ISBN:
9781461527909
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (IX, 385 p)
,
online resource
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Social sciences
;
Operations research
;
Political science.
Abstract:
This volume further explores the possibilities that rational choice and game theory have to offer for international relations research, using a variety of approaches. For instance, while paying due attention to the importance of bilateral representations of international situations in the form of two person games, it also covers cooperative problems in international relations at a multilateral level. In order to achieve this, it contains several pieces of work that are inspired by notions of coalition analysis and cooperative game theory. In order to cover the various aspects of the formal treatment of international cooperation, the volume is divided into five parts: General Aspects, Specific Applications of Game Theory and Cooperation, Deterrence, Escalation and Crises, and finally Other Approaches to Modeling International Cooperation
Description / Table of Contents:
Cooperative Models in International Relations ResearchI Game Theory and Cooperation: General Aspects -- 1 Sources in Game Theory for International Relations Specialists -- 2 On Coalition Games -- 3 From Conflict to Cooperation in the Study of International Security -- 4 A Theory of Cooperation in the Triad -- II Game Theory and Cooperation: Specific Applications -- 5 International Cooperation Among Relative-Gains Maximizers -- 6 The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory -- 7 Implementation Through Sequential Unanimity Games -- III Deterrence -- 8 Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World -- 9 A Question of Procedure at the Vienna Arms Talks -- IV Escalation and Crises -- 10 Limited Nuclear Options and the Dynamics of Escalation -- 11 Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining -- 12 Are Crises Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis -- V Other Approaches to Modeling International Cooperation -- 13 The Origin of Games: A Theory of the Formation of Ordinal Preferences and Games -- 14 An Economic Analysis of Cooperation in the European Community -- 15 Labor Relations in International Comparison, or Why Humans (and Nations) Sometimes Cooperate and Sometimes Don’t.
DOI:
10.1007/978-1-4615-2790-9
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
Permalink
