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  • English  (7)
  • 2005-2009  (7)
  • 1965-1969
  • Estache, Antonio  (7)
  • [Washington, D.C] : World Bank  (7)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    (Un)bundling infrastructure procurement : evidence from water supply and sewage projects (2009)
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: 2009 World Bank eLibrary Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 4854
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio (Un)bundling infrastructure procurement
    Keywords: Government purchasing ; Infrastructure (Economics) ; Sanitation ; Water-supply ; Government purchasing ; Infrastructure (Economics) ; Sanitation ; Water-supply
    Abstract: "Competition in public procurement auctions in the water supply and sanitation sector is largely limited. This is partly because of high technical complexity and partly because of auction design flaws. The division of lot contracts is an important policy choice for auctioneers to achieve efficiency. In general, there is a tradeoff between competition in auctions and size of contracts. Larger works could benefit from economies of scale and scope, but large contracts might undermine competition. Using data on public procurement auctions for water and sewage projects in developing countries, this paper shows that bidder entry is crucially endogenous, especially because it is determined by the auctioneer's bundling and unbundling strategy. If water treatment plant and distribution network works are bundled in a single lot package, competition would be significantly reduced, and this adverse entry effect would in turn raise the public procurement costs of infrastructure. There is no evidence of positive scope economies in the bidder cost structure. It is important to account for the underlying cost structure for designing efficient auction mechanisms. "--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/8/2009 , Also available in print.
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4854
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bidders' entry and auctioneer's rejection : applying a double selection model to road procurement auctions (2009)
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: 2009 World Bank eLibrary Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 4855
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Bidders' entry and auctioneer's rejection
    Abstract: "Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. This paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs. "--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/5/2009 , Also available in print.
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4855
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
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    Online Resource
    Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from oda infrastructure procurement (2009)
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: 2009 World Bank eLibrary Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 4853
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds
    Abstract: "Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders' entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality. "--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/8/2009 , Also available in print.
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4853
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
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    Online Resource
    How concentrated are global infrastructure markets? (2005)
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3513
    Parallel Title: Benitez, Daniel A How concentrated are global infrastructure markets?
    Keywords: Globalization ; Infrastructure (Economics) ; Globalization ; Infrastructure (Economics)
    Abstract: "In infrastructure, the possibility of a positive relationship between operators' profitability and the degree of concentration is a major political issue in view of the wide diversity of feelings about the potential role of the private sector. This is particularly important because of (1) the large residual degree of monopolies, (2) the protection they are granted through exclusivity clauses built in service delivery contracts, and (3) the widespread sense that the same operators tend to be present in most of the privatized operations. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a first set of quantitative assessments of the degree of concentration in infrastructure at the global and the regional levels. Concentration issues were identified in only about 20 percent of the cases studied, and a presumption of concentration was found in another 30 percent of the cases. Benitez and Estache find no correlation between the degree of concentration and the degree of reform adopted by a region or a sector. In more general terms, they find no scope for simple encompassing regional or sectoral statements because issues are region- and sector-specific. The authors conclude by arguing that there are a few cases and regions in which it would make sense for a supranational competition or regulation agency to ensure that the interests of the users are protected more effectively against the risks of collusion and other types of anti-competitive behaviors local regulators would not be equipped to address. This paper--a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network--is part of a larger effort in the network to document the state of the sector"--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/9/2005 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
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    Online Resource
    Infrastructure performance and reform in developing and transition economies : evidence from a survey of productivity measures (2005)
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3514
    Parallel Title: Trujillo, Lourdes Infrastructure performance and reform in developing and transition economies
    Keywords: Industrial productivity Case studies ; Infrastructure (Economics) Case studies ; Industrial productivity Case studies ; Infrastructure (Economics) Case studies
    Abstract: "Estache, Perelman, and Trujillo review about 80 studies on electricity and gas, water and sanitation, and rail and ports (with a footnote on telecommunications) in developing countries. The main policy lesson is that there is a difference in the relevance of ownership for efficiency between utilities and transport in developing countries. In transport, private operators have tended to perform better than public operators. For utilities, ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country studies find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private providers. As for the country-specific studies, some do find differences in performance over time but these differences tend to matter much less than a large number of other variables. Across sectors, private operators functioning in a competitive environment or regulated under price caps or hybrid regulatory regimes tend to catch up best practice faster than public operators. There is a very strong case to push regulators in developing and transition economies toward a more systematic reliance on yardstick competition in a sector in which residual monopoly powers tend to be common. This paper--a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network--is part of a larger effort in the network to document the state of the sector"--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/9/2005 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
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  • 6
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    Online Resource
    Ppi partnerships versus ppi divorces in developing countries (or are we switching from pppi to ppdi?) (2005)
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3470
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Ppi partnerships versus ppi divorces in developing countries (or are we switching from pppi to ppdi?)
    Keywords: Infrastructure (Economics) ; Privatization ; Public-private sector cooperation ; Infrastructure (Economics) ; Privatization ; Public-private sector cooperation
    Abstract: "Thirty years ago, in 1974, Chile launched the first large-scale privatization in a developing country. About 15 years later, Argentina provided a new model of global infrastructure management. Since then a variety of public-private partnerships in infrastructure have been adopted throughout the developing and transition world. These experiences add up to a large and heterogeneous enough sample of experiences from which some fairly robust conclusions on who benefited from the reforms and who did not. Because many of these experiences are also turning sour and the 'privatization' fad of the 1990s seems to be turning into an 'antiprivatization' fad, it seems important to separate facts from emotions. Estache argues that the wide differences in interpretations of the facts can be explained by wide differences in the assessment criteria used by analysts, including the definition of the baseline data chosen to assess the incremental effect of reforms. It is also driven by the sectors, the regions, and probably most important, the actors on which the analysis tends to focus. Once all these factors have been considered, a relatively fair and quantitative assessment of the prospects of the public-private relationship in infrastructure is possible. This paper--a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network--is part of a larger effort in the network to stimulate a debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure reforms"--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/3/2005 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    How widespread were private investment and regulatory reform in infrastructure utilities during the 1990s? (2005)
    [Washington, D.C] : World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3595
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio How widespread were private investment and regulatory reform in infrastructure utilities during the 1990s?
    Keywords: Public utilities Case studies Finance ; Public utilities Case studies Finance
    Abstract: "This note provides a snapshot as of 2004 of the share of countries with an independent regulatory agency and with at least some private sector financing of its sectoral investment needs for electricity, water and sanitation, and telecommunications. Among other things, they show that: For respectively, electricity, water and sanitation, and telecommunications, 51 percent, 21 percent, and 66 percent of the developing countries in the sample have an independent regulator, that is, an agency separate from a ministry and from the operator. For respectively, electricity generation, electricity distribution, water and sanitation, and telecommunications, 47 percent, 36 percent, 35 percent, and 59 percent of the developing countries in the sample have at least some private sector financing. The shares of both agencies and private sector involvement tend to increase with income levels. Latin and Central America and Eastern Europe are outliers among regions as almost systematically they have among the highest shares for both indicators across sectors (except water). "--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/16/2005 , Also available in print.
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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