Abstract: Introduction: The Place of Earth and Gods in Heidegger’s Philosophy -- I. Character of Heidegger’s Philosophy -- II. Heidegger’s Problem of Being -- III. Heidegger’s Stand in the History of Philosophy -- IV. Three Phases of Heidegger’s Thought -- V. Detour from Gods to Earth -- I. Dasein -- I. Approach to the Problem of Dasein -- II. To-be-in-the-world -- III. To-be-in -- IV. World -- V. Space -- VI. Togetherness -- VII. Da as Openness -- VIII. Dread -- IX. Death -- X. Conscience -- XI. Temporality -- II. Being -- I. Heidegger’s Post-Sein und Zeit Works -- II. Dasein -- III. Truth -- IV. Thinking -- V. Language -- VI. Befalling and History -- VII. Subjectivism and Metaphysics -- VIII. Nothingness and Nihilism -- IX. Being and Man -- III. World -- I. Problem of World in Traditional Philosophy -- II. World in the First Phase -- III. World in the Second Phase -- IV. World in the Third Phase -- IV. Earth -- I. Physis -- II. Physis and Logos -- III. Language -- IV. World and Earth -- V. Hölderlin’s Understanding of Nature -- V. Gods -- I. Olympian Deities -- II. Chthonian Religion -- III. Dionysus -- IV. Chaos -- V. Gods and Logos -- VI. Gods as Realities -- VI. Foursome -- VII. Thing -- I. Traditional Understanding of Thing -- II. Artwork as an Assembler -- III. Thing as Assembler -- IV. Subjective and Essential Understanding of Thing -- V. Thing and Space -- VI. Philosophy of Thing -- VIII. Dwelling -- I. Building and Dwelling -- II. Dwelling and Logos -- III. Poet as Prophet -- IV. Festivity -- V. Godly and Godless Man -- Appendix: Heidegger and Christianity.

Abstract: Earth and Gods is an attempt to introduce the reader to Heidegger's fully developed philosophy. The title Earth and Gods gives an im­ pression of not being a general study of Heidegger's philosophy. However, this is not true - the earth and the gods are fundamental ontological symbols of his fully developed philosophy, namely, his third and final phase of thought. This phase repeats the problems of both preceding phases in a fuller and more developed manner; hence, it implies them. The two preceding phases are the phase of Dasein and the phase of Being. These two phases are a natural flow of fundamental problems which reach their final formation and development in the phase of earth and gods. Dasein (the first phase) leads to Being, and Being (the second phase) bursts into fundamental ontological powers of Being (Seinsmiichte) which are earth and sky, gods and mortals (the third phase). Since earth is unthinkable without sky and since gods are gods in the world of mortals - of men, the title Earth and Gods is an abbreviation of these four fundamental powers of Being. Hence, an investigation of earth and gods is an attempt to present Heidegger's philosophy as a whole. Such a presentation provides the reader with the background necessary for a more adequate and efficient understanding of the writings of Heidegger himself. Thus, Earth and Gods may rightly be considered an introduction to Hei­ degger's philosophy.

Abstract: 1 Introduction -- 2 The Assumptions of Science -- 3 Nature of Scientific Research -- 4 Scientific Law and the Practice of Science -- 5 The Uncertainty Principle -- 6 Science and Religion -- 7 Science and Education -- 8 Science and Government -- 9 Conclusion.

Abstract: I am becoming increasingly disturbed by the lack of under­ standing of science revealed by politicians, industrialists and the general public. I am also concerned about the widespread mis­ use of the word "scientific" which is more and more being used in situations where it is quite inappropriate. As a result, in some circumstances gross overestimates are made as to what science can do. In other circumstances the real power of science is foolishly underestimated and the contributions which it can make are squandered. Science is God is an attempt to explain just what is meant by the scientific approach and to define more closoJ. y what the word "scientific" indicates. It is deliberately brief and controversial because I want it to be read. In fact, the material dealt with in each single chapter really deserves a whole book to itself. In the future I hope that I may be able to give to each subject such full treatment. Meanwhile I hope that this book will stimulate discussion about science and will increase understanding of it. DAVID F.

Abstract: Approaches of the concept of style -- The hand of the artist -- Personality and work of the artist -- Awareness of the history of art -- The idea of progress -- The concepts old and new -- Seeing and describing works of art -- Comparisons -- References to pictures.

Abstract: I: The Evolution of Irony -- I: The Ironic Vision in Modern Literature -- II: Tragic Irony: Ancient and Modern -- II: The Philosophers Set the Stage for the Ironic Vision -- III: Schopenhauer: The Implicit Irony of Pessimism -- IV: The Dilemma of the Superman -- III: Religious Irony -- V: Irony and the Religious Quest -- VI: Death the Supreme Ironist -- IV: Irony in Modern Poetry, Fiction, and Drama -- VII: Thomas Hardy the Cosmic Ironist -- VIII: Anatole France and Aesthetic Irony -- IX: Chekhov’s Naturalistic Irony -- X: Illusion Versus Reality -- V: Irony and the Diabolical -- XI: The Devil as Ironist -- XII: The Irony of Thomas Mann -- VI: The Nihilism of the Absurd and the Absurdity of Art -- XIII: The Irony of the Absurd -- VII: Conclusion -- XIV: Conclusion.

Abstract: Approaches of the concept of style -- The hand of the artist -- Personality and work of the artist -- Awareness of the history of art -- The idea of progress -- The concepts old and new -- Seeing and describing works of art -- Comparisons -- References to pictures.

Abstract: Table des Matières / List of Contents -- Première séance (plénière) -- 1. Paroles de bienvenue -- Prof. Dr. W. Brundert, Oberbürgermeister -- Prof. Dr. E. Schütte, Kultusminister -- Dr. H. Lohse, Präsident, Verein Deutscher Bibliothekare. -- 2. Discours d’ouverture du Président de la Fédération -- 3. Rapport financier du Trésorier -- 4. Rapport du Secrétaire général -- 5. Rapport du représentant de I’UNESCO -- 6. Rapport du représentant de la FID -- Deuxième séance (plénière) -- 7. « Le livre et la bibliothèque dans une société industrielle — Books and libraries in an industrial society » -- a) Prof. Dr. W. RÜEGG -- b) Dr. J. E. MORPURGO. -- c) Mr. V. ORLOV (document distribué). -- Troisième séance (plénière) -- 8. Rapports et résolutions des Sections et Commissions -- Associations internationales: AIL, IATUL -- A. Résolutions des Sections (de types de bibliothèques) -- la. Bibliothèques nationales et universitaires -- 1b. Sous-section des bibliothèques universitaires -- 2. Bibliothèques de lecture publique -- 2a. INTAMEL -- 2b. Sous-section des bibliothèques d’enfants -- 2c. Sous-section des bibliothèques d’hôpitaux -- 3. Bibliothèques spécialisées -- 3a. Sous-section des bibliothèques d’observatoires astronomiques -- 4. Bibliothèques parlementaires et administratives -- B. Résolutions des Commissions (problèmes de bibliothéconomie) -- 1. Unification des règles de catalogue -- 2. Catalogues collectifs et prêt international -- 3. Echange de publications -- 3a. Echange de publications officielles -- 4. Périodiques et publications en série -- 5. Statistique -- 6. Fonds et documents rares et précieux -- 7. Formation professionnelle -- 8. Construction des bibliothèques -- 9. Mécanisation -- 10. Bibliographie -- 9. Communications du Bureau exécutif -- a) Le prix Sevensma -- b) La commission de la statistique -- c) Changements de fonctionnaires -- d) Charte de livre -- e) Sessions futures du Conseil général -- 10. Discours de clôture du Président -- Annexes -- Rapports Annuels Et Détails des Associations-Membres Annual Reports and Details of Member-Associations -- UDC (100) Associations internationales -- Association of Libraries of Judaica and Hebraica in Europe -- International Association of Agricultural Librarians and Documentalists (IAALD) -- International Association of Technological University Libraries (IATUL) -- International Association of Law Libraries -- Association of International Libraries -- Membres nationaux UDC (4) Europe -- Allemagne: -- Bundesrepublik: Verein Deutscher Bibliothekare, 1967/1968 -- Verein der Bibliothekare an öffentlichen Büchereien (vormals: Verein Deutscher Volksbibliothekare) 1967/1968 -- Verein der Diplom-Bibliothekare an wissenschaftlichen Bibliotheken, 1967/1968 -- Deutscher Büchereiverland -- Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Spezialbibliotheken 1967/1968 -- D.D.R. Deutscher Bibliotheksverband, 1967/1968. -- Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, 1967 -- Deutsche Bücherei, 1967/1968 -- Nationale Forschungs-und Gedänkstätten, Weimar -- Autriche:Vereinigung Österreichischer Bibliothekare, 1967/1968 -- Verband Österreichischer Volksbüchereien -- Association des archivistes et bibliothécaires de Belgique, et Vlaamse Vereniging van Bibliothek -en archiefpersoneel -- Croix-Rouge de Belgique. Conseil national des Bibliothèques d’hôpitaux -- Union des Bibliothécaires auxiliaires sociaux. -- Association nationale des Bibliothécaires d’expression française de Belgique -- Bulgarie: Libraries in Bulgaria, 1967/1968 -- Danemark: Libraries in Denmark, 1967/1968 -- Danmarks Biblioteksforening -- Danmarks Videnskabelige og Faglige Bibliotekers Sammenslutning -- Espagne:Asociación nacional de Archiveros, bibliotecarios y arqueólogos de España -- Finlande: Suomen Kirjastoseura, 1967/1968 -- Suomen tieteellinen Kirjastoseura. Finlands Vetenskapliga Bibliotekssamfund -- France: Association des bibliothécaires français -- Grande-Bretagne: The Library Association, 1967 -- Hollande: Libraries in the Netherlands in 1967 -- Rijkscommissie van advies inzake het bibliotheekwezen -- Centrale Vereniging voor openbare Bibliotheken -- Nederlandse Vereniging van Bibliothecarissen -- Hongrie: Association of Hungarian librarians, 1967. -- Islande: Association of Icelandic Librarians -- Italie: Associazione Italiana Biblioteche, 1967/1968 -- Luxembourg: Bibliothèque nationale du Grand-Duché -- Monaco: Bibliothèque de Monaco -- Norvège: Norsk bibliotekforening, 1966 and 1967 -- Norsk bibliotekarlag -- Norsk forskningsbibliotekarers forening -- Pologne: Association des bibliothécaires polonais, 1968 -- Portugal: Direcçäo-Geral do Ensino superior e das Belas-artes -- Roumanie: Asociatia hibliotecarilor din Republica Populara Romîna -- Suède: Svenska Bibliotekariesamfundet -- Sveriges Allmänna Biblioteksforening -- Sveriges Vetenskapliga Specialbiblioteks förening -- Svenska Folkbibliotekarieförbundet -- Swedish libraries, 1967/1968 -- Suisse: Vereinigung Schweizerischer Bibliotekare, 1967/1968 -- URSS: USSR Library Council. Library activities in the USSR (Russian text) -- English summary -- Vatican: Biblioteca apostolica Vaticana -- Yugoslavie: Savez drustava bibliotekara Jugoslavije, 1966/1967 -- (4) Asia -- Hong Kong: Hong Kong Library Association -- Inde: Indian Library Association -- Indian Association of Special Libraries and Information Centers (IASLIC), 1967 -- Israel: Israel Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Japon: Japan Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Jourdain: Jordan Library Association, 1967 -- Liban: Lebanese Library Association, 1968/1969 -- Thailande: Thai Library Association -- Turquie: Türk Kütüphaneciler Dernegi -- (6) Afrique -- Afrique du Sud: The South African Libraries, 1967/1968 -- Ghana: Ghana Library Association -- Tunisie: Association tunisienne des Documentalistes, Bibliothécaires et Archivistes -- (7) Amérique du Nord -- Canada: Canadian Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Association canadienne des bibliothécaires de langue française, 1968 -- Ontario Library Association -- Quebec Library Association -- Etats-Unis d’Amérique American Library Association, 1967/1968 -- Medical Library Association -- Special Libraries Association, 1967/1968 -- American Association of Law Libraries -- Association of Research Libraries -- Puerto Rico: Sociedad de Bibliotecarios de Puerto Rico -- (5) Amérique latine -- Brésil: Associaçâo Paulista de Bibliotecârios -- Associaçâo Brasileira de Bibliotecâ.rios -- Federaçâo Brasileira de Associaçóes de Bibliote-cârios (FEBAB) -- Instituto Brasileiro de Bibliografia e Documentaçâo -- Mexique: Asociación Mexicana de Bibliotecarios -- Pérou: Asociación Peruana de Bibliotecarios -- Uruguay: Asociación de Bibliotecarios del Uruguay -- (9) Australasie -- Australie: Library Association of Australia, 1967 -- Nouvelle-Zélande: New Zealand Library Association, 1967/1968 -- * * * -- Associate members / Membres associés.

Abstract: I: Introduction -- II: Religious Positivism -- III: Religious Empiricism -- IV: The Faith Protected -- V: The Role of Reason in Religion -- Epilogue -- Appendix: Previous Work on Mansel.

Abstract: Henry Longueville Mansel published his Bampton Lectures in 1858, twenty­ seven years after Hegel's death and twelve years before the publication of Ritschl's Rechtfertigung und Versoehnung. The timing is significant. As a sweeping critique of liberalism, frequently symbolized by the work of Hegel, the lectures react to the slow but inexorable permeation of English religious thought by German ways of thinking. By 1858, the process was sufficiently widespread that Mansel felt justified in devoting the principal portion of his work to the attack. Ritschl marks the effective end of Hegel's direct influence on theology and a return to a more Kantian mode of thinking. His gambit had already been made, for Mansel is in many ways a more cautious version of Ritschl. Mansel, however, wrote in English and had the misfortune to say what he did at the beginning of a movement so strong that it allowed no quali­ fication. Thus Mansel's thought was rarely accepted. He was certainly not ignored, at least at the time. The lectures, entitled "The Limits of Religious Thought," were an immediate sensation. They were quickly reprinted both on the Continent and in America and went through two editions in 1858, two more in 1859, and a fifth in 1867. For a period they became "almost a textbook in the schools of the University. " 1 Few leading divines of the day were silent and fewer yet were neutral.

Abstract: III Sermons and Religious Treatises -- John Alcock -- St John Fisher -- Desiderius Erasmus -- John Colet -- Hugh Latimer -- John de Feckenham -- William Atkinson Richard Whytford -- Jacobus de Gruytroede -- Richard de Methley -- John Colet -- St John Fisher -- King Henry VIII -- The Bible -- William Tyndale -- Miles Coverdale -- Desiderius Erasmus -- St Thomas More -- William Tyndale -- John Frith -- The Book of Common Prayer -- IV Chronicles and Histories -- Robert Fabyan -- John Bourchier, Lord Berners -- ‘The Translator’ -- John Rastell -- Jan van Dvesborch -- Peter Martyr D’Anghiera -- St Thomas More -- Edward Hall -- George Cavendish -- John Bouge -- Nicholas Harpsfield -- V Romances and Tales -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Philippe Camus -- Jean D’Arras -- Anonymous -- John Capgrave -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Anonymous -- Notes -- Bibliographies -- Suggested Reading.

Abstract: I. Herodotus -- II. Egypt -- III. Persia -- IV. Scythia and Libya -- V. Athens -- VI. Sparta -- VII. Persia and Greece.

Abstract: Herodotus has so often been called, since ancient times, the father of history that this title has blinded us to the question: Was the father of history an historian? Everyone knows that the Greek word from which 'history' is derived always means inquiry in Herodotus. His so-called Histories are in­ quiries, and by that name I have preferred to call them. His inquiries partly result in the presentation of events that are now called 'historical'; but other parts of his inquiry would now belong to the province of the anthro­ pologist or geographer. Herodotus does not recognize these fields as distinct; they all belong equally to the subject of his inquiry, but it is not self-evident what he understands to be his subject: the notorious difficulties in the proemium are enough to indicate this. If his work presents us with so strange a mixture of different fields, we are entitled to ask: Did Herodotus under­ stand even its historical element as we understand it? Without any proof everyone, as far as I am aware, who has studied him has assumed this to be so.

Abstract: Russell and the linguistic philosophy -- I. The quest for logical form -- Reference and meaning -- Two senses of “logical form” -- Logical form, propositional constituents, and reconstructionism -- The “logically perfect” language -- The theory of acquaintance -- Proper names -- The “minimum vocabulary” -- Summary and conclusion -- II. The uses of reconstructionism -- The theory of descriptions -- The analysis of class-symbols -- The logical construction of physical objects -- Conclusion -- III. Critique of Russell’s philosophy of language -- The theory of acquaintance -- The doctrine of logical form -- Philosophical analysis as elucidation of ontological structure -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: RUSSELL AND THE LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY I t is generally acknowledged that Bertrand Russell played a vital role in the so-called "revolution" that has taken place in twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy, the revolution that has led many philo­ sophers virtually to equate philosophy with some variety - or varieties - of linguistic analysis. His contributions to this revolution were two­ fold: (I) together with G. E. Moore he led the successful revolt against the neo-Hegelianism of Idealists such as Bradley and McTaggert; (2) again with Moore he provided much of the impetus for a somewhat revolutionary way of doing philosophy. (I) and (2) are, of course, close­ ly related, since the new way of philosophizing could be said to consti­ tute, in large part, the revolt against Idealism. Be this as it may, how­ ever, the important fact for present consideration is that Russell was a major influence in turning Anglo-American philosophy in the direction it has subsequently taken - toward what may be termed, quite general­ ly, the "linguistic philosophy. " Unfortunately, though his importance as a precursor of the linguistic philosophy is well-known, the precise sense in which Russell himself can be considered a "philosopher of language" has not, to the present time, been sufficiently clarified. Useful beginnings have been made toward an investigation of this question, but they have been, withal, only begin­ nings, and nothing like an adequate picture of Russell's overall philoso­ phy of language is presently available.

Abstract: to ethnomusicology -- Training possibilities for ethnomusicologists -- Illustrations -- Index of subjects -- Index of regions and peoples the music of which has been studied and/or recorded -- Index of authors, collectors and musicians -- Index of periodicals and of some publications containing articles by various authors.

Abstract: This booklet hardly needs a preface; the contents, I think, speak for themselves. It contains a short and carefully brought up to date resume of all that I, as a private University Lecturer in Amsterdam, have tried to teach my pupils. It is intended as a general introduction to ethnomusicology, before going on to the study of the forms of separate music-cultures. I sincerely hope that those, who wish to teach themselves and to qualify in this branch of knowledge, will find a satisfactory basis for self tuition in the matter here brought together. Regarding the possibility of a new edition, any critical remarks or infor­ mation as to possible desiderata would be very gratefully received. J. K. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION My request for critical remarks and desiderata has not been ignored. My sincere thanks to all who took the trouble to let me know what they missed in my booklet. Through their collaboration the contents have undergone a considerable improvement and enlargement as compared to the original edition issued in 1950 by the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, under the title 'Musicologica'. I have taken care to add many particulars from non-European sources, with the result that now the book is no longer so Europe-centric as it was.

Abstract: I. The Epistemology of Albert Einstein -- Section A. The Inductive Beginnings of Scientific Investigation -- Section B. The Formation of Primary Concepts according to Einstein. Their Invention -- Section C. The Deductive Process. The Rules of Naturalness and Simplicity -- Section D. The Epistemological Elements of the Special Theory of Relativity. Confirmation of the Theory -- II. A Metaphysical Analysis of Einstein’s View of Reality -- Section A. The Notion of Reality in Albert Einstein -- Section B. The Problem of the Reality of Relations -- Section C. The Grasp of Reality in Mathematico-physical Investigation -- III. The Metaphysical Foundations Of Einstein’s Epistemology -- Section A. The Foundations of Inductive Beginnings -- Section B. The Roots of the Formation of the Primary Concepts -- Section C. Judgment and Reasoning as Related to Scientific Postulation -- Section D. The Confirmation of the Theorems and the Nature of Scientific Proof -- Conclusions -- Appendix. A note on the Discovery of Being.

Abstract: Now how would things be intelligible if they did not proceed from an intelligence? In the last analy­ sis a Primal Intelligence must exist, which is itself Intellection and Intelligibility in pure act, and which is the first principle of intelligibility and essences of things, and causes order to exist in them, as well as an infinitely complex network of regular relationships, whose fundamental mysterious unity our reason dreams of rediscovering in its own way. Such an approach to God's existence is a variant of Thomas Aquinas' fifth way. Its impact was secretly present in Einstein's famous saying: "God does not play dice," which, no doubt, used the word God in a merely figurative sense, and meant only: "nature does not result from a throw of the dice," yet the very fact implicitly postulated the existence of the divine Intellect. Jacques Maritain God's creation is the insistence on the dependence of "epistemology" on ontology; man's acknow­ ledgement of creation is an insistence on the episte­ mological recovery of ontology.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- II. The Lateran Pacts and the Constituent Assembly -- Introductory Statement -- Initial Skirmishes -- The Debate on Lateran -- The Statisti and Left Parties -- The Vatican Position -- Determining Attitudes: Christian Democrats and Communists -- III. The Catholic Church and the Italian State: The Case of the Bishop of Prato -- Development of the Case -- Preliminary Hearings -- The Trial Begins -- The Case for the Plaintiff -- The Public Prosecutor -- The Case for the Defendant -- The Verdict -- Appeal and Reversal -- IV. Freedom of Religion I: Pre-War Background and Postwar Developments -- The Theory of Freedom of Religion -- The Creation of the Constitutional Court -- The Former Policy -- The New Era and the Pentecostal Sect -- V. Freedom of Religion II: Aggiornamento -- Intervention Ex-officio -- The Impact of the 1953 elections -- The Paden Case -- The Lasco Case -- VI. The Needed Relationship -- Tables -- Appendices.

Abstract: Italy is left out of most contemporary comparative studies of political systems. This omission can be due neither to any intrinsic unimportance of Italy in Europe, nor to the absence of parallel similarities and differ­ ences - the prerequisites of comparative explanation - between the Italian and other Western political systems. It may be due to the paucity of case studies of Italian politics, upon which comparisons would have to be based. Professor Bucci's book will contribute toward overcoming this scarcity. Not only is Italy under-represented in comparative studies of post­ war European politics, but there is also a shortage of monographs dealing with particular aspects of Italian politics since the founding of the Republic, especially in English. I hope that Dr. Bucci's work, which is based exclusively upon original Italian sources, signals the beginning of exploration, more systematic than hitherto, of the goldmine for case studies which post-war Italian politics presents to political scientists.

Abstract: I: Is Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive? -- A. Motive and choice -- II: Agency, Attention and Choice -- A. Agency -- III: Freedom Without a Substantive Self -- A. A libertarian interpretation of freedom -- B. Some objections -- IV: Freedom and Responsibility -- A. Responsibility and causation -- B. Responsibility and the non-voluntary -- V: Responsibility and Practice -- A. Praising, blaming and dispraising -- B. Punishment -- VI: Responsibility and Obligation -- A. “Ought implies can” -- B. “Ought implies can” and common sense -- C. “Ought implies can” and the determinism-libertarianism controversy -- Works Cited.

Abstract: This work is conceived as a modem study of the relationships of the concept of human freedom with the moral concepts of responsibility and obligation and other closely allied notions. One pitfall into which writers on my sub­ jects have occasionally fallen has been that of spending too much time in critically examining positions and arguments which no sane philosopher has ever offered. In order to guard against the danger of debating with "straw men," I have attempted to engage in critical conversations with several twentieth century writers on my theme. I have attempted to pay special at­ tention to a handful of writers who have written extremely important and influential discussions and who are representatives of a diversity of per­ spectives on the issues involved. In particular, I have taken note of the work of two determinists, Sir David Ross and Hastings Rashdall, a libertarian, C. A. Campbell, and a reprel〉entative of the more recent linguistic-analytic approach, P. Nowell-Smith. Many other important writers have been brought in at crucial points in the conversation. But this is not a history of the problem in the 20th century. Rather, it is a critical, systematic study of a problem or set of related problems. This work may be divided roughly into two parts, a metaphysical-psycho­ logical part comprising the first three chapters, and a metaethical-ethical part consisting of the last three chapters.

Abstract: I. The Beginnings -- II. The “Constitutionalism” of Emperor Alexander I -- III. Administrative Activities 1802–1812 -- IV. Reform of Russia’s Finances and Central Administration -- V. Plans of Reform -- VI. Disgrace and Exile -- VII. Philosophical Views and Political Theory -- VIII. Governing Russia’s Provinces -- IX. Projects for Reforming the Provincial Administration -- X. An Unpleasant Interlude — Speransky and the Decembrists -- XI. Codifying Russian Law -- XII. Last Years — Conclusion -- Indices.

Abstract: "An autocracy tempered by assassination", clever foreigners used to say about the Russian empire in the 18th and 19th centuries. With this bon mot the average curiosity about the Tsars' government was satisfied and there seemed to be no need to look further into the matter. There was, on the surface of things, some justification for such a definition: many rulers had suffered violent death and little did the autocracy abate between 1725 and 1905. The impression created by travelers, by historians and journalists, as well as by Russia's own discontented intelligentsia was that nothing really ever changed in Russia, that the autocracy was the same in 1905 as it had been at the death of Peter the Great in 1725. Not that the outside world had remained ignorant of the efforts at reform, the changes, and the modernization wrought in Russia since the day Peter I had "cut a window into Europe. " But the prevailing opinion was that such changes as occurred were merely external and did not affect the fundamental structure of the government or of society.

Abstract: I: The Foundations of Solipsism -- 1: Sensations and Images -- 2: Language and Sensation -- 3: Imagining Instances -- 4: Comprehension -- 5: Understanding and Synonymy -- 6: Verifiability -- 7: Objections -- II: Causality -- 8: Causes and Counterfactuals -- III: Solipsism Proper -- 9: A Quasi-Axiomatic Solipsistic System -- 10: Alternatives to Solipsism -- 11: Anti-Solipsism -- 12: Further Development of the System: Phenomenalism -- 13: Statements about the Past -- 14: Further Development of the System: Other Minds -- 15: Belief -- Conclusion.

Abstract: Philosophers usually have been anxious to avoid solipsism. A large number of good and great philosophers have tried to refute it. Of course, these philosophers have not always had the same target in mind and, like everything else, solipsism over the centuries has become increasingly elusive and subtle. In this book I undertake to state the position in its most modern and what I take to be its most plausible form. At some points in the history of philosophy the solipsist has been one who denied the existence of everything except himself or even the existence of everything except his own present sensations. At other times, the solipsist instead of doubting these things has merely insisted that there could be no good reason for believing in the existence of anything beyond one's own present sensations. Roughly, this doubt is aimed at reasons rather than at things. A solipsist of this sort appears in Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith.

Abstract: I. Biography -- 1. Life and Stoicism -- 2. Teaching -- 3. Writings -- 4. Influence -- II. Life a Game -- 5. Living for Happiness -- 6. Suicide, Euthanasia, Death -- 7. Knowledge for Living -- 8. Rational Self -- III. Logical Topics -- 9. Nature of Logical Studies -- 10. Irrefutability and Epistemological Issues -- 11. Logical Puzzles -- 12. Operators and Kin Matters -- IV. Nature and God -- 13. World Structure -- 14. Providence -- 15. Anthropocentrism -- 16. Proofs of Design -- 17. Cacodicy -- 18. Hymns to God -- 19. Zeus Inoperative? -- V. Value Theory -- 20. Theic Notions -- 21. Good a Protoconcept -- 22. Value Relativity -- 23. Value Criteria and Pleasure -- VI. Pain and Training -- 24. Divisions of Ethics -- 25. Learning Theory -- 26. Rationalization and Erring -- 27. Negative Ethics: A Look -- VII. Preventive Ethics -- 28. Forestall, Resist, Ease -- 29. Control Test -- 30. Anxiety and Fear -- 31. Other Safeguards -- 32. Resistance Methods -- VIII. Remedial Devices -- 33. Examples -- 34. “It’s fate” and Other Tonics -- 35. Loneliness -- 36. Objections -- IX. Social Remarks -- 37. Independence and Outgoingness -- 38. Man as Social -- 39. Troubleshooting and Cosmopolitanism -- 40. Legal Questions -- X. Afterthoughts.

Abstract: Epictetus presents difficulties for the historiall of ideas. He published nothing, while his so-called writings are mostly notes of so me of his discussions taken down haphazardly by a friend. Moreover, about half of the notes are lost, and little is known of his life. All this may go toward explaining the paucity of Epictetus studies; for indeed this is the first book-length commentary published in English devoted only to hirn. All known aspects of his work are here considered and recon­ structed and freshly approached. Eut the emphasis is on his re­ marks in ethics, for the simple reason that ethics was his dominant interest and that his diagnoses of problems in living and tech­ niques for coping with those problems have been insufficiently appreciated. His ethics is primarily pain-oriented: it consists of existential reminders, such as that things are ephemer al and people vulnerable, plus ways of avoiding and easing distress, induding training and thought-analysis, because he believed that people's troubles stern largely from silly habits and precon­ ceptions.

Abstract: I: The threefold basic towards understanding conditioned being’s quest for the unconditioned -- 1. Identification and evaluation of the theme -- 2. The problematic of Tillich’s “quest” -- 3. The axial concepts in this problematic of the “quest” -- II: Three fundamental approaches to resolve the problematic of Tillich’s “quest” -- 1. The first approach: Tillich’s so-called “answering theology” -- 2. The second approach: Tillich’s two formal criteria and his material norm for all systematic theology -- 3. The third approach: Tillich’s existentialism -- III: Idealistic components in Tillich’s interpretation of the God-man relationship -- 1. German idealism in general -- 2. Tillich’s interpretation of the God-man relationship and Kant’s analysis of finitude -- 3. Tillich’s interpretation of the God-man relationship and Fichte’s dynamic view of the subject-object structure -- 4. Tillich’s prius of ultimate concern and Schleiermacher’s prius of “Das schlecht- hinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl -- 5. Tillich’s interpretation of the God-man relationship and Schelling’s explanation of the transition from essence to existence -- 6. Tillich’s interpretation of the God-man relationship and Hegel’s explanation of dialectic -- IV: Tillich’s interpretation of old being -- 1. Old being as reason and the quest for revelation -- 2. Old being as finite essence and the question of God -- 3. Old being as existence and the quest for the Christ -- 4. Old being as ambiguous life and the quest for unambiguous life -- 5. Old being as history and the quest for the kingdom of God -- 6. Conclusion concerning old being and the God-man relationship -- V: New Being in Jesus as the Christ -- 1. What does Tillich find in adequate or false in the chalcedonian formula? -- 2. What does Tillich mean by the incarnation? -- 3. What does Tillich mean by redemption? -- 4. What does Tillich mean by redemption applied to men? -- VI: General conclusions and evaluations regarding Tillich’s interpretation of the God-man relationship -- 1. General criticisms -- 2. Positive and valid aspects of Tillich’s interpretation of the God-man relationship -- Excursus: Tillich’s explanation of the two streams of philosophical thought since the renaissance.

Abstract: The following study on Tillich's theology is based on a doctoral dissertation, presented to the Ludwig-Maximilian University at Munich in December, 1967. Tillich's theology, however, is not a simple structure to analyze, since it is so systematically interrelated. Certainly every major area of his theo­ logical system involves all other major areas, and even the minor areas have complex ramifications to the total system itself. The following pages, there­ fore, can only be construed as one among many viewpoints of his system. Tillich's theological structure might be compared to a painting or some other work of art: one must view it now from this direction, now from that. in order to appreciate the total effect. Certain points should, however, be mentioned here. First of all, a key­ notion in this system is "essentialization. " This concept rounds off and com­ pletes Tillich's entire work. Unfortunately, Tillich himself did not write extensively on this topic, nor did he actually correlate it to the beginning and middle of his system, although it expresses the final telos of his entire theo­ logical work. I have drawn out of the Systematic Theology as much as possi­ ble on the subject of "essentialization," and have tried to analyze it in light of other key-concepts in his system.

Abstract: I. Teil Lebensrelative Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Die lebensrelativen Werte und die Dingwirklichkeit -- 2. Abschnitt: Vitalwerte -- II. Teil Absolute Werte -- 1. Abschnitt: Personwerte -- 2. Abschnitt: Ontologische grenzen materialer Werte -- III. Teil Das Seinsverhältnis von Dasein zu Dasein -- 1. Abschnitt: Zur Ontologie des Wertens -- 2. Abschnitt: Das „da“ Schelers.

Abstract: Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of “thinking.” Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the “thinking” capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the “Objective” or “positive” sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic’s interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, “distinct judgment,” as the theme of “pure analytics” -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of “the same” confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz’s “mathesis universalis,” and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano’s position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the “Prolegomena” from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a “deductive” or “nomological” system-clarified by the concept of “definiteness” -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the “concept” determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist’s attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. “Mathesis pura” as properly logical and as extralogical. The “mathematics of mathematicians” -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enou...

Abstract: 2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.

Abstract: Topologie des Logos und Kant-Interpretation -- § 1. Topologie des Logos -- § 2. Die Entwicklung des Logos. Logos, Dialogos und Synlogos. Katalogos und Analogos -- § 3. Die Logik der Analogia -- § 4. Die Kant-Interpretation als Begreifen des Logos -- Erstes Kapitel. Das Ding an sich und „Die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 5. Die kritische Methode und die Theorie der Erfahrung -- § 6. Die Erfahrung und die besonderen Gesetze -- § 7. Die Erfahrung überhaupt und die besondere Erfahrung. Natura formaliter spectata und natura materialiter spectata -- § 8. Die besondere Erfahrung als Grunderfahrung -- § 9. Die Grenzen der Erfahrung überhaupt. Das Apriorische und das Aposteriorische -- § 10. Das Problem des Dinges an sich -- § 11. Die Existenz des Dinges an sich -- § 12. Dasein und Sosein. Die Logik für das Ding an sich -- § 13. Der Unterschied der transzendentalen Deduktion in der ersten und zweiten Auflage -- § 14. Die transzendentale Deduktion des reinen Verstandesbegriffen in der ersten Auflage. Das Problem der Affinität -- § 15. Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption -- § 16. Die transzendentale Deduktion in der zweiten Auflage. Verstand und Apperzeption -- § 17. Das Wesen der Einbildungskraft -- § 18. Das Wesen der transzendentalen Deduktion -- Zweites Kapitel. Analogien der Erfahrung und Idee -- § 19. Die Bedeutung des Schematismus -- § 20. Der Schematismus und die Urteilskraft -- § 21. Schema und Analogie -- § 22. Mathematische und dynamische Grundsätze -- § 23. Konstitutiv und regulativ. Die negative Bedeutung der Analogie -- § 24. Die positive Bedeutung der Analogie. Die Eigentümlichkeit der Einheit der Analogia -- § 25. Die Grenzen der Grundsätze und das Wesen der Analogie -- § 26. Die erste Analogie der Erfahrung. Die Grenze dieses Grundsatzes. Das Problem des Nichts bei Kant -- § 27. Die zweite Analogie der Erfahrung -- § 28. Der Kausalitätsbegriff bei Kant. Ein Zirkel in Kants Beweis. Die Grenze des Kausalgesetzes -- § 29. Ursache und Wirkung -- § 30. Die dritte Analogie der Erfahrung. Kant und Newton -- § 31. Die Rekonstruktion des Systems der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 32. Die Vernunft -- § 33. Die erste und zweite Idee -- § 34. Die dynamische Idee und die Logik der Analogie -- Drittes Kapitel. Die Teleologie -- § 35. Das Verhältnis zwischen,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Die Entstehung der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 36. Der erste Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”: Anhang zur transzendentalen Dialektik -- § 37. Das prinzip der Vernunftseinheit und die Logik der Analogia -- §38. Die allgemeine Erörterung der Teleologie -- § 39. Der zweite Weg von der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” zur,,Kritik der Urteilskraft”. Vertiefung des Erfahrungsbegriffs -- § 40. Die transzendentale Aesthetik -- § 41. Die Zufälligkeit der Erfahrung. Das Grundproblem der Kantischen Philosophie -- § 42. Affinität und Analogie der Erfahrung. Sosein und Dasein. Die Logik der Analogia als Entwicklung der transzendentalen Logik -- § 43. Die reflektierende Urteilskraft und die Entstehung der Erfahrung. Das übersinnliche Substrat und der intuitive Verstand -- § 44. Der glückliche Zufall und der intuitive Verstand. Zwei Standpunkte der Teleologie -- § 45. Der intuitive Verstand nach der Analogie. Der Als-ob Charakter der Analogie -- § 46. Die allgemeine Analogie auf dem Wege von der Erfahrungüberhaupt zur besonderen Erfahrung. Vier Zweckmäßigkeitsbegriffe.,,Kritik des Geschmacks” und,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” -- § 47. Die organische Zweckmäßigkeit. Teleologie und Mechanismus -- § 48. Die grundsätzliche Teleologie als letzte Einheit der Analogien -- § 49. Das Übersinnliche. Das Problem des Genies. Der Weg von der Natur zur Freiheit -- Anhang. Kant und die moderne Physik -- Viertes Kapitel. Transzendentale Logik und Analogos -- § 50. Wesen und Grenze der transzendentalen Logik -- § 51. Das Wesen der Analogia. Reine Logik, Dialektik und Analogia. Analogia bei Aristoteles, Augustinus und Thomas -- § 52. Analogia bei Kant. Analogie in der,,Kritik der reinen Vernunft” als Analogia proportionis. Analogie in der,,Kritik der Urteilskraft” als Analogia attributionis -- § 53. Universalitas und Universitas. Das Analytisch-Allgemeine und das Synthesitsch-Allgemeine -- § 54. Die logische Konstruktion der Analogia. Satz des Widerspruchs und Satz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten -- Schluss. Die Transzendentale Topik und die Topologie des Logos -- § 55. Der Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie als transzendentale Topik.

Abstract: I Stress and Strain -- 1. Introductory -- 2. Stress. Definitions and notation -- 3. Stresses in two dimensions -- 4. Stresses in three dimensions -- 5. Mohr’s representation of stress in three dimensions -- 6. Displacement and strain. Introduction -- 7. The geometry of finite homogeneous strain in two dimensions -- 8. Finite homogeneous strain in three dimensions -- 9. Mohr’s representation of finite homogeneous strain without rotation -- 10. Infinitesimal strain in two dimensions -- 11. Infinitesimal strain in three dimensions -- II Behaviour of Actual Materials -- 12. Introductory -- 13. The stress-strain relations for a perfectly elastic isotropic solid -- 14. Special cases: biaxial stress and strain -- 15. Strain-energy -- 16. Anisotropic substances -- 17. Finite hydrostatic strain -- 18. Natural strain -- 19. The equations of viscosity -- 20. Fracture and yield -- 21. The maximum shear stress theory of fracture and its generalizations -- 22. Mohr’s theory of fracture -- 23. Earth pressure -- 24. The Griffith theory of brittle strength -- 25. Strain theories of failure -- 26. The tensile test on ductile materials -- 27. Yield criteria -- 28. The yield surface -- 29. The equations of plasticity -- 30. Substances with composite properties -- III Equations of Motion and Equilibrium -- 31. Introductory -- 32. Simple problems illustrating the behaviour of elastic, viscous, plastic and Bingham substances -- 33. The elastic equations of motion -- 34. The elastic equations of equilibrium -- 35. Special cases of the equations of elasticity -- 36. Special problems in elasticity -- 37. Wave propagation -- 38. Elastic waves -- 39. The equations of motion of a viscous fluid -- 40. Special problems in viscosity -- 41. Plastic flow in two dimensions -- IV Applications -- 42. Introductory -- 43. Experimental results on the mechanical properties of rocks -- 44. Systems having one or more planes of weakness -- 45. Porous media -- 46. Further discussion of criteria for failure -- 47. Stresses and faulting in the crust -- 48. The Coulomb-Navier theory in terms of invariants -- 49. The representation of two-dimensional stress fields -- 50. Stresses around openings -- 51. The use of the complex variable -- 52. Displacements -- 53. Underground measurements and their results -- 54. Measurement of rock properties -- 55. Effects of flaws, size and stress gradient -- 56. The complete stress-strain curve -- V Applications to Structural Geology -- 57. Introductory -- 58. Combination of strains -- 59. Determination of finite strain from deformed objects -- 60. Progressive deformation -- 61. Analysis of strain in folding -- 62. Instability theory: folding and kinking -- 63. Development of preferred orientations of ellipsoidal particles -- Notation -- Author Index.

Abstract: IN this monograph I have attempted to set out, in as elemen­ tary a form as possible, the basic mathematics of the theories of elasticity, plasticity, viscosity, and rheology, together with a discussion of the properties of the materials involved and the way in which they are idealized to form a basis for the mathe­ matical theory. There are many mathematical text-books on these subjects, but they are largely devoted to methods for the solution of special problems, and, while the present book may be regarded as an introduction to these, it is also in­ tended for the large class of readers such as engineers and geologists who are more interested in the detailed analysis of stress and strain, the properties of some of the materials they use, criteria for flow and fracture, and so on, and whose interest in the theory is rather in the assumptions involved in it and the way in which they affect the solutions than in the study of special problems. The first chapter develops the analysis of stress and strain rather fully, giving, in particular, an account of Mohr's repre­ sentations of stress and of finite homogeneous strain in three dimensions. In the second chapter, on the behaviour of materials, the stress-strain relations for elasticity (both for isotropic and simple anisotropic substances), viscosity, plas­ ticity and some of the simpler rheological models are described.

Abstract: 1 Introduction -- 2 Prospecting -- 3 Planning and Development -- 4 Removal of Overburden -- 5 The Use of Explosives in Surface Mining -- 6 Quarrying Hard Rocks -- 7 Working Iron and Copper Deposits by Open Pits -- 8 Opencast Coal -- 9 Surface Mining of Bauxite, Clays, Chalk and Phosphates -- 10 Surface Mining of Gold, Platinum, Uranium and Gemstones -- 11 Sand and Gravel -- 12 Alluvial Mining -- 13 Power Supply in the Surface Mining Industries -- 14 Reclamation after Surface Mining -- 15 The Management of Surface Mines -- Appendix I—Electromagnetic Prospecting -- Appendix II—Performance of Medium and Large Draglines -- Appendix III—Aggregates in Concrete.

Abstract: Quarrying and all other branches of surface mining rather than diminishing in importance have become of more and more consequence economically, industrially and particularly with the depletion of high-grade deep-mined mineral reserves. Low-grade minerals require low cost extraction and this in many cases necessitates very expensive mechanized equipment with the cost of individual units running into millions of pounds in the case of large­ scale operations with high productivity. There has been, and there still is, a tendency for the smaller single quarries to be amalgamated into groups with large financial resources and therefore with the ability to purchase these expensive machines so necessary to make operations viable. This in turn requires wider administrative and technical knowledge in executives of these groups and as these often handle a wide range of products from widely differing systems of working, this technical knowledge should embrace the exploitation of many different types of deposits. There is, at present, a great dearth throughout the world of such qualified executives as is apparent from advertisements of vacancies in the technical press. It would appear that these industries offer an attractive career to the widely qualified and experienced technologist in these fields. This book deals with methods of working in the surface extractive indus­ tries, quarry management and power supply-but does not deal with related ancillary processes except where these affect quarrying operations.

Abstract: I. Reaction to Heidegger -- II. Historicism as Humanism -- III. Hegel and Goethe -- IV. Meaning in History -- V. History as a Natural Happening.

Abstract: This brief survey of Professor Karl LOwith's analysis of the modem histori­ cal consciousness is the outgrowth of a year's study at the University of Heidelberg while Professor L6with was still an active member of the faculty. An early version, in the form of a dissertation, was submitted to the History Department of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A. Numerous friends and colleagues have helped me at various stages of this work and I am indebted to them even though I cannot name them all indi­ vidually. However special thanks must be accorded to Professor W. J. Bos­ senbrook of Wayne State University for introducing me to the entire prob­ lem of anti-historicism and to Professor LOwith's work. I am also greatly indebted to Professor John Barlow of Indiana University for his patient assistance with the translations, however the final responsibility for all renditions rests, of course, solely with the author.

Abstract: I -- II -- III -- Concluding Remarks -- A Short Bibliography.

Abstract: At opposite ends of over two millenia Hegel and Aristotle, virtually alone of the great European thinkers, consciously attempted to criticize and develop the thought of their predecessors into systems of their own. Both were thus committed in principle to the view that philosophy in each age of civilization is at once a product, a criticism, and a recon­ struction of the values and insights of its own past; that the fertile mind can only beget anew when it has acknowledged and understood a line of ancestors which has led to its begetting; that the thinker as little as the artist can start with a clean slate and a blankly open-minded atti­ tude to the world which he finds within him and before him. Man is by definition rational; philosophy is his continuous impulse to grasp and appraise a single universe of which he finds himself a part; philosophy therefore contains its history as a constituent element of its own nature, and the developmental character of philosophy must - unless human reason is, unthinkably and unarguably, a mere delusion - in some sense reflect, or even be in some sense identical with, an essentially develop­ mental universe - that is roughly the common creed of Aristotle and Hegel. Both of them further believed, as Plato had believed, that what is most real and intelligible in that universe is eo ipso most good.

Abstract: One -- I. The Historical Significance of the Letters -- II. The Metaphysics of Hierarchy -- III. The Hierarchic Design of the Letters -- IV. The Models of Order in the Eighth and Ninth Letters -- Two The Letters of PS.-Dionysius -- The Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius.

Abstract: N eoplatonism begins explicitly with Plotinus in the third century of our era. The later Neoplatonism of the fifth and six century schools at Athens and Alexandria was both the continuation of the philosophy of Plotinus and also a pagan ideology. When these schools were closed, despite attempts at compromise at Alexandria and as a result of direct and indirect political pressures and actions, pagan ideology died. Many philosophers, such as Isidore, Asclepiodotus, Damascius, and Olym­ piodorus, must have foreseen the danger to philosophy, and their extant writings are sprinkled with forebodings. Would the death of pagan ideology, in the form of pagan worship and the Homeric and Orphic traditions, bring about the death of all genuine philosophy as well? One answer to this great question is found in the enigmatic writings of Ps. -Dionysius the Areopagite. Purposing to be the writings of the Athenian convert of St. Paul, they fall within the province of a multitude of so-called "pseudepigraphic" Christian writings. 1. GENERAL ARGUMENT I embarked on the study of Ps. -Dionysius' Letters with two goals in mind: (r) to grasp in clear detail the unknown author's philosophic intentions in writing his famous Corpus and the way in which he set about writing, and (2) to attempt to see with precision the reason for the absence of a political philosophy in Christian Platonism. The Letters provided a richness of detail and information bearing on the first subject which was wholly unexpected.

Abstract: I. The Italian Revolution -- I. The Emergence of the Roman Question -- 2. The Restoration -- II. Disruption of Church and State -- 3. Rise of the National Movement -- 4. The Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 -- 5. The Unification of Italy -- III. Conciliation and Disengagement -- 6. The First Ministry of Ricasoli -- 7. The Revival of Democracy -- 8. Dissolution of the European Consensus -- 9. The Franco-Italian Settlement.

Abstract: There are two factors in the Revolution and the Risorgimento during the nineteenth century which have dictated the organization of this book and conditioned as well the presentation of its contents. One is the advent of a revolution which, abortive in r849, threatened continually thereafter to break out again; the second is the ideology of a ruling class, whose basic funds of values and conscious aims were abruptly and profoundly altered by the sudden appearance of revo­ lution and the equally swift decay of this same movement. From these two points of view it becomes mandatory that the story of the Risorgimento and the Revolution commence in the year r848. The mastery of the Revolution, as one sees with hindsight, was attained by r861. That achievement, not frequently recognized for what it was in terms of motivation and historical necessity, is of central interest in this book. I have consequently sought to give a rather full picture of events, with particular attention for the internal politics of the revo­ lutionary countries involved. The attitude of a class of men, threatened in their lives and in their property, is the attitude of the counter-revo­ lution. There was a willingness to accept revolutionary progress out of the need to direct its course.

Abstract: I. The Moon and Man -- 1. Man Moves into the Universe -- 2. Human Consequences of the Exploration of Space -- 3. From Alamogordo to Apollo: Will Man Heed the Lesson? -- II. The Politics of Spacefaring -- 4. Man on the Moon: The Columbian Dilemma -- 5. An American “Sputnik” for the Russians? -- 6. The Lunar Landing and the U.S.-Soviet Equation -- 7. Prospects for International Cooperation on the Moon: The Antarctic Analogy -- 8. Post-Apollo Policy: A Look into the 1970s -- III. The Future of Lunar Studies -- 9. Origin and History of the Moon -- 10. A Space Age Phenomenon: The Evolution of Lunar Studies -- 11. Manned Landings and Theories of Lunar Formation -- 12. A View from the Outside -- IV. The Technological Impact -- 13. The Industrial Impact of Apollo -- 14. Saturn/Apollo as a Transportation System -- 15. Apollo: A Pattern for Problem Solving -- 16. Automatic Checkout Equipment: The Apollo Hippocrates.

Abstract: AFTER THE LUNAR LANDING Our concern in this volume is the impact upon science, technology and international cooperation of man's emer­ gence from the "cradle," the biosphere of Earth, to visit the surface of another planet. The editors invited experts in the physical and social sciences who had been think­ ing, talking and writing about space programs for a long time. Some had been critical of manned space flight, its motives and its costs. Some have been or are currently involved in Project Apollo. Some had not committed themselves to value judgments but were fascinated by probable results. In general, the authors regard the moon landing as a climactic event in man's evolution. Sir Bernard Lovell is likely to have a cataclysmic effect on society suggests it and that an international effort should be mounted to send men to Mars in the 1980s. The question of how Project Apollo relates to a scheme of priorities which takes into account such needs as housing, health, pollution and the problems of urbaniza­ tion enters the discussion from several points of view. Eugene Rabinowitch suggests that Apollo may stimulate the development of a system of establishing national priorities in the application of the nation's resources. Freeman Dyson, on the other hand, does not believe that ix PREFACE x any "hierarchy of committees" can devise an accepted order of priorities.

Abstract: Introduction: The Problems of Contemporary Philosophy -- A. Tradition and Innovation in Contemporary Philosophy -- B. The Process of Differentiation in Philosophy -- C. A Look Ahead -- I / The Philosophy of Self-Evidence: Franz Brentano -- A. Mental Phenomena and Knowledge -- B. The Theory of Being -- C. The Theory of Moral Knowledge -- D. Knowledge of God -- E. Evaluation -- II / Methodological Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl -- A. The Absolute Character of Truth -- B. The Problem of Universals -- C. Intentionality, Judgment and Knowledge (The Phenomenology of Consciousness) -- D. The Phenomenological Intuiting of Essences (Die phänomenologische Wesensschau) -- E. Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy -- F. Evaluation -- III / Applied Phenomenology: Max Scheler -- A. Gnoseology and Phenomenology -- B. The Theory of Sympathy -- C. Value and Person -- D. Religious Philosophy and Theology -- E. Man’s Place in the Stratified Structure of the World -- F. Evaluation -- IV / Existential Ontology: Martin Heidegger -- A. The Philosophy of Existence in General and its Historical Relationship to Western Thought -- B. The Ontology of Finite Dasein -- C. Evaluation -- V / The Philosophy of Existence: Karl Jaspers -- A. Philosophical World-Orientation, Illumination of Existence, and Metaphysics -- B. The Being of the Encompassing, and Truth -- C. Evaluation -- VI / Critical Realism: Nicolai Hartmann -- A. The Metaphysics of Knowledge -- B. The Structure of Being -- C. The Philosophy of Spirit -- D. The Philosophy of Value -- E. Evaluation -- VII / Modern Empiricism: Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle -- A. Reasons for the Rise of Modern Empiricism -- B. Immanence Positivism (Mach, Avenarius) and the Epistemology of Moritz Schlick -- C. Definitions and Explications of Concepts -- D. Statements and the Meaning of Statements -- 1. First Formulation of the Empiricist’s Criterion of Meaning -- E. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge -- F. Semantics and Logical Syntax -- G. Evaluation -- VIII / Foundational Studies and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy -- A. Research in the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics -- B. The Theory of Empirical Scientific Knowledge -- C. Problems of Reality -- D. Ethics -- IX / Ludwig Wittgenstein -- A. Philosophy I -- B. Philosophy II -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: I. The Man -- Foreword. Death of a Hero -- I. The Path selected -- II. The Debate -- Prologue to a Debate -- 2. Genesis of the Unified Military Doctrine -- 3. A Battle of Articles -- 4. A Blossom in the Hotbed -- 5. The Debate at the Eleventh Party Congress -- III. The Doctrine -- The End to a Debate -- 6. Wars of the Future -- 7. Arms, Technology, and the Masses -- 8. The Regular Army and Militia -- 9. Inside the Academy and Out -- IV. Some Conclusions -- Ritualism and Reality -- 10. Frunze Today and in 1984 -- 11. Frunze’s Testament -- Epilogue: Who won? -- Appendices -- Appendix 1. ”Front and Rear in War of the Future” -- Appendix 2. ”Our Military Construction and the Tasks of the Military-Scientific Societies” -- Appendix 3. A Note on Frunze’s Campaigns -- Bibliographical note.

Abstract: Alongside the names of such giants of Soviet history as Brezhnev, Khrush­ chev, Kirov, Kosygin, Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky, the name of Mikhail Vasil'evich Fronze may seem to be out of place. In spite of a most impres­ sive flowering of Western scholarship on various aspects of the Soviet Union, the figure of Fronze remains relatively undeveloped. It is, in fact, quite possible to produce a history of the Soviet Union in which he is not 1 mentioned. It has been done several times. The Western neglect of Fronze is not duplicated in works produced in the Soviet Union. There, Frunze is almost invariably treated as a major figure and is popularly regarded as one of the great strategists of the early days of the Soviet republic. He holds, as well, a high place in the ranks of the "Old Bolsheviks. " How are these constrasts between the Western and the Soviet scholarly positions to be explained? Several factors account for the high position occupied by Frunze in Soviet historiography. He was a military hero. He had a long record of revolution­ ary activity. He died at an early age and did not become involved in the purges and other excesses of Stalin's later career. In short, Frunze's short, active life and his contributions to the revolution suited him almost ideally to the role of historical hero. Western scholars have neglected him, probably, for a number of reasons.

Abstract: I -- 1. Hobbes’s “Table of Absurdity” -- 2. Language and the Structure of Locke’s Essay -- 3. Kant’s “Refutation” of the Ontological Argument -- II -- 4. Isomorphism and Linguistic Waste -- 5. Reason, Morals and Philosophic Irony -- 6. Thought and Language -- 7. An Early Nietzsche Fragment on Language -- III -- 8. Analogy and Equivocation in Hobbes -- 9. On the “Composition” of the Critique. A Brief Comment -- 10. Kant’s Copernican Analogy. A Re-Examination -- Name Index.

Abstract: Although all the essays which make up this volume can be read as independent studies - and were in fact originally written as such - it is my hope that the reader will see that a unitary thread runs through them and that together they tell a story of their own. Written originally in response to certain views and doctrines of linguistic philosophy, the point which I have tried to argue in them is that although linguistic philosophy's impact upon our understanding and conception of philosophy has been profound, its contribution to our understanding of the history of philosophy, including its own history, has unfortunately all too often been disappointing, superficial and misguided. While this seems rather remarkable, especially since the tool which it has fashioned is obviously not without its uses even here, in the light of its negative and restrictive conception of language the results achieved are not after all perhaps surprising or unexpected.

Abstract: I: Introduction -- 1. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution -- 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction -- 3. Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words -- 4. Practical Arguments -- 5. Induction as a Genuine Problem and Study of Peirce and Lewis -- II: Scope of Peirce’s Theory of Induction -- III: The Nature and Validity of Inference -- 1. A General Theory of Inference -- 2. Necessary Inference and Probable Inference -- 3. Validity of Probable Inference -- IV: Probable Inference and Justifying Induction -- 1. Induction and Apagogical Inversion of Statistical Deduction -- 2. Induction As a Valid Probable Inference -- V: Requirements for the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remakrs -- 2. Peirce on Fair Sampling and Fair Samples -- 3. Principle of Fair Sampling: A New Formulation -- 4. Peirce on Predesignation -- 5. Relevancy of Predesignation for the Validity of Induction -- VI: Probability and the Validity of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Peirce’s Two Empirical Conceptions of Probability -- 3. Peirce’s Objections to the Laplacian Definition of Probability and Criticism -- VII: A Non-Probabilistic Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Self-Correcting Nature of Inductive Method -- 3. Criteria for Defining Truth and Justifying Induction -- 4. Other Arguments for the Necessity of General Validity of Induction -- VIII: Concluding Remarks on Peirce’s Non-Probabilistic Justification on Induction -- IX: Problems in Lewis’s Theory of Induction -- X: Induction and Analysis of Knowledge of Reality -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Knowledge and “A priori” Concepts -- 3. A Fundamental Principle in Establishing Criteria of Reality -- XI: An “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Problems of Justifying Induction in the Theories of Reality and Knowledge -- 3. Empirical Generalizations as Interpretations of Experience and Principle A -- 4. Analyticity of Principle A -- XII: Implications of Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical Justification of Induction -- 1. From Principle A to Justification of Argument from Past to Future -- 2. Lewis on the Practical Successfulness of Induction -- XIII: Concluding Remarks on Lewis’s “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction -- XIV: Nature of Probability and Rational Credibility -- 1. General Remarks -- 2. Empirical Interpretation of Probability -- 3. Logical Interpretation of Probability -- 4. Rational Credibility, Fair Sampling and Logical Probability -- XV: Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 1. Questions Regarding Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- 2. Degrees of Rational Credibility and Criteria for Determining Them -- 3. Justifying Acceptance of Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility -- XVI: Conclusion -- 1. Similarity Between Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction -- 2. Significances of Peirce’s and Lewis’s Arguments -- 3. Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Justifying Induction -- 4. Bearings upon Practicist and Linguist Arguments -- Appendix I. A Chronological Listing of Peirce’s Papers Directly Bearing upon Induction and Probability -- Appendix II. Proof of the Logical Law of Large Numbers (the Maximum Value Law of Hypergeometric Probability) -- Appendix III. Probabilities of Estimates of Values of Population Parameters -- Selected Bibliography.

Abstract: This book is based on my doctoral dissertation written at Harvard University in the year of 1963. My interest in Peirce was inspired by Professor D. C. Williams and that in Lewis by Professor Roderick Firth. To both of them lowe a great deal, not only in my study of Peirce and Lewis, but in my general approach toward the problems of knowledge and reality. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge Professor Williams for his patient and careful criticisms of the original manuscripts of this book. I also wish to thank Professor Firth and Professor Israel Scheffler for their many suggestive comments regarding my discussions of induc­ tion. However, any error in this study of Peirce and Lewis is completely due to myself. Chung-ying Cheng Honolulu, Hawaii March,1967 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V SUMMARY IX CHAPTER I: Introduction I I. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution I 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction 3 Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words 4 3.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- II. Socrates’ Moral Problem -- I. Justice: Internal and External -- II. Self-Knowledge and its Problems -- III. On the Nature of the Self -- III. The Problem of Art or Techne -- I. The Analysis of Art -- II. The Whole of Art -- III. Does a Doctrine of the Final Good Exist? -- IV. The Mystical Choice Again, and its Alternative -- V. Summary -- IV. The Problem of Knowledge -- I. On the Earlier Theory of Ideas -- II. The Limits and Conditions of Discourse -- III. The Doctrine and Art of Definition -- IV. Opinion and Image -- V. Knowledge-Theory and Self-Knowledge -- V. The Platonic Universe -- I. The Problem of the Universe of Discourse -- II. The Development of the Platonic Universe -- III. The Unity of the Final Universe -- IV. Knowledge in the New Cosmos -- V. Self-Knowledge and the Microcosm -- VI. Philosophy and Myth -- VI. Conclusion and Criticism -- I. Recapitulation: Ignorance and Self-Knowledge -- II. The Question of Immortality -- III. A Platonic View of the Person.

Abstract: This book is intended to offer an interpretation of an important aspect of Plato's philosophy. The matter to be interpreted will be the Platonic myths and doctrines which bear upon self-knowledge and self-ignorance. It is difficult to say in a word just what sort of thing an interpretation is. Rather than attempting to provide a set of rules or meta-rules supposed to define the ideally perfect interpretation, several distinctions will be suggested. I should like to distinguish the philological scholar from the inter­ preter by saying that the latter uses what the former produces. The function of the scholarly examination of a text is to make an ancient (or foreign) writing available to the contemporary reader. The scholar solves grammatical, lexical, and historical problems and renders his author readable by the person who lacks this scholarly learning and technique. The function of the interpreter is to make use of such available writings in order to render their content more intelligible and useful to a given audience. Thus, he thinks through this content, explains, and re-expresses it in a form which can be easily related to problems, persons, doctrines, or events of another epoch or of another class of readers. At the minimum, the interpretation of a philosophic writing may be thought to prepare its teaching for application to matters which belong in another time or context. Detailed application of a doctrine is, of course, still another thing.

Abstract: The Existence of Augustinian “Metaphysics” -- Mutability and Immutability -- Being and Non-Being -- Self-Identity -- Creation and Formation -- Truth -- Participation -- Analogy -- “Essence” and Creatures -- “ Essence” and God.

Abstract: The properly metaphysical dimension of Augustine's thought has received little special attention among scholars - even "Scholastics. " The Thomist metaphysicians - especially we "Anglo-Saxon" ones - receive first honors for being the most neglectful of all. Why? I t is a puzzling phenomenon particularly in the light of the fact (recognized by almost every Thomist) that the very existence of Thomas the theologian is inconceivable apart from his pre-eminent Christian mentor in the intellectual life, the Bishop of Hippo. It is a puzzling phenomenon because, although the Christian metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas is not the Christian metaphysics of Augustine, these metaphysics could not be simply opposed to one another, else the theologies wherein they exercise the indispensable function of vital rational organs would themselves be discordant. But what respectable "Scholas­ tic" would deny that, in their essential teaching about God and the things of God, the thought of these two masters is remarkably congruent? May I suggest that one of the major reasons for this paradoxical neglect of Augustinian metaphysics on the part of Thomists (above all, in the English-speaking world) is their simplistic assumption that whereas Aquinas was an Aristotelian in phi­ losophy, Augustine was a Platonist, despite the fact that in theology they were substantially at one - as if there could be theological agreement, formally speaking, even where there is metaphysical disagreement, formally speaking.

Abstract: Religious Reformers -- Xenophanes of Colophon -- Heraclitus of Ephesus -- Philosophers of Nature -- The Tranformists -- Anaximander of Miletus -- The Agenetists -- 1. Anaxagoras of Klazomenai -- Epilogue.

Abstract: Again and again and again: PHILOSOPHIA FIAT, QUAE PHILOLOGIA FUIT! As a consequence of certain developments in these last hundred years, ancient philosophy has been slipping from the hands of philosophers to become finally an almost exclusive domain of philologists. This has been happening not only because a tremendous amount of genuinely philological work had to be done, and still is needed, in collecting and textually adjusting the pertinent material, but also because a thorough knowledge and command of the ancient languages has become ever more and more of a rarity among philosophers, unfortunately. From the viewpoint of philosophical culture, this is disastrous. For most philologists are in a state of innocence as far as philosophy is concerned. Of course, they themselves are not aware of it. But the tragicomical fact remains: They have all the answers and do not know the questions. And so, led astray by philosophical miscon­ ceptions, they even commit appalling philological blunders every once in a while.

Abstract: 1. The Problem -- 2. A Critique of Reason -- 3. Subjectivity -- 4. The Paradox -- 5. The Christian Purpose served by the PostscriptKierkegaar -- 6. The Anti-Christianity of the Postscript -- 7. Index.

Abstract: I. Introduction -- 1. The acquisition of territory: the evolution of the modern concept -- 2. The acquisition of territory: the differing approach of academic and practising lawyers -- 3. The various modes of acquiring territory — Classification -- 4. Plan of the work -- II. Prescription in International Law -- 5. The distinction between acquisitive prescription and extinctive prescription -- 6. Prescription as a private law concept -- 7. Private law concepts in international law -- 8. Divergence of the definition of prescription between the continental and English legal systems -- 9. Prescription in municipal law — Roman law -- 10. Prescription in municipal law — English law -- 11. Prescription in municipal law — Conclusions -- 12. Doctrinal reasons for the existence of prescription in international law -- 13. The existence of prescription in international law ? Opinions of writers -- 14. The existence of prescription in international law — Judicial decisions rendered by international tribunals -- 15. The existence of prescription in international law — Judicial decisions rendered by municipal courts -- 16. The existence of prescription in international law — Practice of States -- III. Acquiescence as the Juridical Basis of an Historic Title -- 17. General -- 18. The creation of a customary rule of international law — The generality of practice and the time element -- 19. The creation of a customary rule of international law — Opinio jurisand acquiescence -- 20. The consensual basis of customary international law -- 21. Recognition and acquiescence -- 22. The role of the time element in the creation of special customary or “historic” rights -- 23. Some historic rights viewed as remainders of more extensive ancient rights -- 24. Non-exclusive historic rights -- 25. Acquiescence versus prescription as the legal basis of historic rights -- 26. Acquiescence as the juridical basis of historic rights — Opinions of writers -- 27. Acquiescence as the juridical basis of historic rights — Opinions of learned bodies -- 28. Acquiescence as the juridical basis of historic rights — Decisions of international tribunals -- 29. Acquiescence as the juridical basis of historic rights — Decisions of municipal courts -- 30. Acquiescence as the juridical basis of historic rights — State practice -- 31. Acquiescence and estoppel -- IV. The Requirements for the Formation of an Historic Title and its Constituent Elements -- 32. Introductory -- 33. Effective display of State authority — General -- 34. Effective display of State authority — The notion of continuity in respect of territorial situations -- 35. Effective display of State authority — Intention and will to act as sovereign -- 36. Effective display of State authority — Manifestations of State sovereignty -- 37. Effective display of State authority — Possession à titre de souverain -- 38. Acquiescence in the display of State authority — General -- 39. Acquiescence in the display of State authority — The meaning of “acquiescence” -- 40. Notoriety of territorial situations -- 41. Is notification a prerequisite of notoriety? -- 42. Constructive knowledge -- 43. The plea of excusable ignorance -- 44. The relevance of protest to the formation of an historic title -- 45. The conditions for the validity of a protest -- 46. Anticipatory protest -- 47. Protest as a bar to the acquisition of an historic title -- 48. The repetition of protest -- 49. The relevance of the protest of a single State -- 50. Lack of protest does not always indicate acquiescence -- 51. The geographical element in the formation of an historic title -- 52. The role of “legitimate interests” in the formation of an historic title -- 53. The role of the time element in the formation of an historic title -- V. Miscellaneous Problems of Interpretation and Evidence Relating to the Acquisition of an Historic Title -- 54. General -- 55. The application of intertemporal law in the interpretation of an historic title -- 56. The selection, of the “critical date” -- 56. 57. The relative strength of competing claims -- 58. The burden of proving an historic title -- 59. Strict geographical interpretation of an historic title -- VI. Juridical Aspects Specifically Related to the Formation of Maritime Historic Titles -- 60. General -- 61. The impact of the principle of the freedom of the high seas on the formation of maritime historic rights -- 62. What is international acquiescence? -- 63. Manifestations of State authority over maritime areas -- 64. Historic waters — Historic bays in general -- 65. Can multinational bays be claimed as historic bays? -- 66. The effects of territorial changes along the coast of a bay -- 67. Historic waters other than historic bays — Historic rights of delimitation -- 68. Historic waters other than historic bays — Water areas lying within and around island formations -- 69. Historic waters other than historic bays — Historic rights to a greater breadth of the territorial sea -- 70. The juridical status of historic waters — Historic waters are internal waters -- 71. The juridical status of historic waters — The distinction between internal inland waters and internal non-inland waters -- 72. The juridical status of historic waters — Multinational bays -- 73. Non-exclusive historic rights over maritime areas -- 74. Historic rights of fishing -- 75. Are claims to the sea-bed and subsoil of an “historic” character ? -- 76. Sedentary fisheries as historic rights -- VII. Conclusions -- 77. Consolidation as the legal root of historic titles -- 78. Critical appraisal of the doctrine of historic titles -- Appendix — Uti possidetis in international law -- Selected bibliography -- Index of Names -- General Indepc.

Abstract: The question of Historic Titles in International Law has been much discussed in recent years. In particular, it was an issue of some im­ portance in several international arbitrations, such as the Gulf of Fon­ seca case, decided by the Central American Court of Justice; the Island of Palmas case, decided by Judge Huber as sole arbitrator, under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration; the case concerning the Legal Status rif Eastern Greenland before the Permanent Court of International Justice; and, more recently still, the cases concerning Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway); Minquiers and Ecrehos Islets (U nited Kingdom v. France) ; Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. N ether­ lands); and Temple rif Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), before the International Court of Justice. Historic Titles are probably also a re­ levant factor in a number of territorial disputes that have not yet been submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement. The recent controversies over the proper breadth for the territorial sea and the exclusive fishing limits of coastal States have brought to the fore new aspects of the problem.

Abstract: to Part I -- I. Nature and Scope of the Problem -- II. The Historical Development of Diplomatic Asylum in Latin America -- III. Opinio Juris Sive Necessitatis and the Practice of Diplomatic Asylum -- IV. Establishing a Legal Basis through Multilateral Conventions and Treaties -- V. Diplomatic Asylum in Latin American Practice -- VI. United States Practice in Latin America -- VII. Asylum in Consulates -- To Part II -- VIII. Qualification of the Offence: Treaties -- IX. The problem of “Political” Offences -- X. Qualification of the Offence: Practice -- XI. Legal Norms and Political Reality -- Appendices -- Convention on Asylum, La Habana, 1928 -- Convention on Asylum, Montevideo, 1933 -- Convention on Asylum, Caracas, 1954 -- Summary of Cases cited by Colombia in the Colombian-Perúvian -- Asylum Case -- Summary of Cases to which the U.S. has been a Party Cited by Colombia in the Colombian Perúvian Asylum Case.

Abstract: The legal status of the institution of diplomatic asylum really presents two separate questions. (I) Is there evidence that states have regarded the practice of granting such asylum to political refugees as sanctioned by a rule of international law? (2) Assuming this to be the case, does the available evidence make it possible to define a "political refugee" and to determine which party to a dispute has the right to decide upon this question? While in many cases the two questions are not dearly separated in the discussions between the parties involved, they will be treated separately in the following pages. Part one will attempt to answer this question: Assuming the political nature of an offence can be establish­ ed, is there evidence that states have regarded the practice of granting diplomatic asylum as sanctioned by a rule of international law? Obviously, the two questions cannot be separated entirely but it seems advisable to try to isolate them as much as possible. CHAPTER I NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM The term "asylum" is used to identify such a variety of phenomena that the following distinctions must be made before the problem can be properly discussed I. Between diplomatic and territorial asylum. The importance of this distinction was pointed out by the International Court of Justice in the Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case,l often referred to as the Haya de la Torre Case.

Abstract: I Introduction -- 1. Terminology -- 2. Logic, Methodology and Science -- II The Phenomenological Method -- 3. General Remarks -- 4. “Back to the Things Themselves” -- 5. The Object of Phenomenological Investigation -- III Semiotic Methods -- 6. General Remarks -- 7. Formalism -- 8. Rules of Syntactic Meaning -- 9. Semantic Functions and Types -- 10. Semantic Meaning and Verifiability -- 11. Example of Semantic Methods in Practice -- IV The Axiomatic Method -- 12. General Remarks -- 13. The Axiomatic System -- 14. Mathematical Logic -- 15. Definition and Concept Formation -- 16. Example of the Axiomatic Method in Practice -- V Reductive Methods -- 17. General Remarks -- 18. The Structure of the Natural Sciences -- 19. Types of Explanatory Statements -- 20. Induction -- 21. Probability and Statistics -- 22. Historical Method -- Epilogue Guide to Further Reading -- Index of Persons -- Index of Subjects.

Abstract: Professor Bochenski, as he himself points out in the prologue, is a logician; he is best known in England and the United States for his work in the history of logic, and more recently in Soviet and East European philosophy. But he has taught philosophy for many years - in Rome, in Switzerland, and on a number of visits to the United States - and in this book provides an elementary introduction to contemporary work in the field. As a means to this end he has chosen to deal with four alternative methods employed by philosophers in the twentieth century. Philosophical methodology has not attracted much attention, in English­ speaking circles, as a distinct branch of the discipline of philosophy; the term "methodologist", if used at all, would ordinarily be taken to refer to somebody concerned with scientific rather than philosophical method. When, therefore, Professor Bochenski refers, as he frequently does, to "contemporary methodologists", meaning people who debate the re­ spective merits of phenomenology and mathematical logic as ways of approaching the world, the phrase has an odd ring. But philosophical methodology really makes a great deal more sense than scientific method­ ology. In science methodology is almost superfluous; given all the avail­ able information and a reasonably clear idea of what is wanted, there is usually not much ambiguity as to the means of getting it, or not much that could be resolved by mere argument.

Abstract: The Genre -- Lunacharskii Versus the Proletcult -- The Myth of Sten’ka Razin -- Politics Projected into the Past -- The Three Variants of Peter -- Myth Serves the War Effort -- The Transformation of Lermontov -- Conclusion.

Abstract: The taste for history is the most ariswcratic of all tastes. Ernest Rerum "Our century is pre-eminently an historical century . . . . Even art has now become pre-eminently historical. The historical novel and drama interest each and everyone more at present than do similar works belonging to the realm of pure fiction. "! Although Belinskii was writing in 1841, his statement could equally well apply to the Russia of a century later, when the interest in historical fiction had become, if anything, more intense. In fact, the abundance of Soviet historical novels and plays tempts one to believe Heine, when he said that the people want their history handed to them by the poet, not the historian. The infatuation with history to which Belinskii referred was not, however, indigenous to Russia; it was part of a rage, largely inspired by Waiter Scott, which had swept western Europe in the early nine­ teenth century, and which soon spread to Russia. Today, Scott's star has been eclipsed in the West, but it still burns brightly in the Soviet Union. Indeed, it can be said that the West has not only rejected Scott, but, to a considerable extent, the historical novel and playas well. As one writer recently put it: "The reading public, brought up on a strict diet of sex and science, prefers to take its history undiluted­ in the form of unexpurgated memoirs and frank biographies.

Abstract: one: The Elements of Ergonomic Practice -- 1. The Physical Basis of Man’s Perception of His Environment -- The Human Body -- 2. I. Bones, Joints and Muscles -- 3. II. Metabolism and Heat Regulation -- 4. III. Body Size, Limits of Movement and Functioning of Limbs -- 5. IV. The Nervous System -- 6. Man as a System Component -- two: Practical Ergonomics -- Design Factors -- 7. I. Layout of Equipment -- 8. II. Design of Seating -- 9. III. Design of Instrumental Displays -- 10. IV. Compatibility -- 11. V. Design Characteristics of Controls -- Environmental Factors -- 12. I. Environmental Temperature and Humidity -- 13. II. Noise -- 14. III. The Visual Environment -- 15. IV. Vibration -- Organizational Factors -- 16. I. Methods of Investigating Work -- 17. II. The Organization of Work -- 18. III. Inspection -- 19. IV. Shift Work -- 20. V. Age -- References -- Author Index.

Abstract: Until quite recently conditions in industry were often rough. Long hours were worked in insanitary and murky workshops, often with little regard to the effects upon the workpeople who were considered to be expendable. Now, however, these adverse conditions have been recognized and so remedied that there remains little in industrial conditions to disturb the public conscience. This does not mean that conditions of work in office or factory are perfect. The obvious and dramatic abuses of the human frame may have gone, but in their place have arisen stresses and strains which, taking effect only in the long term, are generally undramatic and often unrecognized. They exist none the less. No organized effort to study the effect of working conditions on man's performance was made until the end of World War I, when the Industrial Fatigue Research Board was set up. For the first time, men trained in the human sciences entered industry to study men at work. They made con­ tributions which set a new standard of scientific investigation into human performance and allowed executive action on the basis of evidence rather than of hunch. The Board's work differed from the contribution of Gilbreth in America in that the principles of Motion Study which he developed were, to a large extent, based on intelligent observation rather than controlled experiment. During the 1920S the National Institute of Industrial Psychology was founded and there was close collaboration between it and the I.F.R.B.

Abstract: I. Glossematics and de saussure -- II. History of glossematics. Its name and its object -- I — The autonomy of language. Process and system. Linguistic theory and empiricism -- 1. The autonomy of language -- 2. Process and system -- 3. Linguistic theory and empiricism -- II — Induction and deduction -- In OSG 40 — In Principles 41 — In Synopsis 42 — In Cas 43 — In Structure Morphologique 45 — In OSG Ch. 9 46 — Latest usage 47 — Different analyses 48 — Conclusion 50 — The aim of linguistics and the aim of glossematics 51 -- III — The theory of language: A calculation arbitrary, appropriate and as simple as possible -- 1. Language -- 2. Theory -- 3. Calculus — Calculation -- 4. Glossematic theory arbitrary, appropriate, and as simple as possible -- IV — The principle of analysis -- 1. The system of definitions -- 2. The principle: an a priori -- 3. The premisses -- 4. Basis of division -- 5. All-importance of the dependences -- 6. The nature of the dependences -- 7. The uniformity of the dependences -- 8. Conjunction — disjunction -- 9. Inventories -- 10. Some terminology -- V — Function, form, and their frame of reference -- 1. Function -- 2. Form -- 3. The syllable -- VI — The functives and their substance of expression -- 1. The functives and substance -- 2. Sound on a level with writing? -- 3. Two objections supported -- 4. Oppositions -- VII — The linguistic sign: The sign in itself -- 1. The sign -- 2. Meaning -- 3. Figurae -- 4. Schema and usage -- VIII — The linguistic sign: The sign and purport -- 1. Purport: de Saussure’s division of the “masse amorphe” -- 2. Purport: Hjelmslev’s division of the “masse amorphe” -- 3. The difference between “Purport”, “Content”, and “Substance” -- 4. Expression and content: the straight lines -- 5. The inversion of the sign-orientation -- IX — The commutation test -- 1. The definition of commutation -- 2. The extension of commutation -- 3. Second extension: the exchange of units starting from the content -- 4. Paradigms -- 5. Identification of phonemes — its place in the analysis -- 6. “Place” of the commutation test -- 7. Permutation. Definition of the word -- 8. Categories -- X — Syncretism and catalysis -- 1. Syncretism -- 2. Catalysis -- XI — Ultimate results of the deduction -- 1. The reduction of the phoneme -- 2. The completely analogous categorical structure of the two planes -- XII — Language amidst connotative semiotics, meta-semiotics, semiotics, symbolic systems and non-language -- 1. Connotative semiotics and meta-semiotics -- 2. Language and non-language -- XIII — Additions and alterations -- Bibliography of Louis Hjelmslev -- Publications consulted.

Abstract: This book owes its . existence to the encouragement and help of many others. In the first place I mention Prof. Dr. A. ]. B. N. Reichling, who was my supervisor at Amsterdam University and who from the beginning helped me on, through his most stimulating teaching and above all through his encouragement, his friendly advice and his sincere interest. The readiness with which he was always prepared to spend hours and hours of his valuable time on the discussion of the many problems with which the study of Glossematics confronts one, has often inspired me with wonder and deep gratitude. It is hardly possible to do justice in a preface to a supervisor to whom one owes so much, and from whose keen insight one has learned so much. One can only feel profoundly thankful for having been brought up in the linguistic atmosphere which Prof. Reichling creates about him, an atmosphere characterized by a persistent desire for an empirical approach to the facts of language, which desire he knows how to instill into his pupils. It is with some hesitation that I proceed to thanking the Danish scholars to whom I owe so much. The hesitation is due to an awareness that probably this work bears no proportion to all the trouble they took in my behalf. Above all I am extremely grateful to Prof. Dr.