Abstract: 1. Nature, Culture, and Persons -- 2. The Concept of Consciousness -- 3. Animal and Human Minds -- 4. Action and Causality -- 5. Puzzles about the Causal Explanation of Human Actions -- 6. Cognitivism and the Problem of Explaining Human Intelligence -- 7. Wittgenstein and Natural Languages: an Alternative to Rationalist and Empiricist Theories.

Abstract: viii choice and these include efforts to provide logical frameworks within which wecan make senseof these notions. This series will attempt to bring together work from allof these approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology in the belief that each has something to add to our understanding. The volumes of this series have emerged either from lectures given by an author while serving as an honorary visiting professor at The City Collegeof New York or from a conference sponsored by that institution. The City College Program in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology oversees and directs these lectures and conferences with the financial aid of the Association for Philosophy ofScience, Psychotherapy, and Ethics. MARTIN TAMNY RAPHAEL STERN TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITO RS' PR EFACE vii PR EFACE xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xiii I. NATUR E, CULTUR E, AND PERSONS 2. THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 20 3. ANIMAL AND HUMAN MINDS 42 4 . ACTION AND CAUSALITY 64 5. PUZZLES ABOUT TH E CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF HUMAN ACTIONS 83 6. COGNITIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 101 7. WITTGENSTEIN AND NATURAL LANGUAGES : AN ALTERNATIV E TO RATIONALIST AND EMPIRICIST THEO RIE S 133 INDEX 163 PREFACE I have tried to make a fresh beginning on the theory of cultural phenomena, largely from the perspectives of Anglo-American analytic philosophy.

Abstract: Schutz’s Life Story and the Understanding of his Work -- The Well-informed Citizen: Alfred Schutz and Applied Theory -- Explorations of the Lebenswelt: Reflections on Schutz and Habermas -- Discussion of Wagner, Imber, and Rasmussen -- A. Schutz and F. Kaufmann: Sociology Between Science and Interpretation -- On the Origin of ‘Phenomenological’ Sociology -- Surrender-and-Catch and Phenomenology -- On Surrender, Death, and the Sociology of Knowledge -- The Provisional Homecomer -- Review Section -- Helmut R. Wagner. Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography -- Burke C. Thomason. Making Sense of Reification: Alfred Schutz and Constructionist Theory -- Helmut R. Wagner. Phenomenology of Consciousness and Sociology of the Life-world: An Introductory Study.

Abstract: Introduction: The Sociological Turn -- The Pseudo-Science of Science? -- The Strengths of the Strong Programme -- The Strong Program: A Dialogue -- Problems of Intelligibility and Paradigm Instances -- The Rational and the Social in the History of Science -- A Plague on Both Your Houses -- Two Historiographical Strategies: Ideas and Social Conditions in the History of Science -- The Role of Arational Factors in Interpretive History: The Case of Kant and ESP -- On the Sociology of Belief, Knowledge, and Science -- Scientific and Other Interests -- The Sociology of Reasons: Or Why “Epistemic Factors” are Really “Social Factors”.

Abstract: Although various sections of this work have been published separately in various journals and volumes their separate publication is wholly attributable to the exigencies of life in academia: the work was devised as and is supposed to constitute something of an organic unity. Part II of 'The Cow with the Subtile Nose' was published under the title 'A Creative Use of Language' in New Literary History (Autumn, 1972), pp. 108-18. 'The Cow on the Roof' appeared in The Journal oj Philosophy LXX, No. 19 (November 8, 1973), pp. 713-23. 'A Fine Forehand' appeared in the Journal oj the Philosophy oj Sport, Vol. 1 (September, 1974), pp. 92-109. 'Quote: Judgements from Our Brain' appeared in Perspectives on the Philosophy oj Wittgenstein, ed. by I. Block (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 201-211. 'Art and Sociobiology' appeared in Mind (1981), Vol. XC, pp. 505-520. 'Anything Viewed'appeared in Essays in Honour oj Jaakko Hintikka, ed. by Esa Saarinen, Risto Hilpinen, Illkka Niiniluoto and Merrill Provence Hintikka (Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, Massachusetts: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 285-293. 'How I See Philosophy' appeared in The Owl oj Minerva, ed. by C. J. Bontempo and S. Jack Odell (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975), pp. 223-5. All the remaining parts are also forthcoming in various journals and volumes. I am grateful to Bradley E. Wilson for the preparation of the index.

Abstract: Understanding and Checking -- Understanding -- Producing Evidence -- Evaluating -- Variety and Unity -- Epistemic Change -- Kinds of Knowledge -- Upshot.

Abstract: Ethical Issues in the Law of Tort -- Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (Parts 1 and 2) -- The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory -- Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law -- Tort Liability for Breach of Statute -- Putting Fault Back into Products Liability -- Liability for Failing to Rescue -- Rights, Goals, and Hard Cases.

Abstract: The essays in this volume are the result of a project on Values in Tort Law directed by the Westminster Institute for Ethics and Human Values. We are indebted to the Board of Westminster Col­ lege for its financial support. The project involved two meetings of a mixed group of lawyers and philosophers to discuss drafts of papers and general issues in tort law. Beyond the principal researchers, whose papers appear here, we are grateful to John Bargo, Dick Bronaugh, Craig Brown, Earl Cherniak, Bruce Feldthusen, Barry Hoffmaster and Steve Sharzer for their helpful discussion, and to Nancy Margolis for copy editing. All of these papers except one have appeared before in the journal Law and Philosophy (Vol. 1 No.3, December 1982 and Vol. 2 No.1, Apri11983). Chapman's paper which was previously published in The University of Western Ontario Law Review (Vol. 20 No.1, 1982) appears here with permission. Westminster Institute for Ethics and Human Values, M.D.B. Westminster College, London, Canada B.C. vii INTRODUCTION The law of torts is society's primary mechanism for resolving disputes arising from personal injury and property damage.

Abstract: One / The Emergence of Appraisive Concepts and their Nature -- 1.0 The Etiology of Values -- 2.0 The Fourfold Root of Appraisal -- 3.0 Modes of Appraisal -- 4.0 Creditation and Qualification -- 5.0 Character and Characterization -- 6.0 Areas of Appraisal Compared -- Two / Critical Characterization -- 7.0 Aesthetic Appraisal Illustrated -- 8.0 Musical Characterization -- 9.0 The Structure of Aesthetic Concepts -- 10.0 Metalinguistic Terms in Evaluation -- 11.0 The Importance of Appraisal -- Notes.

Abstract: The present work addresses itself to the question of the nature of appraisive concepts such as were the subject of investigation in The Concepts of Value* and The Concepts of Criticism. ** Many problems of prime importance in the theory of value could not be adequately treated there without diminishing the basic purpose of those studies which was above all to identify, classify and provide a general theoretical framework for the host of concepts with which we characterize and commend subjects of appraisal in all of the principal areas of human interest. The author might have forestalled the disappointment of some of his critics had he then explicitly promised to consider those problems at a later time. But his reluctance to promise what he might not be in a position to produce outweighed a keen awareness of what the problems are and of their evident seriousness. Although my treatment of such problems has only now been undertaken, in point of time my concern with them antedates by far the em­ pirical explorations of the two texts mentioned. Anyone who undertakes such a study is likely to have come under the in­ fluence of Professor Frank Sibley's 'Aesthetic Concepts't and of later develop­ ments in his analysis of certain appraisive concepts. What do such concepts mean and how do they mean9 These are the questions he treated in such a stimulating fashion.

Abstract: Content -- Theory and Measurement -- Vom Henker, vom Lügner und von ihrem Ende -- On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism -- Situation Semantics and the “Slingshot” Argument -- Notes on the Well-Made World -- Logical Foundations of Psychoanalytic Theory -- Friedlands Sterne oder Facta und Ficta -- Mathematics, the Empirical Facts, and Logical Necessity -- Quines Ontologiekriterium -- Zufall und Notwendigkeit in Wittgensteins Tractatus -- Moralbegründung ohne Metaphysik -- Probability as a Quasi-Theoretical Concept — J.V. Kries’ Sophisticated Account after a Century -- Valuations for Direct Propositional Logic -- Logical Semantics for Natural Language -- On How the Distinction between History and Philosophy of Science Should Not Be Drawn -- Vagueness and Alternative Logic -- The Rationalist Theory of Double Causality as an Object of Hume’s Criticism -- A Modest Concept of Moral Sense Perception -- Structuralism and Scientific Realism -- Deterministic and Probabilistic Reasons and Causes -- The Meaning of Probability Statements -- Normative Principles of Rational Communication -- Persönliche Anmerkungen.

Abstract: The conceptual bases of plant morphology -- Commentary on Dr. Cusset’s paper -- Principles in plant morphogenesis -- Commentary on Dr. Mohr’s paper: Deterministic and probabilistic approaches to plant development -- A morphogenetic basis for plant morphology -- Mathematical models of plant morphogenesis -- Rules of growth: Some comments on Erickson’s models of plant growth -- Chance and design in the construction of plants -- Commentary on Dr. Tomlinson’s paper.

Abstract: This volume presents the proceedings of a symposium which I organised for the Developmental Section of the Xlllth International Botanical Congress at Sydney, Australia on August 26, 1981. The paper by Professor T. Sachs, which was received too late for inclusion into the symposium at Sydney, was added to these proceedings because of its direct relevancy and importance. The aim of the symposium was to state in an explicit and comprehensive fashion the most basic axioms and principles of plant morphology and morphogenesis. An awareness of these axioms and principles is of paramount importance since they form. the foundations as well as the goal of structural developmental botany. Both teaching and research are predicated on them. The Introduction by the editor briefly examines the meaning of the concepts "axiom", "principle", and "plant construction". The comprehensive paper by Dr. G. Cusset, a unique historical overview, explicates 37 principles of 5 major conceptual systems and many subsystems. The extensive analysis includes a genealogy of ideas and ways of thinking of major authors ranging from philosophers and naturalists of antiquity to recent investigators of plant form and structure. The bibliography of Dr. Cusset I s paper comprises ca. 700 references. The contribution by Professor H. Mohr focusses on modern principles of morphogenesis and provides a penetrating analysis of scientific explanation in developmental biology. The universal principles (laws) described in this paper apply to all living systems, whereas the more specific principles are limited to plants or only higher plants. Professor T.

Abstract: One. Nature -- I Introduction: The Background -- II Matter -- III Universals: The Forms -- IV Universals: The Qualities -- V The Universe -- Two. Human Nature -- VI Man: Needs and Drives -- VII Man: Perversity -- VIII Mind: Perception -- IX Mind: Conception -- X Morality: The Good -- XI Morality: The Bad -- XII Rhetoric -- XIII Politics -- XIV Art -- XV Religion -- XVI Conclusion: The Foreground.

Abstract: In the following pages I have endeavored to show the impact on philosophy of tech­ nology and science; more specifically, I have tried to make up for the neglect by the classical philosophers of the historic role of technology and also to suggest what positive effects on philosophy the ahnost daily advances in the physical sciences might have. Above all, I wanted to remind the ontologist of his debt to the artificer: tech­ nology with its recent gigantic achievements has introduced a new ingredient into the world, and so is sure to influence our knowledge of what there is. This book, then, could as well have been called 'Ethnotechnology: An Explanation of Human Behavior by Means of Material Culture', but the picture is a complex one, and there are many more special problems that need to be prominently featured in the discussion. Human culture never goes forward on all fronts at the same time. In our era it is unquestionably not only technology but also the sciences which are making the most rapid progress. Philosophy has not been very successful at keeping up with them. As a consequence there is an 'enormous gulf between scientists and philosophers today, a gulf which is as large as it has ever been. ' (1) I can see that with science moving so rapidly, its current lessons for philosophy might well be outmoded tomorrow.

Abstract: 1 Pleasure-seeking and the aetiology of dependence -- 2 Legislation on drug control and drug abuse -- 3 British experience in the management of opiate dependence -- 4 The antagonist analgesic concept -- 5 Cannabis and dependency -- 6 Alcohol dependence: the ‘lack of control’ over alcohol and its implications -- 7 Dependence and psychoactive drugs -- 8 The nature and treatment of cigarette dependence -- 9 Compulsive overeating.

Abstract: ... there is scarcely any agent which can be taken into the body to which some individuals will not get a reaction satisfactory or pleasurable to them, persuading them to continue its use even to the point of abuse ... Eddy (1965) Dependence is one of the major problems of our modern society both in industrialized and developing nations. There is, however, nothing new in man's dependence on drugs. For many centuries past, there can be few people throughout the world who do not 'overuse', 'misuse' or 'abuse' some drugs. For many the drugs that are 'overused' are caffeine [from tea or coffee), nicotine [from tobacco) or alcohol [from beer, wine or spirits), all socially accepted normal ingredients of everyday life in most communities. For a prescribed medical smaller group 'misuse' concerns commonly substances, such as barbiturates, amphetamines. For an even smaller group there is the less socially acceptable 'abuse' of specific drugs such as morphine and related analgesics, cannabis, or hallucinogens.

Abstract: 1 General Theory -- 2 Women’s Relationships with Women -- 3 Barriers between Women -- 4 Daughter-Mother Conflict -- 5 Related Issues -- 6 Lowering the Barriers -- References.

Abstract: This book is an exploration of some of the psychological and so­ cial-psychological factors that have created barriers between women. Particular attention is paid to the daughter-mother relationship. The content is based on psychotherapy material, test results and conversations with patients and non-patients across a wide age span. I acquired the material in my various roles as a clinician, researcher and theorist-and, always, as a woman, with whatever special biases and special understandings that might involve. Because much of the book deals with the development of wom­ en's difficulties in relationships with other women, the emphasis will often be on how the growing daughter feels in her relationship with her mother. The mother's feelings will be discussed very little for two reasons: to limit the scope of this book and because much of what applies to the daughter also applies to the mother. It is often due to her own experiences as a daughter that the mother encounters difficulty in rearing her own daughter or feeling com­ fortable about her ability to do so. But it is important for the reader to keep in mind throughout the book that child-rearing is a frighten­ ing, difficult task at least part of the time for virtually every mother. In any long-term relationship, one begins to experience one's own needs, and it is simply human to wish that the other person in the relationship (even an infant or young child) would meet those needs.

Abstract: Consciousness -- ?) The ego §413 -- ß) Subjective idealism § 415 -- A. Consciousness as such -- B. Self-consciousness § 424 -- C. Reason §438 -- Notes -- Index to the Text -- Index to the Introduction and Notes.

Abstract: Logical Systems and Semantics -- Introducing HPC -- The Kripke, Beth and Topological Interpretations for HPC -- Heyting’s Propositional Calculus and Extensions -- Three Intermediate Logics -- Formulas in One Variable -- Propositional Connectives -- The Interpolation Theorem -- Second Order Propositional Calculus -- Modified Kripke Interpretation -- Theories in HPC 1 -- Theories in HPC 2 -- Completeness of HPC with Respect to RE and Post Structures -- Undecidability Results -- Decidability Results.

Abstract: From the point of view of non-classical logics, Heyting's implication is the smallest implication for which the deduction theorem holds. This book studies properties of logical systems having some of the classical connectives and implication in the neighbourhood of Heyt­ ing's implication. I have not included anything on entailment, al­ though it belongs to this neighbourhood, mainly because of the appearance of the Anderson-Belnap book on entailment. In the later chapters of this book, I have included material that might be of interest to the intuitionist mathematician. Originally, I intended to include more material in that spirit but I decided against it. There is no coherent body of material to include that builds naturally on the present book. There are some serious results on topological models, second order Beth and Kripke models, theories of types, etc., but it would require further research to be able to present a general theory, possibly using sheaves. That would have postponed pUblication for too long. I would like to dedicate this book to my colleagues, Professors G. Kreisel, M.O. Rabin and D. Scott. I have benefited greatly from Professor Kreisel's criticism and suggestions. Professor Rabin's fun­ damental results on decidability and undecidability provided the powerful tools used in obtaining the majority of the results reported in this book. Professor Scott's approach to non-classical logics and especially his analysis of the Scott consequence relation makes it possible to present Heyting's logic as a beautiful, integral part of non-classical logics.

Abstract: I: A topography of the empiricist theories of law -- II: Hobbes’s empiricist theory of morality -- III: The empiricist theories of David Hume and Adam Smith -- IV: Comte and positivism -- V: Herbert Spencer and evolutionism -- VI: Guyau’s philosophy of life -- VII: Durkheim’s sociological ethics -- VIII: Stevenson’s and Hare’s analysis of language -- IX: Scandinavian realism -- X: Scepticism or empiricism? -- XI: The problem of the empiricist explanation of normativity: is there a natural equivalent of ‘duty’? -- XII: The empiricist justification of the claims of morality -- XIII: The hierarchy argument as a justification of morality -- XIV: The congruency argument -- XV: The moral game -- XVI: Conclusion -- Index of Names.

Abstract: a. 'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. ' Thus Kant formulates his attitude to morality (Critique of Practical Reason, p. 260). He draws a sharp distinction between these two objects of admiration. The starry sky, he writes, represents my relationship to the natural, empirical world. Moral law, on the other hand, is of a completely different order. It ' . . . begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is traceable only by the understanding and with which I discern that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary connection (. . . ). ' (p. 260). So Kant sees morality as a separate metaphysical order opposed to the world of empirical phenomena. Human beings belong to both worlds. According to Kant, the personality derives nothing of value from its relationship with the empirical world. His part in the sensuous world of nature places man on a level with any animal which before long must give back to the rest of nature the substances of which it is made.

Abstract: One: Preliminary Essays -- I. The aesthetic structure of waka -- II. The metaphysical background of the theory of Noh: an analysis of Zeami’s ‘Nine Stages’ -- III. The Way of tea: an art of spatial awareness -- IV. Haiku: an existential event -- Two: Texts, translated by Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu -- I. Maigetsush? -- II. The Nine Stages -- III. ‘The Process of Training in the Nine Stages’ (Appendix to ‘The Nine Stages’) -- IV. Observations on the Disciplinary Way of Noh -- V. ollecting Gems and Obtaining Flowers -- VI. Record of Nanb? -- VII. The Red Booklet.

Abstract: The Japanese sense of beauty as actualized in innumerable works of art, both linguistic and non-linguistic, has often been spoken of as something strange to, and remote from, the Western taste. It is, in fact, so radically different from what in the West is ordinarily associated with aesthetic experience that it even tends to give an impression of being mysterious, enigmatic or esoteric. This state of affairs comes from the fact that there is a peculiar kind of metaphysics, based on a realization of the simultaneous semantic articulation of consciousness and the external reality, dominating the whole functional domain of the Japanese sense of beauty, without an understanding of which the so-called 'mystery' of Japanese aesthetics would remain incomprehensible. The present work primarily purports to clarify the keynotes of the artistic experiences that are typical of Japanese culture, in terms of a special philosophical structure underlying them. It consists of two main parts: (1) Preliminary Essays, in which the major philosophical ideas relating to beauty will be given a theoretical elucidation, and (2) a selection of Classical Texts representative of Japanese aesthetics in widely divergent fields of linguistic and extra-linguistic art such as the theories of waka-poetry, Noh play, the art of tea, and haiku. The second part is related to the first by way of a concrete illustration, providing as it does philological materials on which are based the philosophical considerations of the first part.

Abstract: I Science Around 1800: Cognitive and Social Change -- Some Patterns of Change in the Baconian Sciences of the Early 19th Century Germany -- From Celestial Mechanics to Social Physics: Discontinuity in the Development of the Sciences in the Early Nineteenth Century -- 1802 - “Biologie” et Médecine -- Ontologic Foundation of Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Rationalism -- Hermann von Helmholtz: A Physiological Approach to the Theory of Knowledge -- On “Science as a Language” -- The Historical Conditions and Features of the Development of Natural Science in Russia in the First Half of the 19th Century -- The Prussian Professoriate and the Research Imperative, 1790 – 1840 -- European Natural Science. (The Beginning of the 19th Century) -- Science, Knowledge, and the Reproduction of the Social Capacity For Labour -- II Science and Education -- Teaching Method and Justification of Knowledge: C. Ritter - J.H. Pestalozzi -- Possibilities and Limits of the Prussian School Reform at the Beginning of the 19th Century -- Qualitative and Quantitative Aspects of Curricula in Prussian Grammar Schools During the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries and Their Relation to the Development of the Sciences -- Some Aspects of the Development of Mathematics at the University of Halle-Wittenberg in the Early 19th Century -- Justus Grassmann’s School Programs as Mathematical Antecedents of Hermann Grassmann’s 1844 ‘Ausdehnungslehre’ -- On Education as a Mediating Element Between Development and Application: The Plans For the Berlin Polytechnical Institute (1817 – 1850) -- III Mathematics in the Early 19th Century -- Mathematics and the Moral Sciences: The Rise and Fall of the Probability of Judgments, 1785 – 1840 -- Changing Attitudes Toward Mathematical Rigor: Lagrange and Analysis in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries -- The Origins of Pure Mathematics -- Mathematical Physics in France, 1800 – 1835 -- Mathematics in Germany and France in the Early 19th Century: Transmission and Transformation -- Mathematicians in Germany Circa 1800 -- Name Index -- List of Participants.

Abstract: I. Some Characteristic Features of the Passage From the 18th to the 19th Century 1. The following notes grew out of reflections which first led us to send out invitations to, and call for papers for, an interdisciplinary workshop, which took place in Bielefeld from 27th to 30th November, 1979. The status and character of this preface is therefore somewhat ambiguous: on the one hand it does not comment extensively on the articles to follow, on the other hand it could not have been conceived and written in the way it was without knowledge of all the contributions to this volum- which contains revised editions of papers for the workshop - nor without the cooperation of the participants in the above mentioned symposium. Furthermore, although the following may sound slightly programmatic and summary, we hope that it will be sufficiently explicit to provide some key words and concepts useful for further scholarly work. Perhaps the most important result of our efforts is the very structure of these notes: it is aimed at providing methodological orientations for the investigation of what turned out to be a very peculiar period in the history of science. xi H. N. Jahnke and M. Otte (eds.), Epistemological and Social Problems of the Sciences in the Early Nineteenth Century, xi-xlii. Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. xii H. N. JAHNKE ET AL.

Abstract: One: Nuclear Technology -- 1. The History of Nuclear Energy -- 2. Government Regulation of Atomic Power -- 3. Fission Generation of Electricity -- 4. Ethical Problems Raised by Nuclear Technology -- Notes -- Two: Reactor Emissions and Equal Protection -- 1. The Controversy over Low-Level Radiation -- 2. Federal Radiation Standards -- 3. Ethical Problems of Radiation Policy -- 4. Conclusion -- Notes -- Three: Nuclear Wastes and the Argument from Ignorance -- 1. The Social and Economic Costs of Storing Radioactive Wastes -- 2. Philosophical Errors in Analyses of the Waste Problem -- 3. Conclusion -- Notes -- Four: Core Melt Catastrophe and Due Process -- 1. The Price-Anderson Act -- 2. Philosophical Difficulties in the Price-Anderson Act -- 3. Conclusion -- Notes -- Five: Nuclear Economics and the Problem of Externalities -- 1. The Problem of Externalities -- 2. Partially-Compensated Externalities of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle -- 3. The Consequences of the Failure To Compensate -- 4. The Consequences of Recognizing Amenity Rights -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- Six: Nuclear Safety and the Naturalistic Fallacy -- 1. The Naturalistic Fallacy -- 2. Commissions of the Fallacy in Government Studies of Nuclear Power -- 3. The Consequences to Public Policy -- 4. New Directions for Technology and Public Policy -- Notes -- Name Index.

Abstract: This book grew out of projects funded by the Kentucky Human­ ities Council in 1974 and. 1975 and by the Environmental Protec­ tion Agency in 1976 and 1977. As a result of the generosity of these two agencies, I was able to study the logical, methodological, and ethical assumptions inherent in the decision to utilize nuclear fission for generating electricity. Since both grants gave me the opportunity to survey public policy-making, I discovered that there were critical lacunae in allegedly comprehensive analyses of various energy technologies. Ever since this discovery, one of my goals has been to fill one of these gaps by writing a well-docu­ mented study of some neglected social and ethical questions regarding nuclear power. Although many assessments of atomic energy written by en­ vironmentalists are highly persuasive, they often also are overly emotive and question-begging. Sometimes they employ what seem to be correct ethical conclusions, but they do so largely in an in­ tuitive, rather than a closely-reasoned, manner. On the other hand, books and reports written by nuclear proponents, often Under government contract, almost always ignore the social and ethical aspects of energy decision-making; they focus instead only on a purely scientific assessment of fission generation of electricity. What the energy debate needs, I believe, are more studies which aim at ethical analysis and which avoid unsubstantiated assertions. I hope that these essays are steps in that direction.

Abstract: I. Good and Evil -- II. “Is” and “Ought” -- III. Virtue and Temperament -- IV. Subjective and Objective Morality -- V. Ethics and Politics -- VI. Legality and Morality -- VII. Atheism and Ethics -- VIII. Ethics and Aesthetics -- Epilogue -- Notes -- Name Index.

Abstract: "Dialectic" is a fulcrum word. Aristotle attacked this belief, saying that the dialectic was only suitable for some purpose- to enquire into men's beliefs, to arrive at truths about eternal forms of things, known as Ideas, which were fixed and un­ changing and constituted reality for Plato. Aristotle said there is also the method of science, or "physical" method, which observes physical facts and arrives at truths about substances, which undergo change. This duality ofform and substance and the scientific method of arriving at facts about substances were central to Aristotle's philosophy. Thus the dethronement of dialectic from what Socrates and Plato held it to be was ab­ solutely essential for Aristotle, and "dialectic" was and still is a fulcrum word . . . I think it was Coleridge who said everyone is either a Plato­ nist or an Aristotelian . . . Plato is the essential Buddha-seeker who appears again and again in each generation, moving on­ ward and upward toward the "one. " Aristotle is the eternal motorcycle mechanic who prefers the "many. " R.

Abstract: One. Introduction -- I. Logic as an Approach to Philosophy -- Two. Assumptions of Classical Logics -- II. Of Aristotle’s Logic: The Organon -- III. Of Frege’s Logic I: The Ideography -- IV. Of Frege’s Logic II: The Foundations of Arithmetic -- V. Frege’s Logic III: The Basic Laws of Arithmetic -- VI. Of Whitehead’s and Russell’s Principia Mathematica -- Summary -- Three. Assumptions of Modern Logics -- VII. Of Symbolic Logic -- VIII. Of Operational Logic -- IX. Of Modal Logics -- X. Professor Quine and Real Classes -- XI. Of the Nature of Reference -- XII. The Discovery Theory in Mathematics -- Summary -- Four. New Supplementary Logics -- XIII. Toward a Concrete Logic: Discreta -- XIV. Toward a Concrete Logic: Continua and Disorder -- XV. Varieties of Concrete Logic.

Abstract: A system of philosophy of the sort presented in this and the following volumes begins with logic. Philosophy properly speaking is characterized by the kind oflogic it employs, for what it employs it assumes, however silently; and what it assumes it presupposes. The logic stands behind the ontology and is, so to speak, metaphysically prior. One word of caution. The philosophical aspects of logic have lagged behind the mathematical aspects in point of view of interest and develop­ ment. The work of N. Rescher and others have gone a long way to correct this. However, their work on philosophical logic has been more concerned with the logical than with the philosophical aspects. I have in mind another approach, one that would call attention to the ontological (systematic meta­ physics) or metaphysical (critical ontology) aspects, whichever term you prefer. It is this approach which I have pursued in the following chapters. Since together they stand at the head of a system of philosophy which has been developed in some seventeen books, a system which ranges over all of the topics of philosophy, the chosen approach can be seen as the necessary one. But I have not written any logic, I have merely indicated the sort of logic that has to be written.

Abstract: I. Freedom, action and deeds -- Worthiness and reward -- History and harmonization -- Character and duty -- V. Races and peoples -- VI. Incentive and propensity -- VII. Excursus: between Epicurus and Stoa -- Name index.

Abstract: The present book is an exp]oration of some basic issues of Kant's moral phi­ losophy. The point of departure is the concept offreedom and the self-legisla­ tion of reason. Since self-Iegislation is expressed in the sphere of practice or morality, it is meant to overcome some of the vulnerable aspects of Kant's theoretical philosophy, namely that which Kant himself pointed to and called the 'lucky chance,' in so far as the application of reason to sensuous data is concerned. The book attempts to show that Kant's practical or moral philosophy faces questions which are parallel to those he faced in the sphere ofhis theore­ tical philosophy. The problematic situation of realization of practice is parallel to the problematic situation of application of theory. It is in the line of the problems emerging from Kant's practical philosophy that the present book deals with some of Kant's minor writings, or less-known ones, in­ cluding his writings in the sphere of politics, history and education. The limitations of self-Iegislation - this is the theme of the book. The book is parallel to the author's previous one on Kant: 'Experience and its Systema­ tization - Studies in Kant" (Nijhoff, 1965, 2nd edition 1973), as well as to: "From Substance to Subject -Studies in Hegel" (Nijhoff, 1974). Jerusalem 1978 ABBREVIATIONS As to the references to Kant's major works, the following procedme will be ob­ served: Kritik der reinen Vernunft will be quoted as Kr. d. r. V.

Abstract: Inhalts-Anzeige (Band Eins) -- Die Philosophie des Geistes -- zu der Philosophie des Geistes § 377 -- Erste Abtheilung Der Subjective Geist § 387 -- Ein Fragment zur Philosophie des Geistes (1822/5) -- a) Menschenkenntniss -- b) Psychologie -- c) Pneumatologie -- Begriff des Geistes und Eintheilung der Wissenschaft -- Racenverschiedenheit -- Die empfindende Seele -- Anmerkungen -- Register zum text -- Register zur Einleitung und zu den Anmerkungen.

Abstract: The foundations of this edition were laid at the University of Bochum. The readiness with which Professor Poggeler and his staff put the full resources of the Hegel Archive at my disposal, and went out of their way in helping me to survey the field and get t9 grips with the editing of the manuscript material, has put me very greatly in their debt. I could never have cleared the ground so effectively anywhere else, and I should like to express my very deep grati­ tude for all the help and encouragement they have given me. It has been completed in the Netherlands, - in a University which is justly proud of both the liberal and humanistic traditions of its country and its close links with the enterprise and accomplishments of a great com­ mercial city, and in a faculty engaged primarily in establishing itself as a centre of inter-disciplinary research. I have found these surroundings thoroughly congenial, and can only hope that the finished work will prove worthy of its setting.

Abstract: Introductory Notes -- I The World of Shapes, Colours and Sounds in Direct Aesthetic Evaluations -- 1 Interpretation in Aesthetic Experiences -- 2 Sensory Qualities -- 3 Configurations in Space or Time Not Based on Qualitative Relations -- 4 Configurations of Colours and Spatial Forms -- 5 The Organization of Tones in Music -- 6 The Appearance of Real Objects -- II On Arts Reproducing Reality -- 7 Two Realities in Art -- 8 The Problem of Realism -- 9 The Mode of Interpreting Content and Relation to a Preconceived Theme -- 10 The Direct Beauty of the Reproducing Object -- 11 The Value of Reality Reproduced -- 12 Symbolic Art -- 13 “Harmony of Content and Form” -- III The Problem of Expression -- 14 Expressive Signs -- 15 Aesthetic Value and the Expressing of Psychic States -- 16 Two Concepts of Expression in Aesthetics -- IV The Foundations of Aesthetics -- 17 Nature and Art -- 18 What are Aesthetic Experiences? -- 19 Beauty and Creativeness -- 20 Art and Culture -- Supplement 1 On Subjectivism in Aesthetics -- Supplement 2 On Research Concerning the Origin of Art Artistic Creativeness and Sexual Life -- Supplement 3 The Role of the Social Milieu in Shaping of Public Reactions to Works of Art -- Supplement 4 The Educational Potentialities of Artistic Creativeness -- Index of Names -- List of Illustrations.

Abstract: This translation was made from the third edition of The Foundations of Aesthetics as prepared by the author (I ed. 1933. II ed. 1949. III ed. 1957. IV ed. in Works 1966). Some parts of the text were deleted from this translation such as references to examples which could not be understood by non-Polish readers (e.g. reminiscences about famous theatrical interpretations. theatrical productions dating back many years or references to literary characters which serve as specific examples in the consciousness of readers of Polish literature). Names and works of Polish authors cited in the text have been supplemented by brief information notes (the numbers referring to these footnotes have been differentiated by block parentheses). In the block parentheses in the author's footnotes the latest editions are given. Illustrations at the end of the book have been placed according to the order in which they would best serve to analyze the various topics. IX STANISLAW OSSOWSKI'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES The Foundation of Aesthetics is the first major work by Stanislaw Ossowski. Ossowski is well known to the English reader for his socio­ logical works, and especially for his book Class Structure in Social Consciousness and the majority of his works deal with various theoretical and methodological problems of sociology. It should be stressed here, that the book in the field of aesthetics constitutes a turning point in his biography. in the process of changing his focus of interest from logic to sociology.

Abstract: (Volume Two) -- A. Anthropology. The soul § 388 -- a. The natural soul § 391 -- b. The feeling soul § 403 -- c. The actual soul § 411 -- Notes -- Index to the Text -- Index to the Notes.

Abstract: One: The Elements of Knowledge -- I. The Nature of Transcendental Philosophy -- II. Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Is Different from Ours -- III. An Interpretation of Kant’s Distinction -- IV. Kant’s Copernican Revolution -- Two: Transcendental Elements in Rationalism -- I. The Method of Clear and Distinct Ideas -- II. Spinoza’s Contribution to the Aesthetic -- Three: Genesis of a Theory of Reference -- I. Sensibility and Understanding -- II. Historical Motives for Kant’s Distinction -- III. From “Tractarian” to Critical Views About Representation -- Four: Terminology in the Aesthetic -- I. The Ethics of Terminology -- II. Intuitions as Singular Concepts -- III. Intuitions as Forms and as Conditions -- Five: Arguments in the Aesthetic -- I. Kant’s Strategy -- II. Space as an a priori Representation -- III. Space as an Intuitive Representation -- IV. Forms of Intuition in Formal and Transcendental Logic -- Appendix: Logical form in Critical Philosophy -- Index of Names.

Abstract: Eidos and Science -- Durkheim and Husserl: A Comparison of the Spirit of Positivism and the Spirit of Phenomenology -- Can There Be a Scientific Concept of Ideology? -- The Problem of Anonymity in the Thought of Alfred Schutz -- Genesis and Validation of Social Knowledge: Lessons from Merleau-Ponty -- Notes on Contributors.

Abstract: The five essays in this work attempt in interpretive and original ways to further the common field of investigation of man in the life-world. Richard Zaner in his examination of the multi-level approach of the social sciences to the social order points us toward essences and the manner in which they are epistemically understood. By contrasting the work of the later Durkheim with that of Husserl, Edward Tiryakian is able to suggest a commonality of endeavor between them. Paul Ricoeur, after phenomenologically distinguishing three concepts of ideology, examines the supposed conflict between science and ideology and its resolution through a hermeneutics of historical understanding. Maurice N at anson in his discussion of the problem of anonymity reflects on both the sociological givenness of the world and its phenomenological reconstruction, showing the necessary interrelationship of both prior­ ities. Fred Dallmayr, after a presentation of the state of validation in the social sciences and their problems in attempting to ground them­ selves either in regard to logical positivism or phenomenology, refers us to the perspective of Merleau-Ponty concerning the relationship of cognition and experience.

Abstract: I. Irony -- A. Irony and the Concept in The Concept of Irony -- B. Irony as a Measurement and Tool in the Analysis of the Aesthetic Life-View -- II. Anxiety -- A. Anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety -- B. The Concept of Anxiety in Kierkegaard’s Other Writings -- C. The Idea of Anxiety. The Experience and Structure of Anxiety -- D. Attitudes toward Anxiety -- E. Anxiety and the Aesthetic Life-View -- III. Melancholy -- A. The Term “Melancholy” -- B. Melancholy in Either/Or -- C. Melancholy in Repetition and Stages -- D. Towards a Concept of Melancholy -- IV. Despair -- A. Preliminary Considerations -- B. Despair in Either/Or -- C. Despair in The Sickness Unto Death -- D. The Idea of Despair -- E. Despair and the Aesthetic Life-View -- V. The Moods and Subjectivity of the Young Aesthete Johannes -- A. Johannes’ Irony -- B. His Anxiety -- C. His Melancholy -- D. His Despair -- E. Dialetic of Moods in Johannes -- VI. The Dialectic of Moods -- A. Defining “Mood” -- B. The Crisis-Sequence -- C. Interrelationships -- D. Function of Moods in Emerging Religious Subjectivity -- E. Moods and Life-Views -- VII. From Victim to Master of Moods: Towards the Christian Life-View -- A. Preliminary Considerations -- B. Life-View in From the Papers of One Still Living -- C. Life-View in The Book on Adler -- D. Life-View in Either/Or, Stages and the Postscript -- E. Life-View in the Papirer -- F. The Meaning of Life-View -- G. The Aesthetic Life-View Exposed -- Conclusion -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: Kierkegaard himself hardly requires introduction, but his thought con­ tinues to require explication due to its inherent complexity and its unusual method of presentation. Kierkegaard is deliberately un-systematic, anti-systematic, in the very age of the System. He made his point then, and it is not lost upon us today. But that must not deter us from assembling the fragments and viewing the whole. Kierkegaard's religious psychology in particular may finally have its impact and generate the discussion it deserves when its outlines and inter-locking elements are viewed together. Many approaches to his thought are possible, as a survey of the literature about him will readily reveal. ! The present study proceeds with the simple ambition of looking at Kierkegaard on his own terms, of thus putting aside biographical fascination or one's own personal religi­ ous situation. I understand the temptation of both, and have seen the dangers realized in Kierkegaard scholarship. In English-language Kier­ kegaard scholarship, we are now in a new phase, in which the entire corpus of Kierkegaard's authorship is at last viewed as a whole. We have passed the stages of "fad" and of under-formed. Almost all the corpus is available in English, or soon will be. Perhaps now Kierkegaard can be viewed, understood, and criticized dispassionately and objectively, not withstanding author Kierkegaard's personal horror of those adverbs. The present study hopes to make its contribution toward this goal.

Abstract: On the Psychology of Complexions and Relations. 1891 -- Supplementary Notes by Ernst Mally -- An Essay Concerning the Theory of Psychic Analysis. 1894 -- Supplementary Notes by Stephen Witasek -- On Objects of Higher Order and their Relationship to Internal Perception. 1899 -- Additional Notes by Auguste Fischer -- Critical Notes on E. Husserl’s Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology, Volume I. After 1914.

Abstract: 16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the beginning of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. He was a contemporary of Husserl, Frege, Mach, and Russell who were either originally or physicists, except Meinong. Meinong was a historian mathematicians and always a philosopher who became increasingly interested in experi­ mental psychology, under the influence of Franz Brentano. He, as each of his contemporaries, developed his own philosophy. It grew, in a profound fashion, into a very rich realism which was, curiously enoug- based on a staunch empirical attitude. Of all these philosophers, Meinong and Husserl were most closely associated: both of them were students of Brentano and dealt, each. with his own philosophical tools, with the same subject matter, presentations and their objects. Meinong concerned himself, in short critical notes, with Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the first volume of Ideas . . . which was trans­ 1 lated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The last section of this Introduction will be devoted to Meinong's criticism of Husserl. It is done in the last section because some of Meinong's theory is presupposed for the understanding of his critique of Husserl.

Abstract: (Volume Three) -- B. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Consciousness § 413 -- a. Consciousness as such § 418 -- b. Self-consciousness § 424 -- c. Reason § 438 -- C. Psychology. Spirit § 440 -- a. Theoretical spirit (Intelligence) § 445 -- b. Practical spirit § 469 -- c. Free spirit § 481 -- The Phenomenology of Spirit (Summer Term, 1825) -- B. Consciousness § 329 -- a. Consciousness as such -- 1) Sensuous consciousness § 335 -- 2) Perceptive consciousness § 337 -- 3) Understanding § 340 -- b. Self-consciousness § 344 -- 1) Immediate self-consciousness § 348 -- i) Drive -- ii) Desire -- iii) Satisfaction § 350 -- 2) The relatedness of one self-consciousness to another § 352 -- i) Struggle § 353 -- ii) Mastery and Servitude § 356 -- iii) Communal provision -- 3) Universal self-consciousness § 358 -- c. Reason § 360 -- 1) Certainty § 361 -- 2) Substantial truth § 362 -- 3) Knowing and spirit -- Notes -- Index to the Text -- Index to the Notes.

Abstract: Editor’s Introduction -- Review of Dr. E. Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic. -- Husserl and Frege: A New Look at their Relationship -- A Reply to a Critic of my Refutation of Logical Psychologism -- The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl’s Way Out -- On the Question of Logical Method -- Husserl on the Apodictic Evidence of Ideal Laws -- Husserl’s Thesis of the Ideality of Meanings -- Husserl on Signification and Object -- The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations -- Outlines of a Theory of “Essentially Occasional Expressions” -- Husserl’s Conception of a Purely Logical Grammar -- Husserl’s Conception of ‘The Grammatical’ and Contemporary Linguistics -- On Husserl’s Approach to Necessary Truth -- Husserl on Truth and Evidence -- The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations -- Suggestions for Further Reading.

Abstract: I Edmund Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen is, by any standard and also by nearly common consent, a great philosophical work. Within the phenom­ enological movement, it is generally recognised that the breakthrough to pure phenomenology - not merely to eidetic phenomenology, but also to transcendental phenomenology - was first made in these investiga­ tions. But in the context of philosophy of logic and also of theory of know­ ledge in general, these investigations took decisive steps forward. Amongst their major achievements generally recognised are of course: the final death-blow to psychologism as a theory of logic in the Prolegomena, a new conception of analyticity which vastly improves upon Kant's, a theory of meaning which is many-sided in scope and widely ramified in its appli­ cations, a conception of pure logical grammar that eventually became epoch-making, a powerful restatement of the conception of truth in terms of 'evidence' and a theory of knowledge in terms of the dynamic movement from empty intention to graduated fulfillment. There are many other detailed arguments, counter-arguments, conceptual distinctions and phenomenolo­ gical descriptions which deserve the utmost attention, examination and assimilation on the part of any serious investigator. With the publication of J. N. Findlay's English translation of the Untersuchungen, it is expected that this work will find its proper place in the curriculum of the graduate programs in philosophy in the English­ speaking world.

Abstract: 1. The development of modem psychology, Dilthey’s decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology) -- 2. The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his beginning -- 3. Task and significance of the Logical Investigations -- a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths -- b) Researching the correlation: ideal object — psychic lived experiencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description in the reflective attitude -- c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection) -- d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic -- e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for the theory of knowledge -- f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the Logical Investigations. Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental phenomenology — the science of transcendental subjectivity -- 4. Summarizing characterization of the new psychology -- Systematic Part -- 5. Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Questioning the concepts, nature and mind -- 6. Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience) -- 7. Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons -- 8. The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science -- 9. Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori -- a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the factual by fantasy — the eidos as the invariable -- b) Variation and alteration -- c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping what agrees as the eidos -- d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation -- e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the highest genera by variation of ideas — seeing of ideas without starting from experience -- f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences -- 10. The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instruments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world (“natural concept of the world”). Possibility of an articulation of the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind -- 11. Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world. Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian concept of experience. Space and time as the most universal structures of the world -- 12. Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity -- 13. Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality -- 14. Order of realities in the world -- 15. Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-à-vis the psyche -- 16. The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object, which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject -- 17. Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real properties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses -- 18. Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of the natural scientist -- 19. The true world in itself a necessary presumption -- 20. Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy and abnormalcy -- 21. Hierarchical structure of the psychic -- 22. Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal determinations -- 23. Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving -- 24. The unity of the psychic -- 25. The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the naturalistic prejudice -- 26. The subjective in the world as objective theme -- 27. The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the world -- 28. Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective. The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude -- 29. Perceptual field — perceptual space -- 30. Spatial primal presence -- 31. Hyle — hyletic data as matter for intentional functions -- 32. Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object -- 33. Objective temporality and temporality of the stream -- 34. Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in perception. The object as irreal pole -- 35. Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the empty horizon -- 36. The intentional object of perception -- 37. The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the immanent -- 38. The access to pure subjectivity from external perception -- 39. Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself -- 40. The problem of temporality: presenting — retention and protention (positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their significance for practical life) -- 41. Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole. The I as pole of activities and habitualities -- 42. The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others. Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions -- 43. The unity of the subject as monad — static and genetic investigation of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of monads -- 44. Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the corresponding sciences -- 45. Retrospective sense-investigation -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno­ logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A.

Abstract: 1 The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century -- 2 Holland’s Experience of War during the Revolt of the Netherlands -- 3 The Army Revolt of 1647 -- 4 Holland’s Financial Problems (1713–1733) and the Wars against Louis XIV -- 5 Municipal Government and the Burden of the Poor in South Holland during the Napoleonic Wars -- 6 The Sinews of War: The Role of Dutch Finance in European Politics (c. 1750–1815) -- 7 Britain and Blockade, 1780–1940 -- 8 Away from Impressment: The Idea of a Royal Naval Reserve, 1696–1859 -- 9 Problems of Defence in a Non-Belligerent Society: Military Service in the Netherlands during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century -- 10 World War II and Social Class in Great Britain -- 11 The Second World War and Dutch Society: Continuity and Change.

Abstract: War has ever exercised a great appeal on men's minds. Oscar Wilde's witticism notwithstanding this fascination cannot be attri­ buted simply to the wicked character of war. The demonic forces released by war have caught the artistic imagination, while sages have reflected on the enigmatic readiness of each new generation to wage war, despite the destruction, disillusion and exhaustion that war is known to bring in its train. If there never was a good war and a bad peace why did armed conflicts recur with such distressing regularity? Was large-scale violence an intrinsic condition of Man? The answers given to such questions have differed widely: it has even been suggested that the states of war and peace are not as far removed from one another as is usually supposed. The causes of war and the interaction between war and society have long been the subject of philosophical enquiry and historical analysis. Accord­ ing to Thucydides no one was ever compelled to go to war; Cicero remarked how dumb were the laws in time of war, while Clausewitz's profound observation concerning the affinity between war and politics has become almost a commonplace. War being the severest test a society or state can experience historians have naturally been concerned to investigate their rela­ tionship.

Abstract: Descriptive Psychology and the Human Studies -- Lived Experience, Understanding and Description -- Structure and Development in Psychic Life -- Psychology and Hermeneutics -- Understanding, Re-experiencing and Historical Interpretation -- Ideas concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894) -- I: The Problem of a Psychological Foundation for the Human Studies -- II: Distinction between Explanatory and Descriptive Psychology -- III: Explanatory Psychology -- IV: Descriptive and Analytic Psychology -- V: Relationships between Explanatory Psychology and Descriptive Psychology -- VI: Possibility and Conditions of the Solution of the Task of a Descriptive Psychology -- VII: The Structure of Psychic Life -- VIII: The Development of Psychic Life -- IX: Study of the Differences of Psychic Life: The Individual -- Remark -- The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life -- I. Expressions of Life -- II. The Elementary Forms of Understanding -- III. Objective Spirit and Elementary Understanding -- IV. The Higher Forms of Understanding -- V. Projecting, Re-creating, Re-experiencing -- VI. Exegesis or Interpretation -- Appendices.

Abstract: Perhaps no philosopher has so fully explored the nature and conditions of historical understanding as Wilhelm Dilthey. His work, conceived overall as a Critique of Historical Reason and developed through his well-known theory of the human studies, provides concepts and methods still fruitful for those concerned with analyzing the human condition. Despite the increasing recognition of Dilthey's contributions, relati­ vely few of his writings have as yet appeared in English translation. It is therefore both timely and useful to have available here two works drawn from different phases in the development of his philosophy. The "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology" (1894), now translated into English for the first time, sets forth Dilthey's programma­ tic and methodological viewpoints through a descriptive psychology, while "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life" (ca. 1910) is representative of his later hermeneutic approach to historical understanding. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN STUDIES Dilthey presented the first mature statement of his theory of the human studies in volume one of his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Studies), published in 1883. He argued there that for the proper study of man and history we must eschew the metaphysical speculation of the absolute idealists while at the same time avoiding the scientistic reduction of positivism.

Abstract: The Problem of Transcendental Arguments and the Second Critique as Test Case -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Working Model for Transcendental Arguments -- 3. Criteria of a Successful Account of the Argument-Structure of the Analytic of the Second Critique -- The Argument of the Analytic -- 4. Preliminary Outline of the Argument of the Analytic as a Whole -- 5. The Argument of Chapter 1 -- 6. The Argument of Chapter 2 -- 7. The Argument of Chapter 3 -- Conclusions -- 8. Conclusions and Discussion -- Appendixes -- Appendix A: Beck’s Account of the Argument -- Appendix B: Silber’s Account of the Argument -- Appendix C: The Fact of Pure Practical Reason -- Appendix D: Maxims and Laws -- Notes.

Abstract: This work is in no way intended as a commentary on the second Cri­ tique, or even on the Analytic of that book. Instead I have limited myself to the attempt to extract the essential structure of the argument of the Analytic and to exhibit it as an instance of a transcendental argument (namely, one establishing the conditions of the possibility of a practical cognitive viewpoint). This limitation of scope has caused me, in some cases, to ignore or treat briefly concrete questions of Kant's practical philosophy that deserve much closer consideration; and in other cases it has led me to relegate questions that could not be treated briefly to appendixes ,in order not to distract from the development of the argu­ ment. As a result, it is the argument-structure itself that receives pri­ mary attention, and I think some justification should be offered for this concentration on what may seem to be a purely formal concern. One of the most common weaknesses of interpretations of Kant's works is a failure to distinguish the level of generality at which Kant's argument is being developed. This failure is particularly fatal in dealing with the Critiques, since in interpreting them it is important to keep clearly in mind that it is not this or that cognition that is at stake, but the possibility of (a certain kind of) knowledge as such.

Abstract: I. Logic and the Forgetfulness of Being -- II. The Foundation and Limitation of Logic -- III. Heideggers “Attack” on Logic: The Nothing -- IV. Logic versus Authentic Thought -- V. Symbolic Logic: Its Development and Relation to Technicity -- VI. Logos and Language: The Overcoming of Technicity -- Conclusion.

Abstract: Since his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 in which Heidegger delivered his most celebrated salvo against logic, he has frequently been portrayed as an anti-logician, a classic example of the obscurity resultant upon a rejection of the discipline of logic, a champion of the irrational, and a variety of similar things. Because many of Heidegger's statements on logic are polemical in tone, there has been no little misunderstanding of his position in regard to logic, and a great deal of distortion of it. All too frequently the position which is attacked as Heidegger's is a barely recognizable caricature of it. Heidegger has, from the very beginning of his career, written and said much on logic. Strangely enough, in view of all that he has said, his critique of logic has not been singled out as the subject of any of the longer, more detailed studies on the various aspects of his thought.

Abstract: I. Plato in Antiquity -- 1. Plato’s first successors -- 2. Aristotle and the older Peripatetics -- 3. New schools: Zeno, Epicurus, Pyrrho -- 4. The Academy as the school of uncertainty -- 5. Back to certainty -- 6. In Rome. Cicero -- 7. Contacts with the Old Testament -- 8. Across the boundaries of the schools -- 9. Before Plotinus -- 10. The first contacts with Christianity -- 11. Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists -- 12. The Christian Fathers -- 13. Ancient laudatory and calumnious legends on Plato -- 14. Interpretation, criticism, polemics -- 15. Other responses and effects -- II. Plato in the Middle Ages and in the New Age -- 16. Entry into the Middle Ages in the East -- 17. The West before the Renaissance -- 18. The beginning of the Italian Renaissance -- 19. Plato and Aristotle, contest and temporary reconciliation -- 20. Marsilio Ficino. The Florentin Academy -- 21. The diffusion of Renaissance Platonism -- 22. From Descartes to Kant -- 23. The age of the autocracy of reason -- 24. The new Humanism -- 25. Modern Platonic scholarship -- 26. Plato in modern philosophy -- 27. New translations. From science to literature -- 28. Plastic, graphic and mechanical arts. Music. Education -- 29. Life without end -- Name index -- Picture index.

Abstract: Plato's earthly life ended in the year 347 B. C. At the same time, however, began his posthumous life - a life of great influence and fame leaving its mark on aU eras of the history of European learning -lasting until present times. Plato's philosophy has taken root earlier or later in innumerable souls of others, it has matured and given birth to new ideas whose proliferation further dissemi­ nated the vital force of the original thoughts. It happened sometimes, of course, that by various interpretations different and sometimes altogether contradictory thoughts were deduced from one and the same Platonic doctrine: this possibility is also characteristic of Plato's genius. Even though in the history of Platonism there were times less active and creative, the continuity of its tradition has never been completely interrupted and where there was no growth and progress, at least that what had been once accepted has been kept alive. When enquiring into Plato's influence on the development of learning, we shall above all consider the individual approach of various personalities to Plato's philosophy, personal Platonism, which at its best concerns itself with the literary heritage of Plato and though accessible was not always much sought for.

Abstract: I: The Man and His Work -- 1. Life -- 2. General Introduction -- II: Philosophy of Science -- to Part II -- 3. The Idea of Equivalence -- 4. Mathematical Concepts of the Material World -- 5. The Philosophy of Nature -- 6. Science and the Modern World -- 7. The Philosophy of Time -- III: Metaphysics -- 8. Process and Reality -- 9. Prehensions and Societies -- 10. Perception and Bodily Dependency -- 11. Propositions and Judgments -- 12. Causation and Perception -- 13. Religion, Deity and the Order of Nature -- Name Index.

Abstract: I. Philosophy of Human Communication -- 1. Communication as Problematic -- 2. Philosophic Method and Communication -- 3. Speech Act Propositions -- II. Speech Act Structures -- 1. Constatives -- 2. Performatives -- 3. Rules and Conventions -- 4. Locutionary Acts -- III. Speech Act Contents -- 1. Meaning -- 2. Illocutionary Acts -- IV. Speech Act Communication -- 1. Perlocutionary Acts -- 2. Speech as Communication -- V. Existential Speech and the Phenomenology of Communication -- 1. Existential Phenomenology -- 2. Encountering Phenomenological Existence -- 3. The Dialectic Critique -- 1. Books -- 2. Essays and Articles -- 3. Unpublished Materials.

Abstract: The nature and function of language as Man's chief vehicle of communi­ cation occupies a focal position in the human sciences, particularly in philosophy. The concept of 'communication' is problematic because it suggests both 'meaning' (the nature of language) and the activity of speaking (the function of language). The philosophic theory of 'speech acts' is one attempt to clarify the ambiguities of 'speech' as both the use of language to describe states of affair and the process in which that description is generated as 'communication'. The present study, Speech Act Phenomenology, is in part an exam­ ination of speech act theory. The theory offers an explanation for speech performance, that is, the structure of speech acts as 'relationships' and the content of speech acts as 'meaning'. The primary statement of the speech act theory that is examined is that presented by Austin. A seconda­ ry concern is the formulation of the theory as presented by Searle and Grice. The limitations of the speech act theory are specified by applying the theory as an explanation of 'human communication'. This conceptual examination of 'communication' suggests that the philosophic method of 'analysis' does not resolve the antinomy of language 'nature' and 'function'. Basically, the conceptual distinctions of the speech act theory (i. e. locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions) are found to be empty as a comprehensive explanation of the concept 'communication'.

Abstract: John Dewey ranks as the most influential of America's philosophers. That in­ fluence stems, in part, from the originality of his mind, the breadth of his in­ terests, and his capacity to synthesize materials from diverse sources. In addi­ tion, Dewey was blessed with a long life and the extraordinary energy to express his views in more than 50 books, approximately 750 articles, and at least 200 contributions to encyclopedias. He has made enduring intellectual contributions in all of the traditional fields of philosophy, ranging from studies primarily of interest for philosophers in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics to books and articles of wider appeal in ethics, political philosophy, religion, aesthetics, and education. Given the extent of Dewey's own writings and the many books and articles on his views by critics and defenders, it may be asked why there is a need for any further examination of his philosophy. The need arises because the lapse of time since his death in 1952 now permits a new generation of scholars to approach his work in a different spirit. Dewey is no longer a living partisan of causes, sparking controversy over the issues of the day. He is no longer the advocate of a new point of view which calls into question the basic assump­ tions of rival philosophical schools and receives an almost predictable criticism from their entrenched positions. His works have now become classics.

Abstract: Origin of the Theory of Nations with History and Nations without History -- Marxist Theorists on the Evolution of the Concept of Nations with History and Nations without History -- Attitude of 20th Century Marxists Towards Question of the Right of National Self-Determination for Small National Groups -- Conclusion.

Abstract: This study is based upon the concept of nations with history and nations without history which was advanced in 1848/1849 in the pages of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, a Cologne based German newspaper under the editorship of Karl Marx. This theory is presented in this study as a model of opposites ; historic nations and non-historic nations, respec­ tively revolutionary nations and counter-revolutionary national groups which Engels and Marx associated with the philosophy of Hegel. As Marx and Engels saw it, Hegel had taught that nature and history abounded in opposites, and this was believed to be the essence of his dialectic. Marx liked this dialectic better than anything else in Hegel's thought and modified it to fit his own economic theory of history. In reality, however, there are no categories of opposites; certainly not in nature; no two colors are opposites; nor are any two times of the day, indeed nothing temporal, nothing living, nothing that is in process of becoming. ! It is only in human understanding that opposites are intro­ duced. In the history of ideas what has been a misunderstanding of Hegel's teachings has exerted a greater influence upon subsequent generations than Hegel's philosophy as he himself understood it. With Marx's development of the materialistic concept of history, the Volksgeist (Spirit of the Age), so pronounced in Hegel's work lost ground rapidly; first, because it was difficult to understand and second, because its mastery was hardly rewarding to anyone save scholars and philosophers.

Abstract: I: Origin of the Theory of Nations with History and Nations without History -- A. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as editors of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung -- B. Discussion of the concept of nations with history and nations without history in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung -- C. Marx and Engels attitude towards small Slavic national groups after the demise of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung -- II: Marxist Theorists on the Evolution of the Concept of Nations with History and Nations without History -- A. The reappearance in socialist literature of the concept of nations with history and nations without history at the end of the 19th century -- B. Karl Kautsky, Otto Bauer and their exchange of views -- C. Conflict within German social democratic party that brought the discussion of the concept of nations with history and nations without history to the fore in 1915 -- D. Discussion of Rosa Luxemburg’s theories for the renascence of the Polish nation -- E. Comparative comments on the views of Otto Bauer and Rosa Luxemburg in their historical setting -- III: Attitude of 20th Century Marxists towards Question of the Right of National Self-Determination for Small National Groups -- A. The right of national self-determination championed by international social democracy -- IV: Conclusion.

Abstract: This study is based upon the concept of nations with history and nations without history which was advanced in 1848/1849 in the pages of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, a Cologne based German newspaper under the editorship of Karl Marx. This theory is presented in this study as a model of opposites; historic nations and non-historic nations, respec­ tively revolutionary nations and counter-revolutionary national groups which Engels and Marx associated with the philosophy of Hegel. As Marx and Engels saw it, Hegel had taught that nature and history abounded in opposites, and this was believed to be the essence of his dialectic. Marx liked this dialectic better than anything else in Hegel's thought and modified it to fit his own economic theory of history. In reality, however, there are no categories of opposites; certainly not in nature; no two colors are opposites; nor are any two times of the day, indeed nothing temporal, nothing living, nothing that is in process of becoming. ! It is only in human understanding that opposites are intro­ duced. In the history of ideas what has been a misunderstanding of Hegel's teachings has exerted a greater influence upon subsequent generations than Hegel's philosophy as he himself understood it. With Marx's development of the materialistic concept of history, the Volksgeist (Spirit of the Age), so pronounced in Hegel's work lost ground rapidly; first, because it was difficult to understand and second, because its mastery was hardly rewarding to anyone save scholars and philosophers.

Abstract: One: Mythical Speaking “About” God -- 1. The Rejection of Myths and the “Denial” of God -- 2. The Rejection of Myths and the “Affirmation” of God -- 3. Mythical Speaking as Authentic Speaking “About” God -- 4. Retrospect and Prospect -- Two: the Rejection of Metaphysics and the “Negation” of God -- Analytic Philosophy -- Rudolf Carnap -- Ayer -- Flew -- Hare -- Findlay -- Three: the Rejection of Metaphysics and the “Affirmation” of God -- 1. Kant’s So-called “Agnosticism” -- 2. The Intellectualism and Objectivism of Christian Thought -- 3. The “Overcoming of Metaphysics” in Heidegger -- Four: the Acceptance of Metaphysics and the “Affirmation” of God -- 1. The Objectivistic Tradition: Lakebrink -- 2. The Spiritualistic-Monastic Tradition -- 3. Logical Empiricism -- Five: Hermeneutics of Religious Existence -- 1. The Calling of the Name “God” -- 2. The Proper Character of Religious Language -- 3. Speaking “About” God is Speaking About Man -- 4. Christian Religiousness -- Six: Religious Existence and Metaphysical Speech -- The God of Philosophers -- Rejection of the “Proofs” for God’s Existence by the Religious Man -- “The Conclusion of a ‘Proof’ for God’s Existence Can Never Be True” -- The Metaphysical “Proof” for the Existence of “God” -- Metaphysics in the Sciences -- Regional Ontologies -- Metaphysics in the Strict Sense -- Parmenides -- Affirmation in Negation -- “The Metaphysical in Man” -- “Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?” -- Conclusion.

Abstract: This book is an attempt to interpret man's religious existence, an inter­ pretation for which some of the groundwork was laid by the author's book PHENOMENOLOGY AND ATHEISM (Duquesne University Press, 2nd impression, 1965). That work explored the "denial" of God by the leading atheists and came to terms with the most typical forms assumed by their "denials". Nevertheless, I am not an adherent of atheism. The reason why it is possible to agree with many "atheists" without becoming one of them is that man can misunderstand his own religiousness or lapse into an inauthentic form of being a believer. What many "atheists" unmask is one or the other form of pseudo-religiousness which should be unmasked. On the other hand, I have also constantly refused to identify religiousness with such inauthentic forms and to define it in terms of those forms - just as I refuse to identify the appendix with appendicitis, the heart with an infarct, the psyche as a disturbance, and marriage as a fight. The book offered here has been written since the rise of the radical "God is dead" theology. This "theology" without God has often been presented as the only form of theological thought still suitable for "modern man". As the reader will notice, I reject the brash facility with which some "modern men" measure the relevance of "anything" by its "modernity".

Abstract: Logic -- A Notion of Mechanistic Theory -- Essai sur la Logique de L’indeterminisme et la Ramification de L’espace-Temps -- How to Think Quantum-Logically -- The Conditional in Quantum Logic -- Empirical Logic and Quantum Mechanics -- Some Results from the Combinatorial Approach to Quantum Logic -- Probability -- The Quantum Probability Calculus -- The Probability Structure of Quantum-Mechanical Systems -- Towards a Revised Probabilistic Basis for Quantum Mechanics -- Probability in a Discrete Model of Particles and Observations -- Superposition and Macroscopic Observation -- A Note on the So-Called Yes-No Experiments and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics -- Completeness -- On the Completeness of Quantum Theory -- The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox -- Stochastic Incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics -- Errors in the No Hidden Variable Proof of Kochen and Specker -- Operator-Observable Correspondence -- Randomness and Locality in Quantum Mechanics -- Fundamental Statistical Theories -- Why the World is a Quantum World -- On the Determinism of Hidden Variable Theories with Strict Correlation and Conditional Statistical Independence of Observables.

Abstract: During the academic years 1972-1973 and 1973-1974, an intensive sem­ inar on the foundations of quantum mechanics met at Stanford on a regular basis. The extensive exploration of ideas in the seminar led to the org~ization of a double issue of Synthese concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics, especially with the role of logic and probability in quantum meChanics. About half of the articles in the volume grew out of this seminar. The remaining articles have been so­ licited explicitly from individuals who are actively working in the foun­ dations of quantum mechanics. Seventeen of the twenty-one articles appeared in Volume 29 of Syn­ these. Four additional articles and a bibliography on -the history and philosophy of quantum mechanics have been added to the present volume. In particular, the articles by Bub, Demopoulos, and Lande, as well as the second article by Zanotti and myself, appear for the first time in the present volume. In preparing the articles for publication I am much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole, Mrs. Dianne Kanerva, and Mrs. Marguerite Shaw, for their extensive assistance.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- II. The Problem of Psychologism -- III. Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic: A Re-Evaluation -- IV. Sartre and the Cartesian Ego -- V. The Ego and Consciousness in Rival Perspectives: Sartre and Husserl -- VI. World and Epoché in Husserl and Heidegger -- VII. Heidegger and Dewey.

Abstract: The essays which are collected in this book were written at various intervals during the last seven years. The essay "Heidegger and Dewey," which is the last one to be printed in the book, was actually the first one I wrote. It was written as a seminar paper for John D. Goheen's course on Dewey in the Spring of 1968 at Stanford University where I was a second-year graduate student. The paper went unchanged into my thesis "Four Studies in Phenomenology and Pragmatism," which I eventually submitted in 1971, and it is here reprinted with no alteration except for the title. A first version of the two essays on Sartre was written in the Spring of 1969 during my first year of teaching at Princeton University. Even­ tually I decided to break the essay into two parts. A shortened version of "Sartre and the Cartesian Ego" was read at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December 1973.

Abstract: I. Wittgenstein As Critic -- A. Platonism -- B. Intuitionism -- C. Formalism -- D. Empiricism -- E. Conventionalism -- F. Summary and Projection -- II. Wittgenstein as Creator -- A. Wittgenstein’s Behavioral Theory of Inference -- B. The Role of Mathematics -- C. The theory as explanatory -- III. Critics of Wittgenstein -- A. Wittgenstein and Strict Finitism -- B. Wittgenstein and Objectivity -- C. Wittgenstein’s Contributions -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics have not received the recogni­ tion they deserve; they have for the most part been either ignored, or dismissed as unworthy of the author of the Tractatus and the I nvestiga­ tions. This is unfortunate, I believe, and not at all fair, for these remarks are not only enjoyable reading, as even the harshest critics have con­ ceded, but also a rich and genuine source of insight into the nature of mathematics. It is perhaps the fact that they are more suggestive than systematic which has put so many people off; there is nothing here of formal derivation and very little attempt even at sustained and organized argumentation. The remarks are fragmentary and often obscure, if one does not recognize the point at which they are directed. Nevertheless, there is much here that is good, and even a fairly system­ atic and coherent account of mathematics. What I have tried to do in the following pages is to reconstruct the system behind the often rather disconnected commentary, and to show that when the theory emerges, most of the harsh criticism which has been directed against these re­ marks is seen to be without foundation. This is meant to be a sym­ pathetic account of Wittgenstein's views on mathematics, and I hope that it will at least contribute to a further reading and reassessment of his contributions to the philosophy of mathematics.

Abstract: I: Coping with Knowledge -- I. The Problem of Knowledge -- II. The Acquisition of Knowledge -- III. The Assimilation of Knowledge -- IV. The Deployment of Knowledge -- II: Specific Issues -- V. Knowing, Doing and Being -- VI. Absent Objects -- VII. The Mind-Body Problem -- VIII. The Knowledge of the Known -- IX. The Subjectivity of a Realist -- X. Activity as a Source of Knowledge -- XI. On Beliefs and Believing -- XII. Adaptive Responses and the Ecosystem -- XIII. The Reality Game.

Abstract: The acquisition of knowledge is not a single unrelated occasion but rather an adaptive process in which past acquisitions modify present and future ones. In Part I of this essay in epistemology it is argued that coping with knowledge is not a passive affair but dynamic and active, involving its continuance into the stages of assimilation and deployment. In Part II a number of specific issues are raised and discussed in order to explore the dimensions and the depths of the workings of adaptive knowing. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS "Activity as A Source of Knowledge" first appeared in Tulane Studies in Philosophy, XII, 1963; "Knowing, Doing and Being" in Ratio, VI, 1964; "On Beliefs and Believing" in Tulane Studies, XV, 1966; "Absent Objects" in Tulane Studies, XVII, 1968; "The Reality Game" in Tulane Studies, XVIII, 1969; "Adaptive Responses and The Ecosys­ tem" in Tulane Studies, XVIII, 1969; "The Mind-Body Problem" in the Philosophical Journal, VII, 1970; and "The Knowledge of The Known" in the International Logic Review, I, 1970. PART I COPING WITH KNOWLEDGE CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE I. THE CHOSEN APPROACH You are about to read a study of epistemology, one which has been made from a realistic standpoint. It is not the first of such interpre­ tations, and it will not be the last.

Abstract: One: Introduction -- I. The Shift to the Subject in Modern Thought -- II. Hegel’s Prefatory Notion of Subjectivity -- III. Consciousness and Reality -- Two: The Conscious Subject -- IV. The Initial Transaction between the Subject and its Object -- V. The Perceiving Subject -- VI. The Understanding Subject -- Three: The Self-Conscious Subject -- VII. The Rise of the Self-Conscious Subject -- VIII. Freedom and Dependence of the Self-Conscious Subject -- IX. The Self-Estranged Subject -- Four: The Rational Subject -- X. The Activity of the Rational Subject -- XI. The Self-Examination of the Rational Subject -- XII. The Self-Realization of the Rational Subject -- XIII. The Triumph of the Rational Subject -- Five: The Spiritual Subject -- XIV. The Rise of the Personal Subject -- XV. The Dual Life of the Spiritual Subject -- XVI. The Moral Subject -- XVII. The Subject’s Final Quest for Spirituality -- Epilogue -- Retrospect and Prospect.

Abstract: With the rise of analytical philosophy the criticism against Hegelianism has become increasingly shrill, and signs of an embarrassment that Hegel's philosophy should ever have arisen are noticeable in such inftuential works as those of Karl Popper and Hans Reichenbach, to mention but a few. However, many contemporary philosophers stress what is called subjectivity, conceiving reality as susceptible of methodical analysis only to the extent that it is in and for the subject. What is more, they not only insist on the importance of the subject for philosophy, but maintain that the subject must be conceived as the principal determinative of true objectivity. Since knowledge depends for its possibility on the inseverable correlatives of consciousness and reality, they would grant that a proper importance must be given to both subject and object. Still, exemplifying the relational principle within the unity of a dual structure, the subject serves as an exclu­ sive agent that provides ingress into the meaning of the object.

Abstract: I. The Rehabilitation of Rhetoric -- II. Plato and The Sophists -- III. Isocrates and the Power of Logos -- IV. The History and System of Greek Rhetoric -- V. Rhetoric and Philosophy in Rome -- VI. Augustine and Rhetoric -- VII. The Liberal Arts and Education in the Middle Ages -- VIII. The Italian Humanists -- IX. Francis Bacon, René Descartes and the New Science -- X. Pascal and the Art of Persuasion -- XI. Sacred Eloquence -- XII. Kant and the Enlightenment -- XIII. Marx, Nietzsche and Freud -- XIV. Nietzsche and Philosophy -- XV. Philosophy and Metaphor -- XVI. Who is Actually Speaking Whenever Something is Said?.

Abstract: In this volume, I have given attention to what I consider to be some of the central problems and topics in the philosophical thought of SjiSren Kierkegaard. Some of the chapters have been previously publish­ ed but were revised for their appearance here. Others were written expressly for this book. I have tried to focus on issues which have not been customarily dealt with or emphasized in the scholarship on Kierkegaard with the exception of the writings of David Swenson and Paul L. Holmer to which (and to whom) I am greatly indebted. Some of the positions for which I have argued in this volume (especially in Chapters IV and V) may be controversial. I am grateful to all those who enabled me to carry out or influenced me in my studies of Kierkegaard or who assisted with regard to the research for or preparation of this volume. Among these are: Professors Paul L. Holmer, F. Arthur Jacobson, and Dennis A. Rohatyn; Dean Wallace A. Russell and Vice President Daniel J. Zaffarano of Iowa State University.

Abstract: I. Statement of the Problem -- II. Eidetics and its Limits -- III. Existential Structures of Disproportion -- IV. Eidetics, Existence, and Experience -- V. Symbol, Hermeneutic, and Conflict of Interpretation -- VI. Philosophical Reflection as Hermeneutics -- VII. Phenomenology and the Sciences of Language: Further Extensions -- VIII. Conclusions -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: The path Husserl entered upon at the beginning of his philosophical writ­ ings turned out to be the beginning of a long, tedious way. Throughout his life he constantly comes to grips with the fundamental problems which set him upon this path. Beginning with the logical level of meaning, laboring through the idealism of the transcendental phenomenology of the period between Ideas I to the Meditations, in search for the ever more originary, he finally arrived at the level of the Lebenswelt. It was this later focus on the ever more originary, the source, the foundation of meaning which led him finally to the horizon of meaning and the genesis of meaning in the Lebenswelt period. This later period allows for a quasi wedding of his phenomenology with some adaptation of existentialism. But this union called for an adaptation of Husserl's logistic prejudice. The period of the Lebenswelt allows many of the later phenomenologists to speak of the failure of the brackets in their extreme exclusion and to allow for a link between man and his world in the Lebenswelt. This link is at the source of the ontological investigations and theories which arise from the phenomenological movement. However, there is the possibility of many tensions in such an endeavor since the study of being can be most abstract and most concrete.

Abstract: I: The stages in general -- II: Gestation -- III: Infancy -- IV: Childhood -- V: The primary school years -- VI: Adolescence -- VII: Youth -- VIII: Early Manhood -- IX: Maturity -- X: Later middle age -- XI: Old age -- XII: Senescence.

Abstract: 1: Marx’s Critique Of Religion -- Religion and the Unity of Marx’s Thought -- The Beginning and End of Critisism -- From Natural Religion to the Religion of Civil Society -- The Substance and Functions of Religion -- 2: Engels’ Critique of Religion -- Engels’ Role in the Critisism of Religion -- From the Inception of Religion to its Transcendence -- The Masks and Disguises of Religion -- The Unity of Engels’ Critique of Religion -- 3: Lenin’s Critique of Religion -- The Origins, Development, Substance, and Functions of Religion -- Religion and the Unity of Marx, Engels, and Lenin -- Shamefaced Idealism, God-Building, and the Disadvantages of Improved Religion -- 4: Kautsky’s Critique of Religion -- Toward a Developed Materialist Theory of Religion -- Religion from Biblical Times to the Twentieth Century -- The Substance and Functions of Religion -- Kautsky: Stalwart Marxist or Renegade? -- Conclusion.

Abstract: In view of the enormous number of works on Marxism in general and in light of the many books and articles touching on the relationship of Marxism to religion in particular, it may fairly be asked why yet another such work should be produced. My reply is that in eliciting answers to the kinds of questions posed by the methodology I have used, it was necessary to go to the primary sources almost exclusively. This is not to bemoan a sad fate but to affirm that there are notable deficiencies in the secondary sources relevant to my topic. By way of general indictment, I contend that the major difficulty with existing studies of the Marxist critique of religion is that their authors, whether expositors or critics, have failed both to specify their own presuppositions concerning religion and to approach the subject with an adequate comprehension of its many dimensions. Since, in most cases, the reader is equally unprepared, anthropologically, sociologically, psychologically, and historically, for clear and informed thought in this vast and nebulous area, the result has been widespread confusion. As if this were not enough, numerous writers with little more than polemical interests have compounded the confusion by failing to distinguish between religion in general and their own brands of faith in particular. Others have not discriminated between the concepts of metaphysics and the supernatural items of religious belief.

Abstract: Berliner Erinnerungen 1933/34 -- „Raum“ und „Zeit“ als „Formen der Anschauung“ und als „Formale Anschauungen“ in Kants kritischer Theorie -- Zur Begriffsbildung der politischen Theorie -- Nietzsche und die Musik -- The System and the Phenomena: The Kant-Interpretations of Nicolai Hartmann and P. F. Strawson -- The Philosopher’s Thraldom. Alogical Sources of Philosophic Thought -- Durchgang und Aufbruch. Zu Max Müllers Sprach-Werk-Erläuterungen -- Selbstüberwindungen, ohne Ende? -- Mixed Pickles -- Rationalistische Verflachungen im modernen bürgerlichen Bewußtsein -- Probleme einer Geschichte der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung -- Kunst und Normalität. Zur Frage der Bewertung von künstlerischen Produktionen Geisteskranker -- Wirklichkeit als moralische Welt: Lessing zum Beispiel -- Der Begriff „Gehalt“ in Goethes Autobiographie „Dichtung und Wahrheit“ -- Some Observations on Kraus’s Impact Then and Now -- Die Philosophie der Landschaft in Brechts „Buckower Elegien“ -- Bibliographie Hermann Wein 1937–1972 -- Nachsatz.

Abstract: So the philosopher's way to be is the source (Quelle) of his values and of his basic model; it is an important way of understanding thrall. It appears, now, that the thought of this paper could be simplified. The primary notion is the philosopher's "way to be." Style, locus of interest, nisus and way of thought can then be seen as growing out of this, as particular aspects or expressions of it. This entire paper then would be an attempt to come to grips with the primary notion. How is a "way to be" related to what is normally called a philo­ sopher's views or theories (the formulable core)? Is it not irrelevant as non-implicatory fact, like biographical details or social background? I do not think so. A philosopher's way to be is not external fact to the formulable core of his thought. It is not "internal" either in the logical sense. It is what allows us to comprehend his explicit views.

Abstract: The Author’s Abstracts 1900/01 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511–12 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260–63 -- A Draft of a “Preface” to the Logical Investigations, 1913 -- I. Eugen Fink’s Editorial Remarks -- II. Husserl’s Text.

Abstract: TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III.

Abstract: I. The Commentary to the Sentences -- II. The Logic of Rationate Being -- III. An Epistemology of Critical Realism -- IV. The Metaphysics of Being -- V. An Anthropology of the “Imago Dei” -- VI. The Contemplation of God as Man’s Natural End -- VII. The Value of Theological Language -- VIII. The Logic of Theological Language -- IX. Did St. Thomas Modify his Theory of Analogy?.

Abstract: Introduction: The Seeming Contingency of the Question concerning the Body and the Necessity for an Ontological Analysis of the Body -- I: The Philosophical Presuppositions of the Biranian Analysis of the Body -- 1. The Philosophical Presuppositions of Biranian Ontology -- 2. The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories -- 3. The Theory of the Ego and the Problem of the Soul -- II:The Subjective Body -- III: Movement and Sensing -- 1. The Unity of our Senses and the Problem of the Relationship between our Images and our Movements -- 2. The Unity of the Body Interpreted as a Unity of Knowledge. Habit and Memory -- 3. The Individuality of Human Reality as Sensible Individuality -- IV: The Twofold Usage of Signs and the Problem of the Constitution of One’s own Body -- V: Cartesian Dualism -- VI: A Critique of the Thought of Maine de Biran. The Problem of Passivity -- VII: Conclusion. The Ontological Theory of the Body and the Problem of Incarnation. The Flesh and the Spirit -- Index of Authors -- Index of Terms.

Abstract: THE SEEMING CONTINGENCY OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE BODY AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BODY When we disclose and bring forth, within ontological investigations aimed at making possible the elaboration of a phenomenology of the ego, a prob­ lematic concerning the body, we may well seem, with respect to the general direction of our analysis, to elaborate only a contingent and accidental specification of such an analysis and to forget its true goal.! Up to the present, we pursued the clarification of the being of the ego [2] on the level of absolute subjectivity and in the form of an ontological analysis. Is it not possible that the reasons which motivated the project of conducting the investigations relative to the problem of the ego within a sphere of abso­ lute immanence may cease to be valid because we might be led to believe that the body also constitutes the object of these investigations and belongs to a first reality whose study is the task of fundamental ontology? Actually, does not the body present itself to us as a transcendent being, as an inhabi­ tant of this world of ours wherein subjectivity does not reside? If, con­ sequently, the body must constitute the theme of our philosophical reflec­ tion, is it not on condition that the latter submit to a radical modification and cease to be turned toward subjectivity in order to be a reflection on.

Abstract: I. Soul and Mathematicals -- II. Posidonius and Neoplatonism -- III. The Subdivisions of Theoretical Philosophy -- IV. The Origin of the Quadrivium -- V. Speusippus in Iamblichus -- VI. A New Fragment of Aristotle -- VII. Metaphysica Generalis in Aristotle? -- Conclusion -- Index of Names -- Index of Passages in Greek and Latin Authors.

Abstract: The first edition of this book appeared in 1953; the second, revised and enlarged, in 1960. The present, third edition is essentially a reprint of the second, except for the correction of a few misprints and the following remarks, which refer to some recent publications* and replace the brief preface to the second edition. Neither Eudemus nor Theophrastus, so I said (p. 208£. ) knew a branch of theoretical philosophy the object of which would be something called 0'. 1 ~ 0'. 1 andwhich branch wouldbedistinct from theology. And there is no sign that they found such a branch (corresponding to what was later called metaphysica generalis) in Aristotle. To the names of Eudemus and Theophrastus we now can add that of Nicholas of Damascus. In 1965 H. J. Drossaart Lulofs published: Nicolaus Damascenus On the Philosophy of Aristotle (Leiden: Brill), Le. fragments of his m:pr. njc; 'ApLO''t'o't'&AOUC; qJLAOO'OqJLiXC; preserved in Syriac together with an English trans­ lation. In these fragments we find a competent presentation of Aristotle's theoretical philosophy, in systematic form. Nicholas subdivides Aristotle's theoretical philosophy into theology, physics, and mathematics and seems to be completely unaware of any additional branch of philosophy the object of which would be 0'. 1 ~ 0'. 1 distinct from theology with its object (the divine).

Abstract: one -- 1) Multidisciplinary Context of Sociology and Social Psychology -- 2) Problems of Theory and Method : Sensitizing Concepts, Personal Documents -- two -- 3) Verstehen and Related Constructs -- 4) Role-Taking and Related Concepts -- 5) Processes Involved in, and Related to, Role-Taking -- 6) Imagination -- three -- 7) Imaginative Participation in History -- 8) Imaginative Participation in Literature and Drama -- 9) Imaginative Participation in Psychiatry -- Conclusion.

Abstract: I am Czech. In 1948 I graduated from ancient Charles' University at Prague. In 1970 I came to Canada, the country of my choice, from New Zealand where I had taught two years at the University of Canter­ bury in Christchurch. This work was begun after I left Europe. It is intended as contribution to contemporary sociological and social psy­ chological theory, or theories. For a very long time in my native country I was intellectually a Jack­ of-alI-trades. Before coming to sociology I spent two decades of study and research in the fields of philosophy, history and imaginative literature. Looking back I view this not as wasted time, but as an extraordinary introduction to the study of society, of man in society and of society in man. There are many links between these areas of scientific inquiry which I would not have been able to make had I not had this multi­ disciplinary experience. In each of my lives, past and present, I have been for a number of reasons marginal to my fellow men, marginal in several respects. In my native land I refused to conform to the line of the ruling political party. I became a "non-person" in all that implies in a totalitarian regime.

Abstract: Introduction: The Problem, its Background, and a Sketch of its Treatment -- I. Production and Radical Creation -- A. Novelty Proper -- B. Novelty Proper and Creative Acts -- C. Value and Creativity -- II. Spontaneity: The Paradox and the Possibility of Explanation -- A. General Remarks about Explanation -- B. The Paradox of Creativity -- C. The Reality of Spontaneity and the Challenge of Determinism -- D. Intelligibility and the Resources of Language -- III. Language and the Aesthetic Structure of Novelty -- A. Originative Speech as Oblique Expression -- B. Speech and Metaphors -- C. Metaphors and the Intelligibility of Created Objects -- IV. Fundamental Paradox and Intelligibility -- A. The Absurd -- B. Two Loci of the Absurd -- C. The Second Model of Intelligibility -- D. The Possibility of a Third Model of Intelligibility.

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the number of studies of creativity has in­ creased enormously. Although these studies represent a wide variety of perspectives, the largest proportion of them falls within the province of the social and behavioral sciences. Perhaps this is due to the impetus of experimental psychologists, who recognized the special problems that arise when originality is treated under a general theory of cognition. But what­ ever the reason, human creativity has come to be viewed as one of the major concerns of the twentieth century. It has been referred to as the most pressing problem of our time. In spite of the importance of the topic, few philosophers have either analyzed or speculated systematically about creativity, as a distinct topic. This neglect may be the expression of a tacit and sometimes explicit con­ viction that creativity must be taken for granted and not subjected to analytic scrutiny. In any case, the determination of so many behavioral and social scientists not to fall behind in the search for understanding creativity has led to a proliferation of publications that are unrelated to one another and that lack dearly ordered and reflective consideration of what creativity is. Too few writers have either acknowledged or examined what they presuppose about creative acts, about human activity, and a­ bout the nature of explanation when they focus on so complex a phenome­ non as creativity.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- 1. Preliminary Remarks: (Paulinism in the Middle Ages) -- 2. The Problem of (Justification in Medieval Theology) -- II. Justification in the (Pauline Commentaries) -- 1. The Commentaries -- 2. Conclusions and Analysis -- III. Justification in the early Scholastic Literature -- 1. The Carolingian Period -- 2. Early Scholasticism: Tenth to Twelfth Centuries -- IV. The Completion of the Medieval Doctrine: The Processus Justificationis -- 1. First Statements -- 2. The Completed Doctrine -- 3. The Later Scholastics -- V. Conclusions.

Abstract: One of the pleasures and privileges of scholarship is the opportunity to express one's gratitude to friends and colleagues upon the occasion of a publication. As with many scholarly first books, this present work had its genesis as a doctoral dissertation, and hence my first and most profound acknowledgment must be to Professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University of Colorado, whom I am honored to be able to describe as my mentor. Only my fellow "Old Thomsonians" can appreciate the common debt we owe to this great medievalist who was also a magni­ ficent teacher and counsellor. Presently in retirement, he continues to be our principal inspiration and model of scholarly distinction. I am also greatly indebted to another former mentor and now my senior colleague and chairman at the University of Denver, Professor Allen D. Breck, who, together with Deans Edward A. Lindell and Gerhard H. Mundinger, constantly encouraged and assisted my further progress and read the manuscript in its final stages, offering many valuable sugges­ tions as to style and substance. My university provided me with generous support in the form of research funds and clerical services; I am grateful to. those colleagues who made this assistance possible, as well as to friends at other institutions who shared their knowledge and frequently gave salutary advice.

Abstract: I. The Early Thought of Royce -- 1. Moral Theory -- 2. Empirical Theism -- 3. Postulates. The Right to Believe -- 4. Idealism as an Hypothesis Based on Postulates -- 5. Skepticism and the Possibility of Error -- 6. Common Sense and the Problem of Error -- 7. Solution and Conclusion to Absolute Idealism -- 8. Absolute Idealism and the Nature of Error -- 9. The Problem of Evil -- 10. The Conception of God. Critique -- II. The Middle Thought of Royce -- 1. Transition to “The World and the Individual” -- 2. “The World and the Individual”: Introduction -- 3. Realism -- 4. Mysticism -- 5. Critical Rationalism -- 6. The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas -- 7. The Fourth Conception of Being -- 8. The Proof of God’s Existence -- 9. The One, the Many, and the Infinite -- 10. The Temporal and the Eternal -- 11. The Moral Order and the Problem of Evil -- 12. Immortality -- 13. The Conception of God. Summary -- III. The Later Theory of Community -- 1. Transition to “The Problem of Christianity” -- 2. “The Problem of Christianity”: Introduction -- 3. The Moral Burden of the Individual -- 4. Guilt and Atonement -- 5. The Beloved Community -- 6. The Community and the Time-Process -- 7. The Body and Its Members -- 8. The Nature of Interpretation -- 9. The Will to Interpret -- IV. The Later Conception of God -- 1. The World of Interpretation -- 2. The Theoretical and the Practical -- 3. Peirce’s “Neglected Argument” -- 4. The Conception of God -- 5. Elements in Royce’s Later Conception of God Which are Similar to and Continuous with Earlier Conceptions -- 6. Elements in Royce’s Later Conception of God Which are Different from His Earlier Conceptions. Summary.

Abstract: Dr. Jarvis kindly invited me to undertake this Foreword. According to his suggestion, I here intend to complement his work by creating a context for it. To do so, prior notice of a common misrepresentation of Royce and of his contemporary relevance seems needed, before briefly sketching his biography and interest in religion. Finally, to orient the reader to the present study, I will point out Royce's main works and the spirit of the man. In the year 2150 A. D. , what will people be saying about Harvard? If the reported prediction of a self -effacing William James comes true, the common answer will be, "Harvard? Oh, that's the place where Royce taught. " And yet, now that almost a century has passed since Royce began teaching at Harvard, most Americans do not recognize the name "Josiah Royce. " Of those who do, few know him as a significant American philosopher of community. And of these few, far fewer recall either that religious problems first drove Royce to philosophy or that he said such problems "of all human interests, deserve our best efforts and our utmost loyalty. " 1 Little wonder, then, that when Americans survey our "classic" philosophers-Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, Whitehead-few of them respond to Royce as the most explicitly and persistently religious philosopher of them all. Fortunately, however, popularity contests do not accurately weigh the merit of a philosopher.

Abstract: I. Introduction: Hume and Kant and the History of Ideas -- II. Sense, Reason and Imagination -- III. Hume’s “Principles” and Kant’s “Categories” -- IV. Naturalism and Criticism -- V. Hume and Kant on the Philosophy of Religion -- VI. Towards a Theory of “Anthropocentrism” with regard to Naturalism and Criticism.

Abstract: The present work is the product of several years study of the various aspects of Kanfs Critical Philosophy and Hume's naturalism. During that time many individuals have helped with this work and it is hardly possible to set down the names of aH of them. One name does des erve special mention - Prof. Dr. H. Heimsoeth with whom the author has discussed some of the very knotty problems of Kantian Philosophy. Although Hume has been - as Kant freely admits in the Preface to his "Prolegomena" - one of the most decisive influences and turning points in the philosophical development of Kant, the author does not thematize in this work the age-old problem of whether Kant reaHy read, understood and refuted Hume. That it has been, ever since Hume wrote, a favorite pursuit among philosophers to answer hirn, to refute hirn, and to refute Kanfs attempt at refutation of hirn, irrespective of its being convincing or not, must be mentioned with special respect.