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  • 1995-1999  (2)
  • 1930-1934
  • Ferri, Giovanni  (2)
  • Washington, D.C : The World Bank  (2)
  • Bielefeld : transcript
  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
  • Banks and Banking Reform  (2)
Datasource
Material
Language
Years
Year
Author, Corporation
Publisher
  • Washington, D.C : The World Bank  (2)
  • Bielefeld : transcript
  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
Keywords
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Financial Intermediary Distress in the Republic of Korea : Small Is Beautiful? (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (42 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Ferri, Giovanni Financial Intermediary Distress in the Republic of Korea
    Keywords: Bank ; Bank Examinations ; Bank Of Korea ; Banking Systems ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital Adequacy ; Commercial Banks ; Cred Deposits ; Debt Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Institutions ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Ratios ; Loans ; Merchant Banking ; Private Sector Development ; Risk ; Risk Management ; Savings ; Services ; Small Banks ; Supervisory Agencies ; Bank ; Bank Examinations ; Bank Of Korea ; Banking Systems ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital Adequacy ; Commercial Banks ; Cred Deposits ; Debt Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Institutions ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Ratios ; Loans ; Merchant Banking ; Private Sector Development ; Risk ; Risk Management ; Savings ; Services ; Small Banks ; Supervisory Agencies
    Abstract: May 2000 - During a systemic financial crisis in Korea, the probability of financial distress was greater for large financial intermediaries (such as commercial banks and merchant banking corporations) than it was for tiny mutual savings and finance companies. Taking the Korean experience as a laboratory experiment in systemic financial crisis, Bongini, Ferri, and Kang analyze distress in individual institutions among two groups of financial intermediaries. They pool together a group of large financial intermediaries (commercial banks, merchant banking corporations) and another group of tiny mutual savings and finance companies. Both the too-big-to-fail doctrine and the credit channel approach suggest that the probability of distress would be greater for small intermediaries. But Bongini, Ferri, and Kang find that proportionately fewer small intermediaries were distressed than were large intermediaries. They offer two hypothetical explanations for this unexpected result: · Exchange rate exposure - a major shock to Korean intermediaries - was presumably negligible for the small financial intermediaries. · Small financial intermediaries allocated loans better, because of the peer monitoring natural to their mutual nature and deep local roots. Available data did not allow the authors to test the first hypothesis, but they did find support for the second one. Estimating a logit model, they find that the probability of distress was systematically smaller for the mutual savings and finance companies that stayed closer to their origins (for example, collecting many deposits as credit mutual installment savings) and for those with a longer history of doing business in their local community. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the financial crises in East Asia. The authors may be contacted at pbonginimi.unicatt.it, gferri@worldbank.orgor tkang@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    How the Proposed Basel Guidelines on Rating-Agency Assessments Would Affect Developing Countries (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (36 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Majnoni, Giovanni How the Proposed Basel Guidelines on Rating-Agency Assessments Would Affect Developing Countries
    Keywords: Bank ; Bank Capital ; Bank Ratings ; Banking ; Banking Sector ; Banks ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital Adequacy ; Capital Regulation ; Capital Requirements ; Cost Of Capital ; Cred Credit Risk ; Economies ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Markets ; Financial Systems ; Fixed Costs ; Loans ; Markets ; Rating Agencies ; Risk ; Bank ; Bank Capital ; Bank Ratings ; Banking ; Banking Sector ; Banks ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital Adequacy ; Capital Regulation ; Capital Requirements ; Cost Of Capital ; Cred Credit Risk ; Economies ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Markets ; Financial Systems ; Fixed Costs ; Loans ; Markets ; Rating Agencies ; Risk
    Abstract: June 2000 - The Basel Committee has proposed linking capital asset requirements for banks to the banks' private sector ratings. Doing so would reduce the capital requirements for banks that lend prudently in high-income countries; the same incentives would not apply in developing countries. Using historical data on sovereign and individual borrowers, Ferri, Liu, and Majnoni assess the potential impact on non-high-income countries of linking capital asset requirements for banks to private sector ratings, as the Basel Committee has proposed. They show that linking banks' capital asset requirements to external ratings would have undesirable effects for developing countries. First, ratings of banks and corporations in developing countries are less common, so capital asset requirements would be practically insensitive to improvements in the quality of assets - widening the gap between banks of equal financial strength in higher- and lower-income countries. Second, bank and corporate ratings in developing countries (unlike their counterparts in high-income countries) are strongly linked to the sovereign ratings for the country - and appear to be strongly related (asymmetrically) to changes in the sovereign ratings. A sovereign downgrading would bring greater changes in capital allocations than an upgrading, and would call for larger capital requirements at the very time access to capital markets was more difficult. Under the new guidelines, capital requirements in developing countries would thus be exposed to the cyclical swings associated with the revision of sovereign ratings in recent crises. Ultimately, linking banks' capital asset requirements to private sector ratings would reduce the credit available to non-high-income countries and make it more costly, limiting economic activity. Bank capital needs in developing countries would be more volatile than those in high-income countries. These findings suggest that the Basel Committee should reassess the role it proposes assigning to external ratings, to minimize the detrimental impact of the regulatory use of such ratings on developing countries. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the impact of financial regulation on economic development. The authors may be contacted at lliu2worldbank.org or gmajnoni@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
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