ISBN:
9783319044804
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (XIV, 533 p. 2 illus, online resource)
Series Statement:
SpringerLink
Series Statement:
Bücher
Parallel Title:
Druckausg. Preventing corporate corruption
DDC:
364.168
Keywords:
Social sciences
;
Economics
;
Criminology
;
Social Sciences
;
Social sciences
;
Economics
;
Criminology
;
Aufsatzsammlung
;
Korruption
;
Prävention
;
Unternehmen
;
Korruption
;
Prävention
;
Compliance-System
Abstract:
This book presents the results of a two-year international research project conducted for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) to investigate and provide solutions for reducing bribery and corruption in corporations and institutions. It starts with an empirical case study on the effectiveness of a set of self-regulation rules adopted by multinational companies in the energy sector. Second, it explores the context and factors leading to corruption internationally (and the relationships between domestic criminal law and self-regulation). Third, it examines guidelines for the adoption of compliance programs developed by international institutions, to serve as models for the future. The principle result of the book is a three-pronged Anti-Bribery Corruption Model (so called ABC Model), endorsed by the United Nations, intended as a corruption prevention tool intended to be adopted by private corporations. This work provides a common, research-based standard for anti-bribery compliance programs, with international applications. This work will be of interest to researchers studying Criminology and Criminal Justice, particularly in the areas of organized crime and corruption, as well as related areas like Business Ethics and Comparative International Law.
Description / Table of Contents:
Preface ; Contents; Contributors; Part I ; Moving Towards the ABC Model: A General Overview; Towards an Anti-Bribery Compliance Model: Methods and Strategies for a "Hybrid Normativity"; Chapter-1; 1.1 Introduction: Meaning and Purposes of an Anti-Bribery Compliance Model; 1.2 A New Step in International Criminal-Policy Responses Against Corruption?; 1.3 The Current Picture: An "Integrated Criminal Policy" Against Corruption; 1.3.1 Hard-Law Versus Soft-Law Sources; 1.3.1.1 Review Mechanisms; 1.3.1.2 Guidelines; 1.3.2 Public Versus Private Initiatives; 1.3.3 Preventive Versus Punitive Measures
Description / Table of Contents:
1.3.3.1 Civil Remedies1.3.3.2 Administrative and Criminal Measures; 1.4 One Step Further: The ABC Model as "Normative Hybridization"; 1.4.1 Combining Hetero-Regulation and Self-Regulation; 1.4.2 Integrating Hard Law and Soft Law; 1.4.3 Merging Preventive and Punitive Measures; 1.5 Drafting the ABC Model: Coordinated Self-Regulation; 1.6 Implementing the ABC Model: "A Double Track" for States and Corporations; 1.7 Enforcing the ABC Model: Incentives and Criminal Law Responses; 1.8 Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter-2
Description / Table of Contents:
The Universal Approach of the United Nations Convention Against CorruptionChapter-3; The Private Sector Role in the Fight Against Corruption; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Internal Anti-bribery Compliance Programs: General; 3.3 The Requirements for Anti-bribery Compliance Models: Red Flags and the Internal Anti-bribery Unit; 3.4 The Growing Importance of Best Practice and International Comparison; 3.5 Collective Action; 3.6 Cooperation with the Authorities; References; Chapter-4; Public-Private Partnerships and Agency Problems: The Use of Incentives in Strategies to Combat Corruption
Description / Table of Contents:
4.1 Public-Private Partnerships and the Delegation of Corruption Prevention Tasks to Entities4.2 Instrumental Motivations and Relational Incentives; 4.3 The Efficacy of Compliance Programs in Crime Prevention and the Reasons Why Organizations Choose Cooperation; 4.4 "Carrots versus Sticks" in the Public-Private Partnership: Source, Form, and Purpose of the Incentives; 4.5 The Institutional Perspective: Incentives to the Entity; 4.5.1 Compliance Incentives and the Entity's Residual Liability Risk; 4.5.2 Self-Reporting Incentives: The Individual and the Organization
Description / Table of Contents:
4.5.3 Disincentives to Compliance and Reporting: The Problem of International Double Jeopardy4.6 The Entity's Perspective: Incentives to Individuals in the Organization.; References; Chapter-5; Internal Investigations, Whistle-Blowing, and Cooperation: The Struggle for Information in the Criminal Process; 5.1 The Criminal Process as a Struggle for Information; 5.2 Whistle-Blowing Channels and Internal Amnesty Programs; 5.3 The Ombudsman and Self-Auditing Privileges; 5.4 Internal Investigations and the Criminal Process; 5.5 Internal Investigation and the Corporation's Right of Defense
Description / Table of Contents:
5.6 Internal Investigations and the Employees' Right to Defense
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-04480-4
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