Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes : A Defense of Internal Realism / by Gábor Forrai

Englisch

Dordrecht : Springer, 2001

Online-Ressource (VII, 163 p) : digital

Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe) : ISBN 9789048156771

Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe) : ISBN 9780792368854

Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe) : ISBN 9789401728690

978-94-017-2868-3

Weitere Ausgaben: 978-90-481-5677-1 (Druckausgabe)

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2868-3

*Philosophy (General) ; Genetic epistemology ; Linguistics -- Philosophy ; Science -- Philosophy ; Epistemology. ; Philosophy and science. ; Metaphysics ; Philosophy of mind ; Language and languages—Philosophy. ; Science—Philosophy. ; Knowledge, Theory of.

Klassifikation der Library of Congress: BD95-131

Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: 110;

Book Industry Communication: HPJ

bisacsh: PHI013000

This systematic development of the internal realist approach, first developed by Hilary Putnam, tries to steer a middle course between metaphysical realism and relativism. It argues against metaphysical realism that it is open to global skepticism and cannot cope with conceptual pluralism. Against realism it is claimed that there are mind-independent constraints on the validity of our claims to knowledge. The book provides a moderately verificationist account of semantics and a novel explanation of the idea of conceptual schemes. It is also argued that the approach developed can accommodate our commonsense realist intuitions and is also compatible with physicalism and naturalism. Readership: Philosophers at graduate student and advanced level. Advanced undergraduate courses could be based on certain parts of the book

 

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2868-3 [Springer EBook]