Abstract: This course on logic and theory of knowledge fell exactly midway between the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900-01 and Ideas I in 1913. It constitutes a summation and consolidation of Husserl's logico-scientific, epistemological, and epistemo-phenomenological investigations of the preceding years and an important step in the journey from the descriptivo-psychological elucidation of pure logic in the Logical Investigations to the transcendental phenomenology of the absolute consciousness of the objective correlates constituting themselves in its acts in Ideas I. In this course Hu

Abstract: Translator’s Introduction -- Lecture I -- Lecture II -- Lecture III -- Lecture IV -- Lecture V -- Addenda -- The Train of Thought in the Lectures.

Abstract: 3 same lecture he characterizes the phenomenology of knowledge, more specifically, as the "theory of the essence of the pure phenomenon of knowing" (see below, p. 36). Such a phenomenology would advance the "critique of knowledge," in which the problem of knowledge is clearly formulated and the possibility of knowledge rigorously secured. It is important to realize, however, that in these lectures Husserl will not enact, pursue, or develop a phenomenological critique of knowledge, even though he opens with a trenchant statement of the problem of knowledge that such a critique would solve. Rather, he seeks here only to secure the possibility of a phe­ nomenological critique of knowledge; that is, he attempts to secure the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge, not the possibil­ ity of knowledge in general (see below, pp. 37-39). Thus the work before us is not phenomenological in the straightforward sense, but pre­ phenomenological: it sets out to identify and satisfy the epistemic require­ ments of the phenomenological critique of knowledge, not to carry out that critique itself. To keep these two levels of theoretical inquiry distinct, I will call the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of knowledge the "critical level"; the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge the "meta-criticallevel.

Abstract: The Paris Lectures -- General Summary of The Paris Lectures -- Translator’s Note -- General Summary -- Summary of the Correspondences between the Texts of The Paris Lectures and The Cartesian Meditations.

Abstract: The train of thoughts in the lectures -- Lecture I -- Lecture II -- Lecture III -- Lecture IV -- Lecture V.

Abstract: This translation is concluded in our Readings in Twentieth­ Century Philosophy, (N. Y. , The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. , 1963). We owe thanks to Professors W. D. Falk and William Hughes for helping us with the translation. We also owe thanks to Professor Herbert Spiegelberg, Dr. Walter Biemel and the Husser! Archives at Louvain for checking it and we are especially indebted to Professor Dorion Cairns, many of whose suggestions we incorporated in the final draft. WILLIAM P. ALSTON GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN January 1964 CONTENTS V Preface Introduction IX The train of thoughts in the lectures I Lecture I 13 Lecture II 22 Lecture III 33 Lecture IV 43 Lecture V 52 INTRODUCTION From April 26 to May 2, 1907, Husserl delivered five lectures in Gottingen. They introduce the main ideas of his later pheno­ menology, the one that goes beyond the phenomenology of the Logische Untersuchungen. These lectures and Husserl's summary of them entitled "The Train of Thoughts in the Lectures" were edited by Dr. Walter Biemel and first published in 1950 under the 1 title Die Idee der Phiinomenologie. Husserl wrote the summary on the night of the last lecture, not for formal delivery but for his own use. This accounts for the fact that the summary contains incomplete sentences. There are some discrepancies between Lecture V and the corresponding passages in the summary. We may suppose that the passages in the summary are a closer approximation to what Husserl wanted to say.

Abstract: 1. The development of modem psychology, Dilthey’s decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology) -- 2. The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his beginning -- 3. Task and significance of the Logical Investigations -- a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths -- b) Researching the correlation: ideal object — psychic lived experiencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description in the reflective attitude -- c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection) -- d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic -- e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for the theory of knowledge -- f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the Logical Investigations. Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental phenomenology — the science of transcendental subjectivity -- 4. Summarizing characterization of the new psychology -- Systematic Part -- 5. Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Questioning the concepts, nature and mind -- 6. Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience) -- 7. Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons -- 8. The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science -- 9. Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori -- a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the factual by fantasy — the eidos as the invariable -- b) Variation and alteration -- c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping what agrees as the eidos -- d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation -- e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the highest genera by variation of ideas — seeing of ideas without starting from experience -- f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences -- 10. The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instruments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world (“natural concept of the world”). Possibility of an articulation of the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind -- 11. Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world. Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian concept of experience. Space and time as the most universal structures of the world -- 12. Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity -- 13. Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality -- 14. Order of realities in the world -- 15. Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-à-vis the psyche -- 16. The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object, which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject -- 17. Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real properties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses -- 18. Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of the natural scientist -- 19. The true world in itself a necessary presumption -- 20. Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy and abnormalcy -- 21. Hierarchical structure of the psychic -- 22. Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal determinations -- 23. Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving -- 24. The unity of the psychic -- 25. The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the naturalistic prejudice -- 26. The subjective in the world as objective theme -- 27. The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the world -- 28. Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective. The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude -- 29. Perceptual field — perceptual space -- 30. Spatial primal presence -- 31. Hyle — hyletic data as matter for intentional functions -- 32. Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object -- 33. Objective temporality and temporality of the stream -- 34. Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in perception. The object as irreal pole -- 35. Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the empty horizon -- 36. The intentional object of perception -- 37. The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the immanent -- 38. The access to pure subjectivity from external perception -- 39. Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself -- 40. The problem of temporality: presenting — retention and protention (positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their significance for practical life) -- 41. Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole. The I as pole of activities and habitualities -- 42. The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others. Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions -- 43. The unity of the subject as monad — static and genetic investigation of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of monads -- 44. Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the corresponding sciences -- 45. Retrospective sense-investigation -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno­ logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A.

Abstract: The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes. Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as "Typescript C") on which Husserl wrote in 1933: "Cartes. Meditationen / Originaltext 1929 / E. Husserl / für Dorion Cairns". Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserl’s practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a foornote. The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the other - usually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote

Abstract: The Author’s Abstracts 1900/01 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511–12 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260–63 -- A Draft of a “Preface” to the Logical Investigations, 1913 -- I. Eugen Fink’s Editorial Remarks -- II. Husserl’s Text.

Abstract: TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III.

Abstract: Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of “thinking.” Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the “thinking” capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the “Objective” or “positive” sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic’s interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, “distinct judgment,” as the theme of “pure analytics” -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of “the same” confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz’s “mathesis universalis,” and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano’s position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the “Prolegomena” from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a “deductive” or “nomological” system-clarified by the concept of “definiteness” -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the “concept” determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist’s attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. “Mathesis pura” as properly logical and as extralogical. The “mathematics of mathematicians” -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enou...

Abstract: 2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.

Abstract: Preparatory Considerations -- I / The Structures and the Sphere of Objective Formal Logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truthlogic -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- 2. Initial questions of transcendental-logic: problems concerning fundamental concepts -- 3. The idealizing presuppositions of logic and the constitutive criticism of them -- 4. Evidential criticism of logical principles carried back to evidential criticism of experience -- 5. The subjective grounding of logic as a problem belonging to transcendental philosophy -- 6. Transcendental phenomenology and intentional psychology. The problem of transcendental psychologism -- 7. Objective logic and the phenomenology of reason -- Conclusion -- Appendix I / Syntactical Forms and Syntactical Stuffs; Core-Forms and Core-Stuffs -- § 1. The articulation of predicative judgments -- § 2. Relatedness to subject-matter in judgments -- § 3. Pure forms and pure stuffs -- § 4. Lower and higher forms. Their sense-relation to one another -- § 5. The self-contained functional unity of the self-sufficient apophansis. Division of the combination-forms of wholes into copulatives and conjunctions -- § 6. Transition to the broadest categorial sphere -- a. Universality of the combination-forms that we have distinguished -- b. The distinctions connected with articulation can be made throughout the entire categorial sphere -- c. The amplified concept of the categorial proposition contrasted with the concept of the proposition in the old apophantic analytics -- § 7. Syntactical forms, syntactical stuffs, syntaxes -- § 8. Syntagma and member. Self-sufficient judgments, and likewise judgments in the amplified sense, as syntagmas -- § 9. The “judgment-content” as the syntactical stuff of the judgment qua syntagma -- § 10. Levels of syntactical forming -- § 11. Non-syntactical forms and stuffs — exhibited within the pure syntactical stuffs -- § 12. The core-formation, with core-stuff and core-form -- § 13. Pre-eminence of the substantival category. Substantivation -- § 14. Transition to complications -- § 15. The concept of the “term” in traditional formal logic -- Appendix II / The Phenomenological Constitution of the Judgment. Originally Active Judging and Its Secondary Modifications -- § 1. Active judging, as generating objects themselves, contrasted with its secondary modifications -- § 2. From the general theory of intentionality -- a. Original consciousness and intentional modification. Static intentional explication. Explication of the “meaning” and of the meant “itself.” The multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness of the Same -- b. Intentional explication of genesis. The genetic, as well as static, originality of the experiencing manners of givenness. The “primal instituting” of “apperception” with respect to every object-category -- c. The time-form of intentional genesis and the constitution of that form. Retentional modification Sedimentation in the inconspicuous substratum (unconsciousness) -- § 3. Non-original manners of givenness of the judgment -- a. The retentional form as the intrinsically first form of “secondary sensuousness”. The livingly changing constitution of a many-membered judgment -- b. Passive recollection and its constitutional effect for the judgment as an abiding unity -- c. The emergence of something that comes to mind apperceptionally is analogous to something coming to mind after the fashion of passive recollection -- § 4. The essential possibilities of activating passive manners of givenness -- § 5. The fundamental types of originally generative judging and of any judging whatever -- § 6. Indistinct verbal judging and its function -- § 7. The superiority of retentional and recollectional to apperceptional confusion; secondary evidence in confusion -- Appendix III / The Idea of a “Logic of Mere Non-Contradiction” or a “Logic of Mere Consequence” -- § 1. The goal of formal non-contradiction and of formal consequence. Broader and narrower framing of these concepts -- § 2. Relation of the systematic and radical building of a pure analytics, back to the theory of syntaxes -- § 3. The characterization of analytic judgments as merely “elucidative of knowledge” and as “tautologies” -- § 4. Remarks on “tautology” in the logistical sense, with reference to §§ 14–18 of the main text. (By Oskar Becker.).

Abstract: called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas-as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modem sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modem times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a na!ivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate a priori possibilities and necessities.

Abstract: Inhaltsangabe -- Edmund Husserls Briefe an Roman Ingarden -- I. Schreiben vom Oktober 1915 -- II. Brief an Hofrat Roman Ingarden (Vater von Professor Roman Ingarden) vom 2. Februar 1917 -- III. Brief vom 13. Februar 1917 -- IV. Brief vom 20. Juni 1917 -- V. Brief vom 8. Juli 1917 -- VI. Brief vom 5. April 1918 -- VII. Brief vom 27. April 1918 -- VIII. Brief vom 16. November 1919 -- IX. Brief vom 12. März 1920 -- X. Brief vom 18. Juli 1920 -- XI. Brief vom 20. August 1920 -- XII. Brief vom 12. Dezember 1920 -- XIII. Brief vom 30. Dezember 1920 -- XIV. Brief vom 28. März 1921 -- XV. Brief vom 20. Juni 1921 -- XVI. Brief vom 6. August 1921 -- XVII. Brief vom 25. November 1921 -- XVIII. Brief vom 14. Dezember 1922 -- XIX. Brief vom 31. August 1923 -- XX. Brief vom 25. Februar 1924 -- XXI. Brief vom 16. Juni 1924 -- XXII. Brief vom 27. September 1924 -- XXIII. Brief vom 9. Dezember 1924 -- XXIV. Brief gegen Weihnachten 1924 -- XXV. Brief vom 27. Juni 1925 -- XXVI. Brief vom 10. Dezember 1925 -- XXVII. Brief vom 16. April 1926 -- XXVIII. Brief vom 9. April 1927 -- XXIX. Brief vom 29. Juni 1927 -- XXX. Brief vom 19. September 1927 -- XXXI. Brief vom 26. Dezember 1927 -- XXXII. Brief vom 23. Februar 1928 -- XXXIII. Brief vom 6. Mai 1928 -- XXXIV. Brief vom 13. Juli 1928 -- XXXV. Brief vom 18. Oktober 1928 -- XXXVI. Brief vom 23. Dezember 1928 -- XXXVII. Brief vom 31. Dezember 1928 -- XXXVIII. Brief vom 9. Januar 1928 -- XXXIX. Brief vom 16. März 1929 -- XL. Brief vom 24. März 1929 -- XLI. Brief vom 26. Mai 1929 -- XLII. Brief vom 2. Dezember 1929 -- XLIII. Brief vom 2. Dezember 1929 -- XLIV. Brief vom 19. März 1930 -- XLV. Brief vom 19. November 1930 -- XLVI. Brief vom 21. Dezember 1930 -- XL VII. Brief vom 31. Dezember 1930 -- XLVIII. Brief vom 5. Februar 1931 -- XLIX. Brief vom 16. Februar 1931 -- L. Brief vom 19. April 1931 -- LI. Brief vom 15. Mai 1931 -- LII. Brief vom 21. Mai 1931 -- LIII. Brief vom 8. Juli 1931 -- LIV. Brief vom 31. August 1931 -- LV. Brief vom 13. November 1931 -- LVI. Brief vom 25. November 1931 -- LVII. Brief vom 17. Dezember 1931 -- LVIII. Brief vom 10. Februar 1932 -- LIX. Brief vom 7. April 1932 -- LX. Brief vom 11. Juni 1932 -- LXI. Brief vom 19. August 1932 -- LXII. Brief vom 16. Oktober 1932 -- LXIII. Brief vom 21. Oktober 1932 -- LXIV. Brief vom 11. Oktober 1933 -- LXV. Brief vom 2. November 1933 -- LXVI. Brief vom 20. November 1933 -- LXVII. Brief vom 23. November 1933 -- LXVIII. Brief vom 13. Dezember 1933 -- LXIX. Brief vom 13. April 1934 -- LXX. Brief vom 31. Juli 1934 -- LXXI. Brief vom 25. August 1934 -- LXXII. Brief vom 7. Oktober 1934 -- LXXIII. Brief vom 26. November 1934 -- LXXIV. Brief vom 21. Dezember 1934 -- LXXV. Brief vom 15. März 1935 -- LXX VI. Brief vom 13. Mai 1935 -- LXXVII. Brief vom 10. Juli 1935 -- LXXVIII. Brief vom 23. Oktober 1935 -- LXXIX. Brief vom 14. Januar 1936 -- LXXX. Brief vom 16. Mai 1936 -- LXXXI. Brief vom 2. Februar 1936 -- LXXXII. Brief vom 15. Februar 1936 -- LXXXIII. Brief vom 31. Dezember 1936 -- LXXXIV. Brief vom 15. April 1937 -- LXXXV. Brief vom 23. Juli 1937 -- LXXXVI. Brief vom 24. Februar 1938 -- LXXXVII. Brief vom 20. März 1938 -- LXXXVIII. Brief vom 21. April 1938 -- LXXXIX. Todesanzeige vom 27. April 1938 -- Roman Ingarden -- Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl -- Erläuterungen zu den Briefen Husserls.

Abstract: First Meditation. The Way to the Transcendental Ego -- Second Meditation. The Field of Transcendental Experience Laid Open in Respect of Its Universal Structures -- Third Meditation. Constitutional Problems. Truth and Actuality -- Fourth Meditation. Development of the Constitutional Problems Pertaining to the Transcendental Ego Himself -- Fifth Meditation. Uncovering of the Sphere of Transcendental Being as Monadological Intersubjectivity -- Conclusion.