ISBN:
9789401133326
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (VIII, 269 p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Technology, Risk, and Society, An International Series in Risk Analysis 5
Series Statement:
Risk, Governance and Society 5
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Social sciences
;
Economics
;
Political science.
;
Business.
;
Management science.
;
Sociology.
Abstract:
1. Introduction -- Technological Factors: Discoveries, Uncertainties, and Limits on Safety Strategies -- Economic Factors: Shifting Electricity Demand and Financing Problems -- Managerial Factors -- Political Attitudes -- Summary and Outline of the Book -- 2. Shoreham’s Beginnings -- The Early Development of Nuclear Power -- The Surge in Orders -- The Decision to Build Shoreham -- Basic Design of the Plant -- Key Early Decisions -- Summary -- Appendix to Chapter 2 -- 3. The early Politics of Shoreham -- The Contrasting Reactions to Shoreham and Lloyd Harbor -- The Purpose of AEC/NRC Hearings -- The Licensing Process -- Shoreham’s Hearings -- Two Views of the Hearings -- Appendix to Chapter 3 -- 4. Shoreham’s Contruction -- The Review of Construction -- Oversight by LILCO’s Board of Directors and Others -- LILCO’s Management of the Regulatory System -- The Failure of Engineering to Support Construction -- LILCO’s Relationship with Stone and Webster -- Labor Productivity -- The Failure of the Diesel Generators -- Disallowance of Costs -- Appendix to Chapter 4 -- 5. The Emergency Planning Controversy -- The Strengthening of Planning Requirements -- The County’s Split with LILCO -- The Marburger Panel -- LILCO’s Tax Maneuver and Cohalan’s Switch -- The Federal Test of Emergency Planning -- The Federal Response to State and Local Opposition -- Appendix to Chapter 5 -- 6. Takeover, Settlement, or Shoreham? -- The Establishment of the Long Island Power Authority -- Takeover or Negotiated Settlement? -- Projected Costs of the Settlement and Alternatives -- Appendix to Chapter 6 -- 7. The Politics of Settling Shoreham -- The Reactions to the Settlement -- LILCO’s Progress in Licensing Shoreham -- Legislative Action on the Settlement -- The RICO Suit -- The Revised Shoreham Settlement -- The Federal Government’s Opposition to the Settlement -- The Economic Evaluation of the Settlement -- The Denouement at Shoreham -- Conclusion -- Appendix to Chapter 7 -- 8. Conclusion -- LILCO’S Problems and Changes -- State and Local Opposition -- Policy, Personal Stakes, and Decision Momentum -- References -- Appendix: Chronology of Significant Events in the Shoreham Project.
Abstract:
Several individuals noted the potentially important civilian uses of atomic energy shortly after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. That year J. Robert Oppenheimer told a national radio audience that "in the near future" it would be possible to generate profitable electric power from "controlled nuclear chain reaction units" (reactors). It was suggested that, after fIfteen to twenty-five years of development, mature nuclear technology could provide virtually inexhaustible, cheap energy given the abundance of nuclear fuel. Admiral Lewis Strauss, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated that atomic power would generate electricity "too cheap to meter" (A statement that, according to Brookhaven National Laboratories' physicist Herbert Kouts, immediately "caused consternation among his technical advisors" [Kouts, 1983: 3)). For a brief period it was thought that airplanes would fly using atomic power, and homes would install small nuclear reactors for heat and hot water. 1950s and early 1960s a small number of prototype nuclear In the reactors came on line in the United States. The first power plant protoype reactor began operation in Shippingport, Pennsylvania in 1957. It was followed by the Dresden 1 unit near Chicago in 1959, the Yankee plant in Rowe, Massachusetts (1960), and the Indian Point (New York) and Big Rock Point (Michigan) plants in 1%2. These five plants had a combined 800 megawatts (800 MW), or less than one generating capacity ofless than percent of the total American electricity generating capacity in 1962.
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-011-3332-6
URL:
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