Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (44 p)
,
28 cm
Edition:
Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
Series Statement:
Policy research working paper 2183
Parallel Title:
Demirguç-Kunt, Asli Market discipline and financial safety net design
Keywords:
Banks and banking
;
Deposit insurance
;
Banks and banking
;
Deposit insurance
Abstract:
It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks
Note:
"September 1999"--Cover
,
Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29)
,
Also available in print.
URL:
Volltext
(Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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