Abstract: Dispositions and Definitions -- Counterfactuals and Dispositions -- Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic -- In Defense of Dispositions -- Dispositions Revisited -- Dispositions, Grounds, and Causes -- Some Ways of Operationally Introducing Dispositional Predicates with Regard to Scientific and Ordinary Practice -- Dispositional Explanation -- Universals and Dispositions -- Disposition -- A World of Dispositions -- Capacities and Natures -- Powers -- Notes on the Doctrine of Chances -- The Propensity Interpretation of Probability -- Dispositional Probabilities -- Propensities and Probabilities -- Subjunctives, Dispositions, and Chances -- Dispositions and Occurrences -- Dispositions, Occurrences, and Ontology -- Belief and Disposition -- Beliefs as States -- Dispositions, Realism, and Explanation -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis­ positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. I have tried to make the collection as representative as possible, except that problems specifically connected with dispositions in various special sciences are relatively little discussed. Most of these articles have been previously published. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time, and are simultaneously published in Synthese 34, No. 4, which is a special issue on dispositions. Of the previously published material it should be emphasized that the papers by Hempel and Fisk have been extensively revised specially for this anthology. The papers are grouped in four sections, partlyon the basis of their content. However, due to the complexity of the issues involved, there is considerable overlap in content between the different sections, especially between Sections land 11. I wish to thank Professors James Fetzer and Carl G. Hempel for helpful advicc in compiling this anthology.

Abstract: Objective Criteria of Scientific Progress? Inductivism, Falsificationism, and Relativism -- I: The LSE Position -- The Popperian Approach to Scientific Knowledge -- The Ways in Which the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes Improves on Popper’s Methodology -- ‘Crucial’ Experiments: A Case Study -- The Objective Promise of a Research Programme -- II: Reflections on the LSE Position -- Popper vs Inductivism -- In Defence of Aristotle: Comments on the Condition of Content Increase -- Evidential Support, Falsification, Heuristics, and Anarchism -- Science and the Search for Truth -- Philosophy of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions -- Towards a New Theory of Scientific Inquiry -- Some Critical Comments on Current Popperianism on the Basis of a Theory of System Sets -- The Problem of Verisimilitude -- Objectivism vs Sociologism -- III: The LSE Reply -- Research Programmes, Empirical Support, and the Duhem Problem: Replies to Criticism -- Corroboration and the Problem of Content-Comparison -- Unified Bibliography for Parts I And III -- IV: Two Brief Rejoinders -- The Gong Show — Popperian Style -- Reply to Watkins -- Biographical Notes -- Author Index.

Abstract: This collection of essays has evolved through the co-operative efforts, which began in the fall of 1974, of the participants in a workshop sponsored by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. The idea of holding one or more small colloquia devoted to the topics of rational choice in science and scientific progress originated in a conversation in the summer of 1973 between one of the editors (GR) and the late Imre Lakatos. Unfortunately Lakatos himself was never able to see this project through, but his thought-provoking methodology of scientific research programmes was ably expounded and defended by his successors. Indeed, this volume continues and deepens the debate inaugurated in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave), a book which grew out of a conference held in 1965. That debate has continued during the years that have passed since that conference. The group of discussions about the place of rationality in science which have been held between those who emphasize the history of science (with Feyerabend and Kuhn as the most prominent exponents) and the critical rationalists (Popper and his followers), with Imre Lakatos defending a middle ground, these discussions were seen by almost all commentators as the most important event in the philosophy of science in the last decade. This problem area constituted the central theme of our Thyssen workshop. The workshop operated in the following manner.

Abstract: Policy-Formation with Issue-Processing and Transformation of Issues -- A Diagrammatic Exposition of the Logic of Collective Action -- Decision-Theoretic Analysis of Rawls’ Original Position -- The Social Contract: Individual Decision or Collective Bargain? -- On Relating Individual and Social Decisions -- Distributive Justice -- Toward a Theory of Sociality -- Evolution and Fine-Grained Environmental Runs -- Power in Electoral Games -- Index of Names.

Abstract: 1. INTRODUCTION In the Spring of 1975 we held an international workshop on the Foundations and Application of Decision Theory at the University of Western Ontario. To help structure the workshop into ordered and manageable sessions we distri­ buted the following statement of our goals to all invited participants. They in turn responded with useful revisions and suggested their own areas of interest. Since this procedure provided the eventual format of the sessions, we include it here as the most appropriate introduction to these collected papers result­ ing from the workshop. The reader can readily gauge the approximation to our mutual goals. 2. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE (Attached to this statement is a bibliography; names of persons cited in the statement and writing in this century will be found referenced in the biblio­ graphy - certain 'classics' aSide. ) 2. 1. Preamble We understand in the following the Theory of Decisions in a broader sense than is presently customary, construing it to embrace a general theory of decision-making, including social, political and economic theory and applica­ tions. Thus, we subsume the Theory of Games under the head of Decision Theory, regarding it as a particularly clearly formulated version of part of the general theory of decision-making.

Abstract: The ‘Tracing Procedure’ and a Theory of Rational Interaction -- Variety Among Hierarchies of Preference -- Conflict and Structure in Multi-Level Multiple Objective Decision-Making systems -- Inadequacies in the Decision Analysis Model of Rationality -- Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility -- Coordination Theory -- A Piagetian Approach to Decision and Game Theory -- Axiomatizing the Logic of Decision -- On Indeterminate Probabilities -- Irrelevance -- On a Decision Theoretic Method for Social Decisions -- Consensus and Comparison: A Theory of Social Rationality -- Conjoint Measurement: A Brief Survey -- The Minimax Theory and Expected-Utility Reasoning -- Newcomb’s Many Problems -- Newcomb’s Problem, Dominance and Expected Utility -- The Copernican Revelation -- Prolegomena to a Theory of Rational Motives -- Index of Names.

Abstract: 1. INTRODUCTION In the Spring of 1975 we held an international workshop on the Foundations and Application of Decision Theory at the University of Western Ontario. To help structure the workshop into ordered and manageable sessions we distri­ buted the following statement of our goals to all invited participants. They in turn responded with useful revisions and suggested their own areas of interest. Since this procedure provided the eventual format of the sessions, we include it here as the most appropriate introduction to these collected papers result­ ing from the workshop. The reader can readily gauge the approximation to our mutual goals. 2. STATEMENT or OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE (Attached to this statement is a bibliography; names of persons cited in the statement and writing in this century will be found referenced in the biblio­ graphy - certain 'classics' aside. ) 2. 1. Preamble We understand in the following the Theory of Decisions in a broader sense than is presently customary, construing it to embrace a general theory of deciSion-making, induding social, political and economic theory and applica­ tions. Thus, we subsume the Theory of Games under the head of Decision Theory, regarding it as a particularly clearly formulated version of part of the general theory of decision-making.

Abstract: I Proof Theory -- Some Facts from the Theory of Proofs and Some Fictions from General Proof Theory -- Proofs and the Meaning and Completeness of the Logical Constants -- Theory of Quantification and ‰-calculi -- Two Kinds of Extensions of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic -- Equality in the Presence of Apartness -- II Infinitary Languages -- Game-Theoretical Semantics and Back-and-Forth -- Infinitary Languages N?? and Generalized Partial Isomorphisms -- III Set Theory and Model Theory -- Generalizing Set-Theoretical Model Theory and an Analogue Theory on Admissible Sets -- Hierarchies of Model Theoretic Definability — An Approach to Second Order Logics -- Open Problems in the Theory of Ultrafilters -- IV Generalized Quantifiers -- The Reals Cannot Be Characterized Topologically with Strictly Local Properties and Countability Axioms -- On the Expressive Power of the Language Using the Henkin Quantifier -- Remarks on Free Quantifier Variables -- V Recursion Theory -- Recursion in 3E and a Splitting Theorem -- Retracts of Post’s Numbering and Effectivization of Quantifiers -- VI Logic and Natural Language -- Quantifiers in Natural Languages: Some Logical Problems, I -- Models for Natural Languages -- Backwards-Looking Operators in Tense Logic and in Natural Language -- VII Philosophical Logic -- Paradoxes in a Semantic Perspective -- Hintikka’s Possible Worlds and Rigid Designators -- On the Content Analysis of Two Normative Notions -- Singular Terms, Existence and Truth: Some Remarks on a First Order Logic of Existence -- VIII Truthlikeness -- On Distance From the Truth as a True Distance -- Truthlikeness in First-Order Languages -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fourth Scandinavian Logic Symposium and the First Soviet-Finnish Logic Conference were held in JyvaskyIa, Finland, June 29-July 6, 1976. The Conferences were organized by a committee which consisted of the editors of the present volume. The Conferences were supported financially by the Ministry of Education of Finland, by the Academy of Finland, and by the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History of Science. The Philosophical Society of Finland and the Jyvaskyla Summer Festival gave valuable help in various practicalities. 35 papers by authors representing 10 countries were presented at the two meetings. Of those papers 24 appear here. THE EDITORS v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v PART 1/ PROOF THEORY GEORG KREISEL / Some Facts from the Theory of Proofs and Some Fictions from General Proof Theory 3 DAG PRAWITZ / Proofs and the Meaning and Completeness of the Logical Constants 25 v. A. SMIRNOV / Theory of Quantification and tff-calculi 41 LARS SVENONIUS/Two Kinds of Extensions of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic 49 DIRK VAN DALEN and R. STATMAN / Equality in the Presence of Apartness 95 PART II / INFINITARY LANGUAGES VEIKKO RANTALA / Game-Theoretical Semantics and Back-and- Forth 119 MAARET KAR TTUNEN / Infinitary Languages N oo~.

Abstract: One: Attributes -- One/Attribute-Agreement and the Problem of Universals -- Two/Predication and Universals -- Three/Resemblance and Universals -- Four/Abstract Reference and Universals -- Five/Towards A Realistic Ontology -- Two: Substances -- Six/Two theories of substance -- Seven/The Bundle Theory -- Eight/Bare Substrata -- Nine/Towards A Substance-Theory Of Substance -- Epilogue -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: In this book I address a dichotomy that is as central as any in ontology - that between ordinary objects or substances and the various attributes (Le. , properties, kinds, and relations) we associate with them. My aim is to arrive at the correct philosophical account of each member of the dichotomy. What I shall argue is that the various attempts to understand substances or attri­ butes in reductive terms fail. Talk about attributes, I shall try to show, is just that - talk about attributes; and, likewise, talk about substances is just tha- talk about substances. The result is what many will find a strange combina­ tion of views - a Platonistic theory of attributes, where attributes are univer­ sals or multiply exemplifiable entities whose existence is independent of "the world of flux", and an Aristotelian theory of substance, where substances are basic unities not reducible to metaphysically more fundamental kinds of things. Part One is concerned with the ontology of attributes. After distinguishing three different patterns of metaphysical thinking about attributes, I examine, in turn, the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and higher order quanti­ fication. I argue that none of these phenomena by itself is sufficient to establish the inescapability of a Platonistic interpretation of attributes. Then, I discuss the phenomenon of abstract reference as it is exhibited in the use of abstract singular terms.

Abstract: Division One / A Program in the Philosophy of Technology -- 1. The Experience of Technology: Human-Machine Relations -- 2. A Phenomenology of Instrumentation: Perception Transformed -- 3. A Phenomenology of Instrumentation: The Instrument as Mediator -- 4. A Phenomenology of Instrumentation: Technics and Telos -- Division Two / Implications of Technology -- 5. The Existential Import of Computer Technology -- 6. Technology and the Transformation of Experience -- 7. Vision and Objectification -- 8. Bach to Rock, a Musical Odyssey -- Division Three / Pioneers in the Philosophy of Technology -- 9. Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology -- 10. Technology and the Human: Hans Jonas -- 11. The Secular City and the Existentialists -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Depending on how one construes the kinship relations, technology has been either the stepchild of philosophy or its grandfather. In either case, technology has not been taken into the bosom of the family, but has had to wait for attention, care and feeding, while the more unclear elements - science, art, politics, ethics - were being nurtured (or cleaned up). Don Ihde puts technology in the middle of things, and develops a philosophy of technology that is at once distinctive, revealing and thought­ provoking. Typically, philosophy of technology has existed at, or beyond, the margins of the philosophy of science, and therefore the question of technology has come to be posed (when it is) either by historians of technology or by social critics. The philosophy of technology, as analysis and critique of the concepts, methodologies, implicit epistemologies and ontologies of technological praxis and thought, has remained underdeveloped. When philosophy does turn its attention to the insistent presence of technology, it inevitably casts the question in one or another of the dominant modes of philosophical interpretation and reconstruction. Thus, the logic of technological thinking and practice has been a subject of some systematic work (e. g. , in the Praxiology of Kotarbinski and Kotarbinska, among others). And the question of technology's relation to science has been posed in the framework of the nomological model of explanation in the sciences - e. g.

Abstract: 1 / The Hilbert Space Formulation of Quantum Physics -- 1.1 The Hilbert Space -- 1.2 The Lattice of Subspaces of Hilbert Space -- 1.3 Projection Operators -- 1.4 States and Properties of a Physical System -- 2 / The Logical Interpretation of the Lattice Lq -- 2.1 The Quasimodular Lattice Lq -- 2.2 The Relation of Commensurability -- 2.3 The Material Quasi-implication -- 2.4 The Relation between Lattice Theory and Logic -- 3 / The Material Propositions of Quantum Physics -- 3.1 Elements of a Language of Quantum Physics -- 3.2 Argument-rules for Compound Propositions -- 3.3 Commensurability and Incommensurability -- 3.4 The Material Dialog-game -- 4 / The Calculus of Effective Quantum Logic -- 4.1 Formally True Propositions -- 4.2 Formal Dialogs with Material Commensurabilities -- 4.3 The Formal Dialog-game -- 4.4 The Calculus Qeff of Effective Quantum Logic -- 5 / The Lattice of Effective Quantum Logic -- 5.1 The Quasi-implicative Lattice Lqi -- 5.2 Properties of the Lattice Lqi -- 5.3 The Relation between Lqi and the Lattice Li -- 5.4 The Relation between Lqi and the Lattice Lq -- 6 / The Calculus of Full Quantum Logic -- 6.1 Value-definite Material Propositions -- 6.2 The Value-definiteness of Compound Propositions -- 6.3 The Extension of the Calculus Qeff -- 6.4 The Principle of Excluded Middle -- Concluding Remarks: Classical Logic and Quantum Logic.

Abstract: In 1936, G. Birkhoff and J. v. Neumann published an article with the title The logic of quantum mechanics'. In this paper, the authors demonstrated that in quantum mechanics the most simple observables which correspond to yes-no propositions about a quantum physical system constitute an algebraic structure, the most important proper­ ties of which are given by an orthocomplemented and quasimodular lattice Lq. Furthermore, this lattice of quantum mechanical proposi­ tions has, from a formal point of view, many similarities with a Boolean lattice L8 which is known to be the lattice of classical propositional logic. Therefore, one could conjecture that due to the algebraic structure of quantum mechanical observables a logical calculus Q of quantum mechanical propositions is established, which is slightly different from the calculus L of classical propositional logic but which is applicable to all quantum mechanical propositions (C. F. v. Weizsacker, 1955). This calculus has sometimes been called 'quan­ tum logic'. However, the statement that propositions about quantum physical systems are governed by the laws of quantum logic, which differ from ordinary classical logic and which are based on the empirically well-established quantum theory, is exposed to two serious objec­ tions: (a) Logic is a theory which deals with those relationships between various propositions that are valid independent of the content of the respective propositions. Thus, the validity of logical relationships is not restricted to a special type of proposition, e. g. to propositions about classical physical systems.

Abstract: I. Semantics of Natural Language -- Grammar and Meaning -- Sense and Science -- Variable-Free Semantics for Negations with Prosodic Variation -- Informational Independence in Tntensional Context -- II. Mathematical Logic -- A Note on Distributive Normal Forms -- On the Metaphysics of the Real Line -- A Generalization of the Infinitely Deep Languages of Hintikka and Rantala -- III. Applications of Formal Methods -- On the Possibilities of Information Evaluation of Graphical Communications -- On Formal Aspects of Distributive Justice -- Some Reflections on Method in the Theory of Social Choice -- IV. Philosophical Logic -- A Problem about Permission -- Possible Worlds and Formal Semantics -- Continuity and Similarity in Cross-Identification -- V. Epistemology -- Serious Possibility -- On Knowing, Knowing that One Knows and Consciousness -- Knowing that One Sees -- VI. Philosophical Aesthetics -- Anything Viewed -- VII. History of Philosophy -- The ‘Master Argument’ of Diodorus -- Plato in infinitum remisse incipit esse albus -- A Problem for Kant -- Subjects, Predicates, Isomorphic Representation, and Language Games -- Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of Actions in the Constitution of the World -- Index of Names -- Tabula Gratulatoria.

Abstract: Jaakko Hintikka was born on January 12th, 1929. He received his doctorate from the University of Helsinki under the supervision of Professor G. H. von Wright at the age of 24 in 1953. Hintikka was appointed Professor of philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1959. Since the late 50s, he has shared his time between Finland and the U.S.A. He was appointed Professor of philosophy at Stanford University in 1964. As from 1970 Hintikka has been permanent research professor of the Academy of Finland. He has published 13 books and about 200 articles, not to mention the various editorial and organizational activities he has played an active role in. The present collection of essays has been edited to honour Jaakko Hintikka on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday. By dedicating a Festschrift to Jaakko Hintikka, the contributors wish to pay homage to this remarkable man whom they see not only as a scholar of prodigious energy and insight, but as a friend, colleague and former teacher. The contributors hope the essays collected here will bring pleasure to the man they are intended to honour. All of the essays touch upon topics Hintikka has taken an direct or indirect interest in, ranging from technical problems of mathematical logic and applications of formal methods through philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and history of philosophy to philosophical aesthetics.

Abstract: Memories of Hans Reichenbach -- 1. Autobiographical Sketches for Academic Purposes -- 2. Memories of Wendeli Erné, Hans Reichenbach’s Sister -- 3. At the End of School Days: A Look Backward and a Look Forward (1909) -- 4. Letter from Reichenbach to His Four Years Older Brother Bernhard -- 5. From a letter of Bernhard Reichenbach to Maria Reichenbach (1975) -- 6. Memories of Ilse Reichenbach, Hans Reichenbach’s Sister-in-Law -- 7. Memories of Uncle Hans: Nino Erné -- 8. Hans’ Speech at the Funeral of His Father -- 9. Aphorisms of a Docent Formally Admitted to Teach at a University (1924) -- 10. University Student: Carl Landauer -- 11. University Student: Hilde Landauer -- 12. Memories of Hans Reichenbach, 1928 and Later: Sidney Hook -- 13. A Young University Teacher [from a letter of Carl Hempel to Maria Reichenbach, March 21, 1976] -- 14. A Professor in Turkey, 1936: Memories of Matild Kamber -- 15. Concerning Reichenbach’s Appointment to the University of California at Los Angeles: Charles Morris -- 16. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Rudolf Carnap -- 17. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Herbert Feigl -- 18. Recollections of Hans Reichenbach: Ernest Nagel -- 19. U.C.L.A.: Donald Kalish -- 20. U.C.L.A.: Paul Wienpahl -- 21. U.C.L.A.: Norman Dalkey -- 22. U.C.L.A.: Hermann F. Schott -- 23. A Blind Student Recalls Hans Reichcnbach: H. G. Burns -- 24. Recollections of Hans Reichenbach: David Brunswick -- 25. U.C.L.A., 1945–1950: Cynthia Schuster -- 26. U.C.L.A., 1949: W. Bruce Taylor -- 27. 1950: Donald A.Wells -- 28. U.C.L.A., 1951–53: Ruth Anna Putnam -- 29. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Frank Leroi -- 30. Hans Reichenbach’s Definitive Influence on Me: Adolf Grünbaum -- 31. At the Chapel, 1953: Abraham Kaplan -- 32. Hans Reichenbach, a Memoir: Wesley C. Salmon -- 33. Memories of Hans Reichenbach: Maria Reichenbach -- I / Early Writings on Social Problems -- Student Years: Introductory Note to Part I (M.R.) -- 1. The Student (1912–13) -- 2. The Student Body and Catholicism (1912) -- 3. The Free Student Idea: Its Unified Contents (1913) -- 4. Why do we Advocate Physical Culture? (1913) -- 5. The Meaning of University Reform (1914) -- 6. Platform of the Socialist Students’ Party (1918) -- 7. Socializing the University (1918) -- 8. Report of the Socialist Student Party, Berlin and Notes on the Program (1918) -- II / Popular Scientific Articles -- 9. The Nobel Prize for Einstein (1922) -- 10. Relativity Theory in a Matchbox: A Philosophical Dialogue (1922) -- 11. Tycho Brahe’s Sextants (1926) -- 12. The Effects of Einstein’s Theory (1926) -- 13. An Open Letter to the Berlin Funkstunde Corporation (1926) -- 14. Laying the Foundations of Chemistry: The Work of Marcellin Berthelot (1927) -- 15. Memories of Svante Arrhenius (1927) -- 16. A New Model of the Atom (1927) -- 17. On the Death of H. A. Lorentz (1928) -- 18. Philosophy of the Natural Sciences (1928) -- 19. Space and Time: From Kant to Einstein (1928) -- 20. Causality or Probability? (1928) -- 21. The World View of the Exact Sciences (1928) -- 22. New Approaches in Science: Physical Research (1929) -- 23. New Approaches in Science: Philosophical Research (1929) -- 24. New Approaches in Science: Mathematical Research (1929) -- 25. The New Philosophy of Science (1929) -- 26. Einstein’s New Theory (1929) -- 27. Johannes Kepler (1930) -- 28. The Present State of the Sciences: The Exact Natural Sciences (1930) -- 29. One Hundred Against Einstein (1931) -- 30. Is the Human Mind Capable of Giange? (An Interview) (1932) -- III / General Scientific Articles -- 31. Metaphysics and Natural Science (1925) -- 32. Bertrand Russell (1929) -- 33. The Philosophical Significance of Modern Physics (1930) -- 34. The Königsberg Conference on the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences (1930) -- 35. The Problem of Causality in Physics (1931) -- 36. The Physical Concept of Truth (1931) -- 37. Heinrich Scholz’History of Logic (1931) -- 38. Aims and Methods of Modern Philosophy of Nature (1931) -- 39. Kant and Natural Science (1933) -- 40. Carnap’sLogical Structure of the World (1933) -- 41. Theory of Series and Gödel’s Theorems (Sections 17–22) (1948) -- IV / Ethical Analysis -- 42. The Freedom of the Will (1959) -- 43. On the Explication of Ethical Utterances (1959) -- Bibliography of Writings of Hans Reichenbach -- Index of Names.

Abstract: These two volumes form a full portrait of Hans Reichenbach, from the school boy and university student to the maturing and creative scholar, who was as well an immensely devoted teacher and a gifted popular writer and speaker on science and philosophy. We selected the articles for several reasons. Many of them have not pre­ viously been available in English; many are out of print, either in English or in German; some, especially the early ones, have been little known, and deal with subject-matters other than philosophy of science. The genesis and evolu­ tion of Reichenbach's ideas appeared to be of deep interest, and so we in­ cluded papers from four decades, despite occasional redundancy. We were, for example, pleased to include his extensive review article from the encyclo­ pedic Handbuch der Physik of 1929 on 'The Aims and Methods of Physical Knowledge', written at a time of creative collaboration between Reichenbach's Berlin group and the Vienna Circle of Schlick and Carnap. Reichenbach was a pioneer, opening new pathways to the solution of age-old problems in many fields: space, time, causality, induction and probability - philosophical analysis and interpretation of classical physics, relativity and quantum physics - logic, language, ethics, scientific explanation and methodology, critical appreciation and reconstruction of past metaphysical thinkers and scientists from Plato to Leibniz and Kant. Indeed, his own philosophical journey was initiated by his passage from Kant to anti-Kant.

Abstract: Process Philosophy and Quantum Dynamics -- Formal Languages and the Foundations of Physics -- Is the Hilbert space language too rich? -- Generalized Quantum Mechanics -- Quantum Logic -- The Operational Approach to Quantum Mechanics -- Completeness of Quantum Logic -- Quantum Logical Calculi and Lattice Structures -- An Operational Approach to Quantum Probability -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: In two earlier volumes, entitled The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quan­ tum Mechanics (hereafter LAA I, II), I have presented collections of research papers which trace out the historical development and contem­ porary flowering of a particular approach to physical theory. One might characterise this approach as the extraction of an abstract logico-algebraic skeleton from each physical theory and the reconstruction of the physical theory as construction of mathematical and interpretive 'flesh' (e. g. , measures, operators, mappings etc. ) on this skeleton. The idea is to show how the specific features of a theory that are easily seen in application (e. g. , 'interference' among observables in quantum mechanics) arise out of the character of its core abstract structure. In this fashion both the deeper nature of a theory (e. g. , in what precise sense quantum mechanics is strongly statistical) and the deeper differences between theories (e. g. clas­ sical mechanics, though also a 'mechanics', is not strongly statistical) are penetratingly illuminated. What I would describe as the 'mainstream' logico-algebraic tradition is captured in these two collections of papers (LAA I, II). The abstract, structural approach to the characterisation of physical theory has been the basis of a striking transformation, in this century, in the understanding of theories in mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are most significantly characterised by their abstract structural components.

Abstract: Galileo’s Scientific Method: a Reexamination -- Some Tactics in Galileo’s Propaganda for the Mathematization of Scientific Experience -- Galileo Galilei and the Doctores Parisienses -- Descartes as Critic of Galileo -- Galileo and the Causes -- Galileo: Causation and the Use of Geometry -- Galileo’s Matter Theory -- The Conception of Science in Galileo’s Work.

Abstract: The essays in this volume (except for the contribution of Dr. Le Grand) are extremely revised versions of papers originally delivered at a workshop on Galileo held in Blacksburg, Virginia in October, 1975. The meeting was organized by Professor Joseph Pitt and sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Religion, The College of Arts and Sciences, and the Division of Research of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The papers that follow deal with problems OIf Galileo's philosophy of science, specific and general problems connected with his methodology, and with historical and conceptual questions concerning the relationship of his work to that of contemporaries and both earlier and later scientists. New perspectives take many forms. In this book the 'newness' has, for the most part, two forms. First, in the papers by Wisan, Shea, Le Grand and Wallace (the concerns will also appear in some of the other contributions), greatly enriched historical discoveries of how Galileo's science and its method­ ology developed are provided. It should be stressed that these papers are attempts to recapture a deep sense of the kind of science Galileo was creating. Other papers in the volume, for example, those by McMullin, Machamer, Butts and Pitt, underscore the importance of this historical venture by discussing various aspects of the philosophical background of Galileo's thought. The historical and philosophical evaluations and analyses compliment one another.

Abstract: I Metascience: Philosophical Analysis of Scientific Truth -- 1 The Problem of Physical Explanation -- 2 Probability and Causality in Quantum Physics -- 3 Meaning and Scientific Status of Causality -- 4 Methodology of Modern Physics -- 5 Metaphysical Elements in Physics -- 6 Is the Mathematical Explanation of Physical Data Unique? -- II Fundamental Problems of 20th Century Physics -- 7 Probability, Many-Valued Logics and Physics -- 8 On the Frequency Theory of Probability -- 9 Can Time Flow Backwards? -- 10 Causality in Quantum Electrodynamics -- 11 Relativity: An Epistemological Appraisal -- 12 Philosophical Problems Concerning the Meaning of Measurement in Physics -- 13 Bacon and Modern Physics: a Confrontation -- III Science and Human Affairs -- 14 Western Culture, Scientific Method and the Problem of Ethics -- 15 Physical versus Historical Reality -- 16 The New View of Man in His Physical Environment -- 17 Science and Human Affairs -- 18 The New Style of Science -- IV Issues Beyond the Boundaries of Present Science -- 19 Phenomenology and Physics -- 20 Physics and Ontology -- 21 Faith and Physics -- 22 Metaethics -- 23 The Pursuit of Significance -- 24 Note on Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness -- 25 Religious Doctrine and Natural Science -- List of Publications.

Abstract: This book is intended for people interested in physics and its philosophy. for those who regard physics as an essential component of modern culture rather than merely a tool for industry or war. Indeed this volume is addressed to those students, teachers and research workers who enjoy learning, teaching or doing physics, and are in the habit of pausing once in a while to ponder over key physical concepts and hypotheses and to wonder whether received theories are as perfect as textbooks would have us believe and, if not, how they might be improved. Henry Margenau, recently retired from Yale University as Eugene Higgins Professor of Physics and Philosophy, is the most important philosopher of physics of his generation, and indeed one of the most eminent philosophers of science of our century. He introduced and elucidated the notion of the correspondence rule. He claimed and showed, in the heyday of positivism, that physics has metaphysical presuppositions. He was the first to realize that quantum mechanics can do without von Neumann's projection postulat- and that was as far back as 1936. He clarified the physics and the philosophy of Pauli's exclusion principle at a time when it seemed mysterious. He was the first physicist to publish a philosophical paper in a physics journal, which he did as early as 1941. He was also one of the rare scientists who proclaimed the need for a scientific approach to value theory and ethics.

Abstract: V / Philosophy of Physics -- 44. The Present State of the Discussion on Relativity (1922) -- 45. The Theory of Motion According to Newton, Leibniz, and Huyghens (1924) -- 46. The Relativistic Theory of Time (1924) -- 47. The Causal Structure of the World and the Difference between Past and Future (1925) -- 48. The Aims and Methods of Physical Knowledge (1929) -- 49. Current Epistemological Problems and the Use of a Three-Valued Logic in Quantum Mechanics (1951) -- 50. The Logical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1952) -- 51. The Philosophical Significance of the Wave-Particle Dualism (1953) -- VI/Probability and Induction -- 52a. The Physical Presuppositions of the Calculus of Probability (1920) -- 52b. Appendix: A Letter to the Editor (1920) -- 53. A Philosophical Critique of the Probability Calculus (1920) -- 54. Notes on the Problem of Causality [A Letter from Erwin, Schrödinger to Hans Reichenbach] (1924) -- 55. Causality and Probability (1930) -- 56. The Principle of Causality and the Possibility of Its Empirical Confirmation (1932) -- 57. Induction and Probability: Remarks on Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935) -- 58. The Semantic and the Object Conceptions of Probability Expressions (1939) -- 59. A Letter to Bertrand Russell (March 28, 1949) -- Bibliography of Writings oF Hans Reichenbach -- Index of Names to Volumes One and Two.

Abstract: I: The Trace Theory of Memory -- One / An Introduction to Trace Theory -- Two / Trace Theory Criticized -- II: Broadening The Attack -- One / Another Problem for Trace Theory -- Two / Stimulus-Response and Information Processing Computer Theories of Memory -- III: Trace Theory as Philosophy -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The subject of the following study is theories of memory. The first part is a study of one broad type of theory which is very widely adhered to at this time. It enjoys great popularity among neuro­ physiologists, neuropsychologists, and, more generally, among scientifically oriented people who have directed their attention to questions about memory. Further, this way of looking at the matter is not confined to scientific professionals. Indeed, we can find popularized versions of the view in magazines like Time and Reader's Digest. So in the first part of the book, I will give a presentation of the view in its general form. The theory will be presented in such a way as to reveal the features which make it tempting, which make it seem to be a very natural way to explain the phenomena of memory. (And, clearly, from the number of adherents the view has won, it is tempting, and it does seem to be to go about explaining memory. ) After setting forth a natural way this generalized version of the theory, I will next present material by various authors who hold this view. This will allow the reader to get some idea of the different forms which the theory (the 'memory trace' or 'engram' theory) takes. The last step is a critic­ ism of the theory. In the second part of the book, the attack on trace theory will be strengthened by a further criticism.

Abstract: The Infinite in Mathematics and its Elimination (1930) -- Preface -- Analytic Table of Contents -- 1. Basic Facts of Cognition -- II. Symbolism and Axiomatics -- III. Natural Number and Set -- IV. Negative Numbers, Fractions and Irrational Numbers -- V. Set Theory -- VI. The Problem of Complete Decidability of Arithmetical Questions -- VII. The Antinomies -- Remarks on the Controversy about the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (1931) -- Questions of Logical Principle in the Investigation of the Foundations of Mathematics (ca. 1931) -- Bibliography of the Published Writings of Felix Kaufman -- Bibliography of Works cited in the Present Volume -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The main item in the present volume was published in 1930 under the title Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung. It was at that time the fullest systematic account from the standpoint of Husserl's phenomenology of what is known as 'finitism' (also as 'intuitionism' and 'constructivism') in mathematics. Since then, important changes have been required in philosophies of mathematics, in part because of Kurt Godel's epoch-making paper of 1931 which established the essential in­ completeness of arithmetic. In the light of that finding, a number of the claims made in the book (and in the accompanying articles) are demon­ strably mistaken. Nevertheless, as a whole it retains much of its original interest and value. It presents the issues in the foundations of mathematics that were under debate when it was written (and in some cases still are); , and it offers one alternative to the currently dominant set-theoretical definitions of the cardinal numbers and other arithmetical concepts. While still a student at the University of Vienna, Felix Kaufmann was greatly impressed by the early philosophical writings (especially by the Logische Untersuchungen) of Edmund Husser!' He was never an uncritical disciple of Husserl, and he integrated into his mature philosophy ideas from a wide assortment of intellectual sources. But he thought of himself as a phenomenologist, and made frequent use in all his major publications of many of Husserl's logical and epistemological theses.

Abstract: Introductory Essay -- Phenomenology and Philosophy in Japan -- I / Present Day Phenomenology in Japan -- Husserl’s Manuscript ‘A Nocturnal Conversation’: His Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity -- The Paradox of the Phenomenological Method -- The Potential Plurality of the Transcendental Ego of Husserl and Its Relevance to the Theory of Space -- Philosophy and Phenomenological Intuition -- Is Time Real? -- Phenomenology and Grammar: A Consideration of the Relation Between Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy -- Phänomenologische Betrachtung vom Begriff der Welt -- Wahrheit und Unwahrheit oder Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit: Eine Bemerkung zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit -- II / Phenomenology in the Japanese Inheritance -- The Kyoto School of Philosophy and Phenomenology -- Affective Feeling -- The Concrete World of Action in Nishida’s Later Thought -- Appendix: Selected Bibliography of the Major Phenomenological Works Translated into Japanese and of the Major Phenomenological Writings by Japanese Authors (Hirotaka Tatematsu) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: 1 / Background -- 1.0.1 Greek Geometry and Philosophy -- 1.0.2 Geometry in Greek Natural Science -- 1.0.3 Modern Science and the Metaphysical Idea of Space -- 1.0.4 Descartes’ Method of Coordinates -- 2 / Non-Euclidean Geometries -- 2.1 Parallels -- 2.2 Manifolds -- 2.3 Projective Geometry and Projective Metrics -- 3 / Foundations -- 3.1 Helmholtz’s Problem of Space -- 3.2 Axiomatics -- 4 / Empiricism, Apriorism, Conventionalism -- 4.1 Empiricism in Geometry -- 4.2 The Uproar of Boeotians -- 4.3 Russell’s Apriorism of 1897 -- 4.4 Henri Poincaré -- 1. Mappings -- 2. Algebraic Structures. Groups -- 3. Topologies -- 4. Differentiable Manifolds -- Notes -- To Chapter 1 -- To Chapter 2 -- 2.1 -- 2.2 -- 2.3 -- To Chapter 3 -- 3.1 -- 3.2 -- To Chapter 4 -- 4.1 -- 4.2 -- 4.3 -- 4.4 -- References.

Abstract: Geometry has fascinated philosophers since the days of Thales and Pythagoras. In the 17th and 18th centuries it provided a paradigm of knowledge after which some thinkers tried to pattern their own metaphysical systems. But after the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries in the 19th century, the nature and scope of geometry became a bone of contention. Philosophical concern with geometry increased in the 1920's after Einstein used Riemannian geometry in his theory of gravitation. During the last fifteen or twenty years, renewed interest in the latter theory -prompted by advances in cosmology -has brought geometry once again to the forefront of philosophical discussion. The issues at stake in the current epistemological debate about geometry can only be understood in the light of history, and, in fact, most recent works on the subject include historical material. In this book, I try to give a selective critical survey of modern philosophy of geometry during its seminal period, which can be said to have begun shortly after 1850 with Riemann's generalized conception of space and to achieve some sort of completion at the turn of the century with Hilbert's axiomatics and Poincare's conventionalism. The philosophy of geometry of Einstein and his contemporaries will be the subject of another book. The book is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides back­ ground information about the history of science and philosophy.

Abstract: On Clear and Obscure Styles of Philosophical Writing -- Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia -- On the Content and Object of Representations -- Actions and Products. Comments on the Border Area of Psychology, Grammar, and Logic -- Issues in the Logic of Adjectives -- A Survey of Logical and Semantic Problems -- The Reistic or Concretistic Approach -- Comments on the Meaning of Words -- The Controversy Over Designata -- Token-reflexive Words Versus Proper Names -- Connotation and Denotation -- Proposition as the Connotation of Sentence -- Intensional Expressions -- Concerning the So-called Empty Names -- Issues in the Philosophy of Proper Names -- Truth and the Concept of Language -- Ambiguity and the Language of Science -- Significano ‘per se’ and ‘per aliud’ in Anselm -- An Analysis of the Concept of Sign -- The Controversy over the Limits of the Applicability of Logical Methods -- Puzzles of Existence -- Vague Words -- Names and Predicates translated by P. T. Geach -- On the Antinomy of the Liar and the Semantics of Natural Language -- Normal and Non-normal Classes in Current Language -- Normal and Non-Normal Classes Versus the Set-Theoretical and the Mereological Concept of Class -- The Semantics of Open Concepts -- Languages and Theories Adequate to the Ontology of the Language of Science -- A Functional Approach to the Logical Semiotics of Natural Language -- The Principle of Transparency and Semantic Antinomies -- The Semantic Functions of Oblique Speech -- The Semantic Conception of Truth in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences translated by Z. Wójcicka -- The Attribute and the Class translated by B. Stanosz -- Analyticity and Apriority -- Sources of the Texts -- Biographical and Bibliographical Notes.

Abstract: In the Introduction to the Polish-language version of the present book I expressed the hope that Polish studies in semiotics would before long be numerous enough to make possible another anthology on semiotics in Poland containing material published since 1970. That hope has in fact come true. The fact that semiotic research has been gaining momentum in this country is reflected in the growing interest in the discipline, in expanding international contacts, and in the steady increase in the number of publications. Thus, 1972 saw the setting up of the Department of Logical Semiotics, headed by the present writer, at Warsaw University Institute of Phi­ losophy. The seminar on semiotics, which I started in 1961, had met more than two hundred times by the end of 1976; since 1968, meetings have been held jointly with the Polish Semiotic Society. Another semi­ nar, confined to university staff and concerned with logical semiotics, which was inithted in 1970, had met more than fifty times by the end of 1976. The former seminar often plays host to foreign visiting pro­ fessors; so far scholars from Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United States have attended.

Abstract: 1. Introduction -- 1. Concept Explication -- 2. Objectives and Survey -- 2. Cognitive Rationality -- 1. On the Explication of the Concept of Rationality -- 2. Cognitive Rationality and Patterns of Expectation -- 3. Inductive Reasoning and Inductive Probability Theory -- 3. Logico-Mathematical Preliminaries -- 1. Logical Vocabulary -- 2. Set-theoretical Vocabulary -- 3. Some Elements of Probability Theory -- 4. Formally Rational Expectation in a Paradigmatic Context -- 1. Paradigmatic Contexts -- 2. Two Conditions for Rational Expectation -- 3. A Framework for a Paradigmatic Context -- 4. First Analysis of a Rational Expectation Pattern -- 5. A Framework for a Paradigmatic Context (continued) -- 6. Third Formal Condition for Rational Expectation -- 7. Decidable Contexts -- 5. Generalized Carnapian Systems -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Constitutive Principles and Definition of GC-systems -- 3. General Analysis of GC-systems -- 4. Analysis of Positive Inductive GC-systems (0 〈 ? 〈 oo) -- 5. Analysis of Negative Inductive GC-systems (? 〈 0) -- Appendix to Section 2 (Proof of T2) -- 6. Hintikka and Universalized Carnapian Systems -- 1. Introduction -- 2. NH-systems -- 3. Hintikka-systems (H-systems) -- 4. Some Fundamental Properties of H-systems -- 5. An Urn-model for H-systems -- 6. The Equivalence of NH- and SH-systems: Universalized Carnapian systems (UC-systems) -- 7. Analysis of UC-systems -- 8. Fundamental Discussion Related to Applications -- 9. Finite Parameters for H-systems -- 10. Reformulation of H-systems; k ? ? -- 11. GH-systems and G UC-systems -- 12. Survey of Systems -- Appendix to Section 2 (Proof of T1 ) -- 7. Rational Expectation in Multinomial Contexts -- 1. Carnap’s Intended Application -- 2. The Multinomial Context -- 3. Formally Rational Patterns for Open Multinomial Contexts -- 4. Material Conditions of Adequacy; UC-systems as Expectation Pattern for Open Multinomial Contexts -- 5. Constitutional Distributions for Open Multinomial Contexts -- 6. The Hypergeometric Context -- 8. Some Problems and Related Topics -- 1. PER-systems -- 2. On Weakening WPERR -- 3. *UC*-systems and k ? ? -- 4. Confirmation Theory -- 5. Falsification -- 6. Rules of Acceptance in UC-systems -- 9. Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects -- Recurring Symbols -- Conditions/Principles/Axioms -- Definition of Systems.

Abstract: 3 in philosophy, and therefore in metaphilosophy, cannot be based on rules that avoid spending time on pseudo-problems. Of course, this implies that, if one succeeds in demonstrating convincingly the pseudo-character of a problem by giving its 'solution', the time spent on it need not be seen as wasted. We conclude this section with a brief statement of the criteria for concept explication as they have been formulated in several places by Carnap, Hempel and Stegmiiller. Hempel's account ([13J, Chapter 1) is still very adequate for a detailed introduction. The process of explication starts with the identification of one or more vague and, perhaps, ambiguous concepts, the so-called explicanda. Next, one tries to disentangle the ambiguities. This, however, need not be possible at once. Ultimately the explicanda are to be replaced (not necessarily one by one) by certain counterparts, the so-called explicata, which have to conform to four requirements. They have to be as precise as possible and as simple as possible. In addition, they have to be useful in the sense that they give rise to the formulation of theories and the solution of problems. The three requirements of preciseness, simplicity and usefulness. have of course to be pursued in all concept formation.

Abstract: Physical Theory and Experiment -- Two Dogmas of Empiricism -- Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes -- Some Fundamental Problems in the Logic of Scientific Discovery -- Background Knowledge and Scientific Growth -- The Duhemian Argument -- A Comment on Grünbaum’s Claim -- Scientific Revolutions as Changes of World View -- Grünbaum on ‘The Duhemian Argument’ -- Quine, Grünbaum, and the Duhemian Thesis -- Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification -- Duhem, Quine and a New Empiricism -- Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes -- Is it never Possible to Falsify a Hypothesis Irrevocably? -- The Rationality of Science (From‘Against Method’) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex­ perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests. It has often been thought that a certain sort of test is particularly significant: 'crucial experiments' provide supporting empiri­ cal evidence for one theory while providing conclusive evidence against another. However, in 1906 Pierre Duhem argued that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambiguous and therefore that there are no crucial experiments; one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than auxiliary or background hypotheses which experiment has falsified. w. V. Quine has concurred in this judgment, arguing that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not indi­ vidually but only as a corporate body". Some philosophers have thought that the Duhem-Quine thesis gra­ tuitously raises perplexities. Others see it as doubly significant; these philosophers think that it provides a base for criticism of the foundational view of knowledge which has dominated much of western thought since Descartes, and they think that it opens the door to a new and fruitful way to conceive of scientific progress in particular and of the nature and growth of knowledge in general.

Abstract: I: Introduction -- 1. The Object of this Study -- 2. The Significance of this Study -- 3. Some Difficulties -- 4. On Method -- 5. The Questions -- II: First Historical Approach: Positivism and Neopositivism -- 1. The Notion of Positivism -- 2. The History of Early Positivism (pre-1921) -- 3. The History of Neopositivism (post-1921) -- III: Second Historical Approach: Notions of Philosophy and Relationships to Positivism in Marx, Engels and the Earlier Soviet Philosophers (up to World War II) -- l.Marx -- 2. Engels -- 3. Lenin -- 4. From Lenin to Stalinism -- IV: The Soviet Critique of Neopositivism -- 1. Systematic Background -- 2. Historical Background -- 3. Igor Sergeevi? Narskij -- 4. Vladimir Sergeevi? Švyrev -- 5. Pavel Vasil’evi? Kopnin -- 6. Various other Soviet Authors -- 7. Outcome -- V: Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The nrst of the people to be thanked for their help during the composition of this work is Professor I.M. Bochenski, under whom I had the good fortune to study for an extended period of time. Without his help, it is doubtful that this work would have been writt"l1 at all. Among the other professors who helped along the way, I would like to cite in particular Professors A.F. Utz, M.D. Philippe and N. Luyten of the University of Fribourg. Many friends were present at the birth of the ideas contained in this book. By naming K.G. Ballestrem, T.l. Blakeley and M.F. Gagern, I do not want to slight any of the rest. It was A. Spiekermann in Hollinghofen who saw to it that other preoccupations did not rob me of all the time needed for the study of the subject-matter and to the composition of this treatise. Of particular help in getting sources from the libraries of the world were Miss Lifschitz of the Institute of East-European Studies and Mr. Uldry of the Cantonal Library in Fribourg, Switzerland. Finally, my patient typist, Mrs. Frey in Munster, deserves special mention for her beautiful work.

Abstract: Analytical Table of Contents -- 1: The Theory-ladenness of Observation -- 2: An Examination of Some Arguments and Criteria for Radical Meaning Variance -- 3: The Methodological Undesirability of Adopting a Position of Radical Meaning Variance -- 4: The Comparability of Scientific Theories.

Abstract: In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con­ sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in­ vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace­ ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.

Abstract: I. Islam -- Recommencements de l’algèbre aux XIe et XIIe siècles -- The Influence of Stoic Logic on Al-Ja????’s Legal Theory -- The Beginnings of Islamic Theology -- Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences -- II. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- The Organization of Sciences and the Relations of Cultures in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries -- La nouvelle idée de nature et de savoir scientifique au XIIe siècle -- Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica -- III. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries in the Latin West -- From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning -- Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist -- Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus’s Discovery in an Era of Change -- Réflexions sur les rapports entre théorie et pratique au moyen âge -- Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Universities: Some Preliminary Comments.

Abstract: 1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux -- References -- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper -- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable -- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation -- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is -- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates -- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions -- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End -- References -- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy -- Notes -- 3. On Novelty -- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General -- II. Science and Truth -- III. Popper’s View of Science -- Notes -- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts -- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81 -- Note -- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism -- 5. Sensationalism -- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge -- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism -- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience -- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense -- 5. Explanation vs. Consent -- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism -- 7. Conclusion -- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis? -- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked? -- II. Can Refutation be Final? -- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated -- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports? -- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection? -- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports? -- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations -- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics -- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science -- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance -- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction -- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem -- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing -- IV. The Need for Constraints is Quite Real -- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses -- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail -- VII. Conclusion -- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement -- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses -- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence -- II. The Conventional Element in Science -- III. Reducing the Conventions -- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses -- V. What is a Mess? -- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism -- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics -- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems -- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated -- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics -- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science -- V. Popper’s Theory of Science -- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways -- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science -- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics -- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks -- Appendix: What is a Natural Law? -- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics -- I. How Do we Select Questions? -- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works -- III.The Literature on Questions -- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions -- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions -- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity -- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions -- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions -- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality -- X.Collingwood in a New Garb -- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician -- Notes -- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences -- Appendix: Reply to Commentators -- 12.The Confusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science -- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom -- Notes -- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology -- I. Kant’s Scandal -- II. Whitehead’s Scandal -- III.The Facts About Induction -- IV.Success and Rationality -- V. The Sociology of Knowledge -- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism -- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution -- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development -- 15. Imperfect Knowledge -- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable -- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error -- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses -- Notes -- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments -- Note -- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism -- 17. Modified Conventionalism -- I. The Problem -- II. Science and Society -- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation -- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited -- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper -- Notes -- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science -- Abstract -- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression -- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science -- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science -- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science -- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions -- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement -- References -- Appendix on Kant -- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason? -- I. Religion and Reason -- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion -- III. Reason and Faith -- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship -- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation -- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation -- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion -- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action -- IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance -- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi -- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion -- Notes -- Appendix on Buber -- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism -- I. The Compleat Agnostic -- II. The Image of Inductive Science -- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance -- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood -- V. Conversion to Autonomism -- VI. The Assured Agnostic -- Index of Works Cited -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: 1 Subject Matter -- 2 Relevance -- 3 The Fate of Hegel Interpretations -- 4 Divisions -- I / Dialectic -- 1 / Dialectic of the Real -- 2 / Positive Dialectic -- 3 / The Subject Matter of Dialectical Philosophy -- II / Dialectic And Metaphysics -- 1 / ‘Metaphysics’ — A Philosophical Discipline -- 2 / Metaphysical Method in General -- 3 / Spinoza and Double Negation -- III / Dialectical Metaphysics -- 1 / Infinity -- 2 / Absolute Necessity -- 3 / Being is Thought -- Summary -- Epilogue / Hegel’s Dialectic and Contemporary Issues -- 1 Analytic and Dialectic -- 2 The Sublation of Hegel’s Dialectic -- 2.1 First Reversion -- 2.2 Second Reversion -- 2.3 Third Reversion -- 2.4 Fourth Reversion -- Concerning Notes And Abbreviations -- Notes -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This book was written in 1968, and defended as a doctoral dissertation before the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1969. It treats of the systematic views of Hegel which led him to give to the princi­ ple of non-contradiction, the principle of double negation, and the principle of excluded middle, meanings which are difficult to understand. The reader will look in vain for the philosophical position of the author. A few words about the intentions which motivated the author to study and clarify Hegel's thought are therefore not out of place. In the early sixties, when occupying myself with the history of Marxist philosophy, I discovered that the representatives of the logical-positivist tra­ dition were not alone in employing a principle of demarcation; that those of the dialectical Marxist tradition were also using such a principle ('self-move­ ment') as a foundation of a scientific philosophy and as a means to delimit unscientific ideas. I aimed at a clear conception of this principle in order to be able to judge whether, and to what extent, it accords with the foundations of the analytical method. In this endeavor I encountered two problems: (1) What is to be understood by 'analytical method' cannot be ascertained un­ equivocally.

Abstract: I. The Idea of Philosophy -- I. The Concept of “Something” and of the “Absolute Being” -- II. Solovyev’s “Absolute Being” and Scheler’s “The Eternally Astonishing Roofing of the Abyss of Absolute Nothing” -- III. Summary -- II. Solovyev’s Idea of “Integral Knowledge” and Scheler’s “System of Conformity” -- I. The Meta-Anthropological Aspect -- II. The Historical Aspect -- III. The Epistemological Aspect -- III. The Relation Between Religion and Metaphysics -- I. Typology -- II. The Problems -- IV. Systematic Philosophy -- I. “Organic Logic” -- II. “Organic Metaphysics” -- III. “Organic Ethics” -- IV. The Philosophy of Eros -- V. Special Problems -- I. The Feminist Issue and the Idea of God -- II. On the Question of Influence -- VI. Retrospect -- VII. Russian Philosophy from Solovyev to Shestov — Revision of a Soviet Taboo -- I. The Argument over Russian Philosophy -- II. From Theosophy to Phenomenology -- III. The New Religious Philosophy -- VIII. Soviet Judgement and Criticism of Solovyev -- I. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1 st edition 1947 -- II. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 2nd edition 1957 -- III. Against Contemporary Falsifiers of the History of Russian Philosophy, 1960 -- IV. History of Russian Philosophy, 1961 -- IX. Soviet Appropriation of Scheler’s Phenomenology -- Notes -- Bibliography — A Summary of the Works by and on Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This comparative study of the works of Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler explores some of the areas in which their thoughts seem to bear a direct relation to one another. The author shows, however, that such a correlation is not based on any factual influence of the earlier Russian on the later philosophy of Scheler. The similarities in their spiritual and philosophical development are significant as the author demonstrates in his chapter on systematic philosophy. This comparison is not just of historical interest. It is meant to contri­ bute to a better understanding between the East and the West. The author provides a basis for future discussions by establishing a common area of inquiry and by demonstrating a convergence of viewpoints already in regard to these problems. The author also discusses the potential role of the ideas of Solovyev and Scheler in the formation of a consciousness which he sees now emerging in the Soviet Union - a consciousness critical of any misrepresentation both of non-Marxist Russian philosophy as well as of Western philosophy in general. In regard to the translation itself, three things should be mentioned. First of all, the distinction between the important German words "Sein" and "Seiendes" is often difficult to preserve in translation. Unless otherwise noted all references to "being" refer to "Seiendes." Second, the abbreviations of the works of Solovyev and Scheler used in the footnotes are clarified in the summary of the works of these authors found on page 31Off. below.

Abstract: The philosophy of biology, some claim, should move to the centre of philosophy of science - a place it has not been accorded since the time of Mach. Physics was the paradigm of science, and its shadow falls across contemporary philosophy of biology in a variety of contexts: reduction, organization and system, biochemical mechanism, and the models of law and explanation which are derived from the Duhem-Popper-Hempel tradition. In this volume, the editors present essays which probe such historical and methodological questions as reducibility, levels of organization, function and teleology, issues emerging from evolutionary theory, and the species problem. The volume offers ample evidence of how good contemporary work in the philosophical understanding of biology has become. The editors aptly combine a deep philosophical appreciation of conceptual issues in biology with an historical understanding of the radical changes in the science of biology since the 19th century

Abstract: I. Radical Empiricism and the Anomalies in the Knowledge of Science -- II. Troubles with the Problem of Demarcation -- III. The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification -- IV. Facts and Theories: Radical Empiricism -- V. Facts and Theories: Conventionalism -- VI. Reformation and Counter-reformation: Paradigms and Research Programs -- VII. Revolutions in Science: The Accumulation of Knowledge and the Correspondence of Theories -- VIII. Revolutions in Science: Science and Philosophy -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Acceptance Revisited -- Cognitive Decision Theory -- A Critique of Epistemic Utilities -- Induction, Consensus, and Catastrophe -- Elements of Induction -- On Sequential Inference -- Cognitive Decisions under Partial Information -- Local and Global Induction -- Hume and the Problem of Local Induction -- A Conspectus of the Neo-Classical Theory of Induction -- Inquiries, Problems, and Questions: Remarks on Local Induction -- On Piecemeal Knowledge-Formation -- Confirmation, Explanation, and the Paradoxes of Transitivity -- A Selected Bibliography of Local Induction -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The local justification of beliefs and hypotheses has recently become a major concern for epistemologists and philosophers of induction. As such, the problem of local justification is not entirely new. Most pragmatists had addressed themselves to it, and so did, to some extent, many classical inductivists in the Bacon-Whewell-Mill tradition. In the last few decades, however, the use of logic and semantics, probability calculus, statistical methods, and decision-theoretic concepts in the reconstruction of in­ ductive inference has revealed some important technical respects in which inductive justification can be local: the choice of a language, with its syntactic and semantic features, the relativity of probabilistic evalua­ tions to an initial body of evidence or background knowledge and to an agent's utilities and preferences, etc. Some paradoxes and difficulties encountered by purely formal accounts of inductive justification, the erosion of the once dominant empiricist position, which most approaches to induction took for granted, and the increasing challenge of noninduc­ tivist epistemolgies have underscored the need of accounting for the methodological problems of applying inductive logic to real life contexts, particularly in science. As a result, in the late fifties and sixties, several related developments pointed to a new, local approach to inductive justification.

Abstract: The Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1936) -- The Logic of Complementarity and the Foundation of Quantum Theory (1972) -- Mathematics as Logical Syntax — A Method to Formalize the Language of a Physical Theory (1937–38) -- Three-Valued Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1944) -- Three-Valued Logic (1957) -- Reichenbach’s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1958) -- Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space (1957) -- The Logic of Propositions Which are not Simultaneously Decidable (1960) -- Baer *-Semigroups (1960) -- Axioms for Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics (1961) -- Probability in Physics and a Theorem on Simultaneous Observability (1962) -- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories (1963) -- The Structure of the Propositional Calculus of a Physical Theory (1964) -- Boolean Embeddings of Orthomodular Sets and Quantum Logic (1965) -- Logical Structures Arising in Quantum Theory (1965) -- The Calculus of Partial Propositional Functions (1965) -- The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Logics Appropriate to Empirical Theories (1965) -- The Probabilistic Argument for a Non-Classical Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1966) -- Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1967) -- Baer *-Semigroups and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- Semimodularity and the Logic of Quantum Mechanics (1968) -- On the Structure of Quantum Logic (1969) -- On the Structure of Quantal Proposition Systems (1969) -- The Current Interest in Orthomodular Lattices (1970) -- Integration Theory of Observables (1970) -- Probabilistic Formulation of Classical Mechanics (1970) -- Atomicity and Determinism in Boolean Systems (1971) -- Survey of General Quantum Physics (1972) -- Quantum Logics (1974) -- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logics (1974).

Abstract: The twentieth century has witnessed a striking transformation in the un­ derstanding of the theories of mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are significantly characterized by their abstract mathematical structure. This is in opposition to the tradi­ tional opinion that one should look to the specific applications of a theory in order to understand it. One might with reason now espouse the view that to understand the deeper character of a theory one must know its abstract structure and understand the significance of that struc­ ture, while to understand how a theory might be modified in light of its experimental inadequacies one must be intimately acquainted with how it is applied. Quantum theory itself has gone through a development this century which illustrates strikingly the shifting perspective. From a collection of intuitive physical maneuvers under Bohr, through a formative stage in which the mathematical framework was bifurcated (between Schrödinger and Heisenberg) to an elegant culmination in von Neumann's Hilbert space formulation the elementary theory moved, flanked even at the later stage by the ill-understood formalisms for the relativistic version and for the field-theoretic altemative; after that we have a gradual, but constant, elaboration of all these quantal theories as abstract mathematical struc­ tures (their point of departure being von Neumann's formalism) until at the present time theoretical work is heavily preoccupied with the manip­ ulation of purely abstract structures.

Abstract: Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals -- Incomplete Descriptions in the Language of Probability Theory -- A Computational Complexity Viewpoint on the Stability of Relative Frequency and on Stochastic Independence -- A Logic for Subjective Belief -- Discussion -- Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals -- Letter by Robert Stalnaker to W. L. Harper -- Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change (A Response to Stalnaker) -- Toward an Optimization Procedure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics -- Simplicity -- Discussion -- Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference -- Discussion -- Probabilities of Conditionals -- Discussion -- Letter by Stalnaker to Van Fraassen -- Letter by Van Fraassen to Stalnaker.

Abstract: In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.