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  • 2010-2014  (2)
  • Schmid, Hans Bernhard  (2)
  • Dordrecht : Springer  (2)
  • Heidelberg : Springer International Publishing
  • Philosophy (General)  (2)
  • 1
    ISBN: 9789400769342
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (VIII, 372 p. 7 illus, online resource)
    Series Statement: Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 2
    Series Statement: SpringerLink
    Series Statement: Bücher
    Parallel Title: Druckausg. Institutions, emotions, and group agents
    RVK:
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Social sciences Philosophy ; Consciousness ; Philosophy ; Philosophy (General) ; Social sciences Philosophy ; Consciousness ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Sozialphilosophie ; Ontologie ; Gruppe ; Institution ; Sozialphilosophie ; Gruppe ; Institution
    Abstract: The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle’s work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents
    Description / Table of Contents: AcknowledgementsChapter 1. Introduction: Contributions to Social Ontology-Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents; Anita Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid -- Part I: Intentionality and Institutions -- Chapter 2. Document Acts; Barry Smith -- Chapter 3. Searlean Reflections on Sacred Mountains; Filip Buekens -- Chapter 4. Social Objects without Intentions; Brian Epstein -- Chapter 5. The Logical Form of Totalitarianism; Jennifer Hudin -- Chapter 6. Groups, Normativity and Disagreement; Rodrigo E. Sànchaz Brigido -- Chapter 7. Joint Actions, Social Institutions and Collective Goods: A Teleological Account; Seumas Miller -- Chapter 8. Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality: A Taxonomy in Social Ontology; Francesca De Vecchi -- Part II: Shared Emotions and Recognition -- Chapter 9. Emergence and Empathy; Ronald De Sousa -- Chapter 10. The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups; Mikko Salmela -- Chapter 11. Feelings of Being-Together and Caring With; H. Andrés Sànchez Guerrero -- Chapter 12. Joining the Background: Habitual Sentiments behind We-Intentionality; Emanuele Caminada -- Chapter 13. Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Others; Arto Laitinen -- Chapter 14. The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership; Titus Stahl -- Part III: Collective Reasons and Group Agency -- Chapter 15. Acting Over Time, Acting Together; Michael E. Bratman -- Chapter 16. How Where We Stand Constrains Where I Stand: Applying Bratman’s Account of Self-Governance to Collective Action; Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko -- Chapter 17. Team Reasoning and Shared Intention; Abraham Sesshu Roth -- Chapter 18. Collective Intentionality and Practical Reason; Juliette Gloor -- Chapter 19. The SANE Approach to Real Collective Responsibility; Sara Chant -- Chapter 20. Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?; András Szigeti -- Chapter 21. Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? A Challenge to the List-Pettit-Theory; Vuko Andric -- Chapter 22. Direct and Indirect Common Belief; Emiliano Lorini and Andreas Herzig.
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9789400756007
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (VI, 235 p. 2 illus) , digital
    Edition: Online-Ausg. Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    Series Statement: Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 1
    DDC: 378.005
    RVK:
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Ontology ; Law Psychological aspects
    Abstract: This volume aims at giving the reader an overview over the most recent theoretical and methodological findings in a new and rapidly evolving area of current theory of society: social ontology. This book brings together philosophical, sociological and psychological approaches and advances the theory towards a solution of contemporary problems of society, such as the integration of cultures, the nature of constitutive rules, and the actions of institutional actors. It focuses on the question of the background of action in society and illuminates one of the most controversial, cross-disciplinary questions of the field while providing insight into the ontological structure of groups as agents. This volume offers an interesting and important contribution to the debate as it does well in bridging the gap between the analytical and the continental tradition in social philosophy. In addition, this volume expands the reach and depth of the philosophy of sociality by relating it to philosophical ideas from the late 19th and early 20th centuries and to key thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Bourdieu. The contributors include internationally renowned scholars as well as a highly selected set of younger scholars whose work is at the cutting edge of their field. Scholarly, yet accessible, this book is an essential resource for researchers across the social sciences. ​
    Description / Table of Contents: The Background of Social Reality; Contents; The Cultural Background of Acting Together; The Argument from Metaphor and Rule Following; Contingency and the Argument from Experience; In Terms of Theory: Some Programmatic Considerations; The Interpretative Task; The Empirical Method of Philosophy: Making Meaning; The Exegesis of Canon; Outline of the Present Volume; Part I The Ontology of Groups: Their Minds, Intentions, Actions, and Interactions; Part II Into the Background: Capacities and Cases; Part III Social Reality: Its Essence and Constitution
    Description / Table of Contents: Part I: The Ontology of Groups: Their Minds, Intentions, Actions and InteractionsWho Is Afraid of Group Agents and Group Minds?; Introduction; Group Agents and the We-Mode Approach; Collective Intentions; Some Historical Accounts of Group Minds and Group Agents; Conclusion; References; Trying to Act TogetherThe Structure and Role of Trust in Joint Action; 1; 2; 3; References; Missing the Forest for the TreesThe Theoretical Irrelevance of Shared Intentions; The Formation and Agency of Corporate Entities; Shared Intentions?; Responses to Individualist Objections
    Description / Table of Contents: Some Problems with IndividualismConclusion; References; The Boys Carried the Piano UpstairsReconsidering Akratic Action in Group Contexts; Introduction; Defining Akrasia; Single Akratic Agents (In Group Contexts); Strong and Weak Cases of Akrasia; Describing Group Actions; Applying the Analysis Against a Holist Account of Groups; The First-Person Perspective of Agents; Outlook: Collective Akrasia; References; Creating Interpersonal Reality through Conversational Interactions; Introduction; Collective Acceptance as Joint Commitment; Joint Commitments to Projects; Joint Meaning
    Description / Table of Contents: Conversational InteractionsConclusions; References; Part II: Into the Background: Capacities and Cases; Social Rules and the Social Background; Introduction; The Background According to Searle; The Background, Consciousness, and the Connection Principle; The Background and Rules; The Background as Nonconceptual; The Social Background and Layers of Collective Intentionality; References; Sharing the BackgroundSearle, Wittgenstein and Heidegger About the Background of Rule-Governed Behaviour; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; References
    Description / Table of Contents: From Sharing a Background to Sharing One's PresenceTwo Conditions of Joint AttentionIntroduction; The Phenomenon; Generation of Mutual Awareness: Two Conditions; Three Levels of Intentional Attitudes; A Shared Perspective and the Sense of Us; Conclusion; References; Social Ontology, Cultural Sociology, and the War on TerrorToward a Cultural Explanation of Institutional Change; Introduction; The Construction of Social Reality: Searle's Social Ontology; A Cultural-Sociological Reading of Searle's Background; Apocalypse Now: 9/11 and the War on Terror
    Description / Table of Contents: The Image Problem: The Iraq War and the Abu Ghraib Photographs
    Note: Description based upon print version of record , Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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