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  • HeBIS  (2)
  • München UB
  • Online Resource  (2)
  • English  (2)
  • Polish
  • 2000-2004  (2)
  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press  (2)
  • Berlin : Walter de Gruyter GmbH
  • Kollektiventscheidung  (2)
  • Economics  (2)
  • Musicology
  • Education
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  • Online Resource  (2)
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  • English  (2)
  • Polish
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511606076
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 240 pages)
    DDC: 658.4/03
    RVK:
    Keywords: Arrow, Kenneth Joseph ; Sen, Amartya ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Wahl ; Entscheidungsfindung
    Abstract: It is not uncommon to be frustrated by the outcome of an election or a decision in voting, law, economics, engineering, and other fields. Does this 'bad' result reflect poor data or poorly informed voters? Or does the disturbing conclusion reflect the choice of the decision/election procedure? Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow's famed theorem has been interpreted to mean 'no decision procedure is without flaws'. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen dashes hope for individual liberties by showing their incompatibility with societal needs. This highly accessible book offers a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 0511016239 , 0511118988 , 0511492308 , 0521791022 , 9780511016233 , 9780511118982 , 9780511492303 , 9780521791021
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 153 pages)
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology ; Social choice ; Voorkeur ; Wiskundige modellen ; Besliskunde ; Domein (wiskunde) ; Existentie van oplossingen ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Decision making / Mathematical models ; Social choice / Mathematical models ; Mathematisches Modell ; Social choice Mathematical models ; Decision making Mathematical models ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Mathematisches Modell
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 131-145) and index , 1 - Introduction -- - 2 - Notation, definitions, and two fundamental theorems -- - 3 - The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives -- - 4 - Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions -- - 5 - Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences -- - 6 - The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space -- - 7 - Concluding remarks , "Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K.J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied, together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over 40 theorems associated with domain conditions." , "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students."--Jacket
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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