Rethinking counterinsurgency / John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy

Englisch

Santa Monica, CA : Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2008

1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 65 pages)

"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

"MG-595/5-OSD"--Page 4 of cover

Includes bibliographical references (pages 63-65)

Print version: Mackinlay, John: Rethinking counterinsurgency. - Santa Monica, CA : Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2008

978-0-8330-4475-4 electronic bk.

0-8330-4485-0 : electronic bk.

6-611-73645-X

0-8330-4475-3

978-0-8330-4485-3 : electronic bk.

978-6-611-73645-3

*War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 ; Information technology -- Government policy -- United States ; Military intelligence ; Counterinsurgency -- Technological innovations -- United States ; Electronic books ; War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 ; Information technology ; Military intelligence ; Counterinsurgency

*POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Political Freedom & Security ; International Security ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Political Freedom & Security ; Terrorism ; TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING ; Military Science ; Information technology ; Government policy ; Military intelligence ; War on Terrorism (2001-2009) ; United States ; TECHNOLOGY ; Military Science

Klassifikation der Library of Congress: U241

Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: 355.02/180973;

bisacsh: POL012000

bisacsh: TEC025000

bisacsh: HIS 031000

bisacsh: POL037000

British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency, whose base of support is global and whose exploitation of the virtual dimension has outstripped the West's. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations

British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency, whose base of support is global and whose exploitation of the virtual dimension has outstripped the West's. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations

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