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  • Rand Corporation  (14)
  • Counterinsurgency  (14)
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  • 1
    ISBN: 9780833082114 , 0833084704 , 0833082116 , 9780833084705
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxi, 167 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series RR-382-OSD
    Parallel Title: Print version Connable, Ben Modeling, simulation, and operations analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq
    Keywords: Soldiers Protection ; Simulation methods ; Evaluation ; Logistics Simulation methods ; Evaluation ; Military planning Simulation methods ; Evaluation ; Decision making Simulation methods ; Evaluation ; Operations research ; Counterinsurgency Simulation methods ; Evaluation ; Irregular warfare Simulation methods ; Evaluation ; Soldiers ; Logistics ; Military planning ; Decision making ; Operations research ; Counterinsurgency ; Irregular warfare ; COMPUTERS ; Data Modeling & Design ; Operations research ; Military Science - General ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; United States ; Electronic book
    Abstract: RAND conducted a lessons learned examination of operations analysis, modeling, and simulation in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This report identifies ways in which analysts have attempted to support commanders' decisions in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, describes many of the models and tools they employed, provides insight into the challenges they faced, and suggests ways in which the application of modeling, simulation, and analysis might be improved for current and future operations. RAND identified four broad categories of decisions: force protection, logistics, campaign assessment, and force structuring. Modeling, simulation, and analysis were most effective in supporting force protection and logistics decisions, and least effective in supporting campaign assessment and force structuring
    Abstract: RAND conducted a lessons learned examination of operations analysis, modeling, and simulation in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This report identifies ways in which analysts have attempted to support commanders' decisions in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, describes many of the models and tools they employed, provides insight into the challenges they faced, and suggests ways in which the application of modeling, simulation, and analysis might be improved for current and future operations. RAND identified four broad categories of decisions: force protection, logistics, campaign assessment, and force structuring. Modeling, simulation, and analysis were most effective in supporting force protection and logistics decisions, and least effective in supporting campaign assessment and force structuring
    Note: "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation , "National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 137-167)
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9780833085641 , 0833090003 , 0833085646 , 9780833090003
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 97 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Osburg, Jan Assessing locally focused stability operations
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; United States ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; Military Science - General ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Counterinsurgency ; United States Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: This report describes how the Army and other services can better measure and assess the progress and outcomes of locally focused stability operations (LFSO), which are defined as the missions, tasks, and activities that build security, governance, and development by, with, and through the directly affected community, in order to increase stability at the local level. A number of issues related to assessing LFSO are identified, along with foundational challenges that include an inherently complex operational environment, limited doctrinal guidance, competing visions of stability, untested assumptions, and redundant or excessive reporting requirements. The report offers solutions to these and other challenges, and provides concrete recommendations and implementation-related guidance for designing and conducting assessments of LFSO. The report concludes with an assessment plan for a notional African LFSO scenario that illustrates the practical application of those insights
    Abstract: This report describes how the Army and other services can better measure and assess the progress and outcomes of locally focused stability operations (LFSO), which are defined as the missions, tasks, and activities that build security, governance, and development by, with, and through the directly affected community, in order to increase stability at the local level. A number of issues related to assessing LFSO are identified, along with foundational challenges that include an inherently complex operational environment, limited doctrinal guidance, competing visions of stability, untested assumptions, and redundant or excessive reporting requirements. The report offers solutions to these and other challenges, and provides concrete recommendations and implementation-related guidance for designing and conducting assessments of LFSO. The report concludes with an assessment plan for a notional African LFSO scenario that illustrates the practical application of those insights
    Note: "RAND Arroyo Center , "This research was sponsored by the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group and was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Force Development and Technology Program"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (pages 93-97)
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  • 3
    ISBN: 9780833081766 , 0833083643 , 0833081764 , 9780833083647
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 25 pages)
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency Case studies ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Afghanistan ; Military Science - General ; Case studies ; Military & Naval Science ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Counterinsurgency ; Law, Politics & Government ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Abstract: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was ... conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (page 25)
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  • 4
    ISBN: 9780833080547 , 0833083414 , 0833080547 , 9780833083418
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xlii, 286 pages)
    Additional Information: Paths to victory: detailed insurgency case studies
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series RR-291/1-OSD
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Paul, Christopher, 1971- Paths to victory
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency Research ; Counterinsurgency Case studies ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Military & Naval Science ; Case studies ; Law, Politics & Government ; Military Science - General ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Research ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Electronic books
    Abstract: When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won
    Abstract: When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Companion publication to: Paths to victory: detailed insurgency case studies , Includes bibliographical references (pages 277-286)
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  • 5
    ISBN: 9780833068385 , 0833068385 , 9780833058157 , 0833068407 , 0833058150 , 9780833068408
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxxi, 308 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series
    Parallel Title: Print version Connable, Ben Embracing the fog of war
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency Evaluation ; Counterinsurgency ; HISTORY ; Revolutionary ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Intelligence & Espionage ; counterinsurgency ; Afghanistan ; United States ; Vietnam ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process -- contextual assessment -- that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process
    Abstract: Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process -- contextual assessment -- that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense , Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-308)
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  • 6
    ISBN: 9780833058119 , 0833058118 , 9780833052483 , 0833058134 , 0833052489 , 9780833058133
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (19 pages)
    Series Statement: Occasional paper OP-337-OSD
    Parallel Title: Print version Counterinsurgency Scorecard
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; HISTORY ; Military ; Other ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; COMPUTERS ; Data Modeling & Design ; Counterinsurgency ; Military & Naval Science ; Law - U.S ; Law, Politics & Government ; Law - U.S. - General ; Military Science - General ; Afghanistan ; Case studies ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The previously published RAND monograph, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, used detailed case studies of the 30 insurgencies worldwide begun and completed between 1978 and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A core finding was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly predicted the outcome of those 30 insurgencies. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi, exercise in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2011 Afghanistan scores in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses: its score was lower than that in the lowest-scoring historical COIN win but higher than that in the highest-scoring COIN loss. This suggests an uncertain outcome in Afghanistan, but the findings may help provide additional guidance as operations continue
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (page 19)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, Calif : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833051387 , 083305158X , 0833051385 , 9780833051585
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 27 pages)
    Series Statement: Occasional paper OP-327-MCIA
    Parallel Title: Print version Jones, Seth G., 1972- Reintegrating Afghan insurgents
    Keywords: Soldiers Rehabilitation ; Counterinsurgency ; Soldiers ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Soldiers ; Rehabilitation ; HISTORY ; Military ; Afghan War (2001- ) ; Afghanistan ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Terrorism ; Armed Forces ; Demobilization ; Afghanistan Armed Forces ; Demobilization ; Afghanistan ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Figures and Table; Summary; Chapter One: Factors That Enable Reintegration; Perception of Winning; Coercion; Addressing Grievances; Chapter Two: Reintegration Procedures; Proactive Efforts; Screening; Holding and Security Procedures; Incentives; Engagement of Tribal and Other Leaders; Information Operations; Active Use of Personnel; Chapter Three: Conclusions: Reintegration from the Bottom Up; Notes
    Abstract: Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Figures and Table; Summary; Chapter One: Factors That Enable Reintegration; Perception of Winning; Coercion; Addressing Grievances; Chapter Two: Reintegration Procedures; Proactive Efforts; Screening; Holding and Security Procedures; Incentives; Engagement of Tribal and Other Leaders; Information Operations; Active Use of Personnel; Chapter Three: Conclusions: Reintegration from the Bottom Up; Notes
    Note: "Prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity , "The research described in this report was prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002"--Title page verso , "National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-27)
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  • 8
    ISBN: 9780833047694 , 0833059866 , 0833047698 , 9780833059864
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiii, 131 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series
    Parallel Title: Print version Glenn, Russell W Band of brothers or dysfunctional family?
    Keywords: Integrated operations (Military science) ; Counterinsurgency ; Armed Forces Stability operations ; Integrated operations (Military science) ; Counterinsurgency ; Armed Forces ; HISTORY ; Military ; Pictorial ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; Counterinsurgency ; Integrated operations (Military science) ; military operations ; cooperation ; armed forces ; peacekeeping operations ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Counterinsurgency and other stability operations seldom present a nation with trials that threaten its very survival, barring cases in which that nation is the target of insurgents. Bonds between coalition members are therefore weaker than when threat of annihilation reinforces mutual dependence. Such situations are further complicated by the use of force likely not being the primary implement for attaining ultimate success. Devoid of a preeminent threat and denied primary dependence on armed forces, core coalition objectives tend to be political rather than military in character and include counterinsurgency, nation building, developing government capacity, and providing humanitarian assistance -- activities often associated with stability operations. Armed forces are not staffed or trained to meet the long-term demands of many of these tasks. An alliance or coalition must therefore incorporate participation by other government agencies and -- ultimately -- that of the indigenous government and its population more than is expected during conventional combat operations. Recent contingencies have also seen commercial enterprises, militias, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations become key participants in these undertakings. The result is coalitions of a size seldom seen and with a number of affiliations rarely, if ever, approached before the late 20th century. This monograph investigates the dramatic expansion of challenges confronting alliances and coalitions today and thereafter considers potential solutions that include questioning the conception of what constitutes a coalition in today's world
    Abstract: Counterinsurgency and other stability operations seldom present a nation with trials that threaten its very survival, barring cases in which that nation is the target of insurgents. Bonds between coalition members are therefore weaker than when threat of annihilation reinforces mutual dependence. Such situations are further complicated by the use of force likely not being the primary implement for attaining ultimate success. Devoid of a preeminent threat and denied primary dependence on armed forces, core coalition objectives tend to be political rather than military in character and include counterinsurgency, nation building, developing government capacity, and providing humanitarian assistance -- activities often associated with stability operations. Armed forces are not staffed or trained to meet the long-term demands of many of these tasks. An alliance or coalition must therefore incorporate participation by other government agencies and -- ultimately -- that of the indigenous government and its population more than is expected during conventional combat operations. Recent contingencies have also seen commercial enterprises, militias, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations become key participants in these undertakings. The result is coalitions of a size seldom seen and with a number of affiliations rarely, if ever, approached before the late 20th century. This monograph investigates the dramatic expansion of challenges confronting alliances and coalitions today and thereafter considers potential solutions that include questioning the conception of what constitutes a coalition in today's world
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 109-131)
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica Calif : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833053022 , 0833058142 , 0833053019 , 0833053027 , 9780833053015 , 9780833058140
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 21 pages)
    Series Statement: Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) OP-335-A
    Parallel Title: Print version Johnson, David E. (David Eugene), 1950- 2008 battle of Sadr City
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Sadr City, Battle of, Baghdad, Iraq, 2008 ; Iraq War, 2003-2011 Campaigns ; Iraq War, 2003-2011 Case studies Urban warfare ; Counterinsurgency ; Sadr City, Battle of, Baghdad, Iraq, 2008 ; Iraq War, 2003-2011 ; Iraq War, 2003-2011 ; Urban warfare ; HISTORY ; Military ; Iraq War (2003- ) ; Iraq ; Baghdad ; Iraq ; HISTORY ; Military ; General ; Case studies ; Iraq War (2003-2011) ; Sadr City, Battle of (Baghdad, Iraq : 2008) ; Counterinsurgency ; Military campaigns ; Electronic books
    Abstract: "The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, which took place in Baghdad nearly 15 months after the beginning of the U.S. "surge" in Iraq, has received relatively little scholarly attention. However, the coalition's defeat of Jaish al-Mahdi after six weeks of high-intensity fighting offers important lessons for the U.S. Army as it prepares for future operations. Using after-action reports, briefings, other primary sources, and interviews with combatants and officials involved in the fighting and its aftermath, the authors describe the battle, analyze its outcome, and derive implications for the conduct of land operations. Their analysis identifies the following factors as critical to the coalition victory: supporting ground maneuver elements with integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and strike assets; the key roles played by heavy forces, snipers, and special operations forces; decentralized decisionmaking; capable indigenous security forces; and rapid transitions from phase to phase. The authors conclude that the Battle of Sadr City presents a new model for dealing with insurgent control of urban areas: treating an urban area as a wide-area security mission. Unlike previous urban operations against insurgents, in which cities were essentially besieged and then stormed, the objective in this battle was not to take and clear Sadr City but to create conditions that would make it both impossible for the insurgents to operate effectively and possible to restore security to the broader population."--Page 4 of cover
    Abstract: "The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, which took place in Baghdad nearly 15 months after the beginning of the U.S. "surge" in Iraq, has received relatively little scholarly attention. However, the coalition's defeat of Jaish al-Mahdi after six weeks of high-intensity fighting offers important lessons for the U.S. Army as it prepares for future operations. Using after-action reports, briefings, other primary sources, and interviews with combatants and officials involved in the fighting and its aftermath, the authors describe the battle, analyze its outcome, and derive implications for the conduct of land operations. Their analysis identifies the following factors as critical to the coalition victory: supporting ground maneuver elements with integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and strike assets; the key roles played by heavy forces, snipers, and special operations forces; decentralized decisionmaking; capable indigenous security forces; and rapid transitions from phase to phase. The authors conclude that the Battle of Sadr City presents a new model for dealing with insurgent control of urban areas: treating an urban area as a wide-area security mission. Unlike previous urban operations against insurgents, in which cities were essentially besieged and then stormed, the objective in this battle was not to take and clear Sadr City but to create conditions that would make it both impossible for the insurgents to operate effectively and possible to restore security to the broader population."--Page 4 of cover
    Note: "Rand Arroyo Center , "Prepared for the United States Army , Includes bibliographical references (page 21)
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  • 10
    ISBN: 9780833052995 , 0833053051 , 0833052993 , 9780833053053
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xli, 229 pages)
    Parallel Title: Print version From insurgency to stability
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Peace-building ; Counterinsurgency ; Peace-building ; Political Science ; Counterinsurgency ; Military Science - General ; United States ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; HISTORY ; Military ; Strategy ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Government ; International ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; International Relations ; General ; Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; Political Theory of the State ; Peace-building ; United States Armed Forces ; Stability operations ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: This monograph is the first of two volumes that examine how countries confronting insurgencies transition from a high level of violence to a more stable situation. It identifies the procedures and capabilities that the U.S. Department of Defense, other agencies of the U.S. government, U.S. allies and partners, and international organizations require in order to support the transition from counterinsurgency to stability and reconstruction operations. During counterinsurgency, the military takes primary responsibility for security and economic operations, but when the insurgency has been reduced to a level where the state is able to perform its basic functions, police and civilian government agencies take the lead in providing security and services to the population. Successful post-counterinsurgency operations can ensure that lasting peace and stability will follow, rather than a relapse into violence
    Abstract: This monograph is the first of two volumes that examine how countries confronting insurgencies transition from a high level of violence to a more stable situation. It identifies the procedures and capabilities that the U.S. Department of Defense, other agencies of the U.S. government, U.S. allies and partners, and international organizations require in order to support the transition from counterinsurgency to stability and reconstruction operations. During counterinsurgency, the military takes primary responsibility for security and economic operations, but when the insurgency has been reduced to a level where the state is able to perform its basic functions, police and civilian government agencies take the lead in providing security and services to the population. Successful post-counterinsurgency operations can ensure that lasting peace and stability will follow, rather than a relapse into violence
    Note: "This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Title page verso , "RAND National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-229)
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  • 11
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833049766 , 0833049860 , 0833049763 , 9780833049865
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxi, 185 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-982-RC
    Parallel Title: Print version Jones, Seth G., 1972- Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Terrorism Prevention ; Counterinsurgency ; Terrorism ; Politics and government ; Terrorism ; Prevention ; counterinsurgency ; Pakistan ; HISTORY ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Terrorism ; Pakistan ; Counterinsurgency ; Pakistan Politics and government 1988- ; Pakistan ; Electronic books
    Abstract: This document examines the evolution of militancy in Pakistan, assesses Pakistan's efforts to counter militants, and offers a range of policy recommendations. It is based on detailed research in Pakistan and an examination of the quantitative and qualitative literatures on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
    Abstract: This document examines the evolution of militancy in Pakistan, assesses Pakistan's efforts to counter militants, and offers a range of policy recommendations. It is based on detailed research in Pakistan and an examination of the quantitative and qualitative literatures on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 145-167) and index
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  • 12
    ISBN: 9780833049612 , 0833050788 , 9781282940536 , 1282940538 , 9780833050786 , 0833049615
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxx, 153 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-964-OSD
    Parallel Title: Print version Paul, Christopher, 1971- Victory has a thousand fathers
    Keywords: Insurgency Case studies ; Counterinsurgency Case studies ; Insurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Counterinsurgency ; Insurgency ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Military Science - General ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; Case studies ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations
    Abstract: Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations
    Note: Includes bibliographical references
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 13
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833050113 , 0833051164 , 0833050117 , 9780833051165
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 91 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-974-AF
    Parallel Title: Print version Hoehn, Andrew R Risking NATO
    Keywords: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Armed Forces ; Operations other than war ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Armed Forces ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Forecasting ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; HISTORY ; Military ; Afghan War (2001- ) ; Armed Forces ; Armed Forces ; Operations other than war ; Counterinsurgency ; Forecasting ; Afghanistan ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; HISTORY ; General ; Electronic books
    Abstract: NATO's success in Afghanistan -- or lack thereof -- will have significant implications for the alliance itself. Success could promote the image of a capable global security alliance. Failure, or even an indeterminate outcome, would cloud the alliance's own future. The authors examine the risks, commitments, and obligations of the current mission in light of NATO's history and with an eye toward the future, as well as the effects on the alliance's internal dynamics. Drawing on a wide range of sources, the authors describe how NATO came to be involved, concerns and tensions that have developed over the investments and risks that member and nonmember states have in the operation, management of the expectations of nations and peoples, and the need for a coherent, comprehensive, and coordinated long-term strategy. The list of issues NATO faces is long and daunting and extends beyond the borders of the member countries. If the goal is indeed to look toward the future, however, the alliance must confront them; failure to do so would risk the long-term success and sustainability of the alliance
    Abstract: NATO's success in Afghanistan -- or lack thereof -- will have significant implications for the alliance itself. Success could promote the image of a capable global security alliance. Failure, or even an indeterminate outcome, would cloud the alliance's own future. The authors examine the risks, commitments, and obligations of the current mission in light of NATO's history and with an eye toward the future, as well as the effects on the alliance's internal dynamics. Drawing on a wide range of sources, the authors describe how NATO came to be involved, concerns and tensions that have developed over the investments and risks that member and nonmember states have in the operation, management of the expectations of nations and peoples, and the need for a coherent, comprehensive, and coordinated long-term strategy. The list of issues NATO faces is long and daunting and extends beyond the borders of the member countries. If the goal is indeed to look toward the future, however, the alliance must confront them; failure to do so would risk the long-term success and sustainability of the alliance
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-91)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 14
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corp
    ISBN: 9780833047540 , 0833049151 , 083304754X , 9780833049155
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 672 pages)
    Parallel Title: Print version Elliott, Duong Van Mai, 1941- RAND in Southeast Asia
    Keywords: Rand Corporation Influence ; Rand Corporation ; Vietnam War, 1961-1975 Research ; History ; Military planning History 20th century ; Counterinsurgency Research 20th century ; History ; Vietnam War, 1961-1975 ; Military planning ; Counterinsurgency ; HISTORY ; Military ; Vietnam War ; HISTORY ; Military ; General ; Counterinsurgency ; Research ; Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) ; Military planning ; Research ; military strategy ; USA ; History ; Southeast Asia ; Regions & Countries - Asia & the Middle East ; History & Archaeology ; Rand Corporation ; United States ; Vietnam War (1961-1975) ; History ; Electronic books
    Abstract: "This volume chronicles RAND's involvement in researching insurgency and counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand during the Vietnam War era, from the period preceding the dispatch of U.S. troops, to the most intensive combat years, to the Tet Offensive of 1968, to the end of the war in 1975. The author draws on interviews with RAND staff who were involved in research in the region, the hundreds of studies that RAND produced on these topics, and documentary sources outside RAND to provide a narrative that captures the tenor of the times, conveys the attitudes and thinking of those involved, and recounts their personal stories and experiences. Elliott assesses both the extent to which RAND's research influenced U.S. policies and decisionmakers during the war and the effect that the war had on RAND--culminating with the release of the Pentagon Papers, which became a national controversy in 1971"--Provided by publisher
    Abstract: "This volume chronicles RAND's involvement in researching insurgency and counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand during the Vietnam War era, from the period preceding the dispatch of U.S. troops, to the most intensive combat years, to the Tet Offensive of 1968, to the end of the war in 1975. The author draws on interviews with RAND staff who were involved in research in the region, the hundreds of studies that RAND produced on these topics, and documentary sources outside RAND to provide a narrative that captures the tenor of the times, conveys the attitudes and thinking of those involved, and recounts their personal stories and experiences. Elliott assesses both the extent to which RAND's research influenced U.S. policies and decisionmakers during the war and the effect that the war had on RAND--culminating with the release of the Pentagon Papers, which became a national controversy in 1971"--Provided by publisher
    Note: "CP-564-RC"--Page 4 of cover , "RAND Investment in People and Ideas , Includes bibliographical references (pages 627-652) and index
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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