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  • Online Resource  (4)
  • 1980-1984  (4)
  • Wohlfahrtstheorie  (4)
  • Economics  (4)
  • Computer Science
  • Education
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Collective choice and social welfare (1984)
    Amsterdam : North-Holland
    Details
    ISBN: 9781483294575 , 1483294579 , 0444851275 , 9780444851277
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 online resource (xi, 225 pages) , illustrations
    Series Statement: Advanced textbooks in economics v. 11
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Sen, Amartya, 1933- Collective choice and social welfare
    DDC: 302.3
    RVK:
    CC 7750
    RVK:
    QC 160
    Keywords: Elección social ; PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology ; Social choice ; Welfare economics ; Social choice ; Économie du bien-être ; Choix collectif ; Politique sociale ; Économie publique ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Welfare economics ; Social choice ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Wirtschaftstheorie ; Mathematik ; Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Wirtschaftstheorie ; Mathematik ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Wohlfahrtstheorie
    Abstract: This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members
    Note: Reprint. Originally published: San Francisco : Holden-Day, 1970 , Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-218). - Includes indexes
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    BVB
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare (1983)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 9780511897993
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 278 pages)
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    CC 7750
    RVK:
    QC 160
    Keywords: Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Fürsorge ; Kollektiventscheidung
    Abstract: Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary association of free and rational individuals. Among other topics covered are an axiomatic characterisation of the concept of a rational choice, the simple majority decision rule and its extensions, the social choice implications of the concept of equity as nonenvy, the constrained majoritarian collective choice rules and the conflict between the Paretian ethics and the libertarian claims of individual rights.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511897993
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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    Online Resource
    München BSB
    BSZ
    GBV
    KOBV
    HeBIS
    BVB
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The strategy of social choice (1983)
    Amsterdam : North-Holland Pub. Co.
    Details
    ISBN: 9780444863713 , 0444863710 , 9781483256887 , 148325688X
    Language: English
    Pages: xi, 214 pages
    Series Statement: Advanced textbooks in economics v. 18
    DDC: 302.1/3/0724
    RVK:
    QC 160
    Keywords: Choix collectif / Modèles mathématiques ; Vote / Modèles mathématiques ; Jeux, Théorie des ; Game theory ; Social choice / Mathematical models ; Voting / Mathematical models ; Social choice ; Kiesgedrag ; Speltheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Wahl ; Wahlverhalten ; Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Social choice Mathematical models ; Voting Mathematical models ; Game theory ; Wahl ; Spieltheorie ; Wahlverhalten ; Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Wahlverhalten ; Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Wahl
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The economic theory of social institutions (1981)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    Details
    ISBN: 9780511983863
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 177 pages)
    DDC: 306/.3
    RVK:
    QC 130
    RVK:
    QC 160
    Keywords: Wirtschaftstheorie ; Sozialeinrichtung ; Wohlfahrtstheorie
    Abstract: This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded as regularities in the behaviour of social agents, which the agents themselves tacitly create to solve a wide variety of recurrent problems. The repetitive nature of the problems permits them to be described as a recurrent game or 'supergame.' The agents use these regularities as informational devices to supplement the information contained in competitive prices. The final chapter explores the applicability of this theory, first by relating it to previous work on the theory of teams, hierarchies, and non-maximizing decision theory, and then by using it to provide a new approach to a variety of questions both within and outside economics.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511983863
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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