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  • HeBIS  (1)
  • IWF
  • Chamley, Christophe  (1)
  • Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press  (1)
  • Electronic books  (1)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 0511165978 , 0511165382 , 0511616376 , 0511164823 , 9780511165382 , 9780511616372 , 9780511164828 , 9780511165979
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 402 pages) , illustrations
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Chamley, Christophe Rational herds
    DDC: 303.3/2
    RVK:
    Keywords: Social learning ; Social learning Mathematical models ; Decision making ; Collective behavior ; SOCIAL SCIENCE ; General ; Collective behavior ; Decision making ; Social learning ; Soziales Lernen ; Kollektives Verhalten ; Mathematisches Modell ; Sociaal leren ; Wiskundige modellen ; Aprendizagem social ; Aprendizagem social (modelos matemáticos) ; Tomada de decisão ; Comportamento coletivo ; Electronic books ; Electronic books ; Electronic books
    Abstract: 1. Introduction -- Part I. Social learning : 2. Bayesian tools : The bayesian framework ; Binary and Gaussian information ; Private signals and beliefs ; Martingales -- 3. Social learning with a common memory : A canonical model of social learning ; Efficient learning ; Observation noise ; Extensions -- 4. Cascades and herds : The basic model of herding ; The standard model with bounded beliefs ; The convergence of beliefs ; Herds and the slow convergence of beliefs ; Pricing the informational externality ; Crashes and booms -- 5. Limited memories : The sequential model with sampling ; The welfare-improving principle ; Sampling in a very large population ; Social learning or sampling in a large population? -- 6. Delays : The simplest model ; A general model with heterogeneous beliefs ; Properties -- 7. More delays : The length of a period ; Continuous times ; Buildup of private information ; Observation of payoffs -- 8. Outcomes : Incomplete learning ; The determinant of economic success: luck or effort? ; Complete learning with a diversity of private beliefs -- 9. Networks and diffusion : Optimization and diffusion of innovations ; Learning in networks -- 10. Words : Advice by one expert ; Larger sets of states and messages ; Panel of experts ; The receiver does not make the evaluation -- Part II. Coordination : 11. Guessing to coordinate : Overview ; Eductive stability in a standard market ; Strategic complementarities ; Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate -- 12. Learning to coordinate : A distribution with a cluster ; Observation noise -- 13. Delays and payoff externalities : Strategic substitutability ; Strategic complementaries -- Part III. Financial herding : 14.l Sequences of financial trades : Learning in the model of Glosten and Milgrom ; Herds ; Avalanches ; Herding in auctions -- 15. Gaussian financial markets : Actions in the CARA-Gauss model ; Markets ; The convergence of beliefs ; Multiple equilibria, crashes, and booms -- 16. Financial frenzies : Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate ; Information delays in financial markets ; The crash of a bubble.
    Abstract: This book is the first in the exciting new field of social learning
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-394) and indexes , English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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