Abstract: 1. The Model Muddle: Proposals for an Immodest Realism (1966) -- 2. Reduction, Explanation and Ontology (1962) -- 3. Models, Metaphysics and the Vagaries of Empiricism (1965) -- 4. Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science (1965) -- 5. Matter, Action and Interaction (1973) -- 6. Towards a Critical Materialism (1971) -- 7. The Relation Between Philosophy of Science and History of Science (1977) -- 8. Telos and Technique: Models as Modes of Action (1968) -- 9. From Praxis to Logos: Genetic Epistemology and Physics (1971) -- 10. Pictures, Representation, and the Understanding (1972) -- 11. Perception, Representation, and the Forms of Action: Towards an Historical Epistemology (1973) -- 12. Rules and Representation: The Virtues of Constancy and Fidelity Put in Perspective (1978) -- 13. Action and Passion: Spinoza’s Construction of a Scientific Psychology (1973) -- 14. Nature, Number and Individuals: Motive and Method in Spinoza’s Philosophy (1978) -- 15. Hume’s Concept of Identity and the Principium Individuationis (1961) -- 16. Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism (1953) -- 17. Art and Technology: Conflicting Models of Education? The Uses of a Cultural Myth (1973) -- 18. Art as Humanizing Praxis (1976) -- Name Index.

Abstract: Marx Wartofsky has been working for many years within an unusual confluence of philosophical problems. He brings to these intersecting problems his comprehensive intelligence, at once imaginative and rigorous, analytic and historical. He is a philosopher's philosopher, but also Everyman's. Wartofsky is philosopher of the natural and the social sciences, of perception, esthetics and the creative arts, of the 18th century French and the 19th century Germans, of politics and morality, ofthe methods and morals of medicine, and it is plain, of all human existence. To a colleague, he seems Jack-of-all-philosophical-trades, and master of them too. The reader soon will learn that Wartofsky is a genial, lucid and relaxed philosophical companion, deeply serious but without noticeable anxiety. I need not highlight these selected epistemological papers gathered as, and about, Models, since Wartofsky's own introductory remarks are helpful and stimulating in that respect. I need only, after 21 years of friendship and collaboration with him, warn the reader to beware of how profound and provocative these papers will show themselves to be beneath their good-humored and swiftly-flowing surface. And I must publicly note the pleasure with which I welcome Marx Wartofsky's volume to our Boston Studies. Boston University R.S.C. Center for the Philosophy and History of Science September 1979 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE VII xi AC K NOWLEDGEMENTS xiii INTRODUCTION The Model Muddle: Proposals for an Immodest Realism 1.

Abstract: The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes. Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as "Typescript C") on which Husserl wrote in 1933: "Cartes. Meditationen / Originaltext 1929 / E. Husserl / für Dorion Cairns". Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserl’s practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a foornote. The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the other - usually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote

Abstract: 1. The development of modem psychology, Dilthey’s decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology) -- 2. The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his beginning -- 3. Task and significance of the Logical Investigations -- a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths -- b) Researching the correlation: ideal object — psychic lived experiencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description in the reflective attitude -- c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection) -- d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic -- e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for the theory of knowledge -- f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the Logical Investigations. Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental phenomenology — the science of transcendental subjectivity -- 4. Summarizing characterization of the new psychology -- Systematic Part -- 5. Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Questioning the concepts, nature and mind -- 6. Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience) -- 7. Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons -- 8. The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science -- 9. Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori -- a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the factual by fantasy — the eidos as the invariable -- b) Variation and alteration -- c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping what agrees as the eidos -- d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation -- e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the highest genera by variation of ideas — seeing of ideas without starting from experience -- f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences -- 10. The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instruments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world (“natural concept of the world”). Possibility of an articulation of the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind -- 11. Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world. Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian concept of experience. Space and time as the most universal structures of the world -- 12. Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity -- 13. Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality -- 14. Order of realities in the world -- 15. Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-à-vis the psyche -- 16. The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object, which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject -- 17. Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real properties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses -- 18. Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of the natural scientist -- 19. The true world in itself a necessary presumption -- 20. Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy and abnormalcy -- 21. Hierarchical structure of the psychic -- 22. Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal determinations -- 23. Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving -- 24. The unity of the psychic -- 25. The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the naturalistic prejudice -- 26. The subjective in the world as objective theme -- 27. The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the world -- 28. Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective. The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude -- 29. Perceptual field — perceptual space -- 30. Spatial primal presence -- 31. Hyle — hyletic data as matter for intentional functions -- 32. Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object -- 33. Objective temporality and temporality of the stream -- 34. Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in perception. The object as irreal pole -- 35. Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the empty horizon -- 36. The intentional object of perception -- 37. The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the immanent -- 38. The access to pure subjectivity from external perception -- 39. Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself -- 40. The problem of temporality: presenting — retention and protention (positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their significance for practical life) -- 41. Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole. The I as pole of activities and habitualities -- 42. The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others. Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions -- 43. The unity of the subject as monad — static and genetic investigation of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of monads -- 44. Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the corresponding sciences -- 45. Retrospective sense-investigation -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno­ logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A.

Abstract: The Author’s Abstracts 1900/01 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511–12 -- Author’s Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260–63 -- A Draft of a “Preface” to the Logical Investigations, 1913 -- I. Eugen Fink’s Editorial Remarks -- II. Husserl’s Text.

Abstract: TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III.

Abstract: Empiricism at Bay?: Revisions and a New Defense -- Empiricism at Sea -- What Duhem Really Meant -- Genius in Science -- Regularity and Law -- Teleological and Teleonomic, a New Analysis -- Forces, Powers, Aethers, and Fields -- Natural Science and the Future of Metaphysics -- Is the Transition from an Old Theory to a New One of a Sudden and Unexpected Character? -- Some Practical Issues in the Recent Controversy on the Nature of Scientific Revolutions -- The Divergent-Convergent Method — A Heuristic Approach to Problem-Solving -- The Logical and the Extra-Logical -- What is a Logical Constant? -- On the Law of Inertia -- Scientific and Metaphysical Problems: Euler and Kant -- Theory of Language and Philosophy of Science as Instruments of Educational Reform: Wittgenstein and Popper as Austrian Schoolteachers -- Bible Criticism and Social Science -- Kant, Marx and the Modern Rationality -- The Marxist Conception of Science -- The Idea of Statistical Law in Nineteenth Century Science.

Abstract: Modem philosophy of science has turned out to be a Pandora's box. Once opened, the puzzling monsters appeared: not only was the neat structure of classical physics radically changed, but a variety of broader questions were let loose, bearing on the nature of scientific inquiry and of human knowledge in general. Philosophy of science could not help becoming epistemological and historical, and could no longer avoid metaphysical questions, even when these were posed in disguise. Once the identification of scientific methodology with that of physics had been queried, not only did biology and psychology come under scrutiny as major modes of scientific inquiry, but so too did history and the social sciences - particularly economics, sociology and anthropology. And now, new 'monsters' are emerging - for example, medicine and political science as disciplined inquiries. This raises anew a much older question, namely whether the conception of science is to be distinguished from a wider conception of learning and inquiry? Or is science to be more deeply understood as the most adequate form of learning and inquiry, whose methods reach every domain of rational thought? Is modern science matured reason, or is it simply one historically adapted and limited species of western reason? In our colloquia at Boston University, over the past fourteen years, we have been probing and testing the scope of philosophy of science.

Abstract: I/Mathematics -- The Lemniscate of Bernoulli -- Summation of Series of Fractions Depending upon the Roots of the Airy Function -- Wave Propagation in Non-Viscous Fluids -- Polyhedral Numbers -- Materialist Mathematics -- Skew Curves Setting up a Null System in Space -- Über ein Beispiel zur unbestimmten Analytik und seine allgemeine Bedeutung -- Remarks on Two-By-Two Matric Semigroups -- A Unified Approach to Hypernumbers -- Some Remarks on the Concept of Limit -- La notion de fonction chez Condorcet -- II/History of Mathematics and Science -- The Modern Use of Historical Chinese Solar Observations -- The Second Part of Chapter 5 of the De arte mensurandi by Johannes de Muris -- Isaac Newton, the Calculus of Variations, and the Design of Ships. An Example of Pure Mathematics in Newton’s Principia, Allegedly Developed for the Sake of Practical Applications -- The Impact of von Staudt’s Foundations of Geometry -- Georg Samuel Dörffel -- Observational, Rational and Scientific Medicine in Mexico -- History of Science: A Subject for the Frustrated. Recent Japanese Experience -- The Relation between Eudoxus’ Theory of Proportions and Dedekind’s Theory of Cuts -- Rheticus as Editor of Sacrobosco -- Is Euclid on the Skids? -- John Pell’s English Edition of J. H. Rahn’s Teutsche Algebra -- Could the Specific Heat of the Elements Have Contributed to the Discovery of the Periodic System? -- III/The Nature Of Mathematics, Philosophy and Science -- Die Alexander-von-Humboldt-Forschung an der Akademie der Wissenschaften der D.D.R. — Ergebnisse und Ziele -- Ethics and Science -- A Religion of Earth. The Twentieth Century Scientific Revolution and Organized Religion -- Some Heretical Ideas with Respect to Mathematics and Physics -- A Note on Robert Hodes -- Aims and Methods of Scientific Research -- The Concept of ‘Simplicity’ in the Physico-Mathematical Sciences -- Should Science Survive Its Success? -- Jonathan Edwards on the Freedom of the Will -- The Accelerator and the Virgin: The Rise & Fall of Two Cults -- A Note on the Concept of Scientific Practice -- Ideology, Expression, and Mediation -- Is Science Rational? -- On the Philosophical Meaning of Observational Errors -- IV/Cultural and Political Questions -- Falsification in History -- The Evolution of Black Nationalism (1971) -- The Secret of Jheronimus Bosch -- Self-Determination in Theory and Practice -- The Appeal of Marxism in the United States -- Relative Values and the Quest for Socio-Political Standards -- Dirk Struik and the Sociology of Science -- What Is Burgerlijk? Analysis of a Dutch Concept -- American Anti-Imperialism and the Russian Revolution -- Lenin and the Americans at Kuzbas -- Pre-School Education and Its Role in Social Change: A New Zealand Example -- Toward a Critique of Economics.

Abstract: It is fitting that Professor Dirk Jan Struik be greeted with this melange of mathematical, scientific, historical, sociological and political essays. The authors are also appropriately varied: different countries, outlooks, religions, generations, and we suppose - of course we did not as- different politics too. Many more would have joined us, we know, but the good friends in this book make a fine and representative assembly of the intersection of two (mathematical!) classes: affectionately respect­ ful admirers of Dirk Struik, and the best thinkers of this troubled century. Struik has been among the most steadfast supporters of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, that discussion group which we have been holding at Boston University since 1960, but his luminous collaboration has been welcome, in Boston and Cambridge, for nearly five decades among mathematicians, physicists, philosophical and political thinkers, and especially among the students. It has not mattered whether they have been his own students or not, whether at M.LT. or elsewhere, whether scholars or dropouts, nature-lovers or book worms, anarchists or Republicans, Catholics or Unitarians, Communists or communists, prim or liberated. No doubt he has his preferences! But the main thing for Struik has been to educate and respect the other person.

Abstract: Perception and Philosophy Science -- (1) Nature of a Perceptual Theory -- (2) The Psychophysical Law -- (3) Perception of Light and Color -- (4) Perception of Voice and Music -- (5) Theory of Space and Time -- (6) Statistical Theory of Fields -- (7) The Problem of the Unity of Physics -- (8) Nature of a Physical Theory -- (9) A Theory of Psycho-social Evolution -- The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics -- Defense of a Non-Conventionalist Interpretation of Classical Mechanics -- Comments on C. A. Hooker: Systematic Realism -- The Formal Representation of Physical Quantities -- Comments on ‘The Formal Representation of Physical Quantities’ -- Comments on ‘The Formal Representation of Physical Quantities’ -- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logics -- Ontic Commitments of Quantum Mechanics -- Comments on ‘Ontic Commitments of Quantum Mechanics’ -- Quantum Logic and Classical Logic: Their Respective Roles -- Implications of a New Axiom Set for Quantum Logic -- Two Types of Continuity -- General Relativity — Some Puzzling Questions -- Personal Remembrance of Albert Einstein -- The Controversy Concerning the Law of Causality in Contemporary Physics -- Topical Table of Contents -- (1) Causality -- (2) Relevance of Probability -- (3) Teleology in Physics? -- (4) Probability and Free Will.

Abstract: A Model of Mind-Body Relation in Terms of Modular Logic (October 26, 1961) -- Comments -- Comments -- 2 The Relationship of Language to the Formation of Concepts Summary of Oral Presentation (November 30, 1961) -- 3 The Logical Structure of Physics (December 14, 1961) -- Discussion -- 4 Modal Logics I: Modalities and Intensional Languages (February 8. 1962) -- Comments -- Discussion -- 5 Modal Logics II: Toward a Formal Analysis of Cultural Objects (March 8, 1962) -- 6(a) Deterministic Interpretations of the Quantum Theory (March 27, 1962) -- 6(b) Operational Aspects of Hidden-Variable Quantum Theories — With a Postscript on The Impact of Recent Scientific Trends on Art (March 27, 1962) -- Comments -- 7 The Falsifiability of Theories: Total or Partial? A Contemporary Evaluation of the Duhem-Quine Thesis (April 26.1962) -- Comments -- 8(a) Perception and Language Summary of Oral Presentation (May 17, 1962) -- 8(b) Perception: Cause and Achievement Summary of Oral Presentation (May 17, 1962).

Abstract: The broad range of interdisciplinary concerns which are encompassed by the philosophy of science have this much in common: (I) they arise from reflection upon the fundamental concepts, the formal structures, and the methodology of the sciences; (2) they touch upon the characteristically philosophical questions of ontology and epistemology in a unique way, bringing to traditional conceptions the analytic apparatus of modern logic, and the new content and conceptual models of active scientific investigations. These sources are reflected in the present volume, which consists of the major portion of the papers presented to the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science in the academic year 1961-1962. There is no central theme nor any dominant approach in this colloquium. Initiated in 1960 as an inter-university interdisciplinary faculty group, the Colloqnium is intended to foster creative and regular exchange of research and opinion, to provide a forum for professional discussion in the philosophy of science, and to stimulate the development of academic programs in philosophy of science in the colleges and universities of metropolitan Boston. The base of the Colloquium is our philosophic and scientific community, as broad and heterodox as the academic, cultural and techno­ logical complex in and about this city. The Colloquium has been supported in its first full year, as an inter-institutional cooperative association, by a generous grant to Boston University from the U. S. National Science Foundation. We are most grateful for this help.