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  • MPI Ethno. Forsch.  (8)
  • HeBIS
  • 2010-2014  (8)
  • National Defense Research Institute 〈U.S.〉  (8)
  • Afghanistan  (8)
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  • MPI Ethno. Forsch.  (8)
  • HeBIS
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Language
Years
Year
Subjects(RVK)
  • 1
    ISBN: 9780833082428 , 0833082426 , 9780833082435 , 0833082442 , 0833082434 , 083308237X , 9780833082374 , 9780833082442
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xvii, 73 pages)
    Series Statement: RAND Corporation research report series RR469
    Parallel Title: Print version Clarke, Colin P From stalemate to settlement
    Keywords: Insurgency History ; Insurgency ; Mediation, International ; Peace-building ; Insurgency ; Insurgency ; Mediation, International ; Peace-building ; Insurgency ; Mediation, International ; Peace-building ; Law, Politics & Government ; International Relations ; Afghanistan ; LAW ; International ; History ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Electronic books
    Abstract: "In June 2013, the Afghan Taliban opened a political office in Qatar to facilitate peace talks with the U.S. and Afghan governments. Negotiations between the United States and the group that sheltered al-Qaeda would have been unthinkable 12 years ago, but the reality is that a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is one of several possible end games under the current U.S. withdrawal plan. Negotiating an end to an insurgency can be a long and arduous process beset by false starts and continued violence, but a comprehensive review of historical cases that ended in settlement shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative." This research examines 13 historical cases of insurgencies that were resolved through negotiated settlement in which neither side (insurgents or counterinsurgents) unambiguously prevailed. Taken together, these cases reveal that the path to negotiated settlement generally proceeds in seven steps in a common sequence. Although this resulting master narrative does not necessarily conform precisely to every conflict brought to resolution through negotiation, it can serve as an important tool to guide the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw."--Provided by publisher
    Abstract: "In June 2013, the Afghan Taliban opened a political office in Qatar to facilitate peace talks with the U.S. and Afghan governments. Negotiations between the United States and the group that sheltered al-Qaeda would have been unthinkable 12 years ago, but the reality is that a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is one of several possible end games under the current U.S. withdrawal plan. Negotiating an end to an insurgency can be a long and arduous process beset by false starts and continued violence, but a comprehensive review of historical cases that ended in settlement shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a "master narrative." This research examines 13 historical cases of insurgencies that were resolved through negotiated settlement in which neither side (insurgents or counterinsurgents) unambiguously prevailed. Taken together, these cases reveal that the path to negotiated settlement generally proceeds in seven steps in a common sequence. Although this resulting master narrative does not necessarily conform precisely to every conflict brought to resolution through negotiation, it can serve as an important tool to guide the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw."--Provided by publisher
    Note: "This report builds on previous RAND Corporation research on the demonstrated effectiveness of a variety of concepts for counterinsurgency ... at the core of the current research is an analysis of the correlates and conditions of negotiated settlements in historical insurgencies."--Preface , "Approved for public release; distribution unlimited , Includes bibliographical references
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9780833081766 , 0833083643 , 0833081764 , 9780833083647
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 25 pages)
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency Case studies ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Afghanistan ; Military Science - General ; Case studies ; Military & Naval Science ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Counterinsurgency ; Law, Politics & Government ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Abstract: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was ... conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (page 25)
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833059062 , 0833077775 , 0833059068 , 9780833077776
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xix, 70 pages)
    Series Statement: Technical report TR-1014-USFOR-A
    Parallel Title: Print version Assessing freedom of movement for counterinsurgency campaigns
    DDC: 355.02/18
    Keywords: Freedom of movement ; Counterinsurgency ; Freedom of movement ; Counterinsurgency ; Military Science - General ; Afghanistan ; Freedom of movement ; Counterinsurgency ; Military & Naval Science ; Law, Politics & Government ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Freedom of movement (FoM) is the actual or perceived degree to which individuals or groups can move from place to place within a given environment or into and out of that environment. FoM is clearly an important consideration in the development of counterinsurgency tactics, operations, and strategies, but it is addressed infrequently and inconsistently in the doctrine and literature on counterinsurgency. A consistent, comprehensive definition of FoM must take into account the range of complexities and challenges posed by the operating environment, as well as the practical reality that FoM means something different to different groups. Focusing specifically on Afghanistan, this examination considers actual and perceived FoM for civilians, coalition and Afghan security forces, government officials, nongovernmental organizations, and insurgents and profiles the factors that influence these groups and affect data reporting in potentially misleading ways. It also serves as a guide for a bottom-up approach to developing sustainable FoM assessment processes that consider the range of variables that can enable and inhibit actual freedom to move and that can affect the subsequent analysis of FoM data. A historical and global review of a sample of the FoM assessment literature and interviews with assessment experts also clarify best practices and gaps in knowledge and capability that assessment staffs could address
    Abstract: Freedom of movement (FoM) is the actual or perceived degree to which individuals or groups can move from place to place within a given environment or into and out of that environment. FoM is clearly an important consideration in the development of counterinsurgency tactics, operations, and strategies, but it is addressed infrequently and inconsistently in the doctrine and literature on counterinsurgency. A consistent, comprehensive definition of FoM must take into account the range of complexities and challenges posed by the operating environment, as well as the practical reality that FoM means something different to different groups. Focusing specifically on Afghanistan, this examination considers actual and perceived FoM for civilians, coalition and Afghan security forces, government officials, nongovernmental organizations, and insurgents and profiles the factors that influence these groups and affect data reporting in potentially misleading ways. It also serves as a guide for a bottom-up approach to developing sustainable FoM assessment processes that consider the range of variables that can enable and inhibit actual freedom to move and that can affect the subsequent analysis of FoM data. A historical and global review of a sample of the FoM assessment literature and interviews with assessment experts also clarify best practices and gaps in knowledge and capability that assessment staffs could address
    Note: "Prepared for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan , "National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 59-70)
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  • 4
    ISBN: 9780833068385 , 0833068385 , 9780833058157 , 0833068407 , 0833058150 , 9780833068408
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxxi, 308 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series
    Parallel Title: Print version Connable, Ben Embracing the fog of war
    DDC: 355.02/180973
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency Evaluation ; Counterinsurgency ; HISTORY ; Revolutionary ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Intelligence & Espionage ; counterinsurgency ; Afghanistan ; United States ; Vietnam ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process -- contextual assessment -- that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process
    Abstract: Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process -- contextual assessment -- that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense , Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-308)
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  • 5
    ISBN: 9780833058119 , 0833058118 , 9780833052483 , 0833058134 , 0833052489 , 9780833058133
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (19 pages)
    Series Statement: Occasional paper OP-337-OSD
    Parallel Title: Print version Counterinsurgency Scorecard
    Keywords: Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; HISTORY ; Military ; Other ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; COMPUTERS ; Data Modeling & Design ; Counterinsurgency ; Military & Naval Science ; Law - U.S ; Law, Politics & Government ; Law - U.S. - General ; Military Science - General ; Afghanistan ; Case studies ; Electronic books
    Abstract: The previously published RAND monograph, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, used detailed case studies of the 30 insurgencies worldwide begun and completed between 1978 and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A core finding was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly predicted the outcome of those 30 insurgencies. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi, exercise in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2011 Afghanistan scores in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses: its score was lower than that in the lowest-scoring historical COIN win but higher than that in the highest-scoring COIN loss. This suggests an uncertain outcome in Afghanistan, but the findings may help provide additional guidance as operations continue
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (page 19)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, Calif : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833051387 , 083305158X , 0833051385 , 9780833051585
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 27 pages)
    Series Statement: Occasional paper OP-327-MCIA
    Parallel Title: Print version Jones, Seth G., 1972- Reintegrating Afghan insurgents
    Keywords: Soldiers Rehabilitation ; Counterinsurgency ; Soldiers ; Counterinsurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Soldiers ; Rehabilitation ; HISTORY ; Military ; Afghan War (2001- ) ; Afghanistan ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Terrorism ; Armed Forces ; Demobilization ; Afghanistan Armed Forces ; Demobilization ; Afghanistan ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Figures and Table; Summary; Chapter One: Factors That Enable Reintegration; Perception of Winning; Coercion; Addressing Grievances; Chapter Two: Reintegration Procedures; Proactive Efforts; Screening; Holding and Security Procedures; Incentives; Engagement of Tribal and Other Leaders; Information Operations; Active Use of Personnel; Chapter Three: Conclusions: Reintegration from the Bottom Up; Notes
    Abstract: Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Figures and Table; Summary; Chapter One: Factors That Enable Reintegration; Perception of Winning; Coercion; Addressing Grievances; Chapter Two: Reintegration Procedures; Proactive Efforts; Screening; Holding and Security Procedures; Incentives; Engagement of Tribal and Other Leaders; Information Operations; Active Use of Personnel; Chapter Three: Conclusions: Reintegration from the Bottom Up; Notes
    Note: "Prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity , "The research described in this report was prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002"--Title page verso , "National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-27)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND National Defense Research Institute
    ISBN: 9780833049889 , 083305080X , 0833049887 , 9780833050809
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 97 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-1002-MCIA
    Parallel Title: Print version Jones, Seth G., 1972- Afghanistan's local war
    Keywords: National security ; Internal security ; National security ; Internal security ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Security (National & International) ; Internal security ; Afghanistan ; National security ; Politics and government ; Armed Forces ; Military readiness ; Military policy ; Afghanistan ; Afghanistan ; Afghanistan Military policy 21st century ; Afghanistan Armed Forces 21st century ; Afghanistan Armed Forces ; Afghanistan Politics and government 2001- ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Security in Afghanistan has historically required a combination of top-down efforts from the central government and bottom-up efforts from local communities. Since 2001, U.S. and broader international efforts have focused on establishing security solely from the top down through Afghan national security forces and other central government institutions. But local security forces are a critical complement to these efforts, especially in rural areas of the country. The Afghan government and NATO forces need to move quickly to establish a more-effective bottom-up strategy to complement top-down efforts by better leveraging local communities. The Afghan government can work with existing community structures that oppose insurgents to establish village-level policing entities, such as arbakai and chalweshtai, with support from NATO. Effectively leveraging local communities should significantly improve counterinsurgency prospects and can facilitate mobilization of the population against insurgents. This analysis documents lessons about the viability of establishing local security in Afghanistan and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies
    Abstract: Security in Afghanistan has historically required a combination of top-down efforts from the central government and bottom-up efforts from local communities. Since 2001, U.S. and broader international efforts have focused on establishing security solely from the top down through Afghan national security forces and other central government institutions. But local security forces are a critical complement to these efforts, especially in rural areas of the country. The Afghan government and NATO forces need to move quickly to establish a more-effective bottom-up strategy to complement top-down efforts by better leveraging local communities. The Afghan government can work with existing community structures that oppose insurgents to establish village-level policing entities, such as arbakai and chalweshtai, with support from NATO. Effectively leveraging local communities should significantly improve counterinsurgency prospects and can facilitate mobilization of the population against insurgents. This analysis documents lessons about the viability of establishing local security in Afghanistan and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 89-97)
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    ISBN: 9780833049193 , 0833050249 , 0833049194 , 9780833050243
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 52 pages)
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-945-OSD
    Parallel Title: May, Karl, 1842 - 1912 Winnetou
    Parallel Title: Print version Chivvis, Christopher EU civilian crisis management
    RVK:
    Keywords: North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; Postwar reconstruction ; Postwar reconstruction ; Civil-military relations ; Military missions ; Crisis management ; Postwar reconstruction ; Postwar reconstruction ; Civil-military relations ; Military missions ; Crisis management ; HISTORY ; Military ; Strategy ; HISTORY ; Europe ; General ; UE/CE PESD= Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ; Maintien de la paix ; Gestion de crises ; Après-guerre ; Etat de droit ; Société civile ; Police ; Experts ; Civil-military relations ; Crisis management ; Military missions ; Military policy ; Postwar reconstruction ; crisis management ; EU ; Law, Politics & Government ; International Relations ; Afghanistan ; Europe ; European Union countries ; Kosovo (Republic) ; Kosovo ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; Afghanistan ; European Union countries Military policy ; European Union countries ; Electronic book
    Abstract: "The European Union has been deploying civilians in conflict and postconflict stabilization missions since 2003, and the scope of civilian missions is likely to increase in the future. This volume offers a general overview and assessment of the EU's civilian operations to date, as well as a more in-depth look at the two missions in which the EU has worked alongside NATO: the EU police-training mission in Afghanistan and the integrated rule of law mission in Kosovo. The author concludes with a discussion of the main policy implications for the United States and Europe."--Rand web site
    Abstract: "The European Union has been deploying civilians in conflict and postconflict stabilization missions since 2003, and the scope of civilian missions is likely to increase in the future. This volume offers a general overview and assessment of the EU's civilian operations to date, as well as a more in-depth look at the two missions in which the EU has worked alongside NATO: the EU police-training mission in Afghanistan and the integrated rule of law mission in Kosovo. The author concludes with a discussion of the main policy implications for the United States and Europe."--Rand web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 49-52)
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