ISBN:
9780472027750
,
1283334380
,
047290079X
,
9781283334389
,
9780472900794
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (xii, 184 Seiten)
,
Diagramme
Edition:
Also issued in print and PDF version
Additional Information:
Rezensiert in Finke, Daniel, 1977 - [Rezension von: Slapin, Jonathan B., 1970-, Veto power und Thomson, Robert, Resolving decision-making before and after enlargement] 2013
Series Statement:
Knowledge Unlatched Backlist Collection 2016
Series Statement:
Political Science
Series Statement:
New comparative politics
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als Slapin, Jonathan B., 1979 - Veto power
Keywords:
Legislative veto
;
Politics and government
;
Legislative veto European Union countries
;
Electronic books
;
Europäische Union
;
Gesetzgebung
;
Vetorecht
;
Vertrag
;
Verhandlung
Abstract:
Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto -or veto threat- has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration
Abstract:
Introduction -- Institutional design at IGCs. Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power -- Conclusion
Note:
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
,
Also issued in print and PDF version.
,
In English
URL:
Volltext
(kostenfrei)
URL:
http://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
URL:
Volltext
(kostenfrei)
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