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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (24 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement
    Keywords: Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure
    Abstract: Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (44 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (43 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Iimi, Atsushi Price Structure And Network Externalities In The Telecommunications Industry
    Keywords: Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure
    Abstract: Many developing countries have experienced significant developments in their telecommunications network. Countries in Africa are no exception to this. The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. In theory the telecommunications sector has two sector-specific characteristics: network externalities and discriminatory pricing. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. Some countries in Africa are still imposing certain price restrictions. But more important, it remains a policy issue how the authorities should ensure reciprocal access between operators at reasonable cost
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (31 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Zevenbergen, Jaap Rural Land Certification In Ethiopia
    Keywords: Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems ; Agriculture ; Common Property ; Common Property Resource Development ; Common Property Resources ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Compensation ; E-Business ; Enforcement ; Enforcement Mechanisms ; Environment ; Environments ; Land ; Land Administration ; Land Grabbing ; Land Use and Policies ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems ; Urban Development ; Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems ; Agriculture ; Common Property ; Common Property Resource Development ; Common Property Resources ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Compensation ; E-Business ; Enforcement ; Enforcement Mechanisms ; Environment ; Environments ; Land ; Land Administration ; Land Grabbing ; Land Use and Policies ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems ; Urban Development ; Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems ; Agriculture ; Common Property ; Common Property Resource Development ; Common Property Resources ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Compensation ; E-Business ; Enforcement ; Enforcement Mechanisms ; Environment ; Environments ; Land ; Land Administration ; Land Grabbing ; Land Use and Policies ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Development ; Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems ; Urban Development
    Abstract: Although many African countries have recently adopted highly innovative and pro-poor land laws, lack of implementation thwarts their potentially far-reaching impact on productivity, poverty reduction, and governance. The authors use a representative household survey from Ethiopia where, over a short period, certificates to more than 20 million plots were issued to describe the certification process, explore its incidence and preliminary impact, and quantify the costs. While this provides many suggestions to ensure sustainability and enhance impact, Ethiopia's highly cost-effective first-time registration process provides important lessons
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