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Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; Contents; General Introduction; General Overview; Structure of This Book; Part I: Laying the Groundwork; Introduction to Part I; Chapter 1: Four Distinctions; 1 Introduction; 2 Distinction #1: Impressions v. Ideas; 2.1 A Note on Hume's Psychological Method; 3 Distinction #2: Impressions of Sensation v. Impressions of Reflection; 4 The Scope of the Memory and Imagination; 5 Distinction #3: Simple Perceptions v. Complex Perceptions; 5.1 General Overview; 5.2 The Origin of Simple Ideas; 5.3 The Separability of Simple Ideas
5.4 The Origin of Complex Ideas6 Distinction #4: The Principle of Imagination v. the Principle of Memory; 7 Representation 25; 7.1 The Precision Argument: Beattie; 7.2 Response to Beattie; 7.3 The Relational Argument: Falkenstein; 7.4 A Response to Falkenstein; 7.5 The Qualitative Argument: Garrett; 7.6 Response to Garrett; 7.7 Textual Evidence that Directly Opposes the Replication Theory; 8 Summary; 8.1 Principles; Chapter 2: Elementary Belief, Causally-Produced Belief and the Natural Relation of Causality; 1 Introduction; 2 Elementary Belief: The Positive Account of Induction, Part I
2.1 Of the Component Parts of Our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect: An Analysis of 1.3.42.2 Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory: An Analysis of 1.3.5; 2.3 Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea: An Analysis of 1.3.6; 2.3.1 Experience; 3 Causally-Produced Belief: The Positive Account of Induction, Part II; 4 Necessity: The Negative Account of Induction; 4.1 Why Reason Does Not Provide the Idea of Causal Necessity; 4.2 The Role of the Imagination; 4.3 The Role of Resemblance; A Partial Analysis of 1.3.14
5 The Natural Relation of Causality v. The Philosophical Relation of Causality: A Closer Look6 Humean Reason: An Overview; 6.1 Reasoning as a Comparison: Demonstrative v. Probable; 7 Summary; Chapter 3: The Two Systems of Reality; 1 Introduction; 2 The Two Systems; 3 Elementary Beliefs and Causally-Produced Beliefs: How Do They Operate in Hume's Two Systems of Reality?; 4 General Rules; 5 Resemblance and Contiguity; 6 Justification: What We Know So Far; 7 Summary; Summary of Part I; Part II: Perfect Identity and the Transcendental Imagination; Introduction to Part II
A Brief Review of the ScholarshipPrice; Kemp Smith; Wilbanks; Waxman; Summary; Transcendentalism and Naturalism: A Happy Marriage?; Structural Overview of Part II; Chapter 4: Proto-Objects; 1 Introduction; 2 A Brief Review of the Different Meanings of a Humean Object; 3 Six Instances Where 'Object' Means Simple Idea; 4 Proto-Objects Do Not Admit of a Perfect Identity; 4.1 A Preliminary Glance at "Perfect Identity"; 4.2 Proto Objects and Continuity and Distinctness; 4.2.1 Why the Senses Are Not Responsible for Our Belief in the Continued and Distinct Existence of Objects
5 Continuity and Distinctness v. Uninterruptedness and Invariability
This book provides the first comprehensive account of Humes conception of objects in Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, Rocknak shows that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. But, she argues, he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are the causes of our perceptions. On the other hand, he thought that we only imagine such causes when we reach a "philosophical level of thought. This tension manifests itself in Humes account of personal identity; a tension that, Rocknak argues, Hume acknowledges in the Appendix to the Treatise. As a result of Rocknaks detailed account of Humes conception of objects, we are forced to accommodate new interpretations of, at least, Humes notions of belief, personal identity, justification and causality.
