Abstract: Introduction: Against the Elitism of Excessive Scholarship -- Notes -- One: Man as Machine -- Notes -- I. Positivism is to be rejected out of hand -- Notes -- II. Reductionism is an attractive metaphysics -- Notes -- III. Explanation is not elimination -- Notes -- IV. In praise of methodological pluralism -- V. In praise of idle speculation -- Notes -- Two: Man as Animal -- Notes -- VI. Man-as-animal is not the animal-in-man -- Notes -- VII. The philosophical weakness of neo-Darwinism -- Notes -- VIII. The subtlety of behaviorism is sham -- Notes -- IX. Behaviorism as a stern moralizing -- Notes -- X. Anti-intellectualism explained -- Notes -- Three: Man as Rational -- Notes -- XI. Greek metaphysics today -- Notes -- XII. Science and pseudo-science are entangled -- Notes -- XIII. Science is traditionally based on a myth -- Notes -- XIV. The myth that science is utterly rational -- Notes -- XV. Social science without the myth of science -- Notes -- Four: Man as Social -- Notes -- XVI. The rationality of science is partial -- Notes -- XVII. Assuming too much rationality is silly -- Notes -- XVIII. Equality is hard to define -- Notes -- XIX. Psychologism and collectivism explain away each other -- Notes -- XX. A non-reductionist demarcation between psychology and sociology -- Notes -- Five: Man in the Image of God -- Notes -- XXI. Utopias of psychologism and of collectivism are identical -- Notes -- XXII. Skepticism rehabilitated -- Notes -- XXIII. Culture is no burden -- Notes -- XXIV. An image of the democratic man -- Notes -- XXV. Towards a rational philosophical anthropology -- Notes -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The thesis of the present volume is critical and dual. (1) Present day philosophy of man and sciences of man suffer from the Greek mis­ taken polarization of everything human into nature and convention which is (allegedly) good and evil, which is (allegedly) truth and fal­ sity, which is (allegedly) rationality and irrationality, to wit, the polar­ ization of all fields of inquiry, the natural and social sciences, as well as ethics and all technology, whether natural or social, into the totally positive and the totally negative. (2) Almost all philosophy and sci­ ences of man share the erroneous work ethic which is the myth of man's evil nature - the myth of the beast in man, the doctrine of original sin. To mediate or to compromise between the first view of human nature as good with the second view of it as evil, sociologists have devised a modified utilitarianism with deferred gratification so­ called, and the theory of the evil of artificial competition (capitalist and socialist alike) and of keeping up with the Joneses. Now, the mediation is not necessary. For, the polarization makes for abstract errors which are simplistic views of rationality, such as reductionism and positivism of all sorts, as well as for concrete errors, such as the disposition to condemn repeatedly those human weaknesses which are inevitable, namely man's inability to be perfectly rational, avoid all error, etc. , thus setting man against himself as all too wicked.

Abstract: 1. Introduction: The Paradoxes of Paranoia -- 2. Psychological Background -- 3. Sociological Background -- 4. Methodological Background -- 5. Metaphysical Background -- 6. The Paradoxes of Paranoia Revisited -- 7. Paranoia as a Fixation of an Abstract System -- 8. Clinical Matters -- Appendix I: Cognitive Impairment in Schizophrenia -- Appendix II: Freud’s View of Neurosis and Psychosis -- 9. Conclusion: Towards a General Demarcation of Psychopathology -- Postscript -- Notes -- Annotated Bibliography -- Index of Names.

Abstract: There is a curious parallel between the philosophy of science and psychiatric theory. The so-called demarcation question, which has exercised philosophers of science over the last decades, posed the problem of distinguishing science proper from non-science - in par­ ticular, from metaphysics, from pseudo-science, from the non­ rational or irrational, or from the untestable or the empirically meaningless. In psychiatric theory, the demarcation question appears as a problem of distinguishing the sane from the insane, the well from the mentally ill. The parallelism is interesting when the criteria for what fails to be scientific are seen to be congruent with the criteria which define those psychoses which are marked by cognitive failure. In this book Dr Yehuda Fried and Professor Joseph Agassi - a practicing psychiatrist and a philosopher of science, respectivel- focus on an extreme case of psychosis - paranoia - as an essentially intellectual disorder: that is, as one in which there is a systematic and chronic delusion which is sustained by logical means. They write: "Paranoia is an extreme case by the very fact that paranoia is by definition a quirk of the intellectual apparatus, a logical delusion. " (p. 2.

Abstract: 1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux -- References -- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper -- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable -- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation -- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is -- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates -- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions -- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End -- References -- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy -- Notes -- 3. On Novelty -- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General -- II. Science and Truth -- III. Popper’s View of Science -- Notes -- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts -- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81 -- Note -- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism -- 5. Sensationalism -- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge -- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism -- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience -- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense -- 5. Explanation vs. Consent -- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism -- 7. Conclusion -- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis? -- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked? -- II. Can Refutation be Final? -- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated -- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports? -- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection? -- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports? -- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations -- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics -- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science -- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance -- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction -- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem -- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing -- IV. The Need for Constraints is Quite Real -- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses -- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail -- VII. Conclusion -- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement -- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses -- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence -- II. The Conventional Element in Science -- III. Reducing the Conventions -- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses -- V. What is a Mess? -- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism -- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics -- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems -- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated -- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics -- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science -- V. Popper’s Theory of Science -- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways -- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science -- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics -- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks -- Appendix: What is a Natural Law? -- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics -- I. How Do we Select Questions? -- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works -- III.The Literature on Questions -- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions -- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions -- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity -- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions -- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions -- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality -- X.Collingwood in a New Garb -- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician -- Notes -- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences -- Appendix: Reply to Commentators -- 12.The Confusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science -- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom -- Notes -- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology -- I. Kant’s Scandal -- II. Whitehead’s Scandal -- III.The Facts About Induction -- IV.Success and Rationality -- V. The Sociology of Knowledge -- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism -- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution -- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development -- 15. Imperfect Knowledge -- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable -- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error -- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses -- Notes -- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments -- Note -- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism -- 17. Modified Conventionalism -- I. The Problem -- II. Science and Society -- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation -- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited -- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper -- Notes -- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science -- Abstract -- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression -- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science -- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science -- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science -- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions -- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement -- References -- Appendix on Kant -- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason? -- I. Religion and Reason -- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion -- III. Reason and Faith -- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship -- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation -- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation -- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion -- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action -- IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance -- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi -- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion -- Notes -- Appendix on Buber -- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism -- I. The Compleat Agnostic -- II. The Image of Inductive Science -- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance -- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood -- V. Conversion to Autonomism -- VI. The Assured Agnostic -- Index of Works Cited -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.