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  • 2010-2014  (7)
  • 1935-1939
  • 2012  (7)
  • Project Air Force 〈U.S.〉
  • Electronic books  (7)
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  • 2010-2014  (7)
  • 1935-1939
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833076809 , 0833076809 , 9780833076786 , 0833076795 , 0833076787 , 0833076817 , 9780833076816 , 9780833076793
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxvi, 172 pages)
    Parallel Title: Print version Libicki, Martin C Crisis and escalation in cyberspace
    DDC: 358.4/141
    Keywords: United States Decision making ; United States Organization ; United States ; United States ; Information warfare ; Escalation (Military science) ; Cyberspace Security measures ; Crisis management Government policy ; Cyberterrorism Prevention ; Conflict management ; Information warfare ; Escalation (Military science) ; Cyberspace ; Crisis management ; Cyberterrorism ; Conflict management ; United States ; COMPUTERS ; Networking ; Security ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; Armed Forces ; Organization ; Conflict management ; Cyberterrorism ; Prevention ; Escalation (Military science) ; Information warfare ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
    Abstract: Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
    Note: "Prepared for the United States Air Force ... Rand Project Air Force , Includes bibliographical references (pages 163-172)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9780833074553 , 0833083228 , 0833074555 , 9780833083227
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 15 pages)
    Series Statement: RAND Corporation technical report series TR1230
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Bombardment ; Air warfare Economic aspects ; Precision guided munitions ; Air-to-surface missiles Cost effectiveness ; Bombing, Aerial ; Bombardment ; Air warfare ; Precision guided munitions ; Air-to-surface missiles ; Bombing, Aerial ; Air Forces ; United States ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; Bombardment ; Bombing, Aerial ; Precision guided munitions ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; United States Armed Forces ; Weapons systems ; Cost effectiveness ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: This report evaluates the economic wisdom of relying primarily on expendable weapons, such as cruise missiles, to conduct air-to-ground strike missions. Focusing solely on cost, the author examined the U.S. historical use of air-to-ground attack during and since the Vietnam War, looking, among other things, at the length of each conflict and the weapons expended. Only if the United States is confident that all possible conflicts over the system lifetime can be ended in a total of less than about ten days is exclusive reliance on expendable assets prudent. Expendable weapons do have some important operational advantages, but if the United States wishes to maintain the capability to wage air war efficiently for more than a few days, reusable platforms are an important part of an efficient force mix
    Abstract: This report evaluates the economic wisdom of relying primarily on expendable weapons, such as cruise missiles, to conduct air-to-ground strike missions. Focusing solely on cost, the author examined the U.S. historical use of air-to-ground attack during and since the Vietnam War, looking, among other things, at the length of each conflict and the weapons expended. Only if the United States is confident that all possible conflicts over the system lifetime can be ended in a total of less than about ten days is exclusive reliance on expendable assets prudent. Expendable weapons do have some important operational advantages, but if the United States wishes to maintain the capability to wage air war efficiently for more than a few days, reusable platforms are an important part of an efficient force mix
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (page 15)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833079671 , 0833079670 , 9780833070623 , 0833070622
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiii, 88 pages)
    Series Statement: RAND Corporation monograph series MG1194
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Modernizing the mobility Air Force for tomorrow's air traffic management system
    DDC: 358.4/183
    Keywords: United States Equipment ; Maintenance and repair ; Costs ; Evaluation ; United States Operational readiness ; United States ; United States ; Airplanes, Military Maintenance and repair ; Costs ; Evaluation ; Airplanes, Military Electronic equipment ; Avionics ; Airplanes, Military ; Airplanes, Military ; Avionics ; Operational readiness (Military science) ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Air Forces ; United States ; United States ; Airplanes, Military ; Electronic equipment ; Avionics ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Legal mandates for airspace modernization, certification requirements, and minimum aircraft capability and equipment standards aim to improve the efficiency and safety of air traffic, particularly within the world's busiest airspace. Mandates drive changes in technical and operational standards, but they can also deny access to premium altitudes, routing, and even airports for noncompliant aircraft. Aircraft modernization ensures continued access to fuel-efficient cruising altitudes and congested airspace, but these future benefits require an upfront investment in avionics upgrade programs. In a fiscally constrained environment, such decisions must take into account the quantifiable future costs that would be avoided by upgrades, weighed against the costs of modernization. Building on 2009 RAND work examining the cost-effectiveness of modernizing the U.S. Air Force's KC-10 aerial refueling tanker, this study extended the analysis to the C-5, C-17, C-130, and KC-135 fleets, evaluating the cost-effectiveness of modernizing these aircraft for compliance with forthcoming communication, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management mandates. It found that, overall, the Air Force operates these aircraft in regions where some important future mandates will not be met without modernization, but the cost-effectiveness of upgrades depends to a great extent on fuel prices and the characteristics of missions conducted by each aircraft type
    Abstract: Legal mandates for airspace modernization, certification requirements, and minimum aircraft capability and equipment standards aim to improve the efficiency and safety of air traffic, particularly within the world's busiest airspace. Mandates drive changes in technical and operational standards, but they can also deny access to premium altitudes, routing, and even airports for noncompliant aircraft. Aircraft modernization ensures continued access to fuel-efficient cruising altitudes and congested airspace, but these future benefits require an upfront investment in avionics upgrade programs. In a fiscally constrained environment, such decisions must take into account the quantifiable future costs that would be avoided by upgrades, weighed against the costs of modernization. Building on 2009 RAND work examining the cost-effectiveness of modernizing the U.S. Air Force's KC-10 aerial refueling tanker, this study extended the analysis to the C-5, C-17, C-130, and KC-135 fleets, evaluating the cost-effectiveness of modernizing these aircraft for compliance with forthcoming communication, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management mandates. It found that, overall, the Air Force operates these aircraft in regions where some important future mandates will not be met without modernization, but the cost-effectiveness of upgrades depends to a great extent on fuel prices and the characteristics of missions conducted by each aircraft type
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-88) , Title from PDF title screen (viewed on Dec. 14, 2012) , Mode of access: World Wide Web. , System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, Calif : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833068446 , 0833079794 , 083306844X , 9780833079794
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 53 pages)
    Series Statement: Technical report TR-1144/1-AF
    Parallel Title: Print versionJohnson, Stuart E., 1944- Promoting international energy security. Vol. 4
    DDC: 333.79
    Keywords: Petroleum reserves ; Petroleum industry and trade ; Petroleum reserves ; Energy security ; Petroleum reserves ; Petroleum industry and trade ; Petroleum reserves ; Energy security ; Ghana ; Nigeria ; Petroleum industry and trade ; Petroleum reserves ; Energy security ; Atlantic Ocean ; Gulf of Guinea ; Guinea, Gulf of ; Guinea, Gulf of ; Electronic books
    Abstract: "The Gulf of Guinea is an important source of petroleum for the world market, with Nigeria being the dominant producer in this region. Nigeria's oil infrastructure has been subject to frequent attacks, causing production to be well below capacity. Moreover, investments in oil-producing infrastructure are lower than they would be in a secure environment. Oil production has been moving offshore in Nigeria. This trend is likely to continue, based on recent finds in Ghana's waters and off-shore exploratory activity in nearby nations. It is in the interests of the United States, as well as other oil importing nations, to encourage greater production and investment that would raise petroleum output in Nigeria and in the other Gulf of Guinea nations with crude oil reserves. While offshore fields have their own security issues, they are more visible from the air, yielding a potentially powerful role for aviation forces. This provides an opportunity for the U.S. Air Force to contribute to improved regional energy security through partnerships that would build local capabilities to secure offshore infrastructure. Nigeria is the most obvious partner and, despite challenges, has good reason to partner with the United States because the majority of the country's wealth lies in its hydrocarbon sector. But other alternatives are possible, such as working first with other nations in the region, such as Ghana, where governance is considerably better. The U.S. Air Force could then draw on lessons learned from such partnerships and best practices to partner with other countries in the region."--Provided by publisher
    Abstract: "The Gulf of Guinea is an important source of petroleum for the world market, with Nigeria being the dominant producer in this region. Nigeria's oil infrastructure has been subject to frequent attacks, causing production to be well below capacity. Moreover, investments in oil-producing infrastructure are lower than they would be in a secure environment. Oil production has been moving offshore in Nigeria. This trend is likely to continue, based on recent finds in Ghana's waters and off-shore exploratory activity in nearby nations. It is in the interests of the United States, as well as other oil importing nations, to encourage greater production and investment that would raise petroleum output in Nigeria and in the other Gulf of Guinea nations with crude oil reserves. While offshore fields have their own security issues, they are more visible from the air, yielding a potentially powerful role for aviation forces. This provides an opportunity for the U.S. Air Force to contribute to improved regional energy security through partnerships that would build local capabilities to secure offshore infrastructure. Nigeria is the most obvious partner and, despite challenges, has good reason to partner with the United States because the majority of the country's wealth lies in its hydrocarbon sector. But other alternatives are possible, such as working first with other nations in the region, such as Ghana, where governance is considerably better. The U.S. Air Force could then draw on lessons learned from such partnerships and best practices to partner with other countries in the region."--Provided by publisher
    Note: "Project Air Force , "Prepared for the United States Air Force , Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-21)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, Calif : Rand Corporation
    ISBN: 9780833076250 , 0833079832 , 0833076256 , 9780833079831
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxv, 118 pages)
    Series Statement: Technical report TR-1241-AF
    Parallel Title: Print version Working with allies and partners
    Keywords: United States ; United States Security measures ; United States ; United States ; Combined operations (Military science) Cost effectiveness ; Combined operations (Military science) ; HISTORY ; Europe ; General ; Armed Forces ; Security measures ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Air Forces ; United States ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: "U.S. European Command (EUCOM) views building partnerships as its highest theater priority. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) seeks to build partnerships and partner capacity in the EUCOM area of responsibility. In spite of the potential benefits of USAFE's building-partnership (BP) activities, USAFE's posture and its BP activities do come with a cost. In today's austere fiscal environment, it is appropriate to assess how the United States and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) can build partnerships most efficiently while ensuring that the requirements for maintaining key alliances and partnerships continue to be met. This report characterizes the current policy debate on security cooperation and force posture in Europe through a review of the literature and discussions with key policymakers and legislative officials in Washington, develops a framework to describe the current BP approach and environment for the USAF in Europe, defines several alternative postures for conducting BP activities using a building-block approach to cost out each high-payoff BP activity, and recommends efficiencies to improve the USAF's BP activities in Europe."--Publisher's description
    Abstract: "U.S. European Command (EUCOM) views building partnerships as its highest theater priority. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) seeks to build partnerships and partner capacity in the EUCOM area of responsibility. In spite of the potential benefits of USAFE's building-partnership (BP) activities, USAFE's posture and its BP activities do come with a cost. In today's austere fiscal environment, it is appropriate to assess how the United States and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) can build partnerships most efficiently while ensuring that the requirements for maintaining key alliances and partnerships continue to be met. This report characterizes the current policy debate on security cooperation and force posture in Europe through a review of the literature and discussions with key policymakers and legislative officials in Washington, develops a framework to describe the current BP approach and environment for the USAF in Europe, defines several alternative postures for conducting BP activities using a building-block approach to cost out each high-payoff BP activity, and recommends efficiencies to improve the USAF's BP activities in Europe."--Publisher's description
    Note: "Project Air Force , Includes bibliographical references
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833059673 , 083308349X , 083305967X , 9780833083494
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xix, 86 pages)
    Series Statement: RAND Corporation technical report series TR905
    Keywords: United States Supplies and stores ; Costs ; Evaluation ; United States Appropriations and expenditures ; United States Equipment ; Maintenance and repair ; Costs ; Evaluation ; United States ; United States ; United States ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; Armed Forces ; Appropriations and expenditures ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Air Forces ; United States ; Electronic books
    Abstract: One of the more challenging goals in programming is to link Air Force budget program element investments to operationally relevant capability metrics, then to use these metrics to assess any risk incurred by a proposed program objective memorandum (POM). Previous RAND Project AIR FORCE work developed a set of metrics and framework of analysis for capabilities-based programming and assessment of risks of expeditionary combat support. Because of the success of that work, the RAND Corporation was asked to apply and to extend (as needed) this capabilities based approach to the depot maintenance business areas, specifically focusing on depot purchased equipment maintenance (DPEM) as a first step, and to do so with a methodology that is broadly applicable. DPEM comprises numerous depot-level maintenance and inspection activities on capital assets, as well as storage and other supporting activities that span numerous program elements, budget programs, and appropriations. It funds the bulk of the work done at the Air Force depots that does not involve the repair of spares or the work on modification programs. This report presents an analysis of how to better program for DPEM
    Abstract: One of the more challenging goals in programming is to link Air Force budget program element investments to operationally relevant capability metrics, then to use these metrics to assess any risk incurred by a proposed program objective memorandum (POM). Previous RAND Project AIR FORCE work developed a set of metrics and framework of analysis for capabilities-based programming and assessment of risks of expeditionary combat support. Because of the success of that work, the RAND Corporation was asked to apply and to extend (as needed) this capabilities based approach to the depot maintenance business areas, specifically focusing on depot purchased equipment maintenance (DPEM) as a first step, and to do so with a methodology that is broadly applicable. DPEM comprises numerous depot-level maintenance and inspection activities on capital assets, as well as storage and other supporting activities that span numerous program elements, budget programs, and appropriations. It funds the bulk of the work done at the Air Force depots that does not involve the repair of spares or the work on modification programs. This report presents an analysis of how to better program for DPEM
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-86)
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  • 7
    ISBN: 9780833060136 , 0833079778 , 0833068601 , 083306844X , 0833058908 , 0833060139 , 9780833058904 , 9780833068606 , 9780833068446 , 9780833079770
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation technical report series
    Uniform Title: Understanding potential Air Force roles
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Promoting international energy security
    Keywords: Security, International ; Petroleum industry and trade ; Petroleum reserves ; Energy security ; Security, International ; Petroleum industry and trade ; Petroleum reserves ; Energy security ; HISTORY ; Middle East ; General ; Energy security ; Petroleum industry and trade ; Petroleum reserves ; Security, International ; Electronic books
    Abstract: V. 1. Understanding potential Air Force roles / James T. Bartis -- v. 2. Turkey and the Caspian / Andrew S. Weiss [and others] -- v. 3. Sea-lanes to Asia / Ryan Henry [and others] -- v. 4. The Gulf of Guinea / Stuart E. Johnson [and others]
    Note: "Highlights of GAO-13-188 , "Prepared for the United States Air Force , "RAND Project Air Force , Includes bibliographical references , Title from title screen
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