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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789401033329
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (187p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 32
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 32
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Logic
    Abstract: I -- I. The Fundamental Criterion for the Soundness of Arguments -- II. Inferential and Classical Logic -- III. Proof by Contradiction -- IV. The Problem of Locke-Berkeley -- V. On the So-Called ‘Thought Machine’ -- II -- VI. The Paradoxes -- VII. Reason and Intuition -- VIII. Formalized Language and Common Usage -- IX. Considerations about Logical Thought -- X. Constants of Mathematical Thought -- Sources -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.
    Abstract: It is common to consider an area of science as a system of real or sup­ posed truths which not only continuously extends itself, but also needs periodical revision and therefore tests the inventive capacity of each generation of scholars anew. It sounds highly implausible that a science at one time would be completed, that at that point within its scope there would be no problems left to solve. Indeed, the solution of a scientific problem inevitably raises new questions, so that our eagerness for knowledge will never find lasting satisfaction. Nevertheless there is one science which seems to form an exception to this rule, formal logic, the theory of rigorous argumentation. It seems to have reached the ideal endpoint of every scientific aspiration already very shortly after its inception; using the work of some predecessors, Aristotle, or so it is at least assumed by many, has brought this branch of science once and for all to a conclusion. Of course this doesn't sound that implausible. We apparently know what rigorous argumentation is; otherwise various sciences, in particular pure mathematics, would be completely impossible. And if we know what rigorous argumentation is, then it cannot be difficult to trace once and for all the rules which govern it. The unique subject of formal logic would therefore entail that this science, in variance with the rule which holds for all other sciences, has been able to reach completion at a certain point in history.
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9789401032698
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (188p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, A Series of Monographs on the Recent Development of Symbolic Logic, Significs, Sociology of Language, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, Statistics of Language and Related Fields 4
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 4
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Logic
    Abstract: I. Purely Implicational Logic -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Deduction-Theoretic Approach -- 3. Semantic Approach -- 4. Axiomatic Approach -- 5. Completeness -- II. Full Sentential Logic -- 6. Introduction -- 7. Introduction of Further Sentential Connectives -- III. Theory of Quantification, Equality, and Functionality -- 8. Notation -- 9. Reduction Schemata -- 10. Axiomatic Method -- 11. Weak Completeness Theorems -- 12. Equality -- 13. Functionality -- IV. Completeness of Elementary Logic -- 14. Introduction -- 15. Quantification Theory -- 16. Theory of Equality and Functionality -- V. The Formalization of Arithmetic and its Limitations -- 17. An Axiom System for Arithmetic -- 18. Syntactic Incompleteness -- 19. Semantic Incompleteness -- 20. Logic of Higher Order -- VI. The Theory of Definition -- 21. Introduction -- 22. Definability of Primitive Notions -- 23. Padoa’s Method -- 24. Definition-Theoretic Incompleteness -- VII. On Machines Which Prove Theorems -- 25. Introduction — Computation and Formal Deduction -- 26. Formal Deduction and Computing Machines -- 27. The Subformula Principle -- 28. Semantic Tableaux and Natural Deduction -- 29. Complications -- 30. Introduction of New Individual Parameters -- 31. Types of Logical Problems -- 32. Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Supplementary Explanations -- 33. Formal Description of Deduction by Closed Semantic Tableaux -- 34. Independence -- 35. Intuitionistic Logic and Minimal Calculus -- 37. Elementary Logic with Equality and Terms -- 39. Semantic Rules for Quantification Theory -- 40. Deduction-Theoretic Treatment of the Theory of Quantification -- 41. Numerical Computation -- 42. The Interpolation Theorem of Craig-Lyndon -- List of Schemata and Axioms -- (A) Sources -- (B) Recommended Reading -- (C) Periodicals -- Index of Authors and Subjects.
    Abstract: Many philosophers have considered logical reasoning as an inborn ability of mankind and as a distinctive feature in the human mind; but we all know that the distribution of this capacity, or at any rate its development, is very unequal. Few people are able to set up a cogent argument; others are at least able to follow a logical argument and even to detect logical fallacies. Nevertheless, even among educated persons there are many who do not even attain this relatively modest level of development. According to my personal observations, lack of logical ability may be due to various circumstances. In the first place, I mention lack of general intelligence, insufficient power of concentration, and absence of formal education. Secondly, however, I have noticed that many people are unable, or sometimes rather unwilling, to argue ex hypothesi; such persons cannot, or will not, start from premisses which they know or believe to be false or even from premisses whose truth is not, in their opinion, sufficient­ ly warranted. Or, if they agree to start from such premisses, they sooner or later stray away from the argument into attempts first to settle the truth or falsehood of the premisses. Presumably this attitude results either from lack of imagination or from undue moral rectitude. On the other hand, proficiency in logical reasoning is not in itself a guarantee for a clear theoretic insight into the principles and foundations of logic.
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