ISBN:
9780691168739
Language:
English
Pages:
1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 401 pages)
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 1974 - Political economy for public policy
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 1974 - Political economy for public policy
DDC:
330
Keywords:
Wirtschaftspolitik
;
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
;
Politikwissenschaft
;
Theorie
;
Political planning
;
Policy sciences
;
Economics
;
Politische Theorie
;
Staatstätigkeit
;
Politische Wissenschaft
;
Politische Ökonomie
;
Good governance
;
Electronic books
;
Economics.
;
Political planning.
;
Policy sciences.
;
Erde
;
Electronic books
;
Lehrbuch
;
Electronic books
;
Lehrbuch
;
Wirtschaftspolitik
;
Politische Ökonomie
;
Pareto-Optimum
;
Externer Effekt
;
Koordination
;
Information
;
Anreizsystem
;
Spieltheorie
;
Governance
;
Wirtschaftspolitik
;
Politische Ökonomie
;
Governance
Abstract:
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Summary of Contents -- Contents -- Policy Applications -- Preface -- For Whom Is This Book Written? -- A Word on Tone and Technicality -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Three Goals -- The Role of Models -- Why Rationality? -- I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS -- 1 Normative Frameworks -- 1.1 What Is a Normative Framework? -- 1.1.1 Private vs. Public Morality -- 1.2 Utilitarianism -- 1.2.1 Why Be a Utilitarian? -- 1.2.2 Some Problems for Utilitarianism -- 1.3 Egalitarianism -- 1.3.1 Equality of Outcomes -- 1.3.2 Equality of Opportunity
Abstract:
1.4 Kantian Deontology -- 1.4.1 Deontology and the Challenges to Utilitarianism -- 1.4.2 Challenges for Deontological Thinking -- 1.5 Libertarianism -- 1.5.1 Why Be a Libertarian? -- 1.5.2 Some Problems for Libertarianism -- 1.6 Takeaways -- 1.7 Further Reading -- 1.8 Exercises -- 2 Collective Goals -- 2.1 Rational Individuals -- 2.2 Aggregation Procedures -- 2.3 Evaluative Criteria for Aggregation Procedures -- 2.3.1 Transitivity of Social Preferences -- 2.3.2 Unanimity -- 2.3.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- 2.4 Arrow's Theorem -- 2.5 Social Decisions Instead of Social Preferences
Abstract:
2.6 The Public Interest? -- 2.6.1 Only Two Alternatives: May's Theorem -- 2.6.2 Ruling Out Some Collections of Preferences: The Median Voter Theorem -- 2.6.3 Intensity of Preferences -- 2.6.4 Agreement -- 2.7 Takeaways -- 2.8 Further Reading -- 2.9 Exercises -- 3 Pareto Concepts -- 3.1 Pareto Concepts -- 3.2 From Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvements -- 3.3 A Model of Policies and Preferences -- 3.3.1 Actions and Transfers -- 3.3.2 Quasi Linearity: A Bridge from Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvement -- 3.4 A Bridge Too Far? -- 3.4.1 Limited Transfers and Distributional Concerns
Abstract:
3.4.2 Non Quasi Linear Preferences -- 3.5 Relationship to Cost-Benefit Analysis -- 3.6 Are Pareto Improvements Unambiguously in the Public Interest? -- 3.7 Takeaways -- 3.8 Further Reading -- 3.9 Exercises -- 3.10 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.3.1 -- Summing Up Normative Foundations -- II SOCIAL DILEMMAS -- 4 Externalities -- 4.1 Collective Action -- 4.1.1 The Social Dilemma -- 4.1.2 Interpretations -- 4.2 Public Goods -- 4.2.1 Comparison to the First Best or Utilitarian Optimum -- 4.2.2 Interpretation -- 4.2.3 Concentrated vs. Diffuse Interests -- 4.3 The Tragedy of the Commons
Abstract:
4.3.1 A Pareto Improvement -- 4.3.2 The First Best -- 4.3.3 Interpretation -- 4.4 Policy Interventions -- 4.4.1 The Failure of Persuasion -- 4.4.2 Pigovian Subsidies and Taxes -- 4.4.3 Regulation -- 4.5 The Theory of the Second Best -- 4.5.1 The Second Best Pigovian Subsidy -- 4.6 Alternative Responses -- 4.6.1 Altruism -- 4.6.2 A Market in Externalities -- 4.6.3 Ongoing Relationships and Self Organization -- 4.7 Takeaways -- 4.8 Further Reading -- 4.9 Exercises -- 5 Coordination Problems -- 5.1 Coordination Failure -- 5.1.1 Interpretation -- 5.2 Coordination Traps
Abstract:
5.2.1 A Basic Model of Coordination Traps: Investment in Developing Countries
Note:
Includes bibliographical references and index
,
Description based upon print version of record
URL:
Volltext
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URL:
Volltext
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