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  • Online Resource  (4)
  • 1980-1984  (1)
  • 1975-1979  (3)
  • Tuomela, Raimo  (4)
  • Philosophy (General)  (4)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789400963177
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (548p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 171
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Social sciences Philosophy ; Philosophy and social sciences.
    Abstract: 1: Philosophy and the Theory of Social Action -- I Scientific Realism and the Social Sciences -- II Theorizing about Social Action -- 2: Individualism and Concept Formation in the Social Sciences -- I Holistic Social Concepts -- II Conceptual Individualism -- III We-Intentions and Social Motivation -- 3: Theories of Action -- I Views of Human Action -- II Mental Cause Theory -- III Agency Theory -- IV Hermeneutic Theory -- V Arguments for and against Causal Theories of Action -- 4: The Purposive-Causal Theory of Human Action -- I The Fundamental Elements of the Purposive-Causal Theory of Action -- II The Structure of Single-Agent Action -- 5: The Structure of Social Action -- I The General Nature of Social Action -- II Simple Social Actions -- III Complex Social Actions -- IV The Acting of Social Collectives -- V Group Interests Revisited -- 6: Action Generation -- I Action Generation and the By-Relation -- II Action Generation and the Theory of Automata -- III Social Actions, Grammars, and Social Conduct Plans -- 7: Practical Inference and Social Action -- I Loop Beliefs and Practical Inference -- II Mutual Beliefs -- III The Replicative Justification of Social Beliefs -- IV Social Action and Practical Inference -- V Mixed Interest Games and Practical Inference -- VI Social Rules and the Scope of Social Action -- 8: Norms, Rules, and Social Structures -- I Social Norms -- II Social Rules -- III Similarity and Roles -- IV Social Structures -- 9: Social Interaction and Control -- I Acting in Social Relation -- II Overt Social Interaction -- III Covert Social Interaction -- 10: A Pragmatic Theory of Explanation -- I Explaining as Communicative Action -- II Emphasis -- III Understanding and Presuppositions -- 11: Proximate Explanation of Social Action -- I Explanation and Social Action -- II Teleological Explanation -- III Purposive-Causal Explanation -- IV Reason-Explanation -- V Explaining the Style of Action -- VI Understanding Action -- 12: Dynamic Explanation of Social Action -- I Explanation and Other-Regarding Utilities -- II Expected Utilities, Motives, and the Explanation of Social Action -- III The Nature of Dynamic Action Explanations -- 13: Functional and Invisible Hand Explanation of Social Action -- I Action-Functions and Functional Explanations -- II Invisible Hand Explanations of Social Action -- 14: Explanatory Individualism and Explanation of Social Laws -- I Explanatory Individualism -- II Explanation of Social Laws -- Notes -- Name index -- Index of Symbols, Definitions, and Theses.
    Abstract: It is somewhat surprising to find out how little serious theorizing there is in philosophy (and in social psychology as well as sociology) on the nature of social actions or joint act. hons in the sense of actions performed together by several agents. Actions performed by single agents have been extensively discussed both in philosophy and in psycho~ogy. There is, ac­ cordingly, a booming field called action theory in philosophy but it has so far strongly concentrated on actions performed by single agents only. We of course should not forget game theory, a discipline that systematically studies the strategic interac­ tion between several rational agents. Yet this important theory, besides being restricted to strongly rational acting, fails to study properly several central problems related to the concep­ tual nature of social action. Thus, it does not adequately clarify and classify the various types of joint action (except perhaps from the point of view of the agents' utilities). This book presents a systematic theory of social action. Because of its reliance on so-called purposive causation and generation it is called the purposive-causal theory. This work also discusses several problems related to the topic of social action, for instance that of how to create from this perspective the most central concepts needed by social psychology and soci­ ology. While quite a lot of ground is covered in the book, many important questions have been left unanswered and many others unasked as well.
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht : Springer
    ISBN: 9789401712828
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (X, 458 p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 113
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 113
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Science Philosophy ; Science—Philosophy.
    Abstract: Dispositions and Definitions -- Counterfactuals and Dispositions -- Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic -- In Defense of Dispositions -- Dispositions Revisited -- Dispositions, Grounds, and Causes -- Some Ways of Operationally Introducing Dispositional Predicates with Regard to Scientific and Ordinary Practice -- Dispositional Explanation -- Universals and Dispositions -- Disposition -- A World of Dispositions -- Capacities and Natures -- Powers -- Notes on the Doctrine of Chances -- The Propensity Interpretation of Probability -- Dispositional Probabilities -- Propensities and Probabilities -- Subjunctives, Dispositions, and Chances -- Dispositions and Occurrences -- Dispositions, Occurrences, and Ontology -- Belief and Disposition -- Beliefs as States -- Dispositions, Realism, and Explanation -- Index of Names.
    Abstract: This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis­ positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. I have tried to make the collection as representative as possible, except that problems specifically connected with dispositions in various special sciences are relatively little discussed. Most of these articles have been previously published. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time, and are simultaneously published in Synthese 34, No. 4, which is a special issue on dispositions. Of the previously published material it should be emphasized that the papers by Hempel and Fisk have been extensively revised specially for this anthology. The papers are grouped in four sections, partlyon the basis of their content. However, due to the complexity of the issues involved, there is considerable overlap in content between the different sections, especially between Sections land 11. I wish to thank Professors James Fetzer and Carl G. Hempel for helpful advicc in compiling this anthology.
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  • 3
    ISBN: 9789401012423
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (438p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 116
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 116
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Science Philosophy ; Science—Philosophy.
    Abstract: 1 Scientific Realism and Psychology -- Notes -- 2 Human Action -- 1. Actions as Achievements -- 2. Actions and Events -- 3. Actions and Action Statements -- Notes -- 3 Mental Episodes -- 1. The Stream of Consciousness and the Myth of the Given -- 2. Sellars’ Analogy Account of Mental Episodes -- 3. Analogy and the Language of Thought -- 4. Rules of Language -- 5. Conceptuality and Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 4 Concept Formation in Psychology -- 1. Psychological Concepts as Theoretico- Reportive Concepts -- 2. Conceptual Functionalism and Postulational Concept Formation -- 3. Theoretical Analyticity and Mental Episodes -- 4. The Indispensability of Mental Episodes -- Notes -- 5 Psychological Dispositions -- 1. A Realist Account of Dispositions -- 2. Propositional Attitudes as Dispositions -- Notes -- 6 Wanting, Intending, and Willing -- 1. Wanting and Intending -- 2. Trying -- 3. A Formalization of First-Order and Second-Order Propositional Attitudes -- Notes -- 7 Conduct Plan and Practical Syllogism -- 1. Conduct Plan -- 2. Practical Syllogism -- 3. Practical Syllogism as a Schema for Understanding Behavior -- 4. Extended Uses of Practical Syllogism -- Notes -- 8 Explanation of Human Action -- 1. Action-Explanations -- 2. Causality and Intentional-Teleological Explanation of Action -- Notes -- 9 Deductive Explanation and Purposive Causation -- 1. Deductive Explanation -- 2. Purposive Causation -- 3. Action-Explanations Reconsidered -- Notes -- 10 Basic Concepts of Action Theory -- 1. Basic Actions and Action Tokens -- 2. Complex Actions -- 3. Intentionality -- Notes -- 11 Propensities and Inductive Explanation -- 1. Propensities -- 2. Screening Off and Supersessance as Explanatory Notions -- 3. Explanatory Ambiguity and Maximal Specificity -- 4. An Analysis of Inductive Explanation -- Notes -- 12 Probabilistic Causation and Human Action -- 1. Probabilistic Causes -- 2. Actions, Propensities, and Inductive- Probabilistic Explanation -- Notes -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.
    Abstract: This book presents a unified and systematic philosophical account of human actions and their explanation, and it does it in the spirit of scientific realism. In addition, various other related topics, such as psychological concept formation and the nature of mental events and states, are dis­ cussed. This is due to the fact that the key problems in the philosophy of psychology are interconnected to a high degree. This interwovenness has affected the discussion of these problems in that often the same topic is discussed in several contexts in the book. I hope the reader does not find this too frustrating. The theory of action developed in this book, especially in its latter half, is a causalist one. In a sense it can be regarded as an explication and refin~ment of a typical common sense view of actions and the mental episodes causally responsible for them. It has, of course, not been possible to discuss all the relevant philosophical problems in great detail, even if I have regarded it as necessary to give a brief treatment of relatively many problems. Rather, I have concentrated on some key issues and hope that future research will help to clarify the rest.
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  • 4
    ISBN: 9789401018234
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (460p) , digital
    Edition: Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Monographs on Epistemology Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences 72
    Series Statement: Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 72
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Philosophy (General) ; Social sciences Philosophy ; Philosophy and social sciences.
    Abstract: I/Approaches to Teleology, Intentionality, and Historical Understanding -- Causal and Historical Explanation -- Against Reductionism and Purism : Tertium Datur -- Is Transcendental Hermeneutics Possible? -- The Intentions of Intentionality -- Comments on Professor Hintikka’s Paper -- Reply to J. N. Findlay -- II/Causality and Intervention -- Causality and Action -- Causality and History -- An Analysis of Causality -- Explanation and Understanding of Human Behavior -- III/Human Action and its Explanation -- Human Abilities and Dynamic Modalities -- On Deciding -- Intention and Practical Inference -- The Causal Theory of Action -- Explanation and Understanding in History -- Inductive Explanation, Propensity, and Action -- IV/Replies to Commentators. Second thoughts on Explanation and Understanding -- Replies -- Determinism and the Study of Man -- Index of Names.
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