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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (24 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement
    Keywords: Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure
    Abstract: Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (44 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs
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  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (43 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Iimi, Atsushi Price Structure And Network Externalities In The Telecommunications Industry
    Keywords: Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure ; Access to Markets ; Data ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Electricity ; Emerging Markets ; Fax ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure Development ; International Economics & Trade ; International Telecommunication ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Mobile Phone ; Mobile Phone Subscribers ; Mobile Telephone ; Network ; Penetration Rate ; Private Sector Development ; Telecommunications Infrastructure
    Abstract: Many developing countries have experienced significant developments in their telecommunications network. Countries in Africa are no exception to this. The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. In theory the telecommunications sector has two sector-specific characteristics: network externalities and discriminatory pricing. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. Some countries in Africa are still imposing certain price restrictions. But more important, it remains a policy issue how the authorities should ensure reciprocal access between operators at reasonable cost
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (81 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Maurer, Luiz Current And Forthcoming Issues In The South African Electricity Sector
    Keywords: Balance ; Coal ; Coal Reserves ; Distribution Facilities ; E-Business ; Electricity ; Electricity Distribution ; Electricity Supply ; Electricity System ; Electricity Utilities ; Electrification ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Environment ; Private Sector Development ; Balance ; Coal ; Coal Reserves ; Distribution Facilities ; E-Business ; Electricity ; Electricity Distribution ; Electricity Supply ; Electricity System ; Electricity Utilities ; Electrification ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Environment ; Private Sector Development ; Balance ; Coal ; Coal Reserves ; Distribution Facilities ; E-Business ; Electricity ; Electricity Distribution ; Electricity Supply ; Electricity System ; Electricity Utilities ; Electrification ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Environment ; Private Sector Development
    Abstract: One of the contentious issues in electricity reform is whether there are significant gains from restructuring systems that are moderately well run. South Africa's electricity system is a case in point. The sector's state-owned utility, Eskom, has been generating some of the lowest-priced electricity in the world, has largely achieved revenue adequacy, and has financed the bulk of the government's ambitious electrification program. Moreover, the key technical performance indicators of Eskom's generation plants have reached world-class levels. Yet the sector is confronted today with serious challenges. South Africa's electricity system is currently facing a tight demand/supply balance, and the distribution segment of the industry is in serious financial trouble. This paper provides a careful diagnostic assessment of the industry and identifies a range of policy and restructuring options to improve its performance. It suggests removing distribution from municipal control and privatizing it, calls for vertical and horizontal unbundling, and argues that the cost-benefit analysis of different structural options should focus on investment incentives and not just current operating efficiency
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  • 5
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (28 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Kessides, Ioannis N The Pricing Dynamics of Utilities With Underdeveloped Networks
    Keywords: Choice ; Consumers ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Discount Rate ; Diseconomies of Scale ; E-Business ; Economic Efficiency ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Incentives ; Investment ; Low Tariffs ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Markets and Market Access ; Monopoly ; Optimization ; Private Sector Development ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Choice ; Consumers ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Discount Rate ; Diseconomies of Scale ; E-Business ; Economic Efficiency ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Incentives ; Investment ; Low Tariffs ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Markets and Market Access ; Monopoly ; Optimization ; Private Sector Development ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Choice ; Consumers ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Discount Rate ; Diseconomies of Scale ; E-Business ; Economic Efficiency ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Incentives ; Investment ; Low Tariffs ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Markets and Market Access ; Monopoly ; Optimization ; Private Sector Development ; Urban Water Supply and Sanitation ; Water Supply and Sanitation
    Abstract: This paper uses an analytically tractable intertemporal framework for analyzing the dynamic pricing of a utility with an underdeveloped network (a typical case in most developing countries) facing a competitive fringe, short-run network adjustment costs, theft of service, and the threat of a retaliatory regulatory review that is increasing with the price it charges. This simple dynamic optimization model yields a number of powerful policy insights and conclusions. Under a variety of plausible assumptions (in the context of developing countries) the utility will find its long-run profits enhanced if it exercises restraint in the early stages of network development by holding price below the limit defined by the unit costs of the fringe. The utility's optimal price gradually converges toward the limit price as its network expands. Moreover, when the utility is threatened with retaliatory regulatory intervention, it will generally have incentives to restrain its pricing behavior. These findings have important implications for the design of post-privatization regulatory governance in developing countries
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