Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource
Edition:
Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
Series Statement:
Policy research working paper 2543
Parallel Title:
Keefer, Philip When do special interests run rampant?
Keywords:
Banks and banking Political aspects
;
Mathematical models
;
Financial crises Mathematical models
;
Fiscal policy Mathematical models
;
Banks and banking Political aspects
;
Mathematical models
;
Financial crises Mathematical models
;
Fiscal policy Mathematical models
Abstract:
Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups, especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the government's fiscal transfers are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions
Note:
"February 2001"--Cover
,
Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-47)
,
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 18, 2002
,
Also available in print.
URL:
Volltext
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