ISBN:
9789400998209
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (272p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Synthese Language Library, Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 2
Series Statement:
Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 2
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Linguistics
;
Linguistics Philosophy
;
Semantics
;
Semiotics.
;
Language and languages—Philosophy.
Abstract:
1. Introduction -- 1.1 Aims -- 1.2 Beyond Syntax -- 1.3 Bloomfield’s Dilemma -- 1.4 The Research Strategy of the Isolable Subsystem -- 1.5 Theories of Language vs. Language Analysis -- 1.6 Theories of Logic -- 1.7 Logico-Linguistics -- 2. Information and Language -- 2.1 Information States -- 2.2 Input and Output -- 2.3 Information Automata -- 2.4 Language Automata -- 2.5 Black-Box Methodology -- 2.6 The What-Do-You-Know? Game -- 2.7 The Behavior-Analytic Interpretation of Language Automata -- 2.8 The Linguistic Priority of the Language Automaton -- 2.9 Languages -- 2.10 Summary -- 3. On Describing Languages -- 3.1 Descriptive Strategies -- 3.2 Descriptive Equivalence -- 3.3 Language Descriptions as Scientific Theories -- 3.4 Basic Evidence Propeties -- 3.5 The Evidence-Gathering Process -- 4. Language and Deductive Logic -- 4.1 Idealizations -- 4.2 Logical Relationships -- 4.3 Properties of the Logical Relationships -- 4.4 Logics -- 4.5 Informative Languages have Incomplete Logics -- 4.6 Quasi-logical Relationships -- 4.7 Quasi-logical Relationships are often Logical -- 4.8 Logic in the Evidence-Gathering Process -- 5. Semantics, Axiomatics -- 5.1 Semantically Structuralizable Languages -- 5.2 Examples of Artifical Semantically Structuralizable Languages -- 5.3 A Fragment of English -- 5.4 Semantics and Deductive Logic -- 5.5 Axiomatic Language Descriptions -- 5.6 Other Language Families -- 5.7 Logic as a Branch of Linguistics -- 5.8 Syntax, Semantics, Pragmatics -- 6. Meaning -- 6.1 Purports and Imports -- 6.2 Purport-Import Glossaries -- 6.3 Specialized Glossaries -- 6.4 Synonymy -- 7. Language and Inductive Logic -- 7.1 Credibility Weights -- 7.2 Probability Weights -- 7.3 Deductive Logic in Probability-Weighted Languages -- 7.4 The Semantics of Probability-Weighted Languages -- 7.5 Plausible Inference -- 7.6 Statistical Inference -- 7.7 Inductive Reasoning -- 7.8 Extended Semantics -- 8. ‘If-Then’: A Case Study in Logico-Linguistic Analysis -- 8.1 Preliminary Statement of Hypotheses to be Tested -- 82 History of Hypothesis A -- 8.3 History of Hypothesis B -- 8.4 History of Other Hypotheses -- 8.5 Delineation of Constructions of Interest -- 8.6 The Working Hypothesis of Extended Semantic Structuralizability -- 8.7 Exact Statement of Hypothesis A -- 8.8 Exact Statement of Hypothesis B -- 8.9 Remarks on Hypothesis B -- 8.10 Contraposition -- 8.11 Methodological Review -- 8.12 The Hypothetical Syllogism -- 8.13 Further Inference Patterns -- 8.14 The Paradoxes of Material Implication -- 8.15 The Second Paradox Re-examined Dynamically -- 8.16 Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens -- 8.17 Order of Premises -- 8.18 Incompatible Conditionals -- 8.19 Self-Contradictory Conditionals -- 8.20 Aristole’s Slip -- 8.21 Incompleteness of the Rules Governing Conditionals -- 8.22 Logically Disjunct Conditionals -- 8.23 Negations of Conditionals -- 8.24 Conjunctions of Conditionals -- 8.25 Conditionals Containing Other Conditionals -- 8.26 Lewis Carroll’s Barbershop Paradox -- 8.27 Disjunctions of Conditionals -- 8.28 Conclusions about If—then -- 8.29 Further Case Studies -- 8.30 Concluding Remark -- 9. Problem Areas and Computer Applications -- 9.1 Choice of Linguistic Unit -- 9.2 Ambiguity -- 9.3 Context-Dependence -- 9.4 Linguistic Incompleteness -- 9.5 Non-declarative Sentences -- 9.6 Physical Realizability -- 9.7 Automatic Question-Answering -- 9.8 Enthymemes, Analyticity -- 9.9 Further Computer Applications -- 9.10 Artificial Intelligence -- 9.11 The Future -- References.
Abstract:
In 1962 a mimeographed sheet of paper fell into my possession. It had been prepared by Ernest Adams of the Philosophy Department at Berkeley as a handout for a colloquim. Headed 'SOME FALLACIES OF FORMAL LOGIC' it simply listed eleven little pieces of reasoning, all in ordinary English, and all absurd. I still have the sheet, and quote a couple of the arguments here to give the idea. • If you throw switch S and switch T, the motor will start. There fore, either if you throw switch S the motor will start, or, if you throw switch T the motor will start . • It is not the case that if John passes history he will graduate. Therefore, John will pass history. The disconcerting thing about these inferences is, of course, that under the customary truth-functional interpretation of and, or, not, and if-then, they are supposed to be valid. What, if anything, is wrong? At first I was not disturbed by the examples. Having at that time consider able personal commitment to rationality in general and formal logic in par ticular, I felt it my duty and found myself easily able (or so I thought) to explain away most of them. But on reflection I had to admit that my expla nations had an ad hoc character, varying suspiciously from example to example.
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-009-9820-9
URL:
Volltext
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