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  • Edward Elgar Publishing  (5)
  • Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie (DGS)
  • Cheltenham : E. Elgar  (3)
  • Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Pub  (2)
  • Umweltpolitik  (5)
Datasource
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Language
Years
Author, Corporation
Subjects(RVK)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Pub
    ISBN: 9781784716332
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (928 p) , cm
    Series Statement: Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
    Series Statement: The international library of critical writings in economics 325
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als The economics of environmental policy
    RVK:
    Keywords: Umweltökonomik ; Umweltpolitik ; Verhaltensökonomik ; Environmental policy Economic aspects ; Electronic books ; Umweltpolitik ; Umweltökonomie
    Abstract: Recommended readings (Machine generated): Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2003), 'Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation', Review of Economic Studies, 70 (3), July, 489-520 -- Kjell Arne Brekke, Snorre Kverndokk and Karine Nyborg (2003), 'An Economic Model of Moral Motivation', Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), September, 1967-83 -- Olof Johansson-Stenman and James Konow (2010), 'Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics', Environmental and Resource Economics, Special Issue: Behavioral Economics and the Environment, 46 (2), June, 147-66 -- Elizabeth Gsottbauer and Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh (2013), 'Bounded Rationality and Social Interaction in Negotiating a Climate Agreement', International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 13 (3), September, 225-49 -- Matthew E. Kahn (2007), 'Do Greens Drive Hummers or Hybrids? Environmental Ideology as a Determinant of Consumer Choice', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54 (2), September, 129-45 -- Francisco Alpizar, Fredrik Carlsson and Olof Johansson-Stenman (2008), 'Anonymity, Reciprocity, and Conformity: Evidence from Voluntary Contributions to a National Park in Costa Rica', Journal of Public Economics, 92 (5-6), June, 1047-60 -- Noah J. Goldstein, Robert B. Cialdini and Vladas Griskevicius (2008), 'A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels', Journal of Consumer Research, 35 (3), October, 472-82 -- Jen Shang and Rachel Croson (2009), 'A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods', Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1422-39 -- Hunt Allcott (2011), 'Social Norms and Energy Conservation', Journal of Public Economics, Special Issue: The Role of Firms in Tax Systems, 95 (9-10), October, 1082-95 -- Ernst Fehr and Andreas Leibbrandt (2011), 'A Field Study on Cooperativeness and Impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons', Journal of Public Economics, Special Issue: The Role of Firms in Tax Systems, 95 (9-10), October, 1144-55 -- Paul J. Ferraro, Juan Jose Miranda and Michael K. Price (2011), 'The Persistence of Treatment Effects with Norm-Based Policy Instruments: Evidence from a Randomized Environmental Policy Experiment', American Economic Review, 101 (3), May, 318-22 -- Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, Giorgos Kallis, and Andreas Löschel (2011), 'Inequality, Communication, and the Avoidance of Disastrous Climate Change in a Public Good Game', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108 (29), July, 11825-9 -- W. Kip Viscusi, Joel Huber and Jason Bell (2011), 'Promoting Recycling: Private Values, Social Norms, and Economic Incentives', American Economic Review, 101 (3), May, 65-70 -- Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn (2013), 'Energy Conservation "Nudges" and Environmental Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field Experiment', Journal of the European Economic Association, Themed Issue: Social Norms: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory and Field, 11 (3), June, 680-702 -- Larry Karp (2005), 'Global Warming and Hyperbolic Discounting', Journal of Public Economics, 89 (2-3), February, 261-82 -- Kjell Arne Brekke and Olof Johansson-Stenman (2008), 'The Behavioural Economics of Climate Change', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24 (2), Summer, 280-97 -- John M. Gowdy (2008), 'Behavioral Economics and Climate Change Policy', Journal of Economics Behaviour and Organization, 68 (3-4), December, 632-44 -- Fredrik Carlsson (2010), 'Design of Stated Preference Surveys: Is There More to Learn from Behavioral Economics?', Environmental and Resource Economics, Special Issue: Behavioral Economics and the Environment, 46 (2), June, 167-77 -- Cameron Hepburn, Stephen Duncan and Antonis Papachristodoulou (2010), 'Behavioural Economics, Hyperbolic Discounting and Environmental Policy', Environmental and Resource Economics, 46 (2), June, 189-206.
    Abstract: James K. Hammitt (2013), 'Positive versus Normative Justifications for Benefit-Cost Analysis: Implications for Interpretation and Policy', Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 7 (2), Summer, 199-218 -- Juan Camilo Cardenas, John Stranlund and Cleve Willis (2000), 'Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out', World Development, 28 (10), October, 1719-33 -- Heinz Welsch (2002), 'Preferences over Prosperity and Pollution: Environmental Valuation based on Happiness Surveys, Kyklos, 55 (4), November, 473-94 -- John A. List (2003), 'Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (1), February, 41-71 -- Daniel Kahneman and Robert Sugden (2005), 'Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation', Environmental and Resource Economics, Anomalies and Stated Preference Techniques, 32 (1), September, 161-81 -- Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler (2005), 'The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations', American Economic Review, 95 (3), June, 530-45 -- Katrin Rehdanz and David Maddison (2005), 'Climate and Happiness', Ecological Economics, 52 (1), January, 111-25 -- Daniel Pichert and Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos (2008), 'Green Defaults: Information Presentation and Pro-Environmental Behaviour', Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28 (1), March, 63-73 -- W. Kip Viscusi, Joel Huber and Jason Bell (2008), 'Estimating Discount Rates for Environmental Quality from Utility-Based Choice Experiments', Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 37 (2-3), December, 199-220 -- Jason F. Shogren, Gregory M. Pankhurst and Prasenjit Banerjee (2010), 'Two Cheers and a Qualm for Behavioral Environmental Economics', Environmental and Resource Economics, Special Issue: Behavioral Economics and the Environment, 46 (2), June, 235-247 -- Kelly Sims Gallagher and Erich Muehlegger (2011), 'Giving Green to Get Green? Incentives and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 61 (1), January, 1-15 -- Steffen Kallbekken, Stephan Kroll and Todd L. Cherry (2011), 'Do You Not Like Pigou, or Do You Not Understand Him? Tax Aversion and Revenue Recycling in the Lab', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62 (1), July, 53-64 -- Gert Tinggard Svendsen (1999), 'U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective', Public Choice, 101 (1-2), October, 109-28 -- Niels Anger, Christoph Böhringer and Andreas Lange (2015), 'The Political Economy of Energy Tax Differentiation Across Industries: Theory and Empirical Evidence', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 47 (1), February, 78-98 -- Per G. Fredriksson, Eric Neumayer, Richard Damania and Scott Gates (2005), 'Environmentalism, Democracy, and Pollution Control', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49 (2), March, 343-65 -- John A. List and Daniel M. Sturm (2006), 'How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (4), November, 1249-81 -- Scott Barrett (1998), 'Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14 (4), December, 20-39 -- Nathaniel O. Keohane (2009), 'Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable Permits to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gases', Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3 (1), Winter, 42-62 -- Meredith Fowlie, Stephen P. Holland and Erin T. Mansur (2012), 'What do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's NOx Trading Program', American Economic Review, 102 (2), April, 965-93.
    Abstract: Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls, Laure B. de Preux and Ulrich J. Wagner (2014), 'Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme', American Economic Review, 104 (8), August, 2482-508 -- Roger D. Congleton (1992), 'Political Institutions and Pollution Control', Review of Economics and Statistics, 74 (3), August, 412-21 -- Dietrich Earnhart (1997), 'Enforcement of Environmental Protection Laws under Communism and Democracy', Journal of Law and Economics, 40 (2), October, 377-402 -- Thomas Bernauer and Vally Koubi (2013), 'Are Bigger Governments Better Providers of Public Goods? Evidence from Air Pollution', Public Choice, 156 (3-4), September, 593-609 -- Mark Pearson (1995), 'The Political Economy of Implementing Environmental Taxes', International Tax and Public Finance, 2 (2), August, 357-73 -- Gebhard Kirchgässner and Friedrich Schneider (2003), 'On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy' Public Choice, 115 (3-4), June, 369-96 -- Robert W. Hahn (2009), 'Greenhouse Gas Auctions and Taxes: Some Political Economy Considerations', Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3 (2), Summer, 167-88 -- Gilbert E. Metcalf (2009), 'Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions', Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3 (1), Winter, 63-83 -- Toke S. Aidt (2010), 'Green Taxes: Refunding Rules and Lobbying', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 60 (1), July, 31-43 -- Winston Harrington, Alan J. Krupnick and Anna Alberini (2001), 'Overcoming Public Aversion to Congestion Pricing', Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 35 (2), February, 87-105.
    Abstract: Environmental Policy is an increasingly important subject as we enter an era where environmental issues are affecting all walks of life. This informative Research Review provides a guide through the behavioral and political foundations of environmental economic policy. It discusses articles which give an in-depth view of the current economic discipline whilst also looking at research from other social and behavioral sciences. Students and scholars as well as environmental policy makers will find this an essential tool to navigate the political and behavioural issues that we have to understand in order to resolve some of the biggest political issues of our time
    Note: The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings , Includes bibliographical references and index
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Pub
    ISBN: 9781784713201
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (p) , cm
    Series Statement: The international library of critical writings in economics series
    Series Statement: Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
    Parallel Title: Available in another form
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Game theory and international environmental cooperation
    DDC: 333.7015193
    RVK:
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    Keywords: Umweltabkommen ; Klimawandel ; Nachhaltige Entwicklung ; Spieltheorie ; Internationale Klimapolitik ; Game theory ; Environmental law, International ; Environmental economics ; Electronic books ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Spieltheorie ; Anwendung ; Umweltökonomie ; Umweltpolitik
    Abstract: Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This Research Review identifies the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements
    Abstract: A. Caparrós, J.-C. Péreau and T. Tazdai͏̈t (2004), 'North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information', Public Choice, 121 (3-4), December, 455-80 -- Alejandro Caparrós and Jean-Christophe Péreau (2013), 'Forming Coalitions to Negotiate North-South Climate Agreements', Environment and Development Economics, Special Issue on Strategic Behaviour and Environmental Commons, 18 (1), February, 69-92 -- Bård Harstad (2012), 'Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations', Review of Economic Studies, 79 (4), October, 1527-57 -- Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori and Sonia Oreffice (2009), 'Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties', Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (3), March, 411-25 -- Astrid Dannenberg, Andreas Lange and Bodo Sturm (2014), 'Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods', Economica, 81 (322), April, 257-75 -- Scott Barrett (2006), 'Climate Treaties and "Breakthrough" Technologies', American Economic Review, 96 (2), May, 22-5 -- Michael Hoel and Aart de Zeeuw (2010), 'Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?', Environmental and Resource Economics, 47 (3), November, 395-406 -- Matthew McGinty (2007), 'International Environmental Agreements among Asymmetric Nations', Oxford Economic Papers, 59 (1), January, 45-62 -- Hans-Peter Weikard (2009), 'Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule', Manchester School, 77 (5), September, 575-93 -- Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006), 'Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements', Review of International Organizations, 1 (4), December, 379-96 -- Matthew McGinty, Garrett Milam and Alejandro Gelves (2012), 'Coalition Stability in Public Goods Provision: Testing an Optimal Allocation Rule', Environmental and Resource Economics, 52 (3), July, 327-45 -- Stefan Ambec and Yves Sprumont (2002), 'Sharing a River', Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2), December, 453-62 -- Andreas Lange and Carsten Vogt (2003), 'Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity', Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), September, 2049-67 -- Michael Kosfeld, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl (2009), 'Institution Formation in Public Goods Games', American Economic Review, 99 (4), September, 1335-55 -- Francesco Bosello, Barabara Buchner and Carlo Carraro (2003), 'Equity, Development, and Climate Change Control', Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (2-3), April-May, 601-11 -- Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006), 'Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making', Natural Resource Modeling, 19 (3), September, 323-58 -- Geir B. Asheim, Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi and Fredric C. Menz (2006), 'Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 51 (1), January, 93-109 -- Seong-lin Na and Hyun Song Shin (1998), 'International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty', Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (2), April, 173-85 -- Michael Finus and Pedro Pintassilgo (2013), 'The Role of Uncertainty and Learning for the Success of International Climate Agreements', Journal of Public Economics, 103, July, 29-43 --
    Abstract: Alfred Endres and Cornelia Ohl (2001), 'International Environmental Cooperation in the One Shot Prisoners' Dilemma', Schmollers Jahrbuch, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften/Journal of Applied Social Science Studies, 121 (1), 1-26 -- Vincent Boucher and Yann Bramoullé (2010), 'Providing Global Public Goods under Uncertainty', Journal of Public Economics, 94 (9-10), October, 591-603 -- Scott Barrett (2013), 'Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 66 (2), September, 235-50 -- Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, Giorgos Kallis and Andreas Löschel (2011), 'Inequality, Communication, and The Avoidance of Disastrous Climate Change in a Public Goods Game', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108 (29), July, 11825-9 -- Lata Gangadharan and Veronika Nemes (2009) 'Experimental Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty in Provisioning Private and Public Goods', Economic Inquiry 47 (1), January, 146-64 -- Santiago J. Rubio and Alistair Ulph (2007), 'An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54 (3), November, 296-310 -- Aart de Zeeuw (2008), 'Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55 (2), March, 163-74 -- Marc Germain, Philippe Toint, Henry Tulkens and Aart de Zeeuw (2003), 'Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28 (1), October, 79-99 -- Hans-Peter Weikard, Rob Dellink and Ekko van Ierland (2010), 'Renegotiations in the Greenhouse', Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (4), April, 573-96 -- Michèle Breton, Lucia Sbragia and Georges Zaccour (2010), 'A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements', Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (1), January, 25-48
    Abstract: Recommended readings (Machine generated): Karl-Göran Mäler (1989), 'The Acid Rain Game', in H. Folmer and E. van Ierland (eds), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics, Chapter 12, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 231-52 -- Scott Barrett (1994), 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements', Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue on Environmental Economics, 46, October, 878-94 -- Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (1993), 'Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment', Journal of Public Economics, 52 (3), October, 309-28 -- Michael Hoel (1992), 'International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions', Environmental and Resource Economics, 2 (2), March, 141-59 -- Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens (1997), 'The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (3), October, 379-401 -- Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Eftichios S. Sartzetakis (2006), 'Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach', Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8 (2), May, 247-63 -- Santiago J. Rubio and Alistair Ulph (2006), 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited', Oxford Economic Papers, 58 (2), April, 233-63 -- Larry Karp and Leo Simon (2013), 'Participation Games and International Environmental Agreements: A Non-Parametric Model', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 65 (2), March, 326-44 -- Carsten Helm (2001), 'On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a Coalitional Game with Externalities', International Journal of Game Theory, 30 (1), September, 141-6 -- Rögnvaldur Hannesson (1997), 'Fishing as a Supergame', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32 (3), March, 309-22 -- Michael Finus and Sigve Tjøtta (2003), 'The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: The Great Leap Forward?' Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9-10), September, 2031-48 -- Henk Folmer, Pierre v. Mouche and Shannon Ragland (1993), 'Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems', Environmental and Resource Economics, 3 (4), August, 313-35 -- Anke Gerber and Philipp C. Wichardt (2009), 'Providing Public Goods in the Absence of Strong Institutions', Journal of Public Economics, 93 (3-4), April, 429-39 -- Todd L. Cherry and David M. McEvoy (2013), 'Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis', Environmental and Resource Economics, 54 (1), January, 63-77 -- David M. McEvoy and John K. Stranlund (2009), 'Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance', Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (4), April, 491-508 -- Nori Tarui, Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky and Greg Ellis (2008), 'Cooperation in the Commons with Unobservable Actions', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55 (1), January, 37-51 -- Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner (2009) 'A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming: Theory and Some Numbers', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71 (2), August, 187-209 -- Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen (1998), 'Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control', Public Choice, 96 (1-2), July, 145-86 -- Scott Barrett (2002), 'Consensus Treaties', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158 (4), December, 529-47 -- Pierre Courtois and Guillaume Haeringer (2012), 'Environmental Cooperation: Ratifying Second-Best Agreements', Public Choice, 151 (3-4), June, 565-84 --
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    ISBN: 9781781950616
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxv, 275 p) , ill
    Series Statement: Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
    Parallel Title: Available in another form
    Parallel Title: Elektronische Reproduktion von Towards sustainable development in industry?
    DDC: 338.9/27/091724
    RVK:
    Keywords: Nachhaltige Entwicklung ; Umweltbelastung ; Umweltmanagement ; Umweltpolitik ; Chile ; China ; Tschechien ; Pakistan ; Tunesien ; Türkei ; Simbabwe ; Environmental policy ; Sustainable development ; Sustainable development ; Environmental policy ; Industries Environmental aspects ; Industrial policy ; Industries Environmental aspects ; Industrial policy ; Electronic books ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Entwicklungsländer ; Industrie ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Nachhaltigkeit ; Entwicklungsländer ; Industrie ; Umweltpolitik ; Nachhaltigkeit ; Transformationsländer
    Abstract: Many developing and transition economies have not yet undertaken the policy integration measures needed to enhance the impact of industry on sustainable development. In this original and insightful book, national experts from Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey and Zimbabwe - countries which all have designated national sustainable development strategies - report on the extent to which recent changes in industrial, environmental and technology policies have more closely aligned industrial development with the aims of sustainable development
    Abstract: pt. 1. Introduction -- pt. 2. Country reports -- pt. 3. Conclusions
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    ISBN: 9781781952931
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xviii, 327 p) , ill
    Series Statement: ESRI studies series on the environment
    Series Statement: Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
    Parallel Title: Available in another form
    Parallel Title: Elektronische Reproduktion von Firms, governments and climate policy
    DDC: 363.738/74/05610973
    RVK:
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    Keywords: Umweltpolitik ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Klimaschutz ; Umweltökonomik ; Anreiz ; Environmental policy ; Age distribution (Demography) Environmental aspects ; Sustainable development ; Climatic changes Government policy ; Energy consumption Environmental aspects ; Electronic books ; Klima ; Umweltpolitik ; Umweltbezogenes Management
    Abstract: This book analyses the policy mixes that provide the best possible incentives for firms and governments to act on climate change and sign up to international climate agreements. In doing so, the authors address a multitude of related issues including the linkages between flexible mechanisms and voluntary agreements; regulation and taxation; the opportunities and barriers of the Kyoto Protocol for industry; and the incentives for firms to undertake climate-related R&D and investments. As well as illustrating the environmental benefits and cost-effectiveness of alternative policy mixes in reducing GHG emissions, the authors also offer sensible policy prescriptions for increasing the numbers of countries that ratify and implement climate agreements
    Abstract: 1. The compatibility of the Kyoto mechanisms with traditional environmental instruments -- 2. Negotiated agreements and climate change mitigation -- 3. Kyoto flexible mechanisms : opportunities and barriers for industry and financial institutions -- 4. Traditional environmental instruments, Kyoto mechanisms and the role of technical change -- 5. The future evolution of the Kyoto protocol : costs, benefits and incentives to ratification and new international regimes
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cheltenham : E. Elgar
    ISBN: 9781781009918
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxi, 340 p) , ill
    Series Statement: International studies in environmental policy making
    Series Statement: Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
    Parallel Title: Available in another form
    Parallel Title: Elektronische Reproduktion von Greening the budget
    Parallel Title: Elektronische Reproduktion von Greening the budget
    DDC: 333.7
    RVK:
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    Keywords: 11.05.1998 ; Umweltpolitik ; Finanzpolitik ; Subvention ; Staatsversagen ; Marktversagen ; Theorie ; Welt ; Subsidies Case studies ; Sustainable development Case studies ; Budget Case studies ; Environmental policy Case studies ; Electronic books ; Konferenzschrift 1998 ; Konferenzschrift ; Umweltpolitik ; Öffentlicher Haushalt ; Öffentliche Ausgaben ; Umweltpolitik ; Fiskalpolitik
    Abstract: Greening the Budget regards the fundamental cause of environmental degradation as government and market failure and proposes the use of budgets as an instrument of environmental policy to rectify this problem. The book focuses on the elements of the public budget which currently affect the environment and explores the scope for greening both revenue and expenditure through specific measures
    Abstract: pt. 1. Environmentally damaging subsidies -- pt. 2. Taxes and charges -- pt. 3. Subsidies for environmental purposes -- pt. 4. European financial transfers -- pt. 5. Public purchasing and administration
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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