ISBN:
9789400764460
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (X, 93 p. 1 illus, digital)
Series Statement:
SpringerBriefs in Philosophy
Series Statement:
SpringerLink
Series Statement:
Bücher
Parallel Title:
Druckausg.
Keywords:
Philosophy (General)
;
Science Philosophy
;
Philosophy
;
Philosophy (General)
;
Science Philosophy
;
Dialektik
;
Denken
Abstract:
When scientist investigate why things happen, they aim at giving an explanation. But what does a scientific explanation look like? In the first chapter (Theories of Scientific Explanation) of this book, the milestones in the debate on how to characterize scientific explanations are exposed. The second chapter (How to Study Scientific Explanation?) scrutinizes the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation, Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon and shows what went wrong. Next, it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation and clarify briefly what this approach consists in. The third chapter (A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices) elaborates the pragmatic approach by presenting a toolbox for analysing scientific explanation. In the last chapter (Examples of Descriptions and Evaluations of Explanatory Practices) the approach is illustrated with real-life examples of scientists aiming at explaining. This book can be used as a textbook for intermediate philosophy of science courses and is also valuable as “suggested reading” for introductory courses in philosophy of science. The way the book is set up makes it an excellent study and research guide for advanced (MA and PhD) students that work on the topic of scientific explanation. Finally, it is a handy source and reference book for senior researchers in the field of scientific explanations and - more generally - for all philosophers of science.
Description / Table of Contents:
Contents; Introduction; 1 Theories of Scientific Explanation; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Hempel's Models; 1.2.1 The DN Model; 1.2.2 The Value of Explanations; 1.2.3 The IS Model; 1.3 Problems for Hempel's Models; 1.3.1 Accidental Generalisations; 1.3.2 Irrelevant Premises; 1.3.3 Asymmetry; 1.4 Strategies for Solving the Problems; 1.4.1 Causal Derivations; 1.4.2 Positive Causal Factors; 1.4.3 Positive and Negative Causal Factors; 1.4.4 Unificationism; 1.4.5 The Causal-Mechanical Model; 1.4.6 Overview; 1.5 Philip Kitcher's Unification Account of Explanation; 1.5.1 The Idea of Unification
Description / Table of Contents:
1.5.2 Argument Patterns1.5.3 Four Factors of Unifying Power; 1.5.4 Explanations Versus Non-Explanatory Arguments; 1.6 Wesley Salmon's Causal-Mechanical Model of Explanation; 1.6.1 Etiological and Constitutive Explanations; 1.6.2 Causal Interactions; 1.6.3 Causal Processes; 1.6.4 Examples of Causal-Mechanical Explanations; 1.7 Summary and Preview; References; 2 How to Study Scientific Explanation?; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Rudolf Carnap on Explication; 2.3 Carl Hempel's Working-Method; 2.3.1 The First Stage: Explication; 2.3.2 Descriptive and Normative Claims; 2.3.3 Hempel's Failures
Description / Table of Contents:
2.4 Philip Kitcher's Working-Method2.4.1 Kitcher Versus Hempel; 2.4.2 Kitcher's Positive Descriptive Claim; 2.4.3 Kitcher's Normative Claim; 2.5 Wesley Salmon's Working Method; 2.6 A Pragmatic Approach to Studying Scientific Explanations; 2.6.1 Context-Dependent Normative Claims; 2.6.2 Context-Dependent Descriptive Claims; 2.6.3 Epistemic Interests; 2.6.4 Methodological Neutrality Versus Methodological Commitment; 2.6.5 Pragmatic Approach Versus Pragmatic Theory; 2.7 Conclusion; References; 3 A Toolbox for Describing and Evaluating Explanatory Practices; 3.1 Introduction
Description / Table of Contents:
3.2 Types of Explanation-Seeking Questions3.2.1 Explanations of Particular Facts Versus Explanations of Regularities; 3.2.2 Questions About Particular Facts; 3.2.2.1 Questions About Plain Facts; 3.2.2.2 Contrastive Questions; 3.2.2.3 Resemblance Questions; 3.2.3 Questions About Regularities; 3.2.3.1 Examples and Types of Regularities; 3.2.3.2 Types of Questions; 3.3 Possible Formats of Answers to Why-Questions About Plain Facts; 3.3.1 Introduction; 3.3.2 The CDN Format; 3.3.2.1 Structure; 3.3.2.2 Examples; 3.3.3 The PCR Format; 3.3.4 The PNC Format; 3.3.5 The Etiological Format
Description / Table of Contents:
3.3.6 Variations on Previously Described Formats3.4 Possible Formats of Answers to Contrastive Why-Questions; 3.4.1 Introduction: Woodward's Desideratum; 3.4.2 From Reality to Alternative Scenarios; 3.4.3 From an Ideal Scenario to Reality; 3.4.4 Real Contrasts; 3.5 Possible Formats of Answers to Resemblance Why-Questions; 3.5.1 Introduction; 3.5.2 Top-Down Unification; 3.5.3 Bottom-Up Unification; 3.5.3.1 Social Revolutions; 3.5.3.2 Discussion; 3.6 Possible Formats of Explanations of Regularities; 3.6.1 Introduction; 3.6.2 Covering Law Explanations of Regularities
Description / Table of Contents:
3.6.3 Mechanistic Explanations of Capacities
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-007-6446-0
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