ISBN:
9781402028922
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource(VI, 233 p.)
Edition:
1st ed. 2004.
Series Statement:
Contributions to Phenomenology, In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology 52
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Epistemology.
;
Phenomenology .
;
Cognitive psychology.
;
Philosophy of mind.
;
Neuropsychology.
;
Knowledge, Theory of.
;
Philosophy (General)
;
Genetic epistemology
;
Phenomenology
;
Philosophy of mind
;
Psychology, clinical
;
Consciousness
Abstract:
Situational Understanding: A Gurwitschian Critique of Theory of Mind -- Vertical Context after Gurwitsch -- Schizophrenia: A Disturbance of the Thematic Field -- Intentionality, Consciousness, and Intentional Relations: From Phenomenology to Cognitive Science -- The Experience of the Present Moment -- Field Theories of Mind and Brain -- The Marginal Body -- Experimental Evidence for Three Dimensions of Attention -- The Structure of Context and Context Awareness -- The Field of Consciousness as a Living System: Toward a Naturalized Phenomenology of Cognition -- The Three Species of Relevancy in Gurwitsch -- Kinds of Knowledge: Phenomenology and the Sciences.
Abstract:
When I heard the rumor that the findings about the central nervous system obtained with new technology, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET), were too subtle to correlate with the crude results of many decades of behavioristic psychology, and that some psychologists were now turning to descriptions of subjective phenomena in William James, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—and even in Buddhism—I asked myself, “Why not Aron Gurwitsch as well?” After all, my teacher regularly reflected on the types, basic concepts, and methods of psychology, worked with Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein in the institute investigating brain-injured veterans at Frankfurt in the 1920s, conspicuously employed Gestalt theory to revise central Husserlian doctrines, and taught Merleau-Ponty a thing or two. That the last book from his Nachlass had recently been published and that I had recently written an essay on his theory of 1 psychology no doubt helped crystallize this project for me. What is “cognitive science”? At one point in assembling this volume I polled the participants, asking whether they preferred “the cognitive sciences” or “cognitive science. ” Most who answered preferred the latter expression. There is still some vagueness here for me, but I do suspect that cognitive science is 2 another example of what I call a “multidiscipline. ” A multidiscipline includes participants who confront a set of issues that is best approached under more than one disciplinary perspective.
DOI:
10.1007/978-1-4020-2892-2
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