Game theory and international environmental cooperation / Michael Finus

Englisch

Cheltenman, U.K ; Northampton, Mass : Edward Elgar, 2001

1 Online-Ressource (xv, 416 p) : ill

Includes bibliographical references and index

Available in another form: ISBN 9781840644081 (hardback)

Elektronische Reproduktion von: Finus, Michael *1965-*: Game theory and international environmental cooperation. - Cheltenham [u.a.] : Elgar, 2001. - XV, 416 S

Elektronische Reproduktion von: Finus, Michael *1965-*: Game theory and international environmental cooperation. - Cheltenham [u.a.] : Elgar, 2001. - XV, 416 S

978-1-84376-289-8 : e-book

Weitere Ausgaben: 1-84064-408-7 (andere physische Form), 9781840644081 (hardback) (andere physische Form)

DOI: 10.4337/9781843762898

*Internationales Umweltrecht / Spieltheorie / Umweltökonomie

*Umweltökonomie / Spieltheorie

*Environmental economics ; Environmental law, International ; Game theory

*Electronic books

Internationale Umweltpolitik / Spieltheorie / Kooperatives Spiel / Umweltabkommen / Klimaschutz / Verhandlungstheorie / Koalition / Theorie

Klassifikation der Library of Congress: HD75.6

Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: 333.7;

Regensburger Verbund-Klassifikation: QT 200: Q Wirtschaftswissenschaften / QT Umweltökonomie / Erhaltungsmaßnahmen

Regensburger Verbund-Klassifikation: CC 3200: CA-CK Philosophie / CC Systematische Philosophie / CC 3000-CC 3300 Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Wissenschaftstheorie

Regensburger Verbund-Klassifikation: AR 28100: A Allgemeines / AR Naturschutz und Umweltschutz / AR 28000-AR 28800 Politik, Wirtschaft, Finanzierung, Internationale Zusammenarbeit / Umweltpolitik, (nur Umweltpolitik allg.) Umweltzertifikat (UVP als Planungsinstrument, UVP allg. s. AR 14100)

The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between "first-best" policy recommendations and "second-best" designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists' recommendations for the use of (efficient) market-based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover, it is stated, that a single, global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more

1. Introduction -- 2. Important terms, notation and classification of games -- 3. Static games with discrete strategy space -- 4. Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a first approach -- 5. Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a first approach -- 6. Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a second approach -- 7. Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space : a second approach -- 8. Issue linkage -- 9. Static games with continuous strategy space : global emission game -- 10. Finite dynamic games with continuous strategy space and static representations of dynamic games -- 11. Bargaining over a uniform emission reduction quota and a uniform emission tax -- 12. Infinite dynamic games with continuous strategy space -- 13. Coalition models : a first approach -- 14. Coalition models : a second approach -- 15. Coalition models : a third approach -- 16. Summary and conclusions