ISBN:
9783110320121
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (310 S.)
Edition:
Online-Ausg. 2013 Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
Parallel Title:
Print version Digital Whoness : Identity, Privacy and Freedom in the Cyberworld
DDC:
302.23/1
Keywords:
Phänomenologie Cyberworld
;
Philosophie
;
Electronic books
Abstract:
Main description: The first aim is to provide well-articulated concepts by thinking through elementary phenomena of today’s world, focusing on privacy and the digital, to clarify who we are in the cyberworld — hence a phenomenology of digital whoness. The second aim is to engage critically, hermeneutically with older and current literature on privacy, including in today’s emerging cyberworld. Phenomenological results include concepts of i) self-identity through interplay with the world, ii) personal privacy in contradistinction to the privacy of private property, iii) the cyberworld as an artificial, digital dimension in order to discuss iv) what freedom in the cyberworld can mean, whilst not neglecting v) intercultural aspects and vi) the EU context.
Description / Table of Contents:
Acknowledgement; 0 Introduction; 0.1 The significance of a phenomenology of whoness as the startingpoint for discussing the question concerning privacy and freedom in the internet; 0.2 A provisional stocktaking of the discussion in information ethics on privacy and freedom in the internet age; 0.3 Course of the investigation; 1 Phenomenology of whoness: identity, privacy, trust and freedom; 1.1 The trace of whoness starts with the Greeks; 1.2 Selfhood as an identification with reflections from the world; 1.3 Values, ethos, ethics
Description / Table of Contents:
1.4 The question concerning rights: personal privacy, trust and intimacy1.5 The private individual, liberty, private property (Locke); 1.6 The private individual and private property as a mode of reified sociation: the gainful game (classical political economy, Marx); 1.7 Trust as the gainful game's element and the privacy of private property; 1.8 Justice and state protection of privacy; 1.9 Kant's free autonomous subject and privatio in the use of reason; 1.10 Privacy as protection of individual autonomy - On Rössler's The Value of Privacy; 1.11 Arendt on whoness in the world
Description / Table of Contents:
1.11.1 Arendt's discovery of the plurality of whos in The Human Condition1.11.2 The question concerning whoness as the key question of social ontology; 1.11.3 The untenability of the distinction between labour, work and action; 1.11.4 Whoness and the gainful game; 1.11.5 Public and private realms?; 1.12 Recapitulation and outlook; 2 Digital ontology; 2.1 From the abstraction from physical beings to their digital representation; 2.2 Mathematical access to the movement of physical beings; 2.3 The mathematical conception of linear, continuous time
Description / Table of Contents:
2.4 Outsourcing of the arithmologos as digital code2.5 The parallel cyberworld that fits like a glove; 2.5.1 Cyberspace; 2.5.2 Cybertime; 3 Digital whoness in connection with privacy, publicness and freedom; 3.1 Digital identity - a number?; 3.2 Digital privacy: personal freedom to reveal and conceal; 3.3 Protection of private property in the cyberworld; 3.4 Cyber-publicness; 3.5 Freedom in the cyberworld; 3.5.1 The cyberworld frees itself first of all; 3.5.2 The gainful game unleashes its freedom in the cyberworld; 3.5.3 Human freedom in the cyberworld
Description / Table of Contents:
3.6 Assessing Tavani's review of theories and issues concerning personal privacy3.7 An appraisal of Nissenbaum's Privacy in Context; 3.8 Floridi's metaphysics of the threefold-encapsulated subject in a world conceived as infosphere; 3.8.1 The purported "informational nature of personal identity"; 3.8.2 Floridi's purportedly "ontological interpretation of informational privacy"; 3.9 On Charles Ess' appraisal of Floridi's information ethics; 3.9.1 Informational ontology; 3.9.2 Informational privacy; 3.9.3 Getting over the subject-object split
Description / Table of Contents:
3.10 Beavers' response to an objection by Floridi to AI by reverting to Husserlian subjectivist phenomenology
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
,
Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
DOI:
10.1515/9783110320428
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