Abstract: I Fear of Success: Facts and Theories -- 1 Fear of Success—The Traditional View -- 2 Achievement Motivation Theory and a New Theory of Fear of Success -- 3 Social Psychological Perspectives on Fear of Success -- II Recent Research on Fear of Success -- 4 Scoring Success-Avoidance Thema in Responses to Verbal Story Cues -- 5 The The Cumulative Record of Research on Fear of Success -- 6 The Relationship of Fear of Success to Performance Behavior -- III Conclusion -- 7 Progress for Fear of Success -- References.

Abstract: Nought's had, all's spent, Where our desire is got without content: 'Tis safer to be that which we destroy Than by destruction dwell in doubtful joy. So speaks Lady Macbeth upon the attainment of the aim of her ambition (act 3, scene 2). Is this expression of a fear of success the consequence of the highly competitive arena in which she is striving to achieve? Will this sentiment later lead to the avoidance of this or other forms of success? Does she fear success because she is a woman? While the fear and avoidance of success are ideas that are not new to psychology or to human behavior, recent work by Matina Homer has excited great interest in the psychological measure of a personal disposition to avoid success and a behavioral measure of that avoidance. It is with this recent wave of research and writing that Part II of this book is concerned. Great personal interest was stimulated in the "fear of success" concept. It is not only the hypochondriacs who find in the idea of a "fear of success" syndrome an explanation for the course of their lives. In Part I are presented the earlier forms which the concept of "fear of success" took, especially in psychoanalytic theory and per­ sonality theory, originating with Freud's discussion of "those wrecked by success," but citing some of the much older cultural traditions involving a fear and/or avoidance of success.

Abstract: 1 The Author’s Premises -- Character Traits Can Change -- Treatment Is a Means of Changing Character -- Treatment and the Needs of the Individual -- Society’s Unreasonable Expectations -- Social Pressures and Impulsive Behavior -- Staff Attitude and Impulsive Behavior -- Drug Addiction as a Manifestation of Impulsive Behavior -- Specific Premises about Drug-Addicted Impulsive Individuals -- 2 The Settings and the People -- Lexington -- The Composite Patient at Lexington -- A Psychiatric Hospital Setting -- An Outpatient Clinic for Drug Abusers -- 3 Character Disorders -- Personality Disorders -- Paranoid -- Schizoid -- Explosive -- Antisocial -- Passive-Aggressive -- Borderline Personalities -- Depression -- Low Self-Esteem -- Inability to Form Close Personal Relationships -- Manipulation -- Nonpsychotic Techniques of Avoidance -- Inability to Examine One’s Own Behavior -- Action to Avoid Feeling -- Other People Are Unreal -- No Continuity in Patterns of Events -- Inability to Tolerate Criticism -- Inability to Plan -- Inability to Delay Gratification -- Entitlement -- No Experience Bearing Anxiety or Discomfort -- Self-Destruction -- Examples of Depression -- 4 Developmental Defect -- Normal Development -- Loss -- Reactions to the Loss -- Guilt and Conscience -- Inadequate Personal Relationships -- Summary -- 5 Games -- Kinds of Games -- Killing with Kindness -- Contracts -- Peace at Any Price -- Secret Deals -- Distractions -- “I’m No Racist” -- Poor Communication -- Goal Disharmony -- “Uh, Huh,I Knew It AU Along” -- Sliding by, or “I’m No Trouble” -- Good Guy-Bad Guy, or Splitting -- Jailhouse Lawyer -- The Lame Game -- Forget the Past -- Sulk -- Stir Him Up -- Confrontation Avoidance -- Focus on the Specific to Avoid the General Issue -- A Rose by Any Other Name -- No Loss Allowed -- Do as I Say, Not as I Do -- Going Through the Motions -- False Optimism -- Summary -- 6 Violence -- Destructiveness Outside of Treatment -- The Inherent Nature of Violence -- 7 A Graphic Approach to Understanding Intrapersonal Processes -- 8 Treatment -- Preconceived Distortions -- Gaining the Patient’s Attention -- Structure, Limits, Goals -- Transference-Countertransference -- “Different Strokes for Different Folks” -- Alcohol -- Sedative-Hypnotic Addiction -- Opiates -- Treatment Modalities -- Conclusion.

Abstract: I began this book with two purposes. One goal was to present clinical information to support the belief that many of society's allegedly unh'eatable people could be helped to change their de­ structive patterns of living. A second purpose was to present a clear and simple primer for two groups of workers in the field. Most treatment institutions depend upon the services of nurses, aides, guards, and corrections officers. These people, who are the least prepared, do the hulk of the treatment. Because impulsive people learn much from their daily interactions out­ side of formal therapy, the understanding and the training of this "front-line" working staff are crucial. These staff members may find the second part of the book more helpful because of its use of clinical examples and techniques. The other group for whom this book is written includes those who are beginning in the mental health or corrections field. The concept of useful treatment of impulse-ridden people has only begun to be introduced into professional training pro­ grams. The assumption that these individuals were untreatable has kept many professionals at the fringes of this field. For this reason, I hope that the book will find its way into the hands of psychiatric residents, psychologists, social workers, nurses, pro­ bation officers, prison guards, youth workers, policemen, judges, etc.

Abstract: Editor’s Introduction -- Review of Dr. E. Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic. -- Husserl and Frege: A New Look at their Relationship -- A Reply to a Critic of my Refutation of Logical Psychologism -- The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl’s Way Out -- On the Question of Logical Method -- Husserl on the Apodictic Evidence of Ideal Laws -- Husserl’s Thesis of the Ideality of Meanings -- Husserl on Signification and Object -- The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations -- Outlines of a Theory of “Essentially Occasional Expressions” -- Husserl’s Conception of a Purely Logical Grammar -- Husserl’s Conception of ‘The Grammatical’ and Contemporary Linguistics -- On Husserl’s Approach to Necessary Truth -- Husserl on Truth and Evidence -- The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations -- Suggestions for Further Reading.

Abstract: I Edmund Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen is, by any standard and also by nearly common consent, a great philosophical work. Within the phenom­ enological movement, it is generally recognised that the breakthrough to pure phenomenology - not merely to eidetic phenomenology, but also to transcendental phenomenology - was first made in these investiga­ tions. But in the context of philosophy of logic and also of theory of know­ ledge in general, these investigations took decisive steps forward. Amongst their major achievements generally recognised are of course: the final death-blow to psychologism as a theory of logic in the Prolegomena, a new conception of analyticity which vastly improves upon Kant's, a theory of meaning which is many-sided in scope and widely ramified in its appli­ cations, a conception of pure logical grammar that eventually became epoch-making, a powerful restatement of the conception of truth in terms of 'evidence' and a theory of knowledge in terms of the dynamic movement from empty intention to graduated fulfillment. There are many other detailed arguments, counter-arguments, conceptual distinctions and phenomenolo­ gical descriptions which deserve the utmost attention, examination and assimilation on the part of any serious investigator. With the publication of J. N. Findlay's English translation of the Untersuchungen, it is expected that this work will find its proper place in the curriculum of the graduate programs in philosophy in the English­ speaking world.

Abstract: 1. The development of modem psychology, Dilthey’s decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology) -- 2. The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his beginning -- 3. Task and significance of the Logical Investigations -- a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths -- b) Researching the correlation: ideal object — psychic lived experiencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description in the reflective attitude -- c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection) -- d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic -- e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for the theory of knowledge -- f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the Logical Investigations. Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental phenomenology — the science of transcendental subjectivity -- 4. Summarizing characterization of the new psychology -- Systematic Part -- 5. Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Questioning the concepts, nature and mind -- 6. Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience) -- 7. Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons -- 8. The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science -- 9. Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori -- a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the factual by fantasy — the eidos as the invariable -- b) Variation and alteration -- c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping what agrees as the eidos -- d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation -- e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the highest genera by variation of ideas — seeing of ideas without starting from experience -- f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences -- 10. The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instruments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world (“natural concept of the world”). Possibility of an articulation of the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind -- 11. Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world. Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian concept of experience. Space and time as the most universal structures of the world -- 12. Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity -- 13. Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality -- 14. Order of realities in the world -- 15. Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-à-vis the psyche -- 16. The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object, which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject -- 17. Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real properties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses -- 18. Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of the natural scientist -- 19. The true world in itself a necessary presumption -- 20. Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy and abnormalcy -- 21. Hierarchical structure of the psychic -- 22. Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal determinations -- 23. Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving -- 24. The unity of the psychic -- 25. The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the naturalistic prejudice -- 26. The subjective in the world as objective theme -- 27. The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the world -- 28. Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective. The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude -- 29. Perceptual field — perceptual space -- 30. Spatial primal presence -- 31. Hyle — hyletic data as matter for intentional functions -- 32. Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object -- 33. Objective temporality and temporality of the stream -- 34. Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in perception. The object as irreal pole -- 35. Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the empty horizon -- 36. The intentional object of perception -- 37. The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the immanent -- 38. The access to pure subjectivity from external perception -- 39. Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself -- 40. The problem of temporality: presenting — retention and protention (positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their significance for practical life) -- 41. Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole. The I as pole of activities and habitualities -- 42. The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others. Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions -- 43. The unity of the subject as monad — static and genetic investigation of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of monads -- 44. Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the corresponding sciences -- 45. Retrospective sense-investigation -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno­ logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A.

Abstract: 1 The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century -- 2 Holland’s Experience of War during the Revolt of the Netherlands -- 3 The Army Revolt of 1647 -- 4 Holland’s Financial Problems (1713–1733) and the Wars against Louis XIV -- 5 Municipal Government and the Burden of the Poor in South Holland during the Napoleonic Wars -- 6 The Sinews of War: The Role of Dutch Finance in European Politics (c. 1750–1815) -- 7 Britain and Blockade, 1780–1940 -- 8 Away from Impressment: The Idea of a Royal Naval Reserve, 1696–1859 -- 9 Problems of Defence in a Non-Belligerent Society: Military Service in the Netherlands during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century -- 10 World War II and Social Class in Great Britain -- 11 The Second World War and Dutch Society: Continuity and Change.

Abstract: War has ever exercised a great appeal on men's minds. Oscar Wilde's witticism notwithstanding this fascination cannot be attri­ buted simply to the wicked character of war. The demonic forces released by war have caught the artistic imagination, while sages have reflected on the enigmatic readiness of each new generation to wage war, despite the destruction, disillusion and exhaustion that war is known to bring in its train. If there never was a good war and a bad peace why did armed conflicts recur with such distressing regularity? Was large-scale violence an intrinsic condition of Man? The answers given to such questions have differed widely: it has even been suggested that the states of war and peace are not as far removed from one another as is usually supposed. The causes of war and the interaction between war and society have long been the subject of philosophical enquiry and historical analysis. Accord­ ing to Thucydides no one was ever compelled to go to war; Cicero remarked how dumb were the laws in time of war, while Clausewitz's profound observation concerning the affinity between war and politics has become almost a commonplace. War being the severest test a society or state can experience historians have naturally been concerned to investigate their rela­ tionship.

Abstract: Descriptive Psychology and the Human Studies -- Lived Experience, Understanding and Description -- Structure and Development in Psychic Life -- Psychology and Hermeneutics -- Understanding, Re-experiencing and Historical Interpretation -- Ideas concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894) -- I: The Problem of a Psychological Foundation for the Human Studies -- II: Distinction between Explanatory and Descriptive Psychology -- III: Explanatory Psychology -- IV: Descriptive and Analytic Psychology -- V: Relationships between Explanatory Psychology and Descriptive Psychology -- VI: Possibility and Conditions of the Solution of the Task of a Descriptive Psychology -- VII: The Structure of Psychic Life -- VIII: The Development of Psychic Life -- IX: Study of the Differences of Psychic Life: The Individual -- Remark -- The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life -- I. Expressions of Life -- II. The Elementary Forms of Understanding -- III. Objective Spirit and Elementary Understanding -- IV. The Higher Forms of Understanding -- V. Projecting, Re-creating, Re-experiencing -- VI. Exegesis or Interpretation -- Appendices.

Abstract: Perhaps no philosopher has so fully explored the nature and conditions of historical understanding as Wilhelm Dilthey. His work, conceived overall as a Critique of Historical Reason and developed through his well-known theory of the human studies, provides concepts and methods still fruitful for those concerned with analyzing the human condition. Despite the increasing recognition of Dilthey's contributions, relati­ vely few of his writings have as yet appeared in English translation. It is therefore both timely and useful to have available here two works drawn from different phases in the development of his philosophy. The "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology" (1894), now translated into English for the first time, sets forth Dilthey's programma­ tic and methodological viewpoints through a descriptive psychology, while "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life" (ca. 1910) is representative of his later hermeneutic approach to historical understanding. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN STUDIES Dilthey presented the first mature statement of his theory of the human studies in volume one of his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Studies), published in 1883. He argued there that for the proper study of man and history we must eschew the metaphysical speculation of the absolute idealists while at the same time avoiding the scientistic reduction of positivism.

Abstract: The Problem of Transcendental Arguments and the Second Critique as Test Case -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Working Model for Transcendental Arguments -- 3. Criteria of a Successful Account of the Argument-Structure of the Analytic of the Second Critique -- The Argument of the Analytic -- 4. Preliminary Outline of the Argument of the Analytic as a Whole -- 5. The Argument of Chapter 1 -- 6. The Argument of Chapter 2 -- 7. The Argument of Chapter 3 -- Conclusions -- 8. Conclusions and Discussion -- Appendixes -- Appendix A: Beck’s Account of the Argument -- Appendix B: Silber’s Account of the Argument -- Appendix C: The Fact of Pure Practical Reason -- Appendix D: Maxims and Laws -- Notes.

Abstract: This work is in no way intended as a commentary on the second Cri­ tique, or even on the Analytic of that book. Instead I have limited myself to the attempt to extract the essential structure of the argument of the Analytic and to exhibit it as an instance of a transcendental argument (namely, one establishing the conditions of the possibility of a practical cognitive viewpoint). This limitation of scope has caused me, in some cases, to ignore or treat briefly concrete questions of Kant's practical philosophy that deserve much closer consideration; and in other cases it has led me to relegate questions that could not be treated briefly to appendixes ,in order not to distract from the development of the argu­ ment. As a result, it is the argument-structure itself that receives pri­ mary attention, and I think some justification should be offered for this concentration on what may seem to be a purely formal concern. One of the most common weaknesses of interpretations of Kant's works is a failure to distinguish the level of generality at which Kant's argument is being developed. This failure is particularly fatal in dealing with the Critiques, since in interpreting them it is important to keep clearly in mind that it is not this or that cognition that is at stake, but the possibility of (a certain kind of) knowledge as such.

Abstract: I. Logic and the Forgetfulness of Being -- II. The Foundation and Limitation of Logic -- III. Heideggers “Attack” on Logic: The Nothing -- IV. Logic versus Authentic Thought -- V. Symbolic Logic: Its Development and Relation to Technicity -- VI. Logos and Language: The Overcoming of Technicity -- Conclusion.

Abstract: Since his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 in which Heidegger delivered his most celebrated salvo against logic, he has frequently been portrayed as an anti-logician, a classic example of the obscurity resultant upon a rejection of the discipline of logic, a champion of the irrational, and a variety of similar things. Because many of Heidegger's statements on logic are polemical in tone, there has been no little misunderstanding of his position in regard to logic, and a great deal of distortion of it. All too frequently the position which is attacked as Heidegger's is a barely recognizable caricature of it. Heidegger has, from the very beginning of his career, written and said much on logic. Strangely enough, in view of all that he has said, his critique of logic has not been singled out as the subject of any of the longer, more detailed studies on the various aspects of his thought.

Abstract: Inaugural Lecture -- Pensée et Prédication -- I — The Irreducible / In the Individual or in Human Communication? -- The Unique Individual and His Other -- The Irreducible Alienation of the Self -- A Time to Exist on One’s Own -- Love of Self: Obstacle or Privileged Means of Encountering Another? -- II — The Irreducible Personal Nucleus in Human Communication -- Participation or Alienation? -- The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination -- Phenomenology of Personalistic Morality -- The Self and the Other in the Thought of Edith Stein -- III — The Irreducible Factor in Human Creativity: Causality, Language, Cognition and Interpretation -- Otherness and Causality -- Le Langage Entre Soi et Autrui -- The ‘Founded Act’ and the Apperception of Others -- Empathy, A Return to Reason -- The Creative Self and the Other in Man’s Self-Interpretation.

Abstract: I. Plato in Antiquity -- 1. Plato’s first successors -- 2. Aristotle and the older Peripatetics -- 3. New schools: Zeno, Epicurus, Pyrrho -- 4. The Academy as the school of uncertainty -- 5. Back to certainty -- 6. In Rome. Cicero -- 7. Contacts with the Old Testament -- 8. Across the boundaries of the schools -- 9. Before Plotinus -- 10. The first contacts with Christianity -- 11. Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists -- 12. The Christian Fathers -- 13. Ancient laudatory and calumnious legends on Plato -- 14. Interpretation, criticism, polemics -- 15. Other responses and effects -- II. Plato in the Middle Ages and in the New Age -- 16. Entry into the Middle Ages in the East -- 17. The West before the Renaissance -- 18. The beginning of the Italian Renaissance -- 19. Plato and Aristotle, contest and temporary reconciliation -- 20. Marsilio Ficino. The Florentin Academy -- 21. The diffusion of Renaissance Platonism -- 22. From Descartes to Kant -- 23. The age of the autocracy of reason -- 24. The new Humanism -- 25. Modern Platonic scholarship -- 26. Plato in modern philosophy -- 27. New translations. From science to literature -- 28. Plastic, graphic and mechanical arts. Music. Education -- 29. Life without end -- Name index -- Picture index.

Abstract: Plato's earthly life ended in the year 347 B. C. At the same time, however, began his posthumous life - a life of great influence and fame leaving its mark on aU eras of the history of European learning -lasting until present times. Plato's philosophy has taken root earlier or later in innumerable souls of others, it has matured and given birth to new ideas whose proliferation further dissemi­ nated the vital force of the original thoughts. It happened sometimes, of course, that by various interpretations different and sometimes altogether contradictory thoughts were deduced from one and the same Platonic doctrine: this possibility is also characteristic of Plato's genius. Even though in the history of Platonism there were times less active and creative, the continuity of its tradition has never been completely interrupted and where there was no growth and progress, at least that what had been once accepted has been kept alive. When enquiring into Plato's influence on the development of learning, we shall above all consider the individual approach of various personalities to Plato's philosophy, personal Platonism, which at its best concerns itself with the literary heritage of Plato and though accessible was not always much sought for.

Abstract: The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes. Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as "Typescript C") on which Husserl wrote in 1933: "Cartes. Meditationen / Originaltext 1929 / E. Husserl / für Dorion Cairns". Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserl’s practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a foornote. The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the other - usually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote

Abstract: 1. The Problem of Universals Then and Now -- 1. The Problem -- 2. Platonism and Nominalism -- 3. Historical Background -- 4. Epistemological Discussion of Platonism and Nominalism -- 5. Constructive Conceptualism -- 6. The Three Ontological Positions -- 7. Summary -- 2. Towards a Rational Reconstruction of Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience -- I: Kant’s Riddle of Experience -- 1. On Rational Reconstructions of Philosophical Theories -- 2. The Place of Kant’s Theory of Experience within His Theoretical Philosophy -- 3. Synthetic a priori Propositions -- 4. The Existential Hypothesis in Kant’s Fundamental Question -- 5. The Influence of Isaac Newton, Chr. Wolff and D. Hume upon Kant’s Conception of Science -- 6. Kant’s Antinomy of Experience -- 7. Kant’s Project for a Solution: Synthetic a priori Statements as the Way out of the Dilemma -- 8. A Remark on the Relation between the ‘Regressive’ and the ‘Progressive’ Argument -- II: The Logical Structure of the Progressive Argument -- 1. The Aim of the Progressive Argument -- 2. Kant as a Rationalist Precursor of the Theory of Eliminative and Enumerative Induction -- 3. Kant’s Theory of Structural Reduction or a priori Elimination (The Modal Argument) -- 4. Empirical Confirmation and Consolidation -- 5. The Gap in Kant’s Argument -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 3. A Model Theoretic Explication of Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Intensional Relational Systems, Model Worlds, Categorical Identity -- 3. Isomorphism, Homomorphism, Picture, Truth and Falsity -- 4. Logical Spaces, Isomorphism between Logical Spaces, Logically Adequate and Inadequate Pictures -- 5. Application of the Picture Theory to Language -- 4. Phenomenalism and Its Difficulties -- 1. Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics and Phenomenalism -- 2. A Characterization of Phenomenalism -- 3. Motives for Phenomenalism -- 4. Difficulties in Carrying out the Phenomenalistic Programme -- 5. Conclusion -- 5. Ontology and Analyticity -- 1. The Ontological Problem -- 2. The Problem of Analytic Statements -- 3. Concluding Remarks -- Index of Names.

Abstract: These two volumes contain all of my articles published between 1956 and 1975 which might be of interest to readers in the English-speaking world. The first three essays in Vol. 1 deal with historical themes. In each case I as far as possible, meets con­ have attempted a rational reconstruction which, temporary standards of exactness. In The Problem of Universals Then and Now some ideas of W.V. Quine and N. Goodman are used to create a modern sketch of the history of the debate on universals beginning with Plato and ending with Hao Wang's System L. The second article concerns Kant's Philosophy of Science. By analyzing his position vis-a-vis I. Newton, Christian Wolff, and D. Hume, it is shown that for Kant the very notion of empirical knowledge was beset with a funda­ mental logical difficulty. In his metaphysics of experience Kant offered a solution differing from all prior as well as subsequent attempts aimed at the problem of establishing a scientific theory. The last of the three historical papers utilizes some concepts of modern logic to give a precise account of Wittgenstein's so-called Picture Theory of Meaning. E. Stenius' interpretation of this theory is taken as an intuitive starting point while an intensional variant of Tarski's concept of a relational system furnishes a technical instrument. The concepts of inodel world and of logical space, together with those of homomorphism and isomorphism be­ tween model worlds and between logical spaces, form the conceptual basis of the reconstruction.

Abstract: Section 1 — Testing Theories of Empirical Phenomena -- to Section 1 -- 1.1. Symmetric Tests of the Hypothesis That the Mean of One Normal Population Exceeds That of Another -- 1.2. Statistical Tests as a Basis for ‘Yes—No’ Choices -- 1.3. Prediction and Hindsight as Confirmatory Evidence -- 1.4. On Judging the Plausibility of Theories -- Section 2 — Causes and Possible Worlds -- to Section 2 -- 2.1. Causal Ordering and Identifiability -- 2.2. On the Definition of the Causal Relation -- 2.3. Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation -- 2.4. Cause and Counterfactual (with Nicholas Rescher) -- Section 3 — The Logic of Imperatives -- to Section 3 -- 3.1. The Logic of Rational Decision -- 3.2. The Logic of Heuristic Decision Making -- Section 4 — Complexity -- to Section 4 -- 4.1. Theory of Automata: Discussion -- 4.2. Aggregation of Variables in Dynamic Systems (with Albert Ando) -- 4.3. The Theory of Problem Solving -- 4.4. The Organization of Complex Systems -- Section 5 — Theory of Scientific Discovery -- to Section 5 -- 5.1. Thinking by Computers -- 5.2. Scientific Discovery and the Psychology of Problem Solving -- 5.3. The Structure of Ill-Structured Problems -- 5.4. Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic? -- 5.5. Discussion: The Meno Paradox -- Section 6 — Formalizing Scientific Theories -- to Section 6 -- 6.1. The Axioms of Newtonian Mechanics -- 6.2. Discussion: The Axiomatization of Classical Mechanics -- 6.3. Definable Terms and Primitives in Axiom Systems -- 6.4. A Note on Almost-Everywhere Definability -- 6.5. The Axiomatization of Physical Theories -- 6.6. Ramsey Eliminability and the Testability of Scientific Theories (with Guy J. Groen) -- 6.7. Identifiability and the Status of Theoretical Terms -- Name Index.

Abstract: We respect Herbert A. Simon as an established leader of empirical and logical analysis in the human sciences while we happily think of him as also the loner; of course he works with many colleagues but none can match him. He has been writing fruitfully and steadily for four decades in many fields, among them psychology, logic, decision theory, economics, computer science, management, production engineering, information and control theory, operations research, confirmation theory, and we must have omitted several. With all of them, he is at once the technical scientist and the philosophical critic and analyst. When writing of decisions and actions, he is at the interface of philosophy of science, decision theory, philosophy of the specific social sciences, and inventory theory (itself, for him, at the interface of economic theory, production engineering and information theory). When writing on causality, he is at the interface of methodology, metaphysics, logic and philosophy of physics, systems theory, and so on. Not that the interdisciplinary is his orthodoxy; we are delighted that he has chosen to include in this book both his early and little-appreciated treatment of straightforward philosophy of physics - the axioms of Newtonian mechanics, and also his fine papers on pure confirmation theory.

Abstract: 1 Scientific Realism and Psychology -- Notes -- 2 Human Action -- 1. Actions as Achievements -- 2. Actions and Events -- 3. Actions and Action Statements -- Notes -- 3 Mental Episodes -- 1. The Stream of Consciousness and the Myth of the Given -- 2. Sellars’ Analogy Account of Mental Episodes -- 3. Analogy and the Language of Thought -- 4. Rules of Language -- 5. Conceptuality and Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 4 Concept Formation in Psychology -- 1. Psychological Concepts as Theoretico- Reportive Concepts -- 2. Conceptual Functionalism and Postulational Concept Formation -- 3. Theoretical Analyticity and Mental Episodes -- 4. The Indispensability of Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 5 Psychological Dispositions -- 1. A Realist Account of Dispositions -- 2. Propositional Attitudes as Dispositions -- Notes -- 6 Wanting, Intending, and Willing -- 1. Wanting and Intending -- 2. Trying -- 3. A Formalization of First-Order and Second-Order Propositional Attitudes -- Notes -- 7 Conduct Plan and Practical Syllogism -- 1. Conduct Plan -- 2. Practical Syllogism -- 3. Practical Syllogism as a Schema for Understanding Behavior -- 4. Extended Uses of Practical Syllogism -- Notes -- 8 Explanation of Human Action -- 1. Action-Explanations -- 2. Causality and Intentional-Teleological Explanation of Action -- Notes -- 9 Deductive Explanation and Purposive Causation -- 1. Deductive Explanation -- 2. Purposive Causation -- 3. Action-Explanations Reconsidered -- Notes -- 10 Basic Concepts of Action Theory -- 1. Basic Actions and Action Tokens -- 2. Complex Actions -- 3. Intentionality -- Notes -- 11 Propensities and Inductive Explanation -- 1. Propensities -- 2. Screening Off and Supersessance as Explanatory Notions -- 3. Explanatory Ambiguity and Maximal Specificity -- 4. An Analysis of Inductive Explanation -- Notes -- 12 Probabilistic Causation and Human Action -- 1. Probabilistic Causes -- 2. Actions, Propensities, and Inductive- Probabilistic Explanation -- Notes -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: This book presents a unified and systematic philosophical account of human actions and their explanation, and it does it in the spirit of scientific realism. In addition, various other related topics, such as psychological concept formation and the nature of mental events and states, are dis­ cussed. This is due to the fact that the key problems in the philosophy of psychology are interconnected to a high degree. This interwovenness has affected the discussion of these problems in that often the same topic is discussed in several contexts in the book. I hope the reader does not find this too frustrating. The theory of action developed in this book, especially in its latter half, is a causalist one. In a sense it can be regarded as an explication and refin~ment of a typical common sense view of actions and the mental episodes causally responsible for them. It has, of course, not been possible to discuss all the relevant philosophical problems in great detail, even if I have regarded it as necessary to give a brief treatment of relatively many problems. Rather, I have concentrated on some key issues and hope that future research will help to clarify the rest.

Abstract: 1. The So-Called Circle of Understanding -- 2. ’The Problem of Causality’ -- 3. Explanation, Prediction, Scientific Systematization and Non-Explanatory Information -- 1. Introduction -- 2. On Possible Conventions Governing the Use of ’Explanation’ and ’Prediction’ -- 3. An Additional Argument of Plausibility in favour of the Counterthesis -- 4. A Systematic Approach -- 5. Non-Explanatory Information -- 4. The Problem of Induction: Hume’s Challenge and the Contemporary Answers -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Humean Challenge -- 3. Deductivism: K. Popper -- 4. Inductivism 1 -- 5. Inductivism 2 -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 5. Carnap’s Normative Theory of Inductive Probability -- 6. Logical Understanding and the Dynamics of Theories -- 7. Structures and Dynamics of Theories: Some Reflections on J.D. Sneed and T.S. Kuhn -- 8. Language and Logic -- 1. Preface -- 2. The Functions of ‘Is’ -- 3. ‘All’, ‘Something’, and ‘Nothing’ -- 4. ‘I’, ‘You’, ‘He’, ‘She’, ‘It’ -- 5. ‘Not’, ‘And’, ‘Or’, ‘If …Then’ -- 6. Logical Truth -- 7. ‘The’ -- 8. ‘It is Possible That … ’, ‘It is Necessary That …’ -- 9. Remarks on the Completeness of Logical Systems Relative to the Validity-Concepts of P. Lorenzen and K. Lorenz -- Index of Names.

Abstract: These two volumes contain all of my articles published between 1956 and 1975 which might be of interest to readers in the English-speaking world. The first three essays in Vol. 1 deal with historical themes. In each case I have attempted a rational reconstruction which, as far as possible, meets con­ temporary standards of exactness. In The Problem of Universals Then and Now some ideas of W.V. Quine and N. Goodman are used to create a modem sketch of the history of the debate on universals beginning with Plato and ending with Hao Wang's System :E. The second article concerns Kant's Philosophy of Science. By analyzing his position vis-a-vis I. Newton, Christian Wolff, and D. Hume, it is shown that for Kant the very notion of empirical knowledge was beset with a funda­ mental logical difficulty. In his metaphysics of experience Kant offered a solution differing from all prior as well as subsequent attempts aimed at the problem of establishing a scientific theory. The last of the three historical papers utilizes some concepts of modem logic to give a precise account of Wittgenstein's so-called Picture Theory of Meaning. E. Stenius' interpretation of this theory is taken as an intuitive starting point while an intensional variant of Tarski's concept of a relational system furnishes a technical instrument. The concepts of model world and of logical space, together with those of homomorphism and isomorphism be­ tween model worlds and between logical spaces, form the conceptual basis of the reconstruction.

Abstract: of Ontology I -- 1. Ontological Problems -- 2. The Business of Ontology -- 3. Is Ontology Possible? -- 4. The Method of Scientific Ontology -- 5. The Goals of Scientific Ontology -- 6. Ontology and Formal Science -- 7. The Ontology of Science -- 8. Ontological Inputs and Outputs of Science and Technology -- 9. Uses of Ontology -- 10. Concluding Remarks -- 1. Substance -- 1. Association -- 2. Assembly -- 3. Entities and Sets -- 4. Concluding Remarks -- 2. Form -- 1. Property and Attribute -- 2. Analysis -- 3. Theory -- 4. Properties of Properties -- 5. Status of Properties -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 3. Thing -- 1. Thing and Model Thing -- 2. State -- 3. From Class to Natural Kind -- 4. The World -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- 4. Possibility -- 1. Conceptual Possibility -- 2. Real Possibility -- 3. Disposition -- 4. Probability -- 5. Chance Propensity -- 6. Marginalia -- 7. Concluding Remarks -- 5. Change -- 1. Changeability -- 2. Event -- 3. Process -- 4. Action and Reaction -- 5. Panta Rhei -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- 6. Spacetime -- 1. Conflicting Views -- 2. Space -- 3. Duration -- 4. Spacetime -- 5. Spatiotemporal Properties -- 6. Matters of Existence -- 7. Concluding Remarks -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: In this Introduction' we shall sketch the business of ontology, or metaphysics, and shall locate it on the map of learning. This has to be done because there are many ways of construing the word 'ontology' and because of the bad reputation metaphysics has suffered until recently - a well deserved one in most cases. 1. ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS Ontological (or metaphysical) views are answers to ontological ques­ tions. And ontological (or metaphysical) questions are questions with an extremely wide scope, such as 'Is the world material or ideal - or perhaps neutral?" 'Is there radical novelty, and if so how does it come about?', 'Is there objective chance or just an appearance of such due to human ignorance?', 'How is the mental related to the physical?', 'Is a community anything but the set of its members?', and 'Are there laws of history?'. Just as religion was born from helplessness, ideology from conflict, and technology from the need to master the environment, so metaphysics - just like theoretical science - was probably begotten by the awe and bewilderment at the boundless variety and apparent chaos of the phenomenal world, i. e. the sum total of human experience. Like the scientist, the metaphysician looked and looks for unity in diversity, for pattern in disorder, for structure in the amorphous heap of phenomena - and in some cases even for some sense, direction or finality in reality as a whole.

Abstract: Section One Phenomenology and Natural Science -- Hermeneutics of Experimental Science in the Context of the Life-World -- Husserl and the Mind-Brain Relation -- Section Two Phenomenology and Social Science -- Ethnomethodology as a Phenomenological Approach in the Social Sciences -- Mind and Institution -- Alfred Schutz Symposium: The Pregivenness of Sociality -- Husserl and His Influence on Me -- Section Three Phenomenology and Marxism -- Consciousness, Praxis, and Reality: Marxism vs. Phenomenology -- Meaning and Freedom in the Marxist Conception of the Economic -- Section Four Phenomenology and Formal Science -- Objectivity in Logic: A Phenomenological Approach -- Notes on Contributors.

Abstract: Historically, philosophy has been the point of origin of the various sciences. However, once developed, the sciences have increasingly become autonomous, although often taking some paradigm from leading philosophies of the era. As aresult, in recent times the relationship of philosophy to the sciences has been more by way of dialogue and critique than a matter of spawning new sciences. This volume of the Selected Studies brings together a series of essays which develop that dialogue and critique with special reference to the insights of phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenology in its own way has been interfaced with the sciences from its outset. Perhaps the most widely noted relation, due in part to Edmund Husserl's characterization of the beginning steps of phenomenology as a "descriptive psychology," has been with the various psychologies. It is weIl known that the early Gestaltists were influenced by Husserl and, later, the Existential psychologies acknowledged the impact of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, to mention but two philosophers. And, of course, Husserl's lifetime concern for the foundations of logic and mathe­ maties, especially as these (the former in particular) were developed into a foundational "theory of science," has figured prominently in these dialogues. 2 INTRODUCTION Less directly but more currently, the impact of phenomenology upon the disciplines has begun to be feIt in a whole range of the sciences.

Abstract: One Methodology and History -- I. The Subject Matter of the Methodology of Sciences -- II. The Subject Matter of the Methodology of History -- III. The Scope of the Subject Matter (Domain) of Historical Research -- Two Patterns of Historical Research -- Grounds for Classification -- IV. Pragmatic Reflection -- V. Critical Reflection -- VI. Erudite and Genetic Reflection -- VII. Structural Reflection -- VIII. Logical Reflection -- IX. Dialectical Reflection -- Three the Objective Methodology of History -- X. Historical Facts -- XI. The Process of History (Causality and Determinism) -- XII. The Process of History (Historical Regularities) -- Four the Pragmatic Methodology of History. Theory of Source-Based and Non-Source-Based Knowledge -- XIII. The Nature of Historical Cognition -- XIV. Questions and Answers. a General Reconstruction of Historical Research -- XV. Theory of Source-Based Knowledge -- XVI. Theory of Non-Source-Based Knowledge -- XVII. The Functions of Source-Based and Non-Source-Based Knowledge -- Five the Pragmatic Methodology of History: the Methods of Reconstruction of the Process of History -- XVIII. The Authenticity of Sources and the Reliability of Informants -- XIX. Methods of Establishing Historical Facts -- XX. Quantitative Methods in Historical Research -- XXI. The Procedure of Explanation in Historical Research -- XXII. Construction and Synthesis -- Six the Apragmatic Methodology of History -- XXIII. The Nature and Instruments of Historical Narration -- XXIV. Components of Narratives: Historical Statements and Laws -- XXV. Elements of Historical Narratives: Evaluations -- XXVI. The Methodological Structure of Historical Research -- Index of Names.

Abstract: No discipline has been more praised or more criticized than the writing of history. Cioero claimed that history teaches men how to live. Aris­ totle denied it the very name of science and regwded poetry as the higher wisdom. At various times history has been assigned a command­ ing or a demeaning statIUs in the hierarchy of sciences. Today one can admire the increasing precision and sophistication of the methods used by historia:ns. On the other hand, Thucydides' History of the PeZo­ ponesian War still serves as the ideal model of how to reconstruct the historical past. Even those who deny the possibility of an objective reconstruction of the past would themselves likie to be recorded by historians, "objectively" or not. Dislike of history and fear of its verdict are not incompatible with reverence and awe for its practitioners, the historians. So man's attitude to history is ambiguous. The controversy about history continues. Widely differing issues are at stake. Historians themselves, however, are the least engaged in the struggle. Rarely does a historian decide to open the door of his study and join in the melee about the meaning of history. More often he slams it shut and returns to his studies, oblivious of the fact that with the passage of thne the gap between his scientific work and its audience might widen. The historian does not shun the battle, he merely chooses his own battleground.

Abstract: I/Mathematical Logic -- Constructions ‘by Finite’ -- Some Eastern Two Cardinal Theorems -- Functional Interpretation and Kripke Models -- Axioms for Intuitionistic Mathematics Incompatible with Classical Logic -- II/Foundations of Mathematical Theories -- Ineffability Properties of Cardinals II -- Non-Standard Analysis -- Some Purely Mathematical Results Inspired by Mathematical Logic -- Interpretability of Elementary Theories -- III/Category Theory -- Categorical Foundations and Foundations of Category Theory -- IV/Computability Theory -- Re Sets Higher Up (Dedicated to J. B. Rosser) -- Computable Numberings -- On the Basic Notions in the Theory of Induction -- Basic Concepts of Computer Science and Logic -- Structural Relations between Programs and Problems -- Algorithmic Logic, a Tool for Investigations of Programs -- V/Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics -- On a Semantical Language Hierarchy in a Constructive Mathematical Logic -- VI/On The Concept of a Set -- Large Sets -- What is the Iterative Conception of Set? -- VII/Philosophy of Logic -- Do-it-yourself Semantics for Classical Sequent Calculi, including Ramified Type Theory -- Some Philosophical Problems of Hintikka’s Possible Worlds Semantics -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: Methodology and Metascience -- The Problem of the Rationality of Fallible Methods of Inference -- The Problem of Justifying Analytic Sentences -- Axiomatic Systems from the Methodological Point of View -- The Problem of Probabilistic Justification of Enumerative Induction -- Enumerative Induction and the Theory of Games -- On Testability in Empirical Sciences -- On the Theoretical Sense of the So-Called Observational Terms and Sentences -- The Pragmatic Foundations of Semantics -- Mathematical and Empirical Verifiability -- Meaning and Functional Reason -- On a Certain Condition of Semantic Theory of Knowledge -- On the Difference between Deductive and Non-Deductive Sciences -- On Ostensive Definitions -- The Controversy: Deductivism versus Inductivism -- Concepts and Problems in General Methodology and Methodology of the Practical Sciences -- The Foundations of a Methodological Analysis of Mill’s Methods -- Semantic Representation of the Probability of Formulas in Formalized Theories -- Classification as a Kind of Distance Function. Natural Classifications -- The Physical Magnitude and Experience -- Probabilistic Definition on the Example of the Definition of Genotype -- Analytic Sentences in the Semantic System -- The Model of Empirical Sciences in the Concepts of the Creators of Marxism -- On the Empirical Meaningfulness of Sentences -- A Model-Theoretic Approach to the Problem of Interpretation of Empirical Languages -- Empirical Meaningfulness of Quantitative Statements -- The Problem of Analyticity -- A Method of Deciding between N Statistical Hypotheses -- Interpretations of the Maximum Likelihood Principle -- Two Concepts of Information -- Semantical Criteria of Empirical Meaningfulness -- Basic Concepts of Formal Methodology of Empirical Sciences -- Rational Belief, Probability and the Justification of Inductive Inference.

Abstract: The anthology presents a selection of methodological writings pub­ lished by Polish logicians after World War 11 (the first of them dated 1947). All the papers belong to what may be called Logical Methodology or Logical Theory of Science. The epithet 'logical' characterizes rather the general point of view than the particular methods employed by the authors. Apart from articles which make an essential use of different formal (logical and mathematical) methods, there are many which do not involve any formal apparatus whatsoever. The problems the papers deal with may be characterized as problems of the general methodology of empirical science. The papers do not consider the methodological problems of formal (mathematical) knowledge, and, as a rule, they are concerned with empirical science as a whole and not with some of its specific branches. The topics covered by the selected writings include the main issues and controversies discussed within the contemporary methodology of science. A considerable part of the anthology is con­ cerned with the semantics of empirica1languages and considers problems such as interpretation of observational and theoretical terms, analyticity, empirical meaningfulness, etc. Another group of papers deals with the problem of induction and examines various ways of its justification. Some articles discuss the nature and the status of methodology itself. The materials have been selected so as to make up a whole representative of what has been done in this field in Poland since 1945. The book comprises 33 articles by 20 authors.

Abstract: I. The Formulation of the Research Problem and the Choice of the Right Methods -- II. Social Phenomena and Processes -- III. Concepts and Indicators -- IV. Kinds of Propositions -- V. Substantiation of Statements. Empirical Verification of Hypotheses -- VI. Explanation of Events -- VII. Construction of Theories -- VIII. Prediction of Events and Practical Applications of Research Results -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: This is the first part of a textbook for students of sociology, and for those students of other social sciences who wish to make use in their work of the research methods elaborated in the course of the develop­ ment of empirical sociology over the last few decades. The development of empirical sociological research in our country and the growing demand both for a practical application of its results and for graduates of sociological studies in various fields of social practice testifies to a much broader trend. It is evidence of a desire to base our understanding and conscious transformation of social phenom­ ena on a sound, scientific perception of social processes and the mechanisms governing them. The increasing volume of studies in Poland is accompanied by a growing need for a particular type of re­ search method, namely one in which questions addressed to the socio­ logist would be answered in a manner as free as possible of conclusions based on impressions and defining as unambiguously as possible both the limits of the generality and the degree of validity of the inferences drawn from the results of the research. These conditions are met by the so-called standardized methods of investigating social phenomena which, together with statistical methods of analyzing collected material, consti­ tute the principal means of conducting sociological research in the world today.

Abstract: 1/Introduction -- A. General Plan of the Book -- B. Sets and Notation -- C. Kinds and Attributes -- D. Laws and Law-Sentences -- 2/Explanations, Identities, and Theories -- A. Scientific Explanations -- B. Identities -- C. Theories -- 3/Theories with Structured Wholes -- A. Introduction -- B. An Example from Chemistry -- C. The Languages of the Theories -- D. Structures and Homogeneity -- E. Laws of T1 -- 4/Microreductions: Set Theoretical Form -- A. Thing-Identities -- B. Explanations of the Law Sentences of T2 -- C. Attribute-Correlations -- 5/Microreductions with Identities -- A. Thing-Identities -- B. Attribute-Identities -- C. Summary of the Reduction Conditions -- D. Some Possible Objections and Problems -- E. Reasonable Modifications -- 6/Unified Theories and Unified Science -- A. Microreductions and Unified Science -- B. Unified Theories -- C. Unification by Microreduction -- 7/Complications and Obstacles -- A. Variety of Structures and Theories -- B. Hierarchical Structures -- C. Tokenism -- D. Social Theories and Social Structures -- 8/Scientific Progress and Unity of Science -- A. General Aspects of Scientific Progress -- B. Development and Evolution -- C. Problems and Prospects -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The first section of this chapter describes the major goals of this investiga­ tion and the general strategy of my presentation. The remaining three sections review some requisite background material and introduce some terminology and notation used in the book. Section B contains a brief review of some of the ideas and notation of elementary logic and set theory. Section C contains an introductory discussion of kinds and at­ tributes. Section D presents some basic ideas about laws and law­ sentences. A. GENERAL PLAN OF THE BOOK Basic scientific research is directed towards the goals of increasing our knowledge of the wor1d and our understanding of the wor1d. Knowledge increases through the discovery and confirmation of facts and laws. Understanding results from the explanation of known facts and laws, and through the formulation of general, systematic theories. Other things being equal, we tend to feeI that our understanding of a c1ass of phenomena increases as we develop increasingly general and intuitively unified theories of that c1ass of phenomena. It is therefore natural to consider the possibility of one very general, unified theory which, at least in principle, governs all known phenomena. The dream of obtaining such a theory, and the understanding that it would provide, has motivated an enormous amount of research by both scientists and philosophers.

Abstract: I. General Problems -- A Plea for Freeing the History of Scientific Discoveries from Myth -- Progress and Rationality in Research: Science from the Viewpoint of Popperian Methodology -- The Problems of Scientific Validation -- Science and Analogy -- Inductive Method and Scientific Discovery -- Scientific Discovery from the Viewpoint of Evolutionary Epistemology -- The Analytical (Quantitative) Theory of Science and its Implications for the Nature of Scientific Discovery -- Difficulties Inherent in a Pedagogy of Discovery in the Teaching of the Sciences -- Discovery and Vocation -- II. Case Studies -- Two Scientific Discoveries: Their Genesis and Destiny -- Logical and Psychological Aspects of the Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood -- The Discovery of Duodenal Ancylostoma and of its Pathogenic Power -- Weber and Maxwell on the Discovery of the Velocity of Light in Nineteenth Century Electrodynamics -- Cognitive Psychology, Scientific Creativity, and the Case Study Method -- Biographical Notes -- Name Index.

Abstract: The 1977 lectures of the International School for the History of Science at Erice in Sicily were devoted to that vexing but inexorable problem, the nature of scientific discovery. With all that has been written, by scientists themselves, by historians and philosophers and social theorists, by psycholo­ gists and psychiatrists, by logicians and novelists, the problem remains elusive. Happily we are able to bring the penetrating lectures from Erice that summer to a wider audience in this volume of theoretical investigations and detailed case studies. The ancient and lovely town of Erice in Northwest Sicily, 750 m above the sea, was famous throughout the Mediterranean for its temple of the goddess of nature, Venus Erycina, said to have been built by Daedalus. As philosophers and historians of the natural sciences, we hope that the stimulating atmo­ sphere of Erice will to some extent be transmitted by these pages. We are especially grateful to that generous and humane physician and historian of science, Dr. Vincenzo Cappelletti, himself a creative scientist, for his collaboration in bringing this work to completion. We admire his intelligent devotion to fostering creative interaction between scientists and historians of science as Director of the School of History of Science within the great Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture at Erice, as well as for his imaginative leadership of the Istituto della Encic10pedia Italiana.

Abstract: I/From Constitutive Functions to Constituted Functions -- 1. The Coordination of Pairs -- 2. From Constitutive Functions to Equivalence Classes -- 3. From Regularities to Proportionalities -- 4. An Example of Causal and Spatial Functions -- 5. From Coproperties to Covariations: The Equalization and Estimation of Inequalities -- 6. The Composition of Differences: Unequal Partitions -- 7. An Example of the Composition of the Variations of Variations -- II/The Quantification of Constituted Functions -- 8. The Functional Relation between the Increase and the Decrease of Both Sides of a Rectangle Having a Constant Perimeter — The Transformations of the Perimeter of a Square -- 9. Serial Regularities and Proportions -- 10. The Relation between the Size of a Wheel and the Distance Travelled -- 11. The Establishment of a Functional Relation among Several Variables: Distance Travelled, Wheel Size and Rotational Frequency -- 12. The Inverse Proportional Relationship between Weight W and Distance D (Arm of a Lever) in the Equilibrium of a Balance -- 13. Conclusion of Chapters 8 to 12: The General Evolution of Behaviors -- III/Theoretical Problems -- 14. Analyses to Aid in the Epistemological Study of the Notion of Function -- 15. General Conclusions.

Abstract: Years ago, prompted by Grize, Apostel and Papert, we undertook the study of functions, but until now we did not properly understand the relations between functions and operations, and their increasing interactions at the level of 'constituted functions'. By contrast, certain recent studies on 'constitutive functions', or preoperatory functional schemes, have convinced us of the existence of a sort of logic of functions (springing from the schemes of actions) which is prior to the logic of operations (drawn from the general and reversible coordinations between actions). This preoperatory 'logic' accounts for the very general, and until now unexplained, primacy of order relations between 4 and 7 years of age, which is natural since functions are ordered dependences and result from oriented 'applications'. And while this 'logic' ends up in a positive manner in formalizable structures, it has gaps or limitations. Psychologically, we are interested in understanding the system­ atic errors due to this primacy of order, such ·as the undifferentiation of 'longer' and 'farther', or the non-conservations caused by ordinal estimations (of levels, etc. ), as opposed to extensive or metric evaluations. In a sense which is psychologically very real, this preoperatory logic of constitutive functions represents only the first half of operatory logic, if this can be said, and it is reversibility which allows the construction of the other half by completing the initial one-way structures.

Abstract: I / Problems in the Methodology of Science -- Methodology and Systematic Philosophy -- Identity by Sense in Empirical Sciences -- Towards a General Semantics of Empirical Theories -- II / Identifiability Problems -- Identifiability and the Status of Theoretical Terms -- Definability and Identifiability: Certain Problems and Hypotheses -- On Identifiability in Extended Domains -- Prediction and Identifiability -- III / Foundations of Probability and Induction -- An Argument for Comparative Probability -- On the Truthlikeness of Generalizations -- A Third Dogma of Empiricism -- Causal Thinking in Judgment under Uncertainty -- IV / The Concept of Randomness -- A Survey of the Theory of Random Sequences -- Mises Redux -- V / Foundational Problems in Linguistics -- Foundations of Philosophical Pragmatics -- On Problems of Speech Act Theory -- VI / The Prospects of Transformational Grammar -- Transformations and Categories in Syntax -- Consequence of Speaking -- Formal Properties of Phonological Rules -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: 1. Action Modalities -- 1. Some Remarks on the Language L -- 2. On the Semantics of a First-Order Language -- 3. The Semantics for L -- 4. Necessity for something that an Agent does -- 5. Counteraction Conditionality -- 6. Some Defined Action Concepts -- 7. On the Logic of L -- 8. Act Relations -- 9. Act Relations and N-Equality -- 10. Consequences of Action -- 2. Intentions and Reasons -- 11. Belief -- 12. Norms and Normative Positions -- 13. Singular Norms and Intentions to do -- 14. Sets and Systems of Norms -- 15. Intentional Action -- 16. Transmission of Intention -- 17. Acting with a Further Intention -- 18. Reasons for Action and Wants -- 19. Valuations and Value Positions -- 20. Attitudes -- 3. Activities and Proceedings -- 21. Action Complexes -- 22. Structure of Activities: Two Examples -- 23. Finite Automata -- 24. Transmission of Agency -- 25. Determinism and Agency -- 26. Intervention in Norm-Governed Worlds -- 27. Grammars -- 28. Organizations -- 29. L-Grammars and L-Organizations -- 30. Role Structures -- 4. Control, Influence and Interaction -- 31. Control in Relation to an Agent -- 32. On the Power to Act -- 33. Influence and Social Power -- 34. On the Measurement of Influence -- 35. Control over an Agent -- 36. On Communication and Control -- 37. Action in Consequence Relations -- 38. Interaction -- 39. Social Groups and Social Systems -- 40. The Basis of Social Order -- 5. Social Dynamics -- 41. Information-Feedback Control: An Example -- 42. Elementary Information-Feedback Control Loops -- 43. A Dynamic System Model -- 44. Application of the Model to N-Agent Actions -- 45. Elementary Dynamics -- 46. Two-Agent Dynamic Action -- 47. Interdependent Decision -- 48. Interdependent Decision: Metagames -- 49. Metagames and Incomplete Information -- 50. Teleological Systems -- 6. Action-Explanations -- 51. Understanding and Knowledge of Facts -- 52. Understanding and Knowledge of Intentions and Actions -- 53. Meaning and Understanding -- 54. Essential Explanations -- 55. Counterfactuals and Causal Explanations -- 56. Counterfactuals and Explanation of Actions -- 57. Functional Explanation -- 58. Laws and Explanation of Actions -- 59. Free Will and the Validity of Laws -- 60. Agents.

Abstract: This book is intended as a contribution to the foundations of the sciences of man, especially the social sciences. It has been argued with increasing frequency in recent years that the vocabulary of social science is to a large extent an action vocabulary and that any attempt to systematize concepts and establish bases for understanding in the field cannot, therefore, succeed unless it is firmly built on action theory. I think that these claims are sub­ stantially correct, but at the same time it seems to me that action theory, as it is relevant to social science, still awaits vital contributions from logic and philosophy. For example, it has often been said, rightly I believe, that situa­ tions in which two or more agents interact constitute the subject-matter of social science. But have we got an action theory which is rich enough or com­ prehensive enough to allow us to characterize the interaction situation? I think not. Once we have such a theory, however, we should be able to give an accurate account of central social phenomena and to articulate our concep­ tions about the nature of social reality. The conceptual scheme advanced in this book consists, in the first instance, of solutions to a number of characterization problems, i. e. problems which may be expressed by questions of the form "What is the nature of . . .

Abstract: Introduction: Against the Elitism of Excessive Scholarship -- Notes -- One: Man as Machine -- Notes -- I. Positivism is to be rejected out of hand -- Notes -- II. Reductionism is an attractive metaphysics -- Notes -- III. Explanation is not elimination -- Notes -- IV. In praise of methodological pluralism -- V. In praise of idle speculation -- Notes -- Two: Man as Animal -- Notes -- VI. Man-as-animal is not the animal-in-man -- Notes -- VII. The philosophical weakness of neo-Darwinism -- Notes -- VIII. The subtlety of behaviorism is sham -- Notes -- IX. Behaviorism as a stern moralizing -- Notes -- X. Anti-intellectualism explained -- Notes -- Three: Man as Rational -- Notes -- XI. Greek metaphysics today -- Notes -- XII. Science and pseudo-science are entangled -- Notes -- XIII. Science is traditionally based on a myth -- Notes -- XIV. The myth that science is utterly rational -- Notes -- XV. Social science without the myth of science -- Notes -- Four: Man as Social -- Notes -- XVI. The rationality of science is partial -- Notes -- XVII. Assuming too much rationality is silly -- Notes -- XVIII. Equality is hard to define -- Notes -- XIX. Psychologism and collectivism explain away each other -- Notes -- XX. A non-reductionist demarcation between psychology and sociology -- Notes -- Five: Man in the Image of God -- Notes -- XXI. Utopias of psychologism and of collectivism are identical -- Notes -- XXII. Skepticism rehabilitated -- Notes -- XXIII. Culture is no burden -- Notes -- XXIV. An image of the democratic man -- Notes -- XXV. Towards a rational philosophical anthropology -- Notes -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The thesis of the present volume is critical and dual. (1) Present day philosophy of man and sciences of man suffer from the Greek mis­ taken polarization of everything human into nature and convention which is (allegedly) good and evil, which is (allegedly) truth and fal­ sity, which is (allegedly) rationality and irrationality, to wit, the polar­ ization of all fields of inquiry, the natural and social sciences, as well as ethics and all technology, whether natural or social, into the totally positive and the totally negative. (2) Almost all philosophy and sci­ ences of man share the erroneous work ethic which is the myth of man's evil nature - the myth of the beast in man, the doctrine of original sin. To mediate or to compromise between the first view of human nature as good with the second view of it as evil, sociologists have devised a modified utilitarianism with deferred gratification so­ called, and the theory of the evil of artificial competition (capitalist and socialist alike) and of keeping up with the Joneses. Now, the mediation is not necessary. For, the polarization makes for abstract errors which are simplistic views of rationality, such as reductionism and positivism of all sorts, as well as for concrete errors, such as the disposition to condemn repeatedly those human weaknesses which are inevitable, namely man's inability to be perfectly rational, avoid all error, etc. , thus setting man against himself as all too wicked.

Abstract: 1. Act, Content, and Object of the Presentation -- 2. Act, Content, and Object of the Judgment -- 3. Names and Presentations -- 4. The “Presented” -- 5. So-called “Objectless” Presentations -- 6. The Difference between Content and Object -- 7. Description of the Object of a Presentation -- 8. The Ambiguity of the Term ‘Characteristic’ -- 9. The Material Constituents of the Object -- 10. The Formal Constituents of the Object -- 11. The Constituents of the Content -- 12. The Relationship between the Object and the Content of a Presentation -- 13. The Characteristic -- 14. Indirect Presentations -- 15. The Objects of General Presentations.

Abstract: Twardowski's little book - of which I here offer a translation - is one of the most remarkable works in the history of modern philosophy. It is concise, clear, and - in Findlay's words - "amazingly rich in ideas. "l It is therefore a paradigm of what some contemporary philosophers approvingly call "analytic philosophy. " But Twardowski's book is also of considerable historical significance. His views reflect Brentano's ear­ lier position and thus shed some light on this stage of Brentano's philo­ sophy. Furthermore, they form a link between this stage, on the one hand, and those two grandiose attempts to propagate rationalism in an age of science, on the other hand, which are known as Meinong's theory of entities and HusserI's phenomenology. Twardowski's views thus point to the future and introduce many of the problems which, through the influence of Meinong, HusserI, Russell, and Moore, have become standard fare in contemporary philosophy. In this introduc­ tion, I shall call attention to the close connection between some of Twardowski's main ideas and the corresponding thoughts of these four philosophers. 1. IDEAS AND THEIR INTENTIONS Twardowski's main contention is clear. He claims that we must dis­ tinguish between the act, the content, and the object of a presentation. The crucial German term is 'V orstellung. ' This term has a corresponding verb and allows for such expressions as 'das V orgestellte.

Abstract: Include the Observer in the Wave Function? -- On the Possible Connections between Quantum Mechanics and Gravitation -- The Quantum Probability Calculus -- Quantum Logics and Ideal Measurements of the First Kind -- A First Lecture on Quantum Mechanics -- Essay on the Development of the Statistical Theory of the Calculus of Probability -- The Quantum Mechanical One-System Formalism, Joint Probabilities and Locality -- On Propositions and Physical Systems -- Towards a Proper Quantum Theory -- On the Intuitive Understanding of Non-Locality as Implied by Quantum Theory -- Four Ideas of David Bohm on the Relationship between Quantum Mechanics and Relativity -- The Role of Quantum Mechanics in the Set-up of a Mathematical Government among Molecular Populations -- Hidden Parameters, Hidden Probabilities -- The Recent Attempts to Verify Quantum Mechanics -- Spin Correlation Measurement in Proton-Proton Scattering and Comparison with the Theories of the Local Hidden Variables.

Abstract: The articles collected in this volume were written for a Colloquium on Fifty Years of Quantum Mechanics which was held at the University Louis Pasteur of Strasbourg on May 2-4, 1974, in commemoration of the original work by De Broglie in 1924. It is our hope that this volume will convey to the reader the idea that quantum mechanics, besides being a fundamental tool for scien­ tific workers today, is also a source of a number of questions and thoughts about the interpretation of the foundation of quantum mechanics itself. This gives rise to problems of a philosophical and logical character and has repercussions on other domains such as the theory of gravitation. Besides the papers presented at the Colloquium, an article has been included by D. Bohm and B. Hiley. This compensates, perhaps, for the article of S. Kochen, whose manuscript unfortunately did not reach us in time for inclusion in ~his volume. A few months after this Colloquium we learned of the death of Professor Jauch, who had taken a lively and crucial part in its discussions. We have been extremely saddened by the news of his death, and would like to express our long standing indebtedness to him as a physicist.

Abstract: A -- Some problems of formal methodology -- Approximate truth and truthlikeness -- A multiple sentential logic for empirical theories -- An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization -- A two-dimensional continuum of a priori probability distributions on constituents -- Inductive logic and theoretical concepts -- A pragmatic approach to the formalization of empirical theories -- Uncertainty, probability and empirical knowledge -- The concept of empirical data -- Interpretation of theoretical terms: In defence of an empiricist dogma -- Definability problems in the methodology of science -- Laws, identities and reduction -- On logical analysis of methods -- Axiomatization in expected utility theory -- A logical model for game-like situations and the transformation of game-like situations -- Indeterminate probabilities -- Theoretical laws -- Causality, ontology and subsumptive explanation -- On the introduction of intensions into set theory -- Types of information and their role in the methodology of science -- Classification and ranking models in the discrete data analysis -- What have physicists learned from experience about inductive inference? -- B (Papers presented by title) -- Verisimilitude: Popper, Miller and Hattiangadi -- On a general scheme of causal analysis -- Logic of quantum mechanics -- On possibilities and limits of the application of inductive methods -- Correspondence principle and the idealization -- Pragmatic meaning and truth -- Semantic complementarity in quantitative empirical sciences -- Marx’s concept of law of science -- The impossibility theorem for universal theory of prediction -- Scientific knowledge-formation -- The methodology of behavioral theory construction: Nomological-deductive and axiomatic aspects of formalized theory -- Intertheory relations on the formal and semantical level.

Abstract: I/Foundations of The Physical Sciences -- Genesis and Observership -- The Methodology of Physics and Topology -- Axiomatics and the Search for the Foundations of Physics -- II/The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics -- What is Philosophically Interesting about Quantum Mechanics? -- Completeness and Realism in Quantum Mechanics -- III/Foundations of biology -- The Ontological Status of Species as Evolutionary Units -- Theories and Observations of Developmental Biology -- Organic Determinism and Teleology in Biological Research -- Explicit and Implicit Semantic Content of the Genetic Information -- IV/Foundations of Psychology -- Consciousness and the Brain -- Causality and Action -- Methodological Aspects of Analysis of Activity -- V/The Status of Learning Theories -- A Survey of Contemporary Learning Theories -- Conditioning as the Perception of Causal Relations -- Leanable Functions -- VI/Foundations of The Social Sciences -- The Methodology of Social Knowledge and the Problem of the Integration of the Sciences -- VII/Justice and Social Change -- Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics -- Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: A Rejoinder to Prof. Sen -- Non Linear Social Welfare Functions: A Reply to Prof. Harsanyi -- The Measurement of Social Inequality -- VIII/Rationality in Social Sciences -- Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior -- Towards a Unified Decision Theory: A Non-Bayesian Approach -- On the Rationale of the Bayesian Approach: Comments on Prof. Watkins’s Paper -- The Dual Function of Rationality -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know weIl, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: George Lichtheim: Sketch for an Intellectual Portrait -- Marx, Marxism and Method -- Friedrich Engels — Marxism’s Founding Father: Nine Premises to a Theme -- West-European Marxism Today -- Trotsky, Marxism and the Revolution of Backwardness -- The Contexts of Maoism -- Marxism in Russia -- Marxism and Ethics — A Reconsideration -- The Concept of Totality in Lukács and Adorno -- Dialectic without Mediation. On Sartre’s Variety of Marxism and Dialectic -- PCI Strategy and the Question of Revolution in the West -- Zionist Marxism -- Marxism in the Arab World: The Cases of the Egyptian and Syrian Regimes -- Marxism in the Arab World -- Practice and Theory — Kant, Marx, Lukács -- Czechoslovak Marxism in the Reform Period -- Marxism: The Polish Experience -- The Concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production and Contemporary Marxism -- The Student Movement: Marxism as Symbolic Action -- Marxism in Latin America -- Appendix: George Lichtheim — In Memoriam.

Abstract: The essays included in this volume are based on papers delivered at the International Symposium on Varieties of Marxism, held at the Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation on June 16-19,1974, and dedicated to the memory of George Lichtheim. When the idea of such a symposium was first raised, the organizers planned to have George Lichtheim as one of the main speakers at the event. In our last and brief meeting in London, I suggested this to him and Lichtheim gave his consent to attend the symposium, though at that time no date was yet fixed. His tragic death a few months later left a gap not only in the program of the symposium but in Marxist studies generally; it was felt that per­ haps one way of paying tribute to his contribution to the study of a subject so near to his mind would be to name the symposium in his memory and devote an introductory paper to an attempt at an intel­ lectual portrait of George Lichtheim as an historian of ideas. The volume as published includes all papers delivered at the sym­ posium, with the excep,tion of the papers of J. L. Talmon (Jerusalem) on 'Marxism and Nationalism' and Gajo Petrovic (Zagreb) on 'Yugo­ slav Marxism'. Appended is also a short obituary written by me on Lichtheim for the journal Political Science published by the American Political Science Association.

Abstract: One/On The Theory Of Systems -- I. Constructional Definition -- II. The General Apparatus -- III. Extralogical Bases -- Two I On Qualities and the Concrete -- IV. Approach to the Problems -- V. The System of the ‘Aufbau’ -- VI. Foundations of a Realistic System -- VII. Concreta and Qualification -- VIII. Size and Shape -- Three/On Order, Measure, and Time -- IX. The Problem of Order -- X. Topology of Quality -- XI. Of Time and Eternity -- Index to Special Symbols.

Abstract: With this third edition of Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appear­ ance, we are pleased to make available once more one of the most in­ fluential and important works in the philosophy of our times. Professor Geoffrey Hellman's introduction gives a sustained analysis and appreciation of the major themes and the thrust of the book, as well as an account of the ways in which many of Goodman's problems and projects have been picked up and developed by others. Hellman also suggests how The Structure of Appearance introduces issues which Goodman later continues in his essays and in the Languages of Art. There remains the task of understanding Good­ man's project as a whole; to see the deep continuities of his thought, as it ranges from logic to epistemology, to science and art; to see it therefore as a complex yet coherent theory of human cognition and practice. What we can only hope to suggest, in this note, is the b. road Significance of Goodman's apparently technical work for philosophers, scientists and humanists. One may say of Nelson Goodman that his bite is worse than his bark. Behind what appears as a cool and methodical analysis of the conditions of the construction of systems, there lurks a radical and disturbing thesis: that the world is, in itself, no more one way than another, nor are we. It depends on the ways in which we take it, and on what we do.

Abstract: I. The Nature of the Axiom of Reducibility (1928) -- II. A Logical Analysis of the Concept of Probability (1930) -- III. The Concept of Identity (1936) -- IV. Moritz Schlick’s Significance for Philosophy (1936) -- V. Hypotheses (before 1936?) -- VI. Is Logic a Deductive Theory? (1938) -- VII. The Relevance of Psychology to Logic (1938) -- VIII. What is Logical Analysis? (1939) -- IX. Fiction (1950) -- X. A Note on Existence (1952) -- XI. A Remark on Experience (I950’s) -- XII. The Linguistic Technique (after 1953) -- XIII. Belief and Knowledge (1950’s) -- XIV. Two Accounts of Knowing (1950’s) -- Bibliography of Works by Friedrich Waismann -- Index of Names.

Abstract: What the Mind’s Eye Tells the Mind’s Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery -- The Association of Images -- Images, Propositions, and Knowledge -- Mental Imagery and the Problems of Cognitive Representation: A Computer Simulation Approach -- The Separation and Integration of Related Semantic Information -- Interactions Between Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence: The Role of Intuition and Non-Logical Reasoning in Intelligence -- Concerning Imagery -- Holonomy and Structure in the Organization of Perception -- On the Distinction Between the Phenomenal and the Physical Object -- Unconscious Inference and Judgment in Perception -- To Know Your Own Mind -- The Subjective, Experiential Element in Perception -- Can Psychology Do Without Private Data?.

Abstract: Despite the strictures of the extreme Behaviourists, psychologists have been taking an increasing interest in the development of theories concerning the 'mechanisms' internal to humans and animals which permit perceptual, memory, and problem solving behaviour. One consideration which has enormously stimulated an interest in theories of internal cognitive represen­ tation has been progress in the theory and the technology of computing machines, which has opened the promising prospect of computer simulation of human and animal psychological functions. What has developed is the possibility of constructing models of human psychology, realizing them in computer hardware, and testing the resultant machine performance against that of the human subject. A second consideration which helps motivate the construction of models of internal representation is the considerable advances in experimental and theoretical knowledge of the human brain understood from the neuro-anatomical view. The likely profit of adopting a narrowly Behaviourist methodology shrinks in the face of our growing, fine-grained knowledge of cerebral 'wetware'. The purpose of this volume is selectively to exhibit some of the proposals concerning theories of internal representation which have been put forward in recent years. The area of central concern is the resurgence of interest in the role of imagery in cognition which has taken place in the last fifteen years.

Abstract: One: Informative Inference -- 1 / Information -- 2 / The Paradoxes of Confirmation -- 3 / Inductivism and Probabilism -- 4 / Inductive Generalization -- Two: Scientific Method -- 5 / Simplicity -- 6 / Bayes and Popper -- 7 / The Copernican Revelation -- 8 / Explanation -- Three: Statistical Decision -- 9 / Support -- 10 / Testing -- 11 / Bayes/Orthodox Comparisons -- 12 / Cognitive Decisions -- Author Index.

Abstract: This book grew out of previously published papers of mine composed over a period of years; they have been reworked (sometimes beyond recognition) so as to form a reasonably coherent whole. Part One treats of informative inference. I argue (Chapter 2) that the traditional principle of induction in its clearest formulation (that laws are confirmed by their positive cases) is clearly false. Other formulations in terms of the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'resemblance of the future to the past' seem to me hopelessly unclear. From a Bayesian point of view, 'learning from experience' goes by conditionalization (Bayes' rule). The traditional stum­ bling block for Bayesians has been to fmd objective probability inputs to conditionalize upon. Subjective Bayesians allow any probability inputs that do not violate the usual axioms of probability. Many subjectivists grant that this liberality seems prodigal but own themselves unable to think of additional constraints that might plausibly be imposed. To be sure, if we could agree on the correct probabilistic representation of 'ignorance' (or absence of pertinent data), then all probabilities obtained by applying Bayes' rule to an 'informationless' prior would be objective. But familiar contra­ dictions, like the Bertrand paradox, are thought to vitiate all attempts to objectify 'ignorance'. BuUding on the earlier work of Sir Harold Jeffreys, E. T. Jaynes, and the more recent work ofG. E. P. Box and G. E. Tiao, I have elected to bite this bullet. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend an objectivist Bayesian approach.

Abstract: I: The Man and His Work -- 1. Life -- 2. General Introduction -- II: Philosophy of Science -- to Part II -- 3. The Idea of Equivalence -- 4. Mathematical Concepts of the Material World -- 5. The Philosophy of Nature -- 6. Science and the Modern World -- 7. The Philosophy of Time -- III: Metaphysics -- 8. Process and Reality -- 9. Prehensions and Societies -- 10. Perception and Bodily Dependency -- 11. Propositions and Judgments -- 12. Causation and Perception -- 13. Religion, Deity and the Order of Nature -- Name Index.

Abstract: A Useful Four-Valued Logic -- Ternary Simulation of Binary Gate Networks -- A Survey of the Theory of Post Algebras and Their Generalizations -- Many-Valued Algorithmic Logic as a Tool to Investigate Programs -- Local and Fuzzy Logics -- Appendix I: A Survey of Many-Valued Logic (1966–1974) -- Appendix II: List of Presentations -- Appendix III: List of Participants -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: This is a collection of invited papers from the 1975 International Sym­ posium on Multiple-valued Logic. Also included is an extensive bib­ liography of works in the field of multiple-valued logic prior to 1975 - this supplements and extends an earlier bibliography of works prior to 1965, by Nicholas Rescher in his book Many-Valued Logic, McGraw-Hill, 1969. There are a number of possible reasons for interest in the present volume. First, the range of various uses covered in this collection of papers may be taken as indicative of a breadth which occurs in the field of multiple-valued logic as a whole - the papers here can do no more than cover a small sample: question-answering systems, analysis of computer hazards, algebraic structures relating to multiple-valued logic, algebra of computer programs, fuzzy sets. Second, a large part of the interest in such uses and applications has occurred in the last twenty, even ten years. It would be too much to expect this to be reflected in Rescher's 1969 book. Third, in the 1970's a series of annual symposia have been held on multiple-valued logic, which have brought much of this into a sharp focus. * The 1971 and 1972 symposia were held at the SUNY at Buffalo, the 1973 symposium at the Uni­ versity of Toronto, and the 1974 symposium at West Virginia Uni­ versity. Papers from these symposia are included in the bibliography which may be found in an appendix of this book.

Abstract: I Basic Types of Legal Position -- 1. From Bentham to Kanger -- 2. Symbols and Logical Rules -- 3. One-Agent Types -- 4. Individualistic Two-Agent Types -- 5. Collectivistic Two-Agent Types -- II Change of Position and Ranges of Legal Action -- 6. Traditions of Legal Power and a New Departure -- 7. Symbols and Logical Rules (Continued) -- 8. The General Theory of Ranges of Legal Action -- 9. Commitment, Contract and Ranges of Legal Action -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: The present study which I have subtitled A Study in Law and Logic was prompted by the question of whether an investigation into law and legal systems could lead to the discovery of unrevealed fundamental patterns common to all such systems. This question was further stimulated by two interrelated problems. Firstly, could an inquiry be rooted in specifically legal matters, as distinct from the more usual writings on deontic logic? Secondly, could such inquiry yield a theory which would nevertheless embrace a strict and simple logical structure, permitting substantive conclusions in legal matters to be deduced from simple rules governing some basic concepts? Before the development of deontic logic, W. N. Hohfeld devoted his efforts to this question at the beginning of this century. However, with this exception, few jurists have studied the interrelation between law and logic projected in this way. Nevertheless, two great names are to be found, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Jeremy Bentham-both philo­ sophers with legal as weIl as logical training. Bentham's investigations of logical patterns in law have only recently attracted attention; and as for Leibniz, his achievements are still almost totally unexplored (his most important writings on law and logic have not even been translated from Latin). My initial interest in the question was evoked by Professor Stig Kanger. Although primarily a logician and philosopher, Stig Kanger has been interested also in the fundamentals of legal theory.

Abstract: I. Henkin Sets and the Fundamental Theorem -- II. Derivation Rules and Completeness -- III. Gentzen Systems and Constructive Completeness Proofs -- IV. Quantification Theory with Identity and Functional Constants -- V. First Order Theories with Equality -- VI. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems: Preliminary Discussion -- VII. Undecidability and Incompleteness -- VIII. Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem -- IX. Tarski’s Theorems and the Definition of Truth -- X. Some Recursive Function Theory -- XI. Intuitionistic Logic -- XII. Second Order Logic -- XIII. Algebraic Logic -- XIV. Anadic Logic -- Selected Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects -- Index of Symbols.

Abstract: This book is intended to be a survey of the most important results in mathematical logic for philosophers. It is a survey of results which have philosophical significance and it is intended to be accessible to philosophers. I have assumed the mathematical sophistication acquired· in an introductory logic course or in reading a basic logic text. In addition to proving the most philosophically significant results in mathematical logic, I have attempted to illustrate various methods of proof. For example, the completeness of quantification theory is proved both constructively and non-constructively and relative ad­ vantages of each type of proof are discussed. Similarly, constructive and non-constructive versions of Godel's first incompleteness theorem are given. I hope that the reader· will develop facility with the methods of proof and also be caused by reflect on their differences. I assume familiarity with quantification theory both in under­ standing the notations and in finding object language proofs. Strictly speaking the presentation is self-contained, but it would be very difficult for someone without background in the subject to follow the material from the beginning. This is necessary if the notes are to be accessible to readers who have had diverse backgrounds at a more elementary level. However, to make them accessible to readers with no background would require writing yet another introductory logic text. Numerous exercises have been included and many of these are integral parts of the proofs.

Abstract: I Transformations of Concepts -- I. Types of Knowing -- II. Echoing the Classical Distinctions -- III. Craftsmanship as Knowledge -- IV. Reason and Its Realization -- V. Theory, Praxis, and Speculation -- VI. History Replacing Speculation -- VII. Systems of Thought and Their Consequences -- Two Understanding and Activity -- VIII. Residues and Seeds -- IX. The Ways of the Understanding -- X. Discernment -- XI. Underivable Contents -- XII. Events and Acts -- XIII. Non-Preferential Primacy -- XIV. The Ethical Deed -- XV. The Technical Act and Technology -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: I. On the Origin and Significance of the Axioms of Geometry -- Notes [M.S.] -- II. On the Facts Underlying Geometry -- Notes [P.H.] -- III. Numbering and Measuring from an Epistemological Viewpoint -- Notes [P.H.] -- IV. The Facts in Perception -- Appendix 1 -- Appendix 2 -- Appendix 3 -- Notes [M.S.] -- A. Works by Helmholtz -- B. Biographical Materials -- C. Works on Helmholtz -- D. Index to Cited Works (with English translation where known) -- Index of Names.

Abstract: [1977] Hermann von Helmholtz in the History of Scientific Method In 1921, the centenary of Helmholtz' birth, Paul Hertz, a physicist, and Moritz Schlick, a philosopher, published a selection of his papers and lectures on the philosophical foundations of the sciences, under the title Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie. Combining qualities of respect and criticism that Helmholtz would have demanded, Hertz and Schlick scrupulously annotated the texts. Their edition of Helmholtz was of historical influence, comparable to the influence among contemporary mathematicians and philosophers of Hermann Weyl's annotated edition in 1919 of Riemann's great dissertation of 1854 on the foundations of geometry. For several reasons, we are pleased to be able to bring this Schlick/ Hertz edition to the English-reading world: first, and primary, to honor the memory of Hermann von Helmholtz; second, as writings of historical value, to deepen the understanding of mathematics and the natural sciences, as well as of psychology and philosophy, in the 19th centur- for Helmholtz must be comprehended within at least that wide a range; third, with Schlick, to understand the developing empiricist philosophy of science in the early 20th century; and fourth, to bring the contributions of Schlick, Hertz, and Helmholtz to methodological debate in our own time, a half century later, long after the rise and consolidation of logical empiricism, the explosion of physics since Planck and Einstein, and the development of psychology since Freud and Pavlov.

Abstract: 0. Introduction -- 0.1. Logic and Probability -- 0.2. Judgment -- 0.3. Belief and Action -- 0.4. Belief, Judgment and Logic -- 0.5. A Relative View of Belief and Judgment -- I. The Natures of Judgment and Belief -- 1.1. Remarks on the Theory of Judgment -- 1.2. Mentalistic Views of Belief -- 1.3. Mentalistic Views; Distinct Acts of the Mind are Possible -- 1.4. Behavioristic Views. Pragmatism -- 1.5. Other Behavioristic Views -- Notes -- II. Partial Belief -- II.1. Mentalistic Partial Belief -- II.2. The Relation of Belief and Desire -- II.3. Difficulties with this Account -- Notes -- III. Logic And Probability -- III.1. Logic -- III.2. The Probability of Sentences -- III.3. Transparency -- Notes -- IV. Coherence and the Sum Condition -- IV.1. The Concept of Coherence -- IV.2. The Sum Condition Entails the Laws of Probability -- IV.3. Probability Entails the Sum Condition -- Notes -- V. Probability and Infinity -- V.1. Subjectivism and Infinity -- V.2. Extensions of Probabilities -- V.3. Independence -- V.4. Conditional Probability -- V.5. Transparency and Monotonicity -- V.6. Systems with Finite Bases; Indifference -- V.7. Probability and Quantifiers -- Notes -- VI. Infinity and the Sum Condition -- VI.1. Generalization of the Sum Condition -- VI.2. Probability Entails the Generalized Sum Conditions -- VI.3. The Generalized Sum Condition Entails the Laws of Probability -- Appendix on Set Theory and Boolean Algebras -- Appendix on Measure Theory -- Index of Names and Subjects.

Abstract: 1. A WORD ABOUT PRESUPPOSITIONS This book is addressed to philosophers, and not necessarily to those philosophers whose interests and competence are largely mathematical or logical in the formal sense. It deals for the most part with problems in the theory of partial judgment. These problems are naturally formulated in numerical and logical terms, and it is often not easy to formulate them precisely otherwise. Indeed, the involvement of arithmetical and logical concepts seems essential to the philosophies of mind and action at just the point where they become concerned with partial judgment and" belief. I have tried throughout to use no mathematics that is not quite elementary, for the most part no more than ordinary arithmetic and algebra. There is some rudimentary and philosophically important employment of limits, but no use is made of integrals or differentials. Mathematical induction is rarely and inessentially employed in the text, but is more frequent and important in the apP'endix on set theory and Boolean algebra. • As far as logic is concerned, the book assumes a fair acquaintance with predicate logic and its techniques. The concepts of compactness and maximal consistency turn out to have important employment, which I have tried to keep self-contained, so that extensive knowledge of meta­ logical topics is not assumed. In a word, the book presupposes no more logical facility than is customary among working philosophers and graduate students, though it may call for unaccustomed vigor in its application.

Abstract: I The Problem Of Evil -- 1: Stating the Problem of Evil -- 2: The Irrelevance of the Amount of Evil -- 3: The Standard by which Divine Acts are Appraised -- 4: Suffering as Punishment -- 5: The Question of an Afterlife -- 6: The ‘Soul Making’ Theodicy -- 7: The Question of Moral Evil -- 8: The Justification for Creating Opportunities for Virtuous Response -- 9: A New Solution -- 10: The Removal of Objections to the Last Solution -- II Free Will, Men and Machines -- 11: A Conflict Between Religion and Science -- 12: Newcomb’s Problem of Choice -- 13: The Unpredictability of Some Human Choices -- 14: Some Queries Concerning the Absolute Incompetence of Predictors -- 15: The Predictor as a Diagnostician -- 16: ?-Machines and ?-Machines -- 17: ?-Machines and ?-Machines -- III The Confirmation of Theism -- 18: Pascal’s Wager -- 19: Theism and the Verification Principle -- 20: The Vindication of the Verification Principle -- 21: The Principles Underlying Scientific Method -- 22: Miracles -- 23: The Evidence for Theism -- 24: Theism and Scientific Method.

Abstract: I With the immense success of modem science it has generally become accepted that the only way to acquire knowledge is by the use of the method uniformly practiced by working scientists. Consequently, the credibility of the claims of religion, which seem to be based on belief in revelation, tradition, authority and the like, have been considerably shaken. In the face of the serious threat provided by the ascendancy of modem scientific method­ ology, religious thinkers have adopted various defensive attitudes. Some have retreated into an extreme position where Theism is completely safe from any attack on it by the use of empirical methods of inquiry, maintaining that contrary to appearances, religion makes no factual claims whatsoever. To be religious, they say, is to subscribe to a certain value system; it is to adopt a set of practices and a given attitude to the meaning and purpose of life without making any assertions about this or that empirical feature of the universe. Others wishing to remain more faithful to what religion traditionally meant throughout the ages, agree that Theism does make factual claims but that these are so radically different from the kind of claims made by science that it is only right that they should be established by a separate method on its own. In matters of faith reliance on widely entrenched tradition and sacred authority is not objectionable according to some.

Abstract: 1. Correspondence Principle -- 1.1. Bohr’s Principle -- 1.2. The Attitude of Philosophers -- 1.3. A General Methodological Principle in Physics -- 1.4. Descriptive and Normative Versions -- 1.5. Some Logical Difficulties -- Notes to Chapter 1 -- 2. Idealization and Factualization -- 2.1. Scientific Law an an Implication -- 2.2. Factual and Idealizational Laws -- 2.3. Idealization in Science -- 2.4. The Attitude of Philosophers -- 2.5. Idealization and Factualization -- 2.6. Idealization and Essence -- 2.7. Some Controversial Issues -- Notes to Chapter 2 -- 3. Reduction -- 3.1. The Concept of Reduction -- 3.2. Heterogeneous Reduction -- 3.3. Non-Mechanistic Reductionism -- 3.4. Trivial Homogeneous Reduction -- 3.5. Non-Trivial Homogeneous Reduction -- 3.6. Reduction of an Idealizational Law to a Factual One -- Notes to Chapter 3 -- 4. Correspondence Relation -- 4.1. Definition -- 4.2. Simple Implicative Version -- 4.3. Approximative Version -- 4.4. Explanative Version -- 4.5. ‘Dialectical’ Version -- 4.6. Renewed Implicative Version -- 4.7. Some Formal Features -- 4.8. Correspondence Sequence and Correspondence Network -- Notes to Chapter 4 -- 5. The Problem of the Incommensurability and Relations Among Theories -- 5.1. The Claim of Incommensurability -- 5.2. The Problem of Meaning Variance -- 5.3. The Problem of ‘Untranslatable’ Languages -- 5.4. The Problem of the ‘Theory-Ladenness’ of Facts -- 5.5. Various Relations Among Theories -- Notes to Chapter 5 -- 6. The Types of Methodological Empiricism -- 6.1. Inductivism -- 6.2. Hypothetism -- 6.3. Pluralistic Hypothetism -- 6.4. Idealizational Hypothetism -- 6.5. Pluralistic Idealizational Hypothetism -- 6.6. A Confrontation: the Diversity of Methods -- Notes to Chapter 6 -- 7. Revolutions and Continuity -- 7.1. Simple Cumulativism (No Revolutions or One Revolution) -- 7.2. Simple Anticumulativism (Permanent Revolution or Occasional Revolutions Without Continuity) -- 7.3. A Dialectical View (Revolutions and Continuity) -- 7.4. The Threshold of Maturity (Two Kinds of Revolutions) -- 7.5. Periods of Evolution and of Revolution -- 7.6. The Concept of Revolution and Anti-Cumulative Changes -- Notes to Chapter 7 -- 8. Relative and Absolute Truth -- 8.1. Relative Truth -- 8.2. Absolute Truths in Science -- 8.3. Truth-Content and Approximate Truth -- 8.4. The Truth of Idealizational Laws and of Their Factualizations -- 8.5. Relative Truth and Essence -- 8.6. Towards the Absolute Truth -- Notes to Chapter 8 -- 9. Internal and External History of Science -- 9.1. Internal and External Factors -- 9.2. The Problem of the Methodological Historicism -- 9.3. Internal History as an Idealization -- Notes to Chapter 9 -- Index of Names.

Abstract: This book is devoted to the problems of the growth of science. These prob­ lems, neglected for a long time by the philosophers of science, have become in the 60's and 70's a subject of vivid discussion. There are philosophers who stress only the dependence of science upon various sociological, psycho­ logical and other factors and deny any internal laws of the development of knowledge, like approaching the truth. The majority rejects such nihilism and searches for the laws of the growth of science. However, they often overlook the role of the Correspondence Principle which connects the suc­ cessive scientific theories. On the other hand, some authors, while stressing the role of this principle, overlook logical difficulties connected with it, e. g. the problem of the incompatibility of successive theories, of the falsity of some of their assumptions, etc. I believe the Correspondence Principle to be a basic principle of the pro­ gress of contemporary physics and, probably, of every advanced science. How­ ever, this principle must be properly interpreted and the above-mentioned logical difficulties must be solved. Their solution requires, as it seems, revealing the idealizational nature of the basic laws of science, in any case of the quantitative laws of advanced sciences. This point has been recently emphasized by some Polish philosophers, especially in Poznan.

Abstract: I / History of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science -- The Sources of Modern Methodology -- Difficulties in the Historiography of Science -- Logical, Ontological and Methodological Aspects of Scientific Revolutions -- The Origins of Traditional Grammar -- Galileo and the Justification of Experiments -- Leibnizian Space-Times and Leibnizian Algebras -- Changing Concepts of the a Priori -- Competing and Complementary Patterns of Explanation in Social Science -- Subjectivity, Objectivity and Ontological Commitment in the Empirical Sciences -- Genealogy of Science and Theory of Knowledge -- II / Historical Perspectives on the Concept of Matter -- Evolution of the Concept of Matter in Science and Philosophy -- Material Causality -- III / Theory Change -- Describing Revolutionary Scientific Change: a Formal Approach -- Accidental (‘Non-Substantial’) Theory Change and Theory Dislodgment -- Theory-Change as Structure-Change: Comments on the Sneed Formalism -- IV / Programme of the 5th Congress (Appendix) -- Programme of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science -- Index of Names.

Abstract: The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre­ sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun­ dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol­ ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Abstract: I Theories of Action -- 1. Prichard’s Theory of Voluntary Activity -- 2. Prichard, Davidson, and the Notion of Agency -- 3. Objections and Qualifications -- 4. Secondary Uses of Action Language -- 5. Three Theories of Action -- 6. The Metaphysics or Ontology of Action -- 7. Concluding Remarks -- II The Springs of Action -- 1. Preliminary Remarks on Volition -- 2. Intentions and Other Pro Attitudes -- 3. Intention, Belief, and Action -- 4. A Conception of Volition -- 5. Reasons and Purposive Explanations -- 6. Voluntary and Intentional Action -- 7. Concluding Remarks -- III Deliberation -- 1. Aristotle on Deliberation -- 2. Decision and Choice -- 3. Deliberation and Ends -- 4. The Question of Validity -- 5. Deliberation and Choice -- 6. Bayesian Deliberation -- 7. Concluding Remarks -- IV The Logic of Practical Reasoning -- 1. Sellars’s Theory of Practical Inference -- 2. Binkley’s Theory of Practical Reasoning -- 3. Castañeda’s General Theory of the Language of Action -- 4. Normative Statements and Practical Reasoning -- 5. Concluding Remarks.

Abstract: Philosophers writing on the subject of human action have found it tempting to introduce their subject by raising Wittgenstein's question, 'What is left over if you subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?' The presumption is that something of particular interest is involved in an action of raising an arm that is not present in a mere bodily movement, and the philosopher's task is to specify just what this is. Unfortunately, such an approach does not take us very far, since a person could properly be said to raise his (or her) arm while asleep or hypnotized even though he (or she) would not be performing an action in the sense of 'action' with which philosophers are particularly concerned. To avoid this kind of difficulty I shall approach the subject of human action is a more academic way: I shall expound some important rival theories of human action, and introduce the relevant issues by commenting critically on those theories. One of the issues I eventually introduce is a metaphysical one. A theory of action makes sense, I contend, only on the assumption that there are such 'things' as actions (or events). After considering some key arguments bearing on the issue I conclude that, as matters currently stand in philosophy, a metaphysically noncommittal attitude toward actions and events seems justified.

Abstract: I. Cosmology: Myth or Science? -- II. Elementary Particles, Universes, and Singularity Surfaces -- III. General Relativity and our View of the Physical Universe -- IV. Quantum Relativity and the Cosmic Observer -- V. The Expansion of the Universe in the Frame of Conventional General Relativity -- VI. Models, Laws, and the Universe -- VII. Cosmology and Theology -- VIII. An Observational View of the Cosmos -- IX. The Generation of Matter and the Conservation of Energy -- X. On a Chaotic Early Universe -- XI. Cosmological Implications of Non-Velocity Redshifts—A Tired—Light Mechanism -- XII. The Role of Time in Cosmology -- XIII. On Some Cosmological Theories and Constants -- XIV. John Wyclyf on Time -- XV. The English Background to the Cosmology of Wright and Herschel -- XVI. The History of Science and the Idea of an Oscillating Universe -- XVII. Heaven and Earth-The Relation of the Nebular Hypothesis to Geology -- XVIII. Laplace as a Cosmologist -- XIX. Cosmology in the Wake of Tycho Brahe’s Astronomy -- XX. Chronology and the Age of the World -- XXI. Cosmic Order and Human Disorder -- XXII. Basic Christian Assumptions about the Cosmos -- XXIII. Cosmos and Creation -- XXIV. Creation and Redemption -- Index of Proper Names.

Abstract: It is difficult to doubt that we suffer at present from the manifold aspects of an economic crisis which affects all walks of life. Well, men in almost every epoch in history have maintained that they were going through a crisis which was sup­ posed to be always more grave than any preceding critical phase. Very often those crises were not of an economic nature, but concerned either health, the political structure, the opportunity of acquiring knowledge, and so on. I think that we would consider today that some of those claims that were made in various historical epochs were often exaggerated if viewed from a historical point of view. However, it seems undeniable that we at present are in the middle of a universal economic crisis which has affected almost every facet of our daily life. And yet, the fact that despite these adverse conditions it is still possible to gather scholars from all corners of the world to deal with often sheer theo­ retical and sometimes abstract pursuits is a refutation of any facile pessimism­ it is reassuring to all who wonder where political and social events are taking us. Our salvation may well come from those acts of the mind so character­ istic of the pure scientist and scholar.

Abstract: I. Philosophy of Human Communication -- 1. Communication as Problematic -- 2. Philosophic Method and Communication -- 3. Speech Act Propositions -- II. Speech Act Structures -- 1. Constatives -- 2. Performatives -- 3. Rules and Conventions -- 4. Locutionary Acts -- III. Speech Act Contents -- 1. Meaning -- 2. Illocutionary Acts -- IV. Speech Act Communication -- 1. Perlocutionary Acts -- 2. Speech as Communication -- V. Existential Speech and the Phenomenology of Communication -- 1. Existential Phenomenology -- 2. Encountering Phenomenological Existence -- 3. The Dialectic Critique -- 1. Books -- 2. Essays and Articles -- 3. Unpublished Materials.

Abstract: The nature and function of language as Man's chief vehicle of communi­ cation occupies a focal position in the human sciences, particularly in philosophy. The concept of 'communication' is problematic because it suggests both 'meaning' (the nature of language) and the activity of speaking (the function of language). The philosophic theory of 'speech acts' is one attempt to clarify the ambiguities of 'speech' as both the use of language to describe states of affair and the process in which that description is generated as 'communication'. The present study, Speech Act Phenomenology, is in part an exam­ ination of speech act theory. The theory offers an explanation for speech performance, that is, the structure of speech acts as 'relationships' and the content of speech acts as 'meaning'. The primary statement of the speech act theory that is examined is that presented by Austin. A seconda­ ry concern is the formulation of the theory as presented by Searle and Grice. The limitations of the speech act theory are specified by applying the theory as an explanation of 'human communication'. This conceptual examination of 'communication' suggests that the philosophic method of 'analysis' does not resolve the antinomy of language 'nature' and 'function'. Basically, the conceptual distinctions of the speech act theory (i. e. locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions) are found to be empty as a comprehensive explanation of the concept 'communication'.

Abstract: John Dewey ranks as the most influential of America's philosophers. That in­ fluence stems, in part, from the originality of his mind, the breadth of his in­ terests, and his capacity to synthesize materials from diverse sources. In addi­ tion, Dewey was blessed with a long life and the extraordinary energy to express his views in more than 50 books, approximately 750 articles, and at least 200 contributions to encyclopedias. He has made enduring intellectual contributions in all of the traditional fields of philosophy, ranging from studies primarily of interest for philosophers in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics to books and articles of wider appeal in ethics, political philosophy, religion, aesthetics, and education. Given the extent of Dewey's own writings and the many books and articles on his views by critics and defenders, it may be asked why there is a need for any further examination of his philosophy. The need arises because the lapse of time since his death in 1952 now permits a new generation of scholars to approach his work in a different spirit. Dewey is no longer a living partisan of causes, sparking controversy over the issues of the day. He is no longer the advocate of a new point of view which calls into question the basic assump­ tions of rival philosophical schools and receives an almost predictable criticism from their entrenched positions. His works have now become classics.

Abstract: One: Knowledge, Science and Philosophical Theory -- Two: The Ousiology -- Three: Ontology (Ousiology) and Theology.

Abstract: Philosophy finds itself "between tradition and another beginning." 1 For this reason it seems necessary to reconsider the foundations of traditional philosophy in the hope that out of these considerations new questions may arise which may lead to a new philosophical foundation. To this end neither the large manual nor the monograph is well suited. What is required, instead, is to take a few steps which lead our thoughts directly into the problems of a given, traditional, philosophical foun­ dation. In this sense the present work wishes to provide an "introduction" into that philosophical foundation which, until Hegel, had a decisive influence upon traditional philosophy_ Consequently, it does not see its task in providing a survey of this whole complex of problems. Nor does it offer solutions to questions about difficult passages which have been the subject of two thousand years of Aristotelian scholarship_ Instead, it follows a definite path which might bring this Aristotelian science, the theory which seeks to determine being as being, on hei on, closer to the student of philosophy.