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  • Tuomela, Raimo  (8)
  • Dordrecht : Springer  (8)
  • Bielefeld : transcript
  • London [u.a.] : Routledge
  • Philosophy (General)  (8)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789401595940
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (XIII, 436 p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Philosophical Studies Series 82
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Consciousness ; Decision making. ; Social psychology. ; Philosophy of mind ; Artificial intelligence ; Operations research ; Philosophy. ; Personality. ; Difference (Psychology).
    Abstract: In Cooperation, A Philosophical Study, Tuomela offers the first comprehensive philosophical theory of cooperation. He builds on such notions a collective and joint goals, mutual beliefs, collective commitments, acting together and acting collectively. The book analyzes the varieties of cooperation, making use of the crucial distinction between group-mode and individual-mode cooperation. The former is based on collective goals and collective commitments, the latter on private goals and commitments. The book discusses the attitudes and the kinds of practical reasoning that cooperation requires and investigate some of the conditions under which cooperation is likely, rationally, to occur. It also shows some of the drawbacks of the standard game-theoretical treatments of cooperation and presents a survey of cooperation research in neighbouring fields. Readership: Essential reading for researchers and graduate students in philosophy. Also of interest to researchers int he social sciences and AI
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9789401704397
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (XVII, 317 p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 266
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Philosophy of law ; Humanities ; Logic ; Metaphysics ; Philosophy of mind ; Law—Philosophy.
    Abstract: Contemporary Action Theory, Volume I (Individual Action) is concerned with topics in philosophical action theory such as reasons and causes of action, intentions, freedom of will and of action, omissions and norms in legal and ethical contexts, as well as activity, passivity and competence from medical points of view. Cognitive trying, freedom of the will and agent causation are challenges in the discussion on computers in action. The Volume consists of contributions by leading experts in the field written specifically for this volume. No comparable volume currently exists
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789400954465
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (288p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Episteme, A Series in the Foundational, Methodological, Philosophical, Psychological, Sociological, and Political Aspects of the Sciences, Pure and Applied 12
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Science Philosophy ; Metaphysics ; Science—Philosophy.
    Abstract: 1: Philosophy and Transcendental Thinking -- 2: The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image -- I Conceptualizing the World -- II The Stereoscopic View of the World -- 3: The Myth of the Given World, Knowledge, and Language -- I The Myth and its Constituents -- II What is Wrong with the Myth? -- 4: Scientific Realism — Science’s Own Philosophy -- I Kant and Scientific Realism -- II General Arguments for Scientific Realism -- Appendix on Quantum Mechanics, Bell’s Inequalities, and Scientific Realism -- 5: Methodological Arguments for Scientific Realism -- I The Theoretician’s Dilemma and Scientific Realism -- II Theoretical Concepts within Inductive Systematization -- III Quantificational Depth and the Methodological Usefulness of Theoretical Concepts -- IV A Scientific Realist’s View of the Role of Theoretical Concepts -- 6: Internal Realism -- I Metaphysical and Internal Realism -- II Causal Internal Realism -- III Picturing -- 7: Science as the Measure of What There is -- I On the Various Kinds of Scientific Realism -- II Ontology and the Scope of the scientia mensura-thesis -- 8: Social Action and Systems Theory -- I The Conceptual Nature of Social Action -- II We-intentions and Social Action -- III Joint Action and Systems Theory -- 9: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge -- I Truth and Explanation in the Context of Scientific Growth -- II A Pragmatic Account of Scientific Explanation -- III What is Best Explanation? -- IV Inductive Logic, Epistemic Truth, and Best Explanation -- V Scientific Realism and the Growth of Science -- 10: Science, Prescience, and Pseudoscience -- I The Method of Science -- II Science and Prescience -- III Magic and Religion -- IV Pseudoscience -- Notes -- Name Index.
    Abstract: Were one to characterize the aims of this book ambitiously, it could be said to sketch the philosophical foundations or underpinnings of the scientific world view or, better, of the scientific conception of the world. In any case, it develops a comprehensive philosophical view, one which takes science seri­ ously as the best method for getting to know the ontological aspects of the world. This view is a kind of scientific realism - causal internal realism, as it is dubbed in the book. This brand of realism is "tough" in matters of ontology but "soft" in matters of semantics and epistemology. An ancestor of the book was published in Finnish under the title Tiede, toiminta ja todellisuus (Gaudeamus, 1983). That book is a shortish undergraduate-level monograph. However, as some research-level chapters have been added, the present book is perhaps best regarded as suited for more advanced readers. I completed the book while my stay at the University of Wisconsin in Madison as a Visiting Professor under the Exchange Program between the Universities of Wisconsin and Helsinki. I gratefully acknowledge this support. I also wish to thank Juhani Saalo and Martti Kuokkanen for comments on the manuscript and for editorial help. Dr Matti Sintonen translated the Finnish ancestor of this book into English, to be used as a partial basis for this work. His translation was supported by a grant from Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden edistamisvarat. Finally, and as usual, I wish to thank Mrs.
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789400963177
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (548p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 171
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Social sciences Philosophy ; Philosophy and social sciences.
    Abstract: 1: Philosophy and the Theory of Social Action -- I Scientific Realism and the Social Sciences -- II Theorizing about Social Action -- 2: Individualism and Concept Formation in the Social Sciences -- I Holistic Social Concepts -- II Conceptual Individualism -- III We-Intentions and Social Motivation -- 3: Theories of Action -- I Views of Human Action -- II Mental Cause Theory -- III Agency Theory -- IV Hermeneutic Theory -- V Arguments for and against Causal Theories of Action -- 4: The Purposive-Causal Theory of Human Action -- I The Fundamental Elements of the Purposive-Causal Theory of Action -- II The Structure of Single-Agent Action -- 5: The Structure of Social Action -- I The General Nature of Social Action -- II Simple Social Actions -- III Complex Social Actions -- IV The Acting of Social Collectives -- V Group Interests Revisited -- 6: Action Generation -- I Action Generation and the By-Relation -- II Action Generation and the Theory of Automata -- III Social Actions, Grammars, and Social Conduct Plans -- 7: Practical Inference and Social Action -- I Loop Beliefs and Practical Inference -- II Mutual Beliefs -- III The Replicative Justification of Social Beliefs -- IV Social Action and Practical Inference -- V Mixed Interest Games and Practical Inference -- VI Social Rules and the Scope of Social Action -- 8: Norms, Rules, and Social Structures -- I Social Norms -- II Social Rules -- III Similarity and Roles -- IV Social Structures -- 9: Social Interaction and Control -- I Acting in Social Relation -- II Overt Social Interaction -- III Covert Social Interaction -- 10: A Pragmatic Theory of Explanation -- I Explaining as Communicative Action -- II Emphasis -- III Understanding and Presuppositions -- 11: Proximate Explanation of Social Action -- I Explanation and Social Action -- II Teleological Explanation -- III Purposive-Causal Explanation -- IV Reason-Explanation -- V Explaining the Style of Action -- VI Understanding Action -- 12: Dynamic Explanation of Social Action -- I Explanation and Other-Regarding Utilities -- II Expected Utilities, Motives, and the Explanation of Social Action -- III The Nature of Dynamic Action Explanations -- 13: Functional and Invisible Hand Explanation of Social Action -- I Action-Functions and Functional Explanations -- II Invisible Hand Explanations of Social Action -- 14: Explanatory Individualism and Explanation of Social Laws -- I Explanatory Individualism -- II Explanation of Social Laws -- Notes -- Name index -- Index of Symbols, Definitions, and Theses.
    Abstract: It is somewhat surprising to find out how little serious theorizing there is in philosophy (and in social psychology as well as sociology) on the nature of social actions or joint act. hons in the sense of actions performed together by several agents. Actions performed by single agents have been extensively discussed both in philosophy and in psycho~ogy. There is, ac­ cordingly, a booming field called action theory in philosophy but it has so far strongly concentrated on actions performed by single agents only. We of course should not forget game theory, a discipline that systematically studies the strategic interac­ tion between several rational agents. Yet this important theory, besides being restricted to strongly rational acting, fails to study properly several central problems related to the concep­ tual nature of social action. Thus, it does not adequately clarify and classify the various types of joint action (except perhaps from the point of view of the agents' utilities). This book presents a systematic theory of social action. Because of its reliance on so-called purposive causation and generation it is called the purposive-causal theory. This work also discusses several problems related to the topic of social action, for instance that of how to create from this perspective the most central concepts needed by social psychology and soci­ ology. While quite a lot of ground is covered in the book, many important questions have been left unanswered and many others unasked as well.
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789401712828
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (X, 458 p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 113
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 113
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Science Philosophy ; Science—Philosophy.
    Abstract: Dispositions and Definitions -- Counterfactuals and Dispositions -- Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic -- In Defense of Dispositions -- Dispositions Revisited -- Dispositions, Grounds, and Causes -- Some Ways of Operationally Introducing Dispositional Predicates with Regard to Scientific and Ordinary Practice -- Dispositional Explanation -- Universals and Dispositions -- Disposition -- A World of Dispositions -- Capacities and Natures -- Powers -- Notes on the Doctrine of Chances -- The Propensity Interpretation of Probability -- Dispositional Probabilities -- Propensities and Probabilities -- Subjunctives, Dispositions, and Chances -- Dispositions and Occurrences -- Dispositions, Occurrences, and Ontology -- Belief and Disposition -- Beliefs as States -- Dispositions, Realism, and Explanation -- Index of Names.
    Abstract: This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis­ positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. I have tried to make the collection as representative as possible, except that problems specifically connected with dispositions in various special sciences are relatively little discussed. Most of these articles have been previously published. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time, and are simultaneously published in Synthese 34, No. 4, which is a special issue on dispositions. Of the previously published material it should be emphasized that the papers by Hempel and Fisk have been extensively revised specially for this anthology. The papers are grouped in four sections, partlyon the basis of their content. However, due to the complexity of the issues involved, there is considerable overlap in content between the different sections, especially between Sections land 11. I wish to thank Professors James Fetzer and Carl G. Hempel for helpful advicc in compiling this anthology.
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  • 6
    ISBN: 9789401012423
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (438p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 116
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 116
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Science Philosophy ; Science—Philosophy.
    Abstract: 1 Scientific Realism and Psychology -- Notes -- 2 Human Action -- 1. Actions as Achievements -- 2. Actions and Events -- 3. Actions and Action Statements -- Notes -- 3 Mental Episodes -- 1. The Stream of Consciousness and the Myth of the Given -- 2. Sellars’ Analogy Account of Mental Episodes -- 3. Analogy and the Language of Thought -- 4. Rules of Language -- 5. Conceptuality and Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 4 Concept Formation in Psychology -- 1. Psychological Concepts as Theoretico- Reportive Concepts -- 2. Conceptual Functionalism and Postulational Concept Formation -- 3. Theoretical Analyticity and Mental Episodes -- 4. The Indispensability of Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 5 Psychological Dispositions -- 1. A Realist Account of Dispositions -- 2. Propositional Attitudes as Dispositions -- Notes -- 6 Wanting, Intending, and Willing -- 1. Wanting and Intending -- 2. Trying -- 3. A Formalization of First-Order and Second-Order Propositional Attitudes -- Notes -- 7 Conduct Plan and Practical Syllogism -- 1. Conduct Plan -- 2. Practical Syllogism -- 3. Practical Syllogism as a Schema for Understanding Behavior -- 4. Extended Uses of Practical Syllogism -- Notes -- 8 Explanation of Human Action -- 1. Action-Explanations -- 2. Causality and Intentional-Teleological Explanation of Action -- Notes -- 9 Deductive Explanation and Purposive Causation -- 1. Deductive Explanation -- 2. Purposive Causation -- 3. Action-Explanations Reconsidered -- Notes -- 10 Basic Concepts of Action Theory -- 1. Basic Actions and Action Tokens -- 2. Complex Actions -- 3. Intentionality -- Notes -- 11 Propensities and Inductive Explanation -- 1. Propensities -- 2. Screening Off and Supersessance as Explanatory Notions -- 3. Explanatory Ambiguity and Maximal Specificity -- 4. An Analysis of Inductive Explanation -- Notes -- 12 Probabilistic Causation and Human Action -- 1. Probabilistic Causes -- 2. Actions, Propensities, and Inductive- Probabilistic Explanation -- Notes -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.
    Abstract: This book presents a unified and systematic philosophical account of human actions and their explanation, and it does it in the spirit of scientific realism. In addition, various other related topics, such as psychological concept formation and the nature of mental events and states, are dis­ cussed. This is due to the fact that the key problems in the philosophy of psychology are interconnected to a high degree. This interwovenness has affected the discussion of these problems in that often the same topic is discussed in several contexts in the book. I hope the reader does not find this too frustrating. The theory of action developed in this book, especially in its latter half, is a causalist one. In a sense it can be regarded as an explication and refin~ment of a typical common sense view of actions and the mental episodes causally responsible for them. It has, of course, not been possible to discuss all the relevant philosophical problems in great detail, even if I have regarded it as necessary to give a brief treatment of relatively many problems. Rather, I have concentrated on some key issues and hope that future research will help to clarify the rest.
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  • 7
    ISBN: 9789401018234
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (460p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 72
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 72
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Social sciences Philosophy ; Philosophy and social sciences.
    Abstract: I/Approaches to Teleology, Intentionality, and Historical Understanding -- Causal and Historical Explanation -- Against Reductionism and Purism : Tertium Datur -- Is Transcendental Hermeneutics Possible? -- The Intentions of Intentionality -- Comments on Professor Hintikka’s Paper -- Reply to J. N. Findlay -- II/Causality and Intervention -- Causality and Action -- Causality and History -- An Analysis of Causality -- Explanation and Understanding of Human Behavior -- III/Human Action and its Explanation -- Human Abilities and Dynamic Modalities -- On Deciding -- Intention and Practical Inference -- The Causal Theory of Action -- Explanation and Understanding in History -- Inductive Explanation, Propensity, and Action -- IV/Replies to Commentators. Second thoughts on Explanation and Understanding -- Replies -- Determinism and the Study of Man -- Index of Names.
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  • 8
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    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789401025966
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (269p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, And on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 53
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 53
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    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Science Philosophy ; Science—Philosophy.
    Abstract: 1. Theoretical concepts and inductive Inference -- 1. Problems of Inductive Systematization: the Transitivity Dilemma -- 2. Inductive Systematization Established by Theories -- 3. A Logical Framework for the Dynamics of Conceptual Change and Induction -- 2. Hintikka’s Two-Dimensional Continuum of Inductive Logic -- 1. Summary of Hintikka’s Two-dimensional Continuum -- 2. The Treatment of Incomplete Evidence -- 3. Inductive Probabilities of Weak Generalizations -- 1. Probabilities in the Observational Language -- 2. Evidential Theoretical Concepts -- 3. Non-Evidential Theoretical Concepts -- 4. Inductive Probabilities of Strong Generalizations -- 5. Piecewise Definable Theoretical Concepts -- 6. Epistemic Utilities and Inductive Systematization -- 1. Measures of Information and Systematic Power -- 2. Expected Epistemic Utilities of Generalizations -- 3. Competing Generalizations -- 7. Theoretical Concepts and Inductive Explanation -- 1. Explanatory Power of Theories -- 2. Inductive Explanation Illustrated -- 3. Positive Inductive Relevance, Supersessance, and Screening Off -- 4. Inductive Explanation within Hintikka’s System -- 8. Corroboration and Theoretical Concepts -- 1. Theoretical and Observational Support -- 2. Measures of Corroboration Based on Positive Inductive Relevance -- 3. Hintikka’s Measure of Corroboration -- 9. The Logical Indispensability of Theoretical Concepts within Inductive Systematization -- 1. The Theoretician’s Dilemma: Methodological Instrumentalism Refuted -- 2. Logical Indispensability and Positive Inductive Relevance -- 3. Logical Indispensability and Rules of Acceptance -- 10. Linguistic Variance in Inductive Logic -- 1. Linguistic Invariance and Linguistic Variance -- 2. Probability Kinematics -- 3. Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction -- 11. Towards a Non-Inductivist Logic of Induction -- 1. Deductivism and Inductivism -- 2. Hypothetico-Deductive and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference -- 3. The Atheoretical Thesis -- 4. Converse Deduction and Indirect Support -- 5. Conjectures.
    Abstract: Conceptual change and its connection to the development of new seien­ tific theories has reeently beeome an intensively discussed topic in philo­ sophieal literature. Even if the inductive aspects related to conceptual change have already been discussed to some extent, there has so far existed no systematic treatment of inductive change due to conceptual enrichment. This is what we attempt to accomplish in this work, al­ though most of our technical results are restricted to the framework of monadic languages. We extend Hintikka's system of inductive logic to apply to situations in which new concepts are introduced to the original language. By interpreting them as theoretica1 concepts, it is possible to discuss a number of currently debated philosophical and methodological problems which have previously escaped systematic and exact treatment. For instance, the role which seientific theories employing theoretical con­ cepts may play within inductive inference can be studied within this framework. From the viewpoint of seientific realism, sueh a study gives outlines for a theory of what we call hypothetico-induetive inference. Some parts of this work which are based on Hintikka's system of in­ ductive logic are fairly technical. However, no previous knowledge of this system is required, but, in general, acquaintance with the basic ideas of elementary logic and probability theory is suffieient. This work is part of a project, originated by Professors Jaakko Hintikka and Raimo Tuomela, concerning the role of theoretical concepts in science.
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