Blameworthy Belief : A Study in Epistemic Deontologism / edited by Nikolaj Nottelmann

Englisch

Dordrecht : Springer ; [Berlin ; Heidelberg] : Springer, 2007

Online-Ressource : v.: digital

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

978-1-4020-5961-2

Weitere Ausgaben: 978-1-4020-5960-5 (Druckausgabe)

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2

Front Matter; Introduction; Belief and Acceptance; Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness; Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief; Epistemic Undesirability; Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness; Doxastic Control; Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism; Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism; Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism; Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism; Intellectual Obligations

Foresight and Blameworthy Inadvertence to RiskEpistemic Blameworthiness Analysed; Epistemic Autonomy; Back Matter

*Deontologie / Glaube

*Erkenntnistheorie / Meinung / Handlung / Verantwortung

*Philosophy (General) ; Genetic epistemology ; Ethics ; Education -- Philosophy ; Philosophy of law ; Philosophy of mind

Klassifikation der Library of Congress: BD161

Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: 121;

Regensburger Verbund-Klassifikation: CC 4400: CA-CK Philosophie / CC Systematische Philosophie / CC 4000-CC 4500 Erkenntnistheorie / Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie

Regensburger Verbund-Klassifikation: CC 7600: CA-CK Philosophie / CC Systematische Philosophie / CC 7300-CC 7950 Rechts-, Gesellschafts- und Staatsphilosophie / Rechtsphilosophie

Believing the wrong thing can have drastic consequences. The question of when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief goes to the root of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. This book explores the conditions under which someone may be deemed blameworthy for holding a particular belief, drawing on contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship.

Believing the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms. This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight.

 

Online-Ausg.

Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2 [Springer EBook]