vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace­ ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.

Abstract: I. Islam -- Recommencements de l’algèbre aux XIe et XIIe siècles -- The Influence of Stoic Logic on Al-Ja????’s Legal Theory -- The Beginnings of Islamic Theology -- Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences -- II. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- The Organization of Sciences and the Relations of Cultures in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries -- La nouvelle idée de nature et de savoir scientifique au XIIe siècle -- Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica -- III. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning -- Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist -- Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus’s Discovery in an Era of Change -- Réflexions sur les rapports entre théorie et pratique au moyen âge -- Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Universities: Some Preliminary Comments.

Abstract: 1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux -- References -- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper -- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable -- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation -- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is -- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates -- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions -- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End -- References -- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy -- Notes -- 3. On Novelty -- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General -- II. Science and Truth -- III. Popper’s View of Science -- Notes -- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts -- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81 -- Note -- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism -- 5. Sensationalism -- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge -- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism -- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience -- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense -- 5. Explanation vs. Consent -- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism -- 7. Conclusion -- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis? -- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked? -- II. Can Refutation be Final? -- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated -- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports? -- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection? -- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports? -- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations -- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics -- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science -- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance -- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction -- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem -- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing -- IV. The Need for Constraints is Quite Real -- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses -- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail -- VII. Conclusion -- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement -- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses -- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence -- II. The Conventional Element in Science -- III. Reducing the Conventions -- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses -- V. What is a Mess? -- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism -- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics -- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems -- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated -- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics -- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science -- V. Popper’s Theory of Science -- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways -- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science -- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics -- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks -- Appendix: What is a Natural Law? -- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics -- I. How Do we Select Questions? -- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works -- III.The Literature on Questions -- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions -- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions -- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity -- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions -- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions -- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality -- X.Collingwood in a New Garb -- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician -- Notes -- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences -- Appendix: Reply to Commentators -- 12.The Confusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science -- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom -- Notes -- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology -- I. Kant’s Scandal -- II. Whitehead’s Scandal -- III.The Facts About Induction -- IV.Success and Rationality -- V. The Sociology of Knowledge -- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism -- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution -- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development -- 15. Imperfect Knowledge -- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable -- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error -- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses -- Notes -- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments -- Note -- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism -- 17. Modified Conventionalism -- I. The Problem -- II. Science and Society -- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation -- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited -- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper -- Notes -- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science -- Abstract -- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression -- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science -- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science -- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science -- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions -- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement -- References -- Appendix on Kant -- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason? -- I. Religion and Reason -- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion -- III. Reason and Faith -- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship -- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation -- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation -- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion -- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action -- IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance -- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi -- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion -- Notes -- Appendix on Buber -- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism -- I. The Compleat Agnostic -- II. The Image of Inductive Science -- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance -- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood -- V. Conversion to Autonomism -- VI. The Assured Agnostic -- Index of Works Cited -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: 1 Subject Matter -- 2 Relevance -- 3 The Fate of Hegel Interpretations -- 4 Divisions -- I / Dialectic -- 1 / Dialectic of the Real -- 2 / Positive Dialectic -- 3 / The Subject Matter of Dialectical Philosophy -- II / Dialectic And Metaphysics -- 1 / ‘Metaphysics’ — A Philosophical Discipline -- 2 / Metaphysical Method in General -- 3 / Spinoza and Double Negation -- III / Dialectical Metaphysics -- 1 / Infinity -- 2 / Absolute Necessity -- 3 / Being is Thought -- Summary -- Epilogue / Hegel’s Dialectic and Contemporary Issues -- 1 Analytic and Dialectic -- 2 The Sublation of Hegel’s Dialectic -- 2.1 First Reversion -- 2.2 Second Reversion -- 2.3 Third Reversion -- 2.4 Fourth Reversion -- Concerning Notes And Abbreviations -- Notes -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This book was written in 1968, and defended as a doctoral dissertation before the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1969. It treats of the systematic views of Hegel which led him to give to the princi­ ple of non-contradiction, the principle of double negation, and the principle of excluded middle, meanings which are difficult to understand. The reader will look in vain for the philosophical position of the author. A few words about the intentions which motivated the author to study and clarify Hegel's thought are therefore not out of place. In the early sixties, when occupying myself with the history of Marxist philosophy, I discovered that the representatives of the logical-positivist tra­ dition were not alone in employing a principle of demarcation; that those of the dialectical Marxist tradition were also using such a principle ('self-move­ ment') as a foundation of a scientific philosophy and as a means to delimit unscientific ideas. I aimed at a clear conception of this principle in order to be able to judge whether, and to what extent, it accords with the foundations of the analytical method. In this endeavor I encountered two problems: (1) What is to be understood by 'analytical method' cannot be ascertained un­ equivocally.

Abstract: I. The Idea of Philosophy -- I. The Concept of “Something” and of the “Absolute Being” -- II. Solovyev’s “Absolute Being” and Scheler’s “The Eternally Astonishing Roofing of the Abyss of Absolute Nothing” -- III. Summary -- II. Solovyev’s Idea of “Integral Knowledge” and Scheler’s “System of Conformity” -- I. The Meta-Anthropological Aspect -- II. The Historical Aspect -- III. The Epistemological Aspect -- III. The Relation Between Religion and Metaphysics -- I. Typology -- II. The Problems -- IV. Systematic Philosophy -- I. “Organic Logic” -- II. “Organic Metaphysics” -- III. “Organic Ethics” -- IV. The Philosophy of Eros -- V. Special Problems -- I. The Feminist Issue and the Idea of God -- II. On the Question of Influence -- VI. Retrospect -- VII. Russian Philosophy from Solovyev to Shestov — Revision of a Soviet Taboo -- I. The Argument over Russian Philosophy -- II. From Theosophy to Phenomenology -- III. The New Religious Philosophy -- VIII. Soviet Judgement and Criticism of Solovyev -- I. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1 st edition 1947 -- II. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 2nd edition 1957 -- III. Against Contemporary Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophy, 1960 -- IV. History of Russian Philosophy, 1961 -- IX. Soviet Appropriation of Scheler’s Phenomenology -- Notes -- Bibliography — A Summary of the Works by and on Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This comparative study of the works of Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler explores some of the areas in which their thoughts seem to bear a direct relation to one another. The author shows, however, that such a correlation is not based on any factual influence of the earlier Russian on the later philosophy of Scheler. The similarities in their spiritual and philosophical development are significant as the author demonstrates in his chapter on systematic philosophy. This comparison is not just of historical interest. It is meant to contri­ bute to a better understanding between the East and the West. The author provides a basis for future discussions by establishing a common area of inquiry and by demonstrating a convergence of viewpoints already in regard to these problems. The author also discusses the potential role of the ideas of Solovyev and Scheler in the formation of a consciousness which he sees now emerging in the Soviet Union - a consciousness critical of any misrepresentation both of non-Marxist Russian philosophy as well as of Western philosophy in general. In regard to the translation itself, three things should be mentioned. First of all, the distinction between the important German words "Sein" and "Seiendes" is often difficult to preserve in translation. Unless otherwise noted all references to "being" refer to "Seiendes." Second, the abbreviations of the works of Solovyev and Scheler used in the footnotes are clarified in the summary of the works of these authors found on page 31Off. below.

Abstract: The philosophy of biology, some claim, should move to the centre of philosophy of science - a place it has not been accorded since the time of Mach. Physics was the paradigm of science, and its shadow falls across contemporary philosophy of biology in a variety of contexts: reduction, organization and system, biochemical mechanism, and the models of law and explanation which are derived from the Duhem-Popper-Hempel tradition. In this volume, the editors present essays which probe such historical and methodological questions as reducibility, levels of organization, function and teleology, issues emerging from evolutionary theory, and the species problem. The volume offers ample evidence of how good contemporary work in the philosophical understanding of biology has become. The editors aptly combine a deep philosophical appreciation of conceptual issues in biology with an historical understanding of the radical changes in the science of biology since the 19th century

Abstract: I. Radical Empiricism and the Anomalies in the Knowledge of Science -- II. Troubles with the Problem of Demarcation -- III. The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification -- IV. Facts and Theories: Radical Empiricism -- V. Facts and Theories: Conventionalism -- VI. Reformation and Counter-reformation: Paradigms and Research Programs -- VII. Revolutions in Science: The Accumulation of Knowledge and the Correspondence of Theories -- VIII. Revolutions in Science: Science and Philosophy -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Acceptance Revisited -- Cognitive Decision Theory -- A Critique of Epistemic Utilities -- Induction, Consensus, and Catastrophe -- Elements of Induction -- On Sequential Inference -- Cognitive Decisions under Partial Information -- Local and Global Induction -- Hume and the Problem of Local Induction -- A Conspectus of the Neo-Classical Theory of Induction -- Inquiries, Problems, and Questions: Remarks on Local Induction -- On Piecemeal Knowledge-Formation -- Confirmation, Explanation, and the Paradoxes of Transitivity -- A Selected Bibliography of Local Induction -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The local justification of beliefs and hypotheses has recently become a major concern for epistemologists and philosophers of induction. As such, the problem of local justification is not entirely new. Most pragmatists had addressed themselves to it, and so did, to some extent, many classical inductivists in the Bacon-Whewell-Mill tradition. In the last few decades, however, the use of logic and semantics, probability calculus, statistical methods, and decision-theoretic concepts in the reconstruction of in­ ductive inference has revealed some important technical respects in which inductive justification can be local: the choice of a language, with its syntactic and semantic features, the relativity of probabilistic evalua­ tions to an initial body of evidence or background knowledge and to an agent's utilities and preferences, etc. Some paradoxes and difficulties encountered by purely formal accounts of inductive justification, the erosion of the once dominant empiricist position, which most approaches to induction took for granted, and the increasing challenge of noninduc­ tivist epistemolgies have underscored the need of accounting for the methodological problems of applying inductive logic to real life contexts, particularly in science. As a result, in the late fifties and sixties, several related developments pointed to a new, local approach to inductive justification.

Abstract: The Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1936) -- The Logic of Complementarity and the Foundation of Quantum Theory (1972) -- Mathematics as Logical Syntax — A Method to Formalize the Language of a Physical Theory (1937–38) -- Three-Valued Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1944) -- Three-Valued Logic (1957) -- Reichenbach’s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1958) -- Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space (1957) -- The Logic of Propositions Which are not Simultaneously Decidable (1960) -- Baer *-Semigroups (1960) -- Axioms for Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics (1961) -- Probability in Physics and a Theorem on Simultaneous Observability (1962) -- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories (1963) -- The Structure of the Propositional Calculus of a Physical Theory (1964) -- Boolean Embeddings of Orthomodular Sets and Quantum Logic (1965) -- Logical Structures Arising in Quantum Theory (1965) -- The Calculus of Partial Propositional Functions (1965) -- The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Logics Appropriate to Empirical Theories (1965) -- The Probabilistic Argument for a Non-Classical Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1966) -- Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Baer *-Semigroups and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- Semimodularity and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- On the Structure of Quantum Logic (1969) -- On the Structure of Quantal Proposition Systems (1969) -- The Current Interest in Orthomodular Lattices (1970) -- Integration Theory of Observables (1970) -- Probabilistic Formulation of Classical Mechanics (1970) -- Atomicity and Determinism in Boolean Systems (1971) -- Survey of General Quantum Physics (1972) -- Quantum Logics (1974) -- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logics (1974).

Abstract: The twentieth century has witnessed a striking transformation in the un­ derstanding of the theories of mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are significantly characterized by their abstract mathematical structure. This is in opposition to the tradi­ tional opinion that one should look to the specific applications of a theory in order to understand it. One might with reason now espouse the view that to understand the deeper character of a theory one must know its abstract structure and understand the significance of that struc­ ture, while to understand how a theory might be modified in light of its experimental inadequacies one must be intimately acquainted with how it is applied. Quantum theory itself has gone through a development this century which illustrates strikingly the shifting perspective. From a collection of intuitive physical maneuvers under Bohr, through a formative stage in which the mathematical framework was bifurcated (between Schrödinger and Heisenberg) to an elegant culmination in von Neumann's Hilbert space formulation the elementary theory moved, flanked even at the later stage by the ill-understood formalisms for the relativistic version and for the field-theoretic altemative; after that we have a gradual, but constant, elaboration of all these quantal theories as abstract mathematical struc­ tures (their point of departure being von Neumann's formalism) until at the present time theoretical work is heavily preoccupied with the manip­ ulation of purely abstract structures.

Abstract: Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals -- Incomplete Descriptions in the Language of Probability Theory -- A Computational Complexity Viewpoint on the Stability of Relative Frequency and on Stochastic Independence -- A Logic for Subjective Belief -- Discussion -- Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals -- Letter by Robert Stalnaker to W. L. Harper -- Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change (A Response to Stalnaker) -- Toward an Optimization Procedure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics -- Simplicity -- Discussion -- Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference -- Discussion -- Probabilities of Conditionals -- Discussion -- Letter by Stalnaker to Van Fraassen -- Letter by Van Fraassen to Stalnaker.

Abstract: In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.