Format:
1 Online-Ressource (xii, 212 pages)
,
digital, PDF file(s)
ISBN:
9780511509988
Content:
Why do social organizations decide to protest instead of working through institutional channels? This book draws hypotheses from three standard models of contentious political action - POS, resource mobilization, and identity - and subjects them to a series of qualitative and quantitative tests. The results have implications for social movement theory, studies of protest, and theories of public policy/agenda setting. The characteristics of movement organizations - type of resources, internal leadership competition, and identity - shape their inherent propensity to protest. Party alliance does not constrain protest, even when the party ally wins power. Instead, protest becomes a key part of organizational maintenance, producing constant incentives to protest that do not reflect changing external conditions. Nevertheless, organizations do respond to changes in the political context, governmental cycles in particular. In the first year of a new government, organizations have strong incentives to protest in order to establish their priority in the policy agenda
Content:
Riding the tiger : popular organizations, political parties and urban protest -- Setting the stage : research design, case selection, and methods -- The limits of loyalty -- A union born out of struggles : the Union of Municipal Public Servants of São Paulo -- Partisan loyalty and corporatist control : the Unified Union of Workers of the Government of the Federal District -- Clients or citizens? : neighborhood associations in Mexico City -- Favelas and cortiços : neighborhood organizing in São Paulo -- The dynamics of protest
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9780521881296
Additional Edition:
Print version ISBN 9780521881296
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1017/CBO9780511509988
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
