ISBN:
9781785360794
Sprache:
Englisch
Seiten:
1 Online-Ressource (1,248 p)
,
cm
Serie:
Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
Serie:
International library of critical writings in economics
Schlagwort(e):
Competition
;
Electronic books
Kurzfassung:
Recommended readings (Machine generated): Lysias (c. 386 B.C.), "Against the Corn Dealers." -- Case of Monopolies (1607), 11 Coke 84b-88b. The English Reports, LXXVII, 1260-1266. -- Adam Smith (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in Edwin Cannan (ed.), London: Methuen. -- James Madison (1787), "The Federalist No. 10," in Jacob E. Cooke (ed.) (1961), The Federalist, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 56-65. -- Henry C. Simons (1936), "The Requisites of Free Competition," American Economic Review, Supplement, 68-76. -- Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (1980), "Competition Policy and Antitrust: Some Comparative Observations," Zeitschrift fuer die Gasamte Staatswissenschaft, September, 387-398. -- John Bates Clark (1900), "Trusts," Political Science Quarterly, XV (2), June, 181-195. -- Arthur T. Hadley (1887), "Private Monopolies and Public Rights," Quarterly Journal of Economics, reprinted 1961, 1, 28-44. -- Robert Liefmann (1915), "Monopoly or Competition as the Basis of a Government Trust Policy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXIX, 308-325. -- Richard T. Ely (1887), "The Future of Corporations," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 75, July, 259-266. -- Alfred Marshall (1980), Some Aspects of Competition: Presidential Address Delivered to the Economic Science and Statistics Section of the British Association, at Leeds, 1890, London: Harrison and Sons, 5-35. -- Jeriamiah W. Jenks (1900), The Trust Problem, New York: McClure, Phillips & Co. -- Eliot Jones (1920), "Is Competition in Industry Ruinous," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXIV, 473-519. -- Kojiro Niino (1962), "The Logic of Excessive Competition - With Reference to the Japanese Inter-firm Competition," Kobe University Economic Review, 8, 51-62. -- Ruytaro Komiya (1990), The Japanese Economy: Trade, Industry, and Government, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. -- Robert H. Bork (1966), "Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act", Journal of Law and Economics, IX, October, 7-48. -- Robert H. Lande (1989), "Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust," Antitrust Law Journal, 58, 631-644. -- Richard A. Posner (1975), "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, 83 (4), August, 807-827. -- William S. Comanor and Robert H. Smiley (1975), "Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXIX (2), May, 177-194.
Kurzfassung:
James C. Miller III, Thomas F. Walton, William E. Kovacic and Jeremy A. Rabkin (1984), "Industrial Policy: Reindustrialization Through Competition or Coordinated Action?" Yale Journal on Regulation, 2 (1), 1-37. -- Kurt Bloch (1932) "On German Cartels," Journal of Business, V (3), July, 213-222. -- David B. Audretsch (1989), "Legalized Cartels in West Germany," Antitrust Bulletin, 34, Fall, 579-600. -- Klaus Stegemann (1977), "The Exemption of Specialization Agreements: As Proposed for Stage II Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act," Canadian Public Policy, 3 (4), Autumn, 533-545. -- John M. Connor and Robert H. Lande (2012), "Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays," Cardozo Law Review, 34 (2), 101-157. -- John M. Connor (2000), Global Price Fixing, Boston: Kluwer. -- Peter Asch and Joseph J. Seneca (1975), "Characteristics of Collusive Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, XXIII, March, 223-237. -- James P. Cairns (1964), "Benefits from Restrictive Agreements: The British Experience," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXX (2), May, 228-240. -- R. W. Shaw and S. A. Shaw (1983), "Excess Capacity and Rationalisation in the West European Synthetic Fibres Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXII (2), December, 149-66. -- Merton J. Peck, Richard C. Levin and Akira Goto (1988), "Picking Losers: Public Policy Toward Declining Industries in Japan," in John B. Shoven (ed.), Government Policy Towards Industry in the United States and Japan, Cambridge: CUP, 195-221, 235-239. -- William H. Nicholls (1949), "The Tabacco Case of 1946," American Economic Review, XXXIX (3), May, 284-296. -- Jesse Markham (1951), "The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership," American Economic Review, XLI, December, 891-905. -- F. M. Scherer (2015), "The Federal Trade Commission, Oligopoly, and Shared Monopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, 46, 5-23. -- Charles J. Bullock (1901), "Trust Literature: A Survey and a Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XV, February, 167-217. -- F. M. Scherer (1987), "Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress," New York University Law Review, 62 (5), November, 998-1019. -- F. M. Scherer (2011), "Standard Oil as a Technological Innovator," Review of Industrial Organization, 38, 225-233. -- George W. Stocking and Willard F. Mueller (1955), "The Cellophane Case and the New Competition," American Economic Review, XLV, March, 29-63. -- Oliver E. Williamson (1972), "Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations," Harvard Law Review, 85, June, 1512-1531. -- Erich Kaufer (1980), "The Control of the Abuse of Market Power by Market-Dominant Firms Under the German Law Against Restraints of Competition," Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 136 (3), September, 510-532.
Kurzfassung:
Eleanor M. Fox (1986), "Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness," Notre Dame Law Review, 61 (5), 981-1020. -- F. M. Scherer (2011), "Abuse of Dominance by High Technology Enterprises: A Comparison of U.S. and E.C. Approaches," Economia e Politica Industriale (Journal of Industrial and Business Economics), March, 39-62. -- Richard E. Caves (1974), "International Trade, International Investment, and Imperfect Markets," Special Papers in International Economics No. 10, International Finance Section, Princeton University, November 1-34. -- Lester G. Telser (1966), "Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse," Journal of Law and Economics, IX, October, 259-270. -- Basil S. Yamey (1972), "Predtatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments," Journal of Law and Economics, XV (1), April, 129-42. -- Malcolm R. Burns (1986), "Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (2), April 266-296. -- Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act," Harvard Law Review, 88 (4), February, 697-733. -- Oliver E. Williamson (1977), "Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis," Yale Law Journal, 87 (284), December, Sections I-II, VII, 284-315, 337-340. -- William J. Baumol (1979), "Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing," Yale Law Journal, 89 (1), November 1-26. -- George J. Stigler (1950), "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," American Economic Review, XL (2), May, 23-34. -- George Bittlingmayer (1985), "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?" Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII (1), April, 77-98, 116-118. -- Shaw Livermore (1935), "The Success of Industrial Mergers," Quarterly Journal of Economics, L, November, 68-96. -- Jürgen Müller (1976), "The Impact of Mergers on Concentration: A Study of Eleven West German Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, XXV (2), 113-132. -- David M. Barton and Roger Sherman (1984), "The Price and Profit Effects of Horizontal Merger: A Case Study," Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXIII (2), December, 165-177. -- Henry G. Manne (1965), "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, LXXIII, April, 110-120. -- Richard E. Caves (1989), "Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs. Hindsight," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 7, March, 151-174. -- Ajit Singh (1971), Take-overs: Their Relevance to the Stock Market and the Theory of the Firm, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Oliver E. Williamson (1968), " Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, LVIII, March, 18-36. -- U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (June 14 1984), 1-11, 13-15.
Kurzfassung:
F. M. Scherer (2012), "Merger Efficiencies and Competition Policy," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development conference paper, DAF/COMP/WD(2012). -- Alexis Jacquemin (1990), "Horizontal Concentration and European Merger Policy," European Economic Review, 34, May, 539-550. -- William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), "Market Power in Antitrust Cases," Harvard Law Review, 94 (5), March, 937-983. -- George J. Stigler and Robert A. Sherwin (1985), "The Extent of the Market," Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII (1), October, 555-585. -- F. M. Scherer (2009), "On the Paternity of a Market Delineation Approach," American Antitrust Institute working paper 09-01, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/aai-working-paper-no-09-01-paternity-market-delineation-approach. -- The Economist (2016), March, 23-28. -- William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga (1974), "Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, " Journal of Law and Economics, XVII (2), October, 329-356. -- F. M. Scherer (1990), 'Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission', Administrative Law Review, 42 (4), Fall, 461-487. -- The Case of Monopolies', (1907), 11 Coke 84b-88b, The English Reports, LXXVII, 1260-66 -- Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in Edwin Cannan (ed.), London, Methuen, Volume I, 63-4, 124-7, 130, Volume II, 245-6 -- James Madison (1961), 'The Federalist No. 10', in Jacob E. Cooke (ed.), The Federalist, Middletown, CT; Wesleyan University Press, 56-65 -- Arthur T. Hadley (1887), 'Private Monopolies and Public Rights', Quarterly Journal of Economics, reprinted 1961, 1, 28-44 -- Richard T. Ely (1887), 'The Future of Corporations', Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 75, July, 259-66 -- Alfred Marshall (1890), Some Aspects of Competition: Presidential Address Delivered to the Economic Science and Statistics Section of the British Association, at Leeds, 1890, London: Harrison and Sons, 5-35 -- John Bates Clark (1900), 'Trusts', Political Science Quarterly, XV (2), June, 181-95 -- Henry C. Simons (1936), 'The Requisites of Free Competition', American Economic Review, XXVI (1), March (Supplement), 68-76 -- Robert Liefmann (1915), 'Monopoly or Competition as the Basis of a Government Trust Policy', Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXIX, 308-25 -- Eliot Jones (1920), 'Is Competition in Industry Ruinous', Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXIV, 473-519 -- Kojiro Niino (1962), 'The Logic of Excessive Competition - With Reference to the Japanese Inter-firm Competition', Kobe University Economic Review, 8, 51-62.
Kurzfassung:
Ryutaro Komiya (1990), The Japanese Economy: Trade, Industry, and Government, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 297-301, notes and references -- Robert H. Bork (1966), 'Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act', Journal of Law and Economics, IX, October, 7-48 -- Robert H. Lande (1989), 'Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust', Antitrust Law Journal, 58, 631-44 -- Richard A. Posner (1975), 'The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation', Journal of Political Economy, 83 (4), August, 807-27 -- William S. Comanor and Robert H. Smiley (1975), 'Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXIX (2), May, 177-94 -- James C. Miller III, Thomas F. Walton, William E. Kovacic and Jeremy A. Rabkin (1984), 'Industrial Policy: Reindustrialization Through Competition or Coordinated Action?', Yale Journal on Regulation, 2 (1), 1-37 -- (1926), 'Against the Corn Dealers', Lysias, Classical Library, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 490-503 -- Kurt Bloch Dr. (1932), 'On German Cartels', Journal of Business, V (3), July, 213-22 -- Emst-Joachim Mestmacker (1980), 'Competition Policy and Antitrust: Some Comparative Observations', Zeitschrtfi filr die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 136 (3), September, 387-98, 404-7 -- David B. Audretsch (1989), 'Legalized Cartels in West Germany', Antitrust Bulletin, 34, Fall, 579-600 -- Klaus Stegemann (1977), 'The Exemption of Specialization Agreements: As Proposed for Stage II Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act', Canadian Public Policy, 3 (4), Autumn, 533-45 -- James P. Cairns (1964), 'Benefits from Restrictive Agreements: The British Experience', Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXX (2), May, 228-40 -- R.W. Shaw and S.A. Shaw (1983), 'Excess Capacity and Rationalisation in the West European Synthetic Fibres Industry', Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXII (2), December, 149-66 -- Merton J. Peck, Richard C. Levin and Akira Goto (1988), 'Picking Losers: Public Policy Toward Declining Industries in Japan', in John B. Shoven (ed.), Government Policy Towards Industry in the United States and Japan, Cambridge: CUP, 195-221, 235-9 -- William H. Nicholls (1949), 'The Tobacco Case of 1946', American Economic Review, XXXIX (3), May, 284-96 -- Jesse W. Markham (1951), 'The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership', American Economic Review, XLI, December, 891-905 -- Peter Asch and Joseph J. Seneca (1975), 'Characteristics of Collusive Firms', Journal of Industrial Economics, XXIII, March, 223-37 -- Charles J. Bullock (1901), 'Trust Literature: A Survey and a Criticism', Quarterly Journal of Economics, XV, February, 167-217 -- F.M. Scherer (1987), 'Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress', New York University Law Review, 62 (5), November, 998-1019.
Kurzfassung:
George W. Stocking and Willard F. Mueller (1955), 'The Cellophane Case and the New Competition', American Economic Review, XLV, March, 29-63 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1972), 'Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations', Harvard Law Review, 85, June, 1512-31 -- Erich Kaufer (1980), 'The Control of the Abuse of Market Power by Market-Dominant Firms Under the German Law Against Restraints of Competition', Zeitschrifi fir die Gesamte Staaiswissenschaft, 136 (3), September, 510-32 -- Eleanor M. Fox (1986), 'Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness', Notre Dame Law Review, 61 (5), 981-1020 -- Richard E. Caves (1974), 'International Trade, International Investment, and Imperfect Markets', Special Papers in International Economics No. 10, International Finance Section, Princeton University, November, 1-34 -- L.G. Telser (1966), 'Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse', Journal of Law and Economics, IX, October, 259-70 -- B.S, Yamey (1972), 'Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments', Journal of Law and Economics, XV (1), April, 129-42 -- Malcolm R. Burns (1986), 'Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (2), April, 266-96 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1977), 'Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis', Yale Law Journal, 87 (284), December, Sections I-H, VII, 284-315, 337-40 -- William J. Baumol (1979), 'Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing', Yale Law Journal, 89 (1), November, 1-26 -- George J. Stigler (1950), 'Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger', American Economic Review, XL (2), May, 23-34 -- George Bittlingmayer (1985), 'Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII (1), April, 77-98, 116-18 -- Shaw Livermore (1935), 'The Success of Industrial Mergers', Quarterly Journal of Economics, L, November, 68-96 -- Jürgen Müller (1976), 'The Impact of Mergers on Concentration: A Study of Eleven West German Industries', Journal of Industrial Economics, XXV (2), December, 113-32 -- David M. Barton and Roger Sherman (1984), 'The Price and Profit Effects of Horizontal Merger: A Case Study', Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXHI (2), December, 165-77 -- Henry G. Marine (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, LXXHI, April, 110-20 -- Richard E. Caves (1989), 'Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs. Hindsight', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 7, March, 151-74 -- Oliver E. Williamson (1968), 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs', American Economic Review, LVIII, March, 18-36 -- Alexis Jacquemin (1990), 'Horizontal Concentration and European Merger Policy', European Economic Review, 34, May, 539-50.
Kurzfassung:
William M. Landes and vRichard A. Posner (1981), 'Market Power in Antitrust Cases', Harvard Law Review, 94 (5), March, 937-83 -- George J. Stigler and Robert A. Sherwin (1985), 'The Extent of the Market', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII (1), October, 555-85 -- U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (June 14 1984), 1-11, 13-15 -- William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga (1974), 'Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages', Journal of Law and Economics, XVH (2), October, 329-56 -- F.M. Scherer (1990), 'Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission', Administrative Law Review, 42, Fall, 461-87.
Kurzfassung:
This review draws on a collection of seminal writings dealing with the development of competition policy in Europe, the United States and Japan. It begins by discussing the writings of leading philosophers and scholars on the rationale and desirability of competition in market economies. These interpretations range in time of origin from ancient Greece through to Adam Smith and James Madison to very recent contributions in the competition policy debate. Having established relevant philosophical foundations, the review offers analyses by leading British, American, German and Japanese scholars on the interpretation and administration of laws concerning price-fixing and other restrictive agreements, market dominance and monopolization, predatory practices and mergers
Anmerkung:
The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings
,
Includes bibliographical references
DOI:
10.4337/9781785360794
URL:
Deutschlandweit zugänglich
URL:
Deutschlandweit zugänglich
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