ISBN:
9781785362149
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (li, 728 p)
,
ill
,
cm
Series Statement:
Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games
Keywords:
Nash, John F.
;
Nash, John F
;
Verhandlungstheorie
;
Spieltheorie
;
Kooperatives Spiel
;
Finanzmathematik
;
Collective bargaining Econometric models
;
Negotiation Mathematical models
;
Game theory
;
Electronic books
;
Aufsatzsammlung
;
Nash, John F. 1928-2015
;
Spieltheorie
;
Verhandlungstheorie
Abstract:
This book explores game theory's development as a tool to understand economic behavior
Abstract:
Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), 'Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining', Econometrica, 51 (1), January, 219-21 -- Yves Sprumont (2000), 'A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34, 27-38 -- Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), 'An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players', Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 129-42 -- John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), 'The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai- Smorodinsky Solutions', Economics Letters, 36, 365-9 -- Lin Zhou (1996), 'The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems', Econometrica, 65 (3), May, 681-5 -- William Thomson (1987), 'Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point', Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1), 50-58 -- Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), 'Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms', Mathematics of Operations Research, 16 (3), August, 447-61 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), 'Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 951-9 -- William Thomson (1983), 'The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population', Mathematics of Operations Research, 8 (3), August, 319-26 -- William Thomson (1983), 'Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (2), December, 211-26 -- William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), 'Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division', Mathematical Social Sciences, 4, 205-18 -- Terje Lensberg (1987), 'Stability and Collective Rationality', Econometrica, 55 (4), July, 935-61 -- Terje Lensberg (1988), 'Stability and the Nash Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (2), 330-41 -- Youngsub Chun (2002), 'The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining', Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 25-43 -- Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), 'Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', in O. Moeschlin (ed) and D. Pallaschke (ed) (eds), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 65-71 -- Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), 'Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes', Econometrica, 50 (3), May, 639-47 -- Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), 'Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 961-5 -- John E. Roemer (1988), 'Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (1), 1-31 -- Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), 'On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences', Econometrica, 60 (5), September, 1171-86
Abstract:
Recommended readings (Machine generated): John F. Nash Jr. (1950), 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (2), April, 155-62 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem', Mathematics of Operations Research, 2 (1), February, 64-5 -- Alvin E. Roth (1977), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Journal of Economic Theory, 16 (2), December, 247-51 -- Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences', Econometrica, 59 (6), November, 1787-801 -- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), 'Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions', Econometrica, 62 (5), September, 1161-78 -- Efe A. Ok (1998), 'Inequality Averse Collective Choice', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 30, 301-21 -- Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), 'Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 43 (3), May, 513-18 -- A.E. Roth (1979), 'An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 8 (3), 129-32 -- Ehud Kalai (1977), 'Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1623-30 -- Haruo Imai (1983), 'Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution', Econometrica, 51 (2), March, 389-401; 'Erratum', Econometrica, 51 (5), September, 1603 -- W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), 'Monotonicity and Independence Axioms', International Journal of Game Theory, 9 (1), 37-49 -- P.L. Yu (1973), 'A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems', Management Science, 19 (8), April, 936-46 -- Youngsub Chun (1988), 'The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems', Economics Letters, 26, 103-6 -- Roger B. Myerson (1977), 'Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1631-7 -- M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), 'The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game', International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (3/4), 163-93 -- Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems', Econometrica, 49 (4), July, 883-97 -- Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), 'Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions', International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (4), 501-24 -- Hans Peters (1986), 'Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining', Econometrica, 54 (1), January 153-69 -- Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), 'Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games', in G. Th. Guilbaud (ed) (ed.), La Decision, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 251-63
Abstract:
Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), 'Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis', Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (2), April, 288-306 -- Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), 'A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory', Econometrica, 63 (5), September, 1241-9 -- Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), 'Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 24, 19-33 -- Walter Bossert (1993), 'An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 25, 205-20 -- Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), 'Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 65 (1), January, 1-18 -- John Nash (1953), 'Two-Person Cooperative Games', Econometrica, 21 (1), January, 128-40 -- Eric van Damme (1986), 'The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal', Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1), 78-100 -- Ariel Rubinstein (1982), 'Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model', Econometrica, 50 (1), January, 97-109 -- Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), 'Distortion of Preferences and the Nash Theory of Bargaining', Economics Letters, 3, 203-6 -- Joel Sobel (1981), 'Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 49 (3), May, 597-619 -- H. Moulin (1984), 'Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June, 32-45 -- Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), 'Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions', Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 292-308 -- M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), 'On Dividing Justly', Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (1), 1-24
Note:
Includes bibliographical references
,
The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings
DOI:
10.4337/9781785362149
URL:
Volltext
(Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
URL:
Deutschlandweit zugänglich
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