Kurzfassung: Kapitel 1. Einleitung des Herausgebers -- Kapitel 2. Einleitung -- Kapitel 3. Empirische und eidetische Forschung. Phänomenologische Forschung als eidetische -- Kapitel 4. Die Phänomenologie als eidetische Wissenschaft und ihr Verhältnis zur empirischen Psychologie -- Kapitel 5. Phänomenologie als Eidetik des reinen Bewusstseins -- Kapitel 6. Die phänomenologische Reduktion als die für die Phänomenologie konstitutive Methode und ihre Bedeutung für die Erkenntnistheorie -- Kapitel 7. Das Forschungsfeld der Phänomenologie. Die für ihre Methode leitenden Unterscheidungen und die Hauptrichtungen phänomenologischer Arbeit -- Kapitel 8. Nachweis der Originalseiten -- Kapitel 9. Namenregister.

Kurzfassung: Der vorliegende Band enthält den Text der zweistündigen Vorlesung, die Husserl im Sommersemester 1912 unter dem Titel „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ in Göttingen gehalten hat. Das Thema der ursprünglich als „Urteilstheorie“ angekündigten Vorlesung wurde kurzfristig geändert, da es nicht möglich sei, wie Husserl zu Beginn der Vorlesung erläutert, „eine Urteilstheorie darzustellen, ohne weitgehende Kenntnis in Betreff gewisser allgemeiner Bewusstseinsgestaltungen vorauszusetzen“. Neben einer Untersuchung von Bewusstseinsphänomenen wie „äußere und innere Wahrnehmung, Erlebnis- und Zeitbewusstsein, Erinnerung, Erwartung, Aufmerksamkeit, Erfassung, Explikation und dergleichen” liegt das Hauptaugenmerk der Vorlesung auf der Erläuterung der beiden Grundpfeiler der phänomenologischen Methode: der Wesensschau und der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Die Vorlesung vom Sommersemester 1912 diente Husserl als Vorlage bei der Niederschrift seines transzendental-phänomenologischen Hauptwerkes, der „Ideen I“ (Husserliana Bd. III/1), mit der er während der Vorlesungszeit, nämlich Ende Mai oder Anfang Juni 1912, begann. Inhaltliche Übereinstimmungen mit dem Vorlesungstext weisen der Erste Abschnitt der “Ideen I” („Tatsache und Wesen“), der Zweite Abschnitt („Die phänomenologische Fundamentalbetrachtung“) und teilweise der Dritte Abschnitt („Zur Methodik und Problematik der reinen Phänomenologie“) auf. – Die hier erstmals veröffentlichte Vorlesung „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ aus dem Sommersemester 1912 bietet Forschern und Studenten interessante Einblicke in Entwicklung und Thematik von Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie.

Kurzfassung: Chapter 1. Werten und Wert. – Zur Wertlehre -- Chapter 2. Die Von Gegenständen Ausgehende Erregung Von Gefühlen Gegenüber der auf Die Gegenstände Hinzielenden Wertung. Die Frage Nach dem Gefühlscharakter des Wertens -- Chapter 3. Die Analogie Zwischen Denkakten und Axiologischen Akten. Rezeptivität und Spontaneität bei der Konstitution von Seins- und Wertobjektivitäten -- Chapter 4. Die Arten der Gemütsintentionalität -- Chapter 5. Die Konstitution der Gemütscharaktere -- Chapter 6. Gefühlsbewusstsein – Bewusstsein von Gefühlen. Gefühl als Akt und als Zustand -- Chapter 7. Passivität und Aktivität in Intellekt und Gemüt -- Chapter 8. Reine Werte gegenüber Praktischen Werten. Die Frage Nach der Absoluten Willenswahrheit -- Chapter 9. Das Gefallen am Schönen und der Schönheitswert -- Ergänzende Texte.

Kurzfassung: Die ersten drei Bände der vorliegenden,vier Teilbände umfassenden Edition bieten eine umfangreiche Präsentation von Husserls deskriptiver Erforschung der intentionalen Strukturen des Bewusstseins in den drei Hauptklassen von intentionalen Akten, den Verstandes-, Gemüts- und Willensakten. Der größte Teil der wiedergegebenen Manuskripte entstand in den Jahren zwischen 1908 und 1915. Im Jahr 1925 hat Husserls Assistent Ludwig Landgrebe auf der Grundlage vieler der hier edierten Texte ein umfangreiches Typoskript mit dem Titel „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins“ angefertigt. Husserls fragmentarischer Entwurf einer Einleitung zu diesem Typoskript wird im ersten Band der Edition wiedergegeben. Der zweite Teilband enthält Husserls deskriptive Untersuchungen der Gefühlsakte und der Konstitution der Werte in solchen Akten. In detaillierten Beschreibungen unterscheidet er zwischen verschiedenen Gefühlsarten, zwischen Gefühlspassivität und Gefühlsaktivität und er ringt mit dem Problem der objektivierenden Leistung der Gefühlsakte. .

Kurzfassung: Chapter 1. Zur Intentionalität der Objektivation im Urteilen, Meinen und Stellungnehmen -- Chapter 2. Zur Analyse der Explikativen und Prädikativen Synthesen und Ihrer Fundamente -- Chapter 3. Zur Analyse der Stellungnahmen in Ihren Modi und Fundierungen -- Chapter 4. Analysen zu den Vollzugsmodi der Aufmerksamkeit, zu Erkenntnisstreben und Erkenntniserwerb, zu Ausdruck und Verstehen und zu Vorgegebenheit und Affektion -- Chapter 5. Texte zu Landgrebes Typoskript der „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins.

Kurzfassung: Die ersten drei Bände der vorliegenden,vier Teilbände umfassenden Edition bieten eine umfangreiche Präsentation von Husserls deskriptiver Erforschung der intentionalen Strukturen des Bewusstseins in den drei Hauptklassen von intentionalen Akten, den Verstandes-, Gemüts- und Willensakten. Der größte Teil der wiedergegebenen Manuskripte entstand in den Jahren zwischen 1908 und 1915. Im Jahr 1925 hat Husserls Assistent Ludwig Landgrebe auf der Grundlage vieler der hier edierten Texte ein umfangreiches Typoskript mit dem Titel „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins“ angefertigt. Husserls fragmentarischer Entwurf einer Einleitung zu diesem Typoskript wird im ersten Band der Edition wiedergegeben. Der erste Teilband enthält Manuskripte, die der deskriptiven Analyse verschiedener Weisen der Objektivation in unterschiedlichen Aktformen und Aktvollzügen des Vorstellens und Denkens wie dem thematischen Meinen, dem Aufmerken und Zuwenden, dem Explizieren und Urteilen sowie dem Stellungnehmen gewidmet sind. Husserls besonderes Interesse gilt dabei der Beziehung zwischen Rezeptivität und Spontaneität.

Kurzfassung: Chapter 1. Gesamtinhaltsverzeichnis (zu Husserliana XLIIII, 1-4) -- Chapter 2. Einleitung der Hrsg -- Chapter 3. Textkritischer Anhang (zu Husserliana XLIII, 1-3) -- Chapter 4. Zur Textgestaltung -- Chapter 5. Textkritische Anmerkungen -- Chapter 6. Nachweis der Originalseiten -- Chapter 7. Namenregister.

Kurzfassung: Die ersten drei Bände der vorliegenden,vier Teilbände umfassenden Edition bieten eine umfangreiche Präsentation von Husserls deskriptiver Erforschung der intentionalen Strukturen des Bewusstseins in den drei Hauptklassen von intentionalen Akten, den Verstandes-, Gemüts- und Willensakten. Der größte Teil der wiedergegebenen Manuskripte entstand in den Jahren zwischen 1908 und 1915. Im Jahr 1925 hat Husserls Assistent Ludwig Landgrebe auf der Grundlage vieler der hier edierten Texte ein umfangreiches Typoskript mit dem Titel „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins“ angefertigt. Husserls fragmentarischer Entwurf einer Einleitung zu diesem Typoskript wird im ersten Band der Edition wiedergegeben. Der vierte Teilband enthält den textkritischen Apparat.

Kurzfassung: Chapter 1. Die Handlung als Willentlicher Vorgang -- Chapter 2. Das Wesen des schlichten Handelns -- Chapter 3. Unterschiede in der Willensmeinung -- Chapter 4. Willenskausation und Physische Kausation -- Chapter 5. Naturkausalität und Willenskausalität. Zur Analyse der Primären schöpferischen Handlung -- Chapter 6. Passivität und Spontaneität im Doxischen Gebiet und im Willensgebiet -- Chapter 7. Praktische Möglichkeiten und Praktischer Bereich. Die Modi willentlichen Geschehens -- Chapter 8. Das Bewusstsein des „Ich kann“ als Voraussetzung Jeder Willensthesis. Die Konstitution von Willenswegen und Tätigkeitsfeldern aus Unwillkürlichen Ichtätigkeiten -- Chapter 9. Die Entwicklung „Praktischer Apperzeptionen“ (des Willens). Doxische und Praktische Affektion -- Chapter 10. Zur Willensanalyse: Das Wirken des Ich als Inneres und äußeres Tun und Erzeugen. Die aus dem Vollzug von Stellungnahmen Erwachsenden Idealen Bestimmungen des Ich -- Chapter 11. Vorstellen, Denken und Handeln -- Chapterv 12. Das Allgemeine des Strebens und Seine Verschiedenen Richtungen -- Chapter 13. Zur Lehre von der Intentionalität im Hinblick auf die Genesis der Weltkonstitution. Der Strebenscharakter des Aktlebens -- Ergänzende Texte.

Kurzfassung: Die ersten drei Bände der vorliegenden, vier Teilbände umfassenden Edition bieten eine umfangreiche Präsentation von Husserls deskriptiver Erforschung der intentionalen Strukturen des Bewusstseins in den drei Hauptklassen von intentionalen Akten, den Verstandes-, Gemüts- und Willensakten. Der größte Teil der wiedergegebenen Manuskripte entstand in den Jahren zwischen 1908 und 1915. Im Jahr 1925 hat Husserls Assistent Ludwig Landgrebe auf der Grundlage vieler der hier edierten Texte ein umfangreiches Typoskript mit dem Titel „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins“ angefertigt. Husserls fragmentarischer Entwurf einer Einleitung zu diesem Typoskript wird im ersten Band der Edition wiedergegeben. Der dritte Teilband dokumentiert Husserls deskriptive Forschung im Willensgebiet, seine Analysen der Willens- und Handlungsformen, eingeschlossen die Willenspassivität in Form der Neigungen, Triebe, Tendenzen und Strebungen. Das Wollen als Ingangsetzen der Handlung, das fiat, wird vom die Handlung ausführenden Wollen, dem Handlungswillen, unterschieden. Verschiedene Formen der Handlung werden analysiert. Passive und aktive Willensmodi und ihre Beziehung werden untersucht. .

Kurzfassung: Translator’s Introduction -- Lecture I -- Lecture II -- Lecture III -- Lecture IV -- Lecture V -- Addenda -- The Train of Thought in the Lectures.

Kurzfassung: 3 same lecture he characterizes the phenomenology of knowledge, more specifically, as the "theory of the essence of the pure phenomenon of knowing" (see below, p. 36). Such a phenomenology would advance the "critique of knowledge," in which the problem of knowledge is clearly formulated and the possibility of knowledge rigorously secured. It is important to realize, however, that in these lectures Husserl will not enact, pursue, or develop a phenomenological critique of knowledge, even though he opens with a trenchant statement of the problem of knowledge that such a critique would solve. Rather, he seeks here only to secure the possibility of a phe­ nomenological critique of knowledge; that is, he attempts to secure the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge, not the possibil­ ity of knowledge in general (see below, pp. 37-39). Thus the work before us is not phenomenological in the straightforward sense, but pre­ phenomenological: it sets out to identify and satisfy the epistemic require­ ments of the phenomenological critique of knowledge, not to carry out that critique itself. To keep these two levels of theoretical inquiry distinct, I will call the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of knowledge the "critical level"; the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge the "meta-criticallevel.

Kurzfassung: The Paris Lectures -- General Summary of The Paris Lectures -- Translator’s Note -- General Summary -- Summary of the Correspondences between the Texts of The Paris Lectures and The Cartesian Meditations.

Kurzfassung: The train of thoughts in the lectures -- Lecture I -- Lecture II -- Lecture III -- Lecture IV -- Lecture V.

Kurzfassung: This translation is concluded in our Readings in Twentieth­ Century Philosophy, (N. Y. , The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. , 1963). We owe thanks to Professors W. D. Falk and William Hughes for helping us with the translation. We also owe thanks to Professor Herbert Spiegelberg, Dr. Walter Biemel and the Husser! Archives at Louvain for checking it and we are especially indebted to Professor Dorion Cairns, many of whose suggestions we incorporated in the final draft. WILLIAM P. ALSTON GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN January 1964 CONTENTS V Preface Introduction IX The train of thoughts in the lectures I Lecture I 13 Lecture II 22 Lecture III 33 Lecture IV 43 Lecture V 52 INTRODUCTION From April 26 to May 2, 1907, Husserl delivered five lectures in Gottingen. They introduce the main ideas of his later pheno­ menology, the one that goes beyond the phenomenology of the Logische Untersuchungen. These lectures and Husserl's summary of them entitled "The Train of Thoughts in the Lectures" were edited by Dr. Walter Biemel and first published in 1950 under the 1 title Die Idee der Phiinomenologie. Husserl wrote the summary on the night of the last lecture, not for formal delivery but for his own use. This accounts for the fact that the summary contains incomplete sentences. There are some discrepancies between Lecture V and the corresponding passages in the summary. We may suppose that the passages in the summary are a closer approximation to what Husserl wanted to say.

Kurzfassung: 1. The development of modem psychology, Dilthey’s decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology) -- 2. The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his beginning -- 3. Task and significance of the Logical Investigations -- a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths -- b) Researching the correlation: ideal object — psychic lived experiencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description in the reflective attitude -- c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection) -- d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic -- e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for the theory of knowledge -- f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the Logical Investigations. Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental phenomenology — the science of transcendental subjectivity -- 4. Summarizing characterization of the new psychology -- Systematic Part -- 5. Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Questioning the concepts, nature and mind -- 6. Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience) -- 7. Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons -- 8. The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science -- 9. Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori -- a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the factual by fantasy — the eidos as the invariable -- b) Variation and alteration -- c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping what agrees as the eidos -- d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation -- e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the highest genera by variation of ideas — seeing of ideas without starting from experience -- f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences -- 10. The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instruments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world (“natural concept of the world”). Possibility of an articulation of the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind -- 11. Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world. Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian concept of experience. Space and time as the most universal structures of the world -- 12. Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity -- 13. Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality -- 14. Order of realities in the world -- 15. Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-à-vis the psyche -- 16. The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object, which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject -- 17. Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real properties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses -- 18. Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of the natural scientist -- 19. The true world in itself a necessary presumption -- 20. Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy and abnormalcy -- 21. Hierarchical structure of the psychic -- 22. Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal determinations -- 23. Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving -- 24. The unity of the psychic -- 25. The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the naturalistic prejudice -- 26. The subjective in the world as objective theme -- 27. The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the world -- 28. Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective. The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude -- 29. Perceptual field — perceptual space -- 30. Spatial primal presence -- 31. Hyle — hyletic data as matter for intentional functions -- 32. Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object -- 33. Objective temporality and temporality of the stream -- 34. Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in perception. The object as irreal pole -- 35. Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the empty horizon -- 36. The intentional object of perception -- 37. The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the immanent -- 38. The access to pure subjectivity from external perception -- 39. Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself -- 40. The problem of temporality: presenting — retention and protention (positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their significance for practical life) -- 41. Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole. The I as pole of activities and habitualities -- 42. The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others. Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions -- 43. The unity of the subject as monad — static and genetic investigation of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of monads -- 44. Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the corresponding sciences -- 45. Retrospective sense-investigation -- Selected Bibliography.

Kurzfassung: THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno­ logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A.

Kurzfassung: The Author’s Abstracts 1900/01 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511–12 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260–63 -- A Draft of a “Preface” to the Logical Investigations, 1913 -- I. Eugen Fink’s Editorial Remarks -- II. Husserl’s Text.

Kurzfassung: TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III.

Kurzfassung: Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of “thinking.” Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the “thinking” capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the “Objective” or “positive” sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic’s interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, “distinct judgment,” as the theme of “pure analytics” -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of “the same” confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz’s “mathesis universalis,” and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano’s position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the “Prolegomena” from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a “deductive” or “nomological” system-clarified by the concept of “definiteness” -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the “concept” determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist’s attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. “Mathesis pura” as properly logical and as extralogical. The “mathematics of mathematicians” -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enou...

Kurzfassung: 2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.

Kurzfassung: First Meditation. The Way to the Transcendental Ego -- Second Meditation. The Field of Transcendental Experience Laid Open in Respect of Its Universal Structures -- Third Meditation. Constitutional Problems. Truth and Actuality -- Fourth Meditation. Development of the Constitutional Problems Pertaining to the Transcendental Ego Himself -- Fifth Meditation. Uncovering of the Sphere of Transcendental Being as Monadological Intersubjectivity -- Conclusion.