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  • 1
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    Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (44 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Estache, Antonio Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed
    Schlagwort(e): Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Kurzfassung: Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs
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  • 2
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    Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement : Are There Any Fringe Bidders? (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (24 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement
    Schlagwort(e): Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure
    Kurzfassung: Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency
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  • 3
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    Multidimensionality And Renegotiation : Evidence From Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions In Latin America (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Estache, Antonio Multidimensionality And Renegotiation
    Schlagwort(e): Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Kurzfassung: Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award criteria. Using auction data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the probability of renegotiation this paper estimates by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. The findings show that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that such political considerations could hinder efficiency and transparency in auctions. The analysis also shows that the renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good governance, particularly anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem
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  • 4
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    Infrastructure And Trade Preferences For The Livestock Sector : Empirical Evidence From The Beef Industry In Africa (2007)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (39 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Iimi, Atsushi Infrastructure And Trade Preferences For The Livestock Sector
    Schlagwort(e): Agriculture ; Agriculture ; Competitiveness ; Cred Demand ; Culture ; Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economics ; Emerging Markets ; Equations ; Exchange ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Free Trade ; GDP ; Income ; International Economics & Trade ; International Trade ; Livestock and Animal Husbandry ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Markets and Market Access ; Middle Income Countries ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Trade Policy ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Agriculture ; Agriculture ; Competitiveness ; Cred Demand ; Culture ; Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economics ; Emerging Markets ; Equations ; Exchange ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Free Trade ; GDP ; Income ; International Economics & Trade ; International Trade ; Livestock and Animal Husbandry ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Markets and Market Access ; Middle Income Countries ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Trade Policy ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Agriculture ; Agriculture ; Competitiveness ; Cred Demand ; Culture ; Debt Markets ; Development ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economics ; Emerging Markets ; Equations ; Exchange ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Free Trade ; GDP ; Income ; International Economics & Trade ; International Trade ; Livestock and Animal Husbandry ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets ; Markets and Market Access ; Middle Income Countries ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Trade Policy ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Kurzfassung: Trade preferences are expected to facilitate global market integration and offer the potential for rapid economic growth and poverty reduction for developing countries. But those preferences do not always guarantee sustainable external competitiveness to beneficiary countries and may risk discouraging their efforts to improve underlying productivity. This paper examines the EU beef import market where several African countries have been granted preferential treatment. The estimation results suggest that profitability improvement achieved by countries under the Cotonou protocol compares unfavorably with the returns to nonbeneficiary countries in recent years. Rather, it shows that public infrastructure, such as paved roads, has an important role in lowering production costs and thus increasing external competitiveness and market shares
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  • 5
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    Price Structure And Network Externalities In The Telecommunications Industry : Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa (2007)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (43 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Iimi, Atsushi Price Structure And Network Externalities In The Telecommunications Industry
    Schlagwort(e): Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure
    Kurzfassung: Many developing countries have experienced significant developments in their telecommunications network. Countries in Africa are no exception to this. The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. In theory the telecommunications sector has two sector-specific characteristics: network externalities and discriminatory pricing. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. Some countries in Africa are still imposing certain price restrictions. But more important, it remains a policy issue how the authorities should ensure reciprocal access between operators at reasonable cost
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  • 6
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    Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (24 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Broadman, G. Harry Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry
    Schlagwort(e): Banks and Banking Reform ; Barriers ; Barriers To Entry ; Business Environment ; Business Investment ; Competition ; Competition Policy ; Competitive Market ; Debt Markets ; Developing Countries ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; International Accounting Standards ; Liberalization ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Market Share ; Market Shares ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Monopoly ; Output ; Price ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Privatization ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Regional Trade ; Small Scale Enterprises ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Vertical Integration ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Barriers ; Barriers To Entry ; Business Environment ; Business Investment ; Competition ; Competition Policy ; Competitive Market ; Debt Markets ; Developing Countries ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; International Accounting Standards ; Liberalization ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Market Share ; Market Shares ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Monopoly ; Output ; Price ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Privatization ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Regional Trade ; Small Scale Enterprises ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Vertical Integration
    Kurzfassung: May 2000 - The absence of new business in Russia is striking. Reforms to make Russia more competitive should start with eliminating regulatory and institutional barriers to the entry of new competitors. Many industrial firms in Russia have undergone changes in ownership, but relatively few have been competitively restructured. Using survey and other data, Broadman suggests that much of Russian industry is immune from robust competition because of heavy vertical integration, geographic segmentation, and the concentration of buyers and sellers in selected markets. Moreover, regulatory constraints protect incumbent firms from competition with new entrants, both domestic and foreign. Broadman sketches a reform agenda for Russia's post-privatization program, which emphasizes the restructuring of anticompetitive structures and the reduction of barriers to entry. Broadman's proposed reform agenda calls broadly for strengthening Russia's nascent rules-based framework for competition policy to reduce discretion, increase transparency, and improve accountability. This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Regional Office - is part of a larger effort in the region to assess structural reform in Russia. The author may be contacted at hbroadmanworldbank.org
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  • 7
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    Competition, Corporate Governance, and Regulation in Central Asia : Uzbekistan's Structural Reform Challenges (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (28 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Broadman, G. Harry Competition, Corporate Governance, and Regulation in Central Asia
    Schlagwort(e): Business Performance ; Competition ; Competition Policy ; Corporate Governance ; Corporate Law ; Corporate Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Enforcement ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Governance ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Legal Frameworks ; Macroeconomic Policy ; Macroeconomic Stability ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Market Economy ; Market Share ; Market Structure ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Monopoly ; National Governance ; Output ; Price ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Reform Program ; Social Protections and Labor ; Trade ; Trade Associations ; Business Performance ; Competition ; Competition Policy ; Corporate Governance ; Corporate Law ; Corporate Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Enforcement ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Governance ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Legal Frameworks ; Macroeconomic Policy ; Macroeconomic Stability ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Market Economy ; Market Share ; Market Structure ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Monopoly ; National Governance ; Output ; Price ; Prices ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Reform Program ; Social Protections and Labor ; Trade ; Trade Associations
    Kurzfassung: May 2000 - Like many Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has adopted a gradual, cautious approach in its transition to a market economy. It has had some success attaining macroeconomic stability, but microeconomic reforms have lagged behind. It is time to accelerate structural reform. In Uzbekistan state enterprises are being changed into shareholding companies, and private enterprises account for 45 percent of all registered firms. But business decisions to set prices, output, and investment are often not market-based, nor wholly within the purview of businesses, especially those in commercial manufacturing and services. Lines of authority for corporate governance - from state enterprises to private enterprises - are ill-defined, so there is little discipline on corporate performance and little separation between government and business. Nascent frameworks have been created for competition policy (for firms in the commercial sector) and regulatory policy (governing utilities in the infrastructure monopoly sector). But implementation and enforcement have been hampered by old-style instruments (such as price controls) rooted in central planning, by lack of a strong independent regulatory rule-making authority, by the limited understanding of the basic concepts of competition and regulatory reform, and by weak institutional capabilities for analyzing market structure and business performance. Based on fieldwork in Uzbekistan, Broadman recommends: · Deepening senior policy officials' understanding of, and appreciation of the benefits from, enterprise competition and how it affects economic growth. · Reforming competition policy institutions and legal frameworks in line with the country's goal of strengthening structural reforms and improving macroeconomic policy. · Improving the ability of government and associated institutions to assess Uzbekistan's industrial market structure and the determinants of enterprise conduct and performance. · Making the authority responsible for competition and regulatory policymaking into an independent agency - a champion of competition - answerable directly to the prime minister. · Strengthening incentives and institutions for corporate governance and bringing them in line with international practice. · Subjecting infrastructure monopolies to systemic competitive restructuring and unbundling, where appropriate. For other utilities, depoliticize tariff setting and implementation of regulations; ensure that price, output, and investment decisions by service suppliers are procompetitive (creating a level playing field among users); and increase transparency and accountability to the public. This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Regional Office - is part of a larger effort in the region to assess structural reform in Central Asia. The author may be contacted at hbroadmanworldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
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    Seeds of Corruption : Do Market Institutions Matter? (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (38 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Recanatini, Francesca Seeds of Corruption
    Schlagwort(e): Accountability ; Bank ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Corruption ; Corruption and Anticorruption Law ; Debt Markets ; Discretion ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Fight Against Corruption ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Governance ; Governance ; Governance Indicators ; Governance Reforms ; Government ; Government Officials ; Governments ; Investigation ; Law and Development ; Laws ; Legal Products ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Monopolies ; Monopoly ; National Governance ; Organization ; Policies ; Policy ; Political Economy ; Politicians ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Services ; Transparent Mechanism ; Accountability ; Bank ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Corruption ; Corruption and Anticorruption Law ; Debt Markets ; Discretion ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Fight Against Corruption ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Governance ; Governance ; Governance Indicators ; Governance Reforms ; Government ; Government Officials ; Governments ; Investigation ; Law and Development ; Laws ; Legal Products ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Monopolies ; Monopoly ; National Governance ; Organization ; Policies ; Policy ; Political Economy ; Politicians ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Services ; Transparent Mechanism
    Kurzfassung: June 2000 - Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized certain factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and capture of government officials. Only now are these relationships becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition. Ten years into the transition, corruption is so pervasive that it could jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. Broadman and Recanatini present an analytical framework for examining the role market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. Using recently available data on the incidence of corruption and on institutional development, they provide preliminary evidence on the link between the development of market institutions and incentives for corruption. Virtually all of the indicators they examine appear to be important, but three are statistically significant: · The intensity of barriers to the entry of new business. · The effectiveness of the legal system. · The efficacy and competitiveness of services provided by infrastructure monopolies. The main lesson emerging from their analysis: a well established system of market institutions - clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances (including strong enforcement mechanisms), and a robust competitive environment - reduces opportunities for rent-seeking and hence incentives for corruption. Both the design and effective implementation of such measures are important if a market system is to be effective. It is not enough, for example, to enact first-rate laws if they are not enforced. The local political economy greatly affects whether a given policy reform will curtail corruption. Especially important are the following factors in the political economy: · The credibility of the government's commitment to carrying out announced reforms. · The degree to which government officials are captured by the entities they regulate or oversee. · The stability of the government itself. · The political power of entrenched vested interests. Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized these factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and capture of government officials. Only now are they becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition. This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to analyze the determinants of corruption and develop remedies. The authors may be contacted at hbroadmanworldbank.org or frecanatini@worldbank.org
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  • 9
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    Improving Russia's Policy on Foreign Direct Investment (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (56 p.))
    Ausgabe: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Paralleltitel: Drebentsov, Vladimir Improving Russia's Policy on Foreign Direct Investment
    Schlagwort(e): Barriers ; Corporate Governance ; Debt Markets ; Developing Countries ; Domestic Market ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Economies ; Emerging Markets ; Enforcement ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Foreign Direct Investment ; Foreign Direct Investment ; Foreign Investment ; Foreign Investor ; Foreign Investors ; Global Market ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investor ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Natural Resources ; Outputs ; Price ; Private Sector Development ; Property Rights ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Social Protections and Labor ; Tax ; Technology Transfers ; Trade ; Trade Law ; Trade and Regional Integration ; Transition Countries ; Barriers ; Corporate Governance ; Debt Markets ; Developing Countries ; Domestic Market ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Economies ; Emerging Markets ; Enforcement ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Foreign Direct Investment ; Foreign Direct Investment ; Foreign Investment ; Foreign Investor ; Foreign Investors ; Global Market ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investor ; Labor Policies ; Law and Development ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Natural Resources ; Outputs ; Price ; Private Sector Development ; Property Rights ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Social Protections and Labor ; Tax ; Technology Transfers ; Trade ; Trade Law ; Trade and Regional Integration ; Transition Countries
    Kurzfassung: May 2000 - Russia gets relatively little foreign direct investment and almost none of the newer, more efficient kind, involving state-of-the-art technology and world-class competitive production linked to dynamic global or regional markets. Why? And what should be done about it? Foreign direct investment brings host countries capital, productive facilities, and technology transfers as well as employment, new job skills, and management expertise. It is important to the Russian Federation, where incentives for competition are limited and incentives to becoming efficient are blunted by interregional barriers to trade, weak creditor rights, and administrative barriers to new entrants. Bergsman, Broadman, and Drebentsov argue that the old policy paradigm of foreign direct investment (established before World War II and prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s) still governs Russia. In this paradigm there are only two reasons for foreign direct investment: access to inputs for production and access to markets for outputs. Such kinds of foreign direct investment, although beneficial, are often based on generating exports that exploit cheap labor or natural resources or are aimed at penetrating protected local markets, not necessarily at world standards for price and quality. They contend that Russia should phase out high tariffs and nontariff protection for the domestic market, most tax preferences for foreign investors (which don't increase foreign direct investment but do reduce fiscal revenues), and many restrictions on foreign direct investment. They recommend that Russia switch to a modern approach to foreign direct investment by: · Amending the newly enacted foreign direct investment law so that it will grant nondiscriminatory national treatment to foreign investors for both right of establishment and post-establishment operations, abolish conditions (such as local content restrictions) inconsistent with the World Trade Organization agreement on trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), and make investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms more efficient (giving foreign investors the chance to seek neutral binding international arbitration, for example). · Strengthening enforcement of property rights. · Simplifying registration procedures for foreign investors, to make them transparent and rules-based. · Extending guarantee schemes covering basic noncommercial risks. This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Regional Office - is part of a larger effort in the region to assist the Russian authorities in preparing for accession to the World Trade Organization. The authors may be contacted at hbroadmanworldbank.org or vdrebentsov@worldbank.org
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