

Border Fences

Migration Control, Selectivity and Power Relations at Fortified Borders

Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil.)
im Fach Soziologie

eingereicht am 08.09.2021
an der Kultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
von Kristina Korte
Datum der Verteidigung: 18.02.2022

Prof. Dr. Peter Frensch
Präsident (komm.) der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Prof. Dr. Christian Kassung
der Dekan der Kultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät

Gutachterin /Gutachter:

1. Prof. Dr. Steffen Mau
2. Prof. Dr. Johanna Hoerning
3. Prof. Dr. Gökce Yurdakul

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	3
1 INTRODUCTION	4
1.1 Why Borders (Still) Matter	4
1.2 How Borders Work: Theoretical Angles	7
1.3 What We Still Need to Learn About Borders: Knowledge Gap and Research Problem	14
1.4 Approach, Methods and Field Research	16
1.5 Dissertation Outline	21
2 EMPIRICAL PAPERS	24
2.1 “Who is the Animal in the Zoo?” Fencing in and Fencing out at the Hungarian-Serbian Border. A Qualitative Case Study	24
2.2 “So, if you ask Whether Fences Work: They Work”—the Role of Border Fortifications for Migration Control and Access to Asylum. Comparing Hungary and the USA	55
2.3 Filtering or Blocking Mobility. Inequalities, Marginalization and Power Relations at Fortified Borders	77
3 CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK	106
3.1 Contribution to Theory—Control, Mobility, Inequality	106
3.2 Methodological Considerations.....	110
3.3 Recommendations for Further Research.....	111
LITERATURE	114
ANNEX	119
Annex I: Interview partners	119
Annex II: Exemplary Interview Guideline	120
Annex III: Summary	122
Annex IV: Zusammenfassung	123

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

After working outside of academia for some years, returning to research and daring to pursue a doctoral dissertation were by no means a given. I would like to therefore express my gratitude to all those who encouraged and supported me throughout this challenging journey. First of all, I would like to thank my main supervisor, Steffen Mau, for his trust and inspiration, for being available for any inquiry and for responding to all my emails within minutes, and finally for his always encouraging yet not too comforting feedback that helped me keep moving forward. I also want to thank my second supervisor, Johanna Hoerning, who generously granted me her time and was very helpful in refining my methodological questions, as well as Gökce Yurdakul, who kindly agreed to join my dissertation committee and gave feedback and advice.

Furthermore, I am grateful to all my colleagues at the department of Macrosociology; first and foremost, to Fabian Gülzau, with whom I was lucky to share the research project and the office for the last years and who commented on all my writings and responded readily to the myriad of questions I had. Our student colleagues, Magdalena Freckmann, Sara Hueber, Zoé Perko, and Robert Tiede, have contributed a lot to this dissertation through their reliable and excellent work.

Doing a PhD at the SFB1265 really felt like a period of learning and development, as it provided not only many opportunities of professional training and exchange but also granted the possibility and the time to focus on my dissertation. The doctoral research training group has been a critical, supportive and joyful community that made the, sometimes, solitary time of writing a thesis not only easier but also much more pleasant.

On a personal level, I would like to thank my friends: Lea, for accompanying me in many ways (and on many walks) throughout the last years; Melanie, for an open ear and wise words; Kaja, for inspiring me with her enthusiasm for research; Ludwig, for challenging debates, proofreading and a lot of patience and support; Iulia, for encouragement and dancing; Judith for hugs (indispensable for finishing a dissertation); and many others who have been supportive in one way or another. I am also grateful to my flatmates (who had to endure all my moods over the years), for my beautiful home and to my neighbors who made the time in lockdown and isolation much more bearable. Last but not least I would like to thank my family, Mareike, Klaas and Karin Korte, for never doubting in my capacities and for equipping me with a sense of perseverance and dark humor, both of which helped a lot to bring this project to an end. A special thanks goes to my mother for a beautiful place in the countryside, where I happily spent several weeks writing in a perfectly calm and enjoyable environment.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Why Borders (Still) Matter

In February 2019, an attack in Jammu and Kashmir, for which a Pakistan-based militant group claimed responsibility, led to the death of at least forty members of the Indian security forces. In the months that followed, the Pakistani-Indian border became the site of airstrikes and border skirmishes between the Pakistani and Indian military, which were accompanied by mutual accusations and warnings of a possible nuclear war. Open warfare did not erupt, but the situation has remained very tense to date. Although this border has been contested and fortified for decades, the incident abruptly reminded the world of the danger of an ongoing border conflict between two nuclear powers.

Some years earlier in 2015, Hungary reacted to the movement of refugees heading towards the EU by rapidly closing and fencing its border to Serbia. This “new iron curtain” (Amjahid 2015) has remained in place and is still being used to strictly control and filter the people who try to enter Hungary and, thereby, the EU. Despite the ongoing militarization of the external border of the EU, which has been challenged by migrants and human rights activists, the EU is still being perceived as a region of free movement because of its open internal borders. This changed in 2020 when member states of the European Union started closing their borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As the EU is considered as a model region for internal open border policies, these border closures came as a shock. Suddenly, travel became restricted for people accustomed to moving freely almost all over the world, and national economies suffered due to the absence of seasonal workers who also used to routinely cross these borders. In contrast to the Indian-Pakistani border, which is difficult to cross and has been strictly controlled for a long period of time, the closing of the internal EU borders cut through borderlands that used to be permeable and highly frequented.

These episodes demonstrate how much borders still matter in a globalized world. Border lines that were barely perceptible in stable and peaceful times can suddenly manifest themselves in moments of crisis, while others are in a constant state of tension and threat. Furthermore, as the different examples show, borders are still a very powerful tool to control and restrict human mobility. It is one of the key characteristics of most borders to control entry and to exclude those who are not welcome. The exclusion of some is particularly striking through the way in which migratory routes are blocked by closed borders: This is made visible in the media through dramatic images of overcrowded refugee boats in the Mediterranean or of family separation at the US-Mexican border. However, at the same time, these shocking images have become so regular and familiar that they do not receive much public

attention anymore. The closing of borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic received much more attention because this was a new phenomenon, but also because for once the borders were closed for (almost) everyone, including those who were used to traveling frequently and easily all over the world. This was intriguing because borders that are closed to everyone have become rare today. Instead, the large gap between those who can easily cross borders and those who cannot appears to be the normal state. Most borders, even the most heavily controlled ones, aim at filtering mobility by selecting some who are allowed to enter while blocking, delaying or deterring others.

This indicates how closely borders and (im-)mobility are related to each other. Borders are the places where control over mobility is enacted, operationalized and made visible. The distinction between legal and illegal movement is thrown into a sharp relief at the border. Mobility designates any form of (human) movement and thus can take place either internationally or within nation-states. Migration—as a sub-category of mobility—is defined by crossing an international border (Vollmer and Düvell 2021). Movement within nation-states is usually not referred to as migration but rather as internal displacement or other forms of mobility. The link between borders and migration is thus very close, as borders are constitutive for migration. In other words, “if there were no borders, there would be no migrants – only mobility” (De Genova 2013, 253). Both borders and migration are related to the state and to politics: Just as borders are a precondition for nation-states, both borders and nation states are a precondition of migration. Both (international) mobility and migration have significantly increased in the last 20 years. Just like borders, mobility shapes our contemporary world and will probably become more and more important in the future. The share of migrants in the total world’s population is still very low, but a full 10% of the world's population aspires to migrate (Vollmer and Düvell 2021). It can be assumed that borders and their fortification contribute to prevent some of the potential migrants from departing, which further stresses the importance of borders for (im-)mobility.

The last decades have shown that although money, goods, and travelers move worldwide, borders will not disappear. Instead, they are still here and shape our life. When border researchers have realized that the expected “borderless” (Ohmae 1990) or “flat” (Friedman 2006) world would not become a reality, some have instead called for a “good border” or for “coexistence in spite of borders” (see Newman 2003, 23). Quite contrary to these optimistic visions, studies show that border fortifications are on the rise and their numbers have constantly increased in the last decades (Carter and Poast 2017; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). Thus, “far from being viewed as passé, borders should be brought back as a centerpiece in the analysis of world politics” (Andreas 2003, 108). Borders persist, but their functions have changed: “The idea that borders will change over time suggests that while physical borders may be historically and socially viscous, representations

of borders and meanings attributed to them are inheritably changeable” (Cooper and Perkins 2012, 66). Borders have long been designed for the military defense of a national territory from opposing and, often, neighboring armies. Today they are becoming more and more important as spaces and instruments for the policing of a variety of actors whose common denominator is mobility (Walters 2006, 188). Border research has accompanied these functional changes and developed new concepts to grasp what borders stand for. As part of the historical change of border functions, they are now considered “less important in terms of military defense and coercive control, and are notable for their (selective) permeability to human mobility” (Rumford 2006, 159). Borders have been conceptualized not only as “lines in the sand” (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009), but also as markers of difference (Newman 2012) and as institutions that separate and connect at the same time (Kolosov, Zotova, and Sebentsov 2016; Varol and Soylemez 2017). The simultaneous trends of digitalization and externalization of borders indicate that control and policing become more and more relevant at contemporary borders, which are becoming more complex (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013), ambivalent (Balibar 2017) and paradoxical (Brown 2017).

Borders thus remain essential social phenomena, but their functions change. Contrary to expectations of a borderless globalized world, they are becoming more and more fortified with walls and fences. In light of this development, border literature discusses the question of why an internationally interconnected and globalized world erects more and more fences. This dissertation takes part in the debate by examining how fortifications are used to control human mobility at borders. It sets out to analyze one of the main functions of borders, namely control, which is most evident at fortified borders. The analysis, thus, connects to broader questions about the nature and relevance of borders today, their functioning and their role in controlling and filtering human mobility. It is important to add that borders are important institutions of control, but they are not all-powerful. Rather, they can be described as contested places where struggles over mobility and control take place (Hess and Kasperek 2017). They are sites where migrants and all those who wish to cross the borders struggle with the state institutions aiming to stop them, and they are also places where one state struggles with its neighbor over control, entry, movement and power. Borders that are secured by walls or fences—labelled here as fortified borders—are places where the control function is operationalized in an extreme manner. Researching them can thus help us to understand how border control works. Being sites where state power is extremely present but also especially challenged, they are good cases to study how the control function is implemented at borders. For these reasons, this dissertation uses fortified borders in order to study mobility and migration control. As mentioned above, border research has convincingly demonstrated that the prediction of a borderless world is outdated and that, instead, border fortifications are on the rise. However, the reasons for this trend are still being argued

(Simmons 2019a). One point of debate is whether the new fortifications are evidence of tighter control (Jones 2016) or rather a sign of loss of control (Brown 2017). Having a closer look at how mobility control is implemented at fortified borders can therefore close a research gap.

To this end, four fortified borders on four different continents are used as case studies. I conducted field research in eight countries at both sides of the respective borders, namely those between Pakistan and India, Morocco and Algeria, Mexico and the U.S., and Serbia and Hungary. The dissertation is structured as follows: The introductory chapter presents the relevant literature and theory (1.2), the research questions and the research gap (1.3) as well as the empirical approach and methods (1.4) and the dissertation outline (1.5). This is followed by three empirical papers (2.1, 2.2, 2.3). The concluding chapter (3) then discusses the main results as well as methodological considerations and proposes directions for further research.

1.2 How Borders Work: Theoretical Angles

Social scientists vividly debate the (changing) role and nature of contemporary borders. Borders have been considered for a long time first and foremost as lines between spaces and as markers of territory: “Borders are lines. They constitute the sharp point at which categories, spaces and territories interface” (Newman 2012, 37). In this conception, the state border constitutes “a continuous line demarcating the territory and sovereign authority of the state, enclosing its domain” (Walters 2006, 193). In addition to this classic definition as markers of territory, the understanding of borders today also comprises their situatedness in the social world as social and political constructions. In this way, they are not just neutral geographical phenomena, but connected to interests and power relations: “Someone creates them and, once created, manages them in such a way as to serve the interests of those same power elites” (Newman 2012, 35). Borders and processes of bordering determine social relations: “All borders, each act of debordering and rebordering, and every border crossing are constitutive of social relations, and, as such, help us orientate ourselves to the world” (Rumford 2006, 167). Hence, far from being merely “lines in the sand” (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009), borders are considered as institutions (Balibar 2010; Simmons 2019a), having their own set of internal rules and norms (Newman 2003; Newman and Paasi 1998) or as regimes (Hess and Kasparek 2019, 2017). They have consequences for the social world: “Borders are productive: they are places where institutional facts are produced through the imposition of status-functions on people and things” (Cooper and Perkins 2012, 57).

This understanding of borders as institutions or as being part of a border regime points to the fact that borders are not just neutral lines sketched in the sand but have functions and thereby consequences. Their functioning as institutions is closely linked to state power (Paasi 2009). They are seen as places of active governance (Simmons 2019b) or as places of control (Mau, Gülzau, and Korte 2021). Yet state power is always contested and, in this sense, borders can be seen as a place of encounter between state power and human agency. They are thus places of confrontation between conflicting goals and claims (Vollmer and Düvell 2021). The border here becomes a place of conflict (Hess and Kasperek 2017) or a place of negotiations “in which institutional facts are challenged by an array of non-state actors” (Cooper and Perkins 2012, 66). This understanding of borders as sites of negotiation and struggle becomes very clear with regard to human mobility, as the border is the place where migration encounters its government (Hess and Kasperek 2019). These questions of power, governance, control and struggle become visible at fortified borders, where state power is extremely present but also especially challenged. In the following, I will give an overview on different functions that borders can fulfill with a focus on human mobility. These functions are derived from border literature in which, however, they are most often mentioned only in passing. The terms are often used interchangeably and not in a clear-cut and systematic way. Analyzing these functions in a precise and systematic way is necessary to better understand how borders work—that is, their functioning as well as their impact. This overview does not aspire to completeness but is rather intended to give an impression of which functions are considered here and how I systematize them in order to illustrate my view on borders.

As mentioned above, borders are closely linked to human mobility but are also essential for social life in general. They are often described as having very complex and even contradictory functions (Balibar 2010, 2017). They are marked by the tensions between practices of border reinforcement and border crossing as well as between enabling justice and limiting it at the same time (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). They are seen as being oppressive and repressive as well as liberating and enhancing (Paasi 2005). While one of their essential features is to separate states and people, they connect them at the same time, “balancing the twin border goals of facilitation and enforcement” (Andreas 2003, 107-8). As this dissertation focuses on human mobility—and not on the movement of goods or information—only the following functions will be presented in detail: the barrier and protection function, the function as a resource, the connective as well as the symbolic function and, most importantly, the control function. Since control is the focus here, this function is spelled out more by including the related topics of mobility control, migration control, filtering and inequality. These topics then lead to two fields of research that need to be considered when analyzing mobility control at borders: first, the field of mobility and migration studies and second, that of research on inequality.

Figure 1 gives an overview on the different functions of borders. Some of them will be elaborated in more detail in this thesis while others are less central; this will be further illustrated in section 1.5. The different functions will be described in more detail in the following.




Figure 1: border functions

One of the major features of a border is to stop and block people and things, that is to operate as a barrier (Newman 2003, 14; Kolosov, Zotova, and Sebentsov 2016). The barrier function of borders is related to the idea of protection: They act as a barrier in order to protect what is inside them. Therefore, it can be considered as “the dominant commonsense function assigned to the border [that it] is required to protect the inside against a very real threat emanating from the outside through rigorous management of people” (Cooper and Perkins 2012, 66). Such very real threats can emanate, for example, from terrorist attacks, from which states try to protect their populations with fortifications (Avdan 2019). However, it is sometimes unclear if a threat is real or not which makes the protection function ambivalent; it is hard to tell if borders protect or if they rather repress or both (Balibar 2017). While border closure can be related to real security issues, security can also be used as a pretext with the objective to further militarize borders and prevent cross-border mobility (Vallet and David 2014; Jones 2009). Securitization discourses are often related to processes of exclusion and othering and thereby to the symbolic function of borders.

So, the barrier function may be directed against real dangers, but the border can also operate in a symbolic way by using a real or imagined threat. Borders shape identities by demarcating the inside from the outside and the “us” from the “other”. Fortified borders are particularly symbolic: “Walls are consummately functional, and walls are potent organizers of human psychic landscapes generative of

cultural and political identities” (Brown 2017, 86). State borders are supposed to determine and protect a state territory and are therefore considered an important manifestation of state sovereignty. This does not mean, however, that the more fortified a border is, the more powerful and sovereign the state behind it is. To the contrary, it has been claimed that the new border fortifications rather indicate that modern states cannot assert their sovereignty anymore: “the new walls often function theatrically, projecting power and efficaciousness that they do not and cannot actually exercise” (Brown 2017, 37). States use borders to demonstrate their power. To do that, they need to create fear from the “other” on the outside, imagined as different and dangerous (Newman 2006). The phenomenon of “border anxiety” (Simmons 2019b) may derive from real dangers behind the border, but it can also be used by governments to create fear that may be used and exploited politically. The symbolic function of borders has very real consequences, as it affects how borders, mobility and society are controlled. Related to the symbolic function, there is a vast body of literature on bordering as a process (e.g. Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Jones and Johnson 2014; Altay, Yurdakul, and Korteweg 2021). This can be mentioned only briefly here as the focus of this work is on national borders and border politics rather than on bordering processes in everyday life.

The barrier function emphasizes how borders separate spaces and people from each other. However, borders do not only separate but also relate spaces (Löw and Weidenhaus 2017), and thereby have the function to connect (Sohn 2014b). As much as they prevent mobility, they may also generate it. The nature of borders to both separate and connect becomes clear when looking at borderlands which are the places that reflect both the limits and the opportunities of border crossing (Gerst 2017). Borders produce exclusion and dichotomizations, but they can also invite transgression. Crossing them can defy the limits of exclusion and enclosure and create specific cultures of borderlands (Soja 2005). As borders separate different states and social and economic systems, crossing them can create opportunities (Schindler 2021), for example, by commuting, trading, smuggling or using services and opportunities on the other side of the border. By creating and maintaining the difference between two (national) systems, borders can thus function as resources for those who cross them (Daoudi 2015). At the same time, borders can be used as resources by governments, who can profit from them by generating value from cross-border interactions (Sohn 2014a). However, the ways in which both people and states can use borders as resources depend on how these borders are being controlled.

The control function is essential for borders. Seeing “borders as places of control” (Mau, Gülzau, and Korte 2021) highlights that control becomes more and more central to how borders work as border control intensifies (Andreas 2003, 79). Control can be understood as a particular technology of power (Walters 2006), and borders are consequently shaped by the exercise of power and by power relations.

Thus, “instead of being mere neutral lines, borders are important institutions and ideological symbols that are used by various bodies and institutions in the perpetual process of reproducing territorial power” (Paasi 2009, 213). How borders are shaped and how they function is related to power relations, as “the marriage between territories and borders is impregnated with societal power” (ibid., 216). Borders work as a means to preserve privileges of the powerful and, in this way, contribute to sustain and exacerbate global inequality (Jones 2016; Rosière and Jones 2012) as will be discussed in more detail below. If control is seen as a particular technology of power, this means that border control is used to sustain or change power relations. Control has always been a function of borders, but it has become increasingly important over time and has changed its focus: Today, it is less concerned with territorial and economic practices and instead functions as a form of policing (Walters 2006).

This shift towards policing is legitimized by discourses about dangerous mobilities, and it is used to gain control over populations. State borders are therefore seen as sites of active governance (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Walters 2006). They enable governmental actors to gain control over populations because they are places where people are being temporarily immobilized, which means that they can be searched, monitored, surveilled and have their data captured (Pallister-Wilkins 2016; Urry 2007). As state borders help to strengthen the link between the state and the territory, they also allow more control over the population. This link between population, territory and state power can be understood in terms of governmentality (Jones 2016, 78-9). Governments use borders to control territories, but also people and their bodies; fortifications can therefore be considered as spatial forms of biopolitical governance (Pallister-Wilkins 2016). Governmental actors can use borders to exercise power and control over populations and thereby define who the population is and who belongs to it. This way, “border institutions govern the extent of inclusion and exclusion, the degree of permeability, the laws governing trans-boundary movement” (Newman 2003, 14). While some describe a situation where the regulation of mobilities are internalized in people’s mobile practices in a process of “governmobility” (Bærenholdt 2013), others emphasize that border and mobility control is never complete, but always contested and challenged: “No sooner is one border crossing updated, one smuggling route closed down, and another opens up. Border control is like antivirus software, not just because it aspires to filter and secure its interior, but also because its fate is to toil in the shadow of the restless hacker” (Walters 2006, 200). In this regard, borders are not only places of control but also places of conflict (Hess and Kasperek 2017), as movement and fixity can be seen “as a conflict between the desire for freedom and the desire for control, between people who move around and people who want them to stay in place” (Jones 2016, 10).

The struggle between mobile people and state actors is related to the question of who is allowed to cross a border and who is not. Borders do not only work as barriers that stop movement, but also as

filters that separate wanted from unwanted mobility (Mau et al. 2012). Modern borders are considered as diffuse, asymmetric and membrane-like (Cooper and Perkins 2012, 56), especially when it comes to migration: “Filtering, selecting, and channeling migratory movements – rather than simply excluding migrants and asylum seekers – seem to be the aim of contemporary border and migration regimes” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 165). A prerequisite for filtering is that people are first classified into different categories. At borders, people are categorized and consequently treated in different ways. This is why borders are described as polysemic (Balibar 2017), as they never exist in the same ways for individuals belonging to different social groups, and they represent different things to different people. Here, borders do not work as impenetrable barriers, but as membranes—or filters—that “unevenly and disproportionately channel inward and outward flows of information, goods and people” (Cooper and Perkins 2012, 56). It is mostly at the border crossings where states tend to expend their effort to filter by implementing a mix of policies, structures and symbols to connect and separate by blocking or facilitating entry selectively (Simmons 2019a). This capacity to select who is allowed to cross a border and, thereby, to regulate movement is constitutive for what it means to be a modern state (Torpey 1998). However, the filtering function of borders is not exercised exclusively at the border line. The main tool for filtering is the issuance of visas and passports (Simmons 2019a), which takes place in consulates and embassies. Furthermore, practices of externalization and remote control are being increasingly used to filter mobility far from the border line (Zaiotti 2016b; Shachar 2007, 2020), which further increases the unequal access to mobility as will be discussed in more detail below. In the following, I will present some research in mobility and migration studies as well as literature on borders, mobility and inequality. This is not with the intention to present the whole and very vast fields of migration research, mobility studies or inequality literature, which would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. The idea is rather to show where the topics of migration, mobility and inequality overlap with borders and which literature has already discussed the nexus between these topics and research fields. As mobility, migration and inequality are related to the control function of borders, research on these topics needs to be considered in order to understand how borders work.

Migration is a subcategory of mobility, but in literature they are mostly addressed separately. The link between borders and mobility might seem obvious—it is at borders where mobility can be seen to be stopped, slowed down, or channeled. Yet, while research on mobilities and on borders have both been argued to be central to the social sciences (Rumford 2006), little attention has been paid to the interrelations between both fields (Richardson 2013). This may in part be related to the fact that border studies is mostly state-centric and “fetishize[s] state controls”, whereas mobilities studies is rather agent-centric, turning away from states, economic, or cultural systems (Salter 2013, 7). As a consequence, there is still a need to rethink how border studies engages with mobilities and vice versa (Richardson 2013, 1). Including all kinds of movement (and thus going beyond the subject of migration

research), mobility studies are defined as a “broad project of establishing a ‘movement-driven’ social science in which movement, potential movement and blocked movement are all conceptualized as constitutive of economic, social and political relations” (Urry 2007, 43). While border literature tends to study separations, mobility research highlights flows and movement. Using both approaches, we can consider borders as institutions that control mobility by working as barriers to the unimpeded flows of goods, people and information. However, borders do not only hinder mobility—they also create it. Borders are sites where not only territories meet but also spaces with different social orders. They separate different legal, economic and health systems and, as a consequence, border crossings may bring opportunities here. While mobility studies surprisingly does not engage so much with the phenomenon of (state) borders, the research fields of borders and migration are somewhat more linked, mostly via the concept of border or migration regimes defined as a set of policies, practices, and related discourses with regard to migration control at borders (Vollmer and Düvell 2021). Migration policy and control is often—although not exclusively—enforced at the border (Vollmer and Düvell 2021), and borders are analyzed as tools to prevent migration.

Borders prevent migration and are thereby related to inequality: “Moving between places [...] can be a source of status and power, and expression of the rights to movement either temporarily or permanently. And where movement is coerced it may generate social deprivation and exclusion” (Urry 2007, 9). Again, the border is the place where movement is being restricted. Unequal access to mobility can derive from practices that take place far from the border line such as visa regulations (Mau et al. 2015; Recchi et al. 2021) or externalization policies (Zaiotti 2016a; Shachar 2007). However, mobility control and filtering also take place at the border line, which thereby contributes to creating or maintaining unequal access to movement. If mobility is a resource (Huysmans et al. 2021), then selecting mobility at borders is a form of social inequality (Schindler 2021; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013); to the point that human life comes to depend upon sorting systems that determine who or what should enter and exit (Urry 2007, 202). While freedom of movement is a privilege, more movement does not always mean more freedom. Borders can force people to stop, but they can also force them to be more mobile than they wish by deterring them or forcing them to take detours: Unsuccessful border crossings often lead to longer journeys and create mobility (Schindler 2021). Hence, more mobility is not always a privilege, as it is sometimes assumed (Huysmans et al. 2021), but the *right* to movement is very unequally distributed, which creates the “global mobility divide” (Mau et al. 2015). Fortifications control and filter mobility, and they are therefore a key component of the global landscape of flows and barriers, dividing richer from poorer parts of the globe (Brown 2017, 36).

This chapter showed that borders have manifold functions. While touching on several of them, this dissertation focuses on one of the most central ones, that is the control function. I understand borders

here as institutions of mobility control and, consequently, as places where struggles over mobility, control and power take place between state and non-state actors as well as between neighboring states. At most borders, the control function is implemented by filtering mobility. Therefore, they sustain and increase an unequal access to mobility. Their symbolic function consists in distinguishing the inside from the outside and creating homogenous groups. Consequently, borders can also be used to control and discipline the society they enclose. I consider borders here as institutions that exert control in many different ways, but the focus of the analysis is on fortification and the role they play in this broader border regime.

After presenting some of the vast literature on borders, migration, mobility and inequality in this chapter, the next section will focus on the question of what still needs to be done in these fields by presenting the knowledge gap as well as the ensuing research questions.

1.3 What We Still Need to Learn About Borders: Knowledge Gap and Research Problem

There is a large body of research on borders, but the field of border studies is increasingly fragmented in terms of disciplines and research topics (Gerst and Krämer 2021), which makes it very difficult to gain an overview of the existing literature and theory. When the fields of migration and mobility research are also considered, things become even more complex. Comparative studies on border fortification provide important knowledge on processes of rebordering (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Carter and Poast 2017), but because they use a macro perspective, they do not consider the particularities of specific cases or the variety of fortifications. On the other hand, there are studies on border fortification which analyze specific cases in depth, mostly focusing on migration control. These studies, often based on qualitative and anthropological methods, make important contributions with very detailed analyses of the mechanisms of border control and their effects on migrants, thereby connecting the topics of borders and migration. With very precise analyses of border regimes, they are able to link the border fences and infrastructure to other mechanisms of border control. Due to this focus on migration, however, they neglect other functions of borders as well as the effects of fortification on other groups than migrants. They are restricted to single cases mostly analyzing the external EU borders. Therefore, issues specific to the global South are rarely addressed in border research as quantitative studies on fortification rarely include concrete issues such as colonial history, and the border regime literature is very focused on the global North.

Although the fields of fortification literature on the one hand and border regime analysis on the other hand touch upon very similar topics, they are not connected and rarely relate to each other. As a result,

fortified borders are often considered either as a uniform category (from a macro perspective) or as single specific units (from a case study perspective). As these different strands of literature analyze border control and securitization from different perspectives, bringing them together offers the possibility to get a more complete picture of how borders are controlled today. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to integrate the different perspectives, including comparative literature on fortification trends as well as literature on the functioning of borders as regimes in specific cases. It is based on a qualitative case study design. Using four different cases allows us to have a comparative perspective on different forms of border and mobility control without neglecting the specific context of each case. Furthermore, it examines the control function of borders by looking at different aspects of control. The previous section showed that control is an important function of borders and will probably become even more relevant in the future; we still need to investigate how exactly borders control mobility, how the control function is implemented at fortified borders, what different forms of control may exist and what effects they have.

Studies on borders, migration and mobility are isolated from one another. Focusing on the control function of borders provides an opportunity to link not only the different research strands mentioned above, but also these different topics. Mobility studies are surprisingly disconnected with studies on migration or borders (for example see Urry 2007), while border regime literature focuses on migration without discussing other forms of (im-)mobility. This dissertation does not aim to bring together all the dispersed strands of research on borders, mobility and migration, as this attempt would be doomed to fail. However, the focus on control is useful to link some of these topics and research fields or to indicate where they need to be connected in order to understand important and current sociological phenomena: who is being controlled (migrants and other mobile populations), how are they being controlled (by border fortification and other control mechanisms at borders) and what is the impact of the control and filtering function of borders (unequal access to mobility). These research problems shall be addressed with an empirical focus on fortified borders by asking the following research questions:

1. How is mobility controlled at fortified borders?

1.a What role does filtering play in this?

1.b What implications does fortified borders have on unequal access to mobility?

The following section will explain how these questions are approached methodologically and present the fieldwork, the empirical material and the research process.

1.4 Approach, Methods and Field Research

This chapter presents the methodological approach of the dissertation. As the cases and case selection are described in detail in the three papers, they will be mentioned only briefly here in order to avoid repetition. Instead, this chapter focuses on the research approach and process, in particular, on the field work. Some considerations resulting from the empirical work and methodological challenges will be discussed later in the concluding section (3.2).

The dissertation is based on field research and qualitative topic-centered expert interviews (Witzel and Reiter 2012) in eight countries situated on each side of four different nation-state borders: the Serbian-Hungarian, the U.S. American-Mexican, the Pakistani-Indian and the Moroccan-Algerian. These borders were chosen for being similarly fortified but for being different in many other aspects: their respective geographical positions, (historical) contexts, motivations for fortification and relationships with their neighbors. Table 1—extracted from paper 3—provides an overview on some key characteristics of the four borders.

	<i>Length</i>	<i>Type of fortification</i>	<i>Motives for fortification</i>	<i>Relationship between neighboring states</i>	<i>Mode of closure (Land Border)</i>	<i>Date of fortification</i>
DZA-MAR	1559 km	Fence (MAR). Ditch and rampart (DZA)	Territorial conflict, smuggling, migration	Conflict, no cooperation	Completely closed	Since 2014 (1957 French barrier)
IND-PAK	3190 km	Double fence (IND)	Territorial conflict, smuggling, terrorism	Conflict, fragile ceasefire	Closed except for 1–2 border crossings	Since 1980
USA-MEX	3169 km	Fences, barriers (USA)	Smuggling, migration, criminality, domestic policy	Strong trade relations	Many border crossings, difficult to control	Since the 1990s
HUN-SRB	164 km	Double fence (HUN)	Domestic policy, migration	Cooperative	Closed except for few border crossings	2015–2017

Table 1: Overview of Characteristics of the Four Cases

The overview points to some relevant differences between the cases: The Moroccan-Algerian and the Indian-Pakistani fortifications are related to territorial conflicts that originate in colonial history. Both borders were at least to some degree closed from both sides, and they are almost completely sealed. The Mexican-U.S. American and Serbian-Hungarian borders are closed and fortified unilaterally by one country and are designed to block some irregular movement but let other travelers pass. Furthermore, they both show cooperative relationships between the neighboring states, while the two former cases are marked by very conflictual relations. Two of the four cases are in the global South and the other

two are in the global North, which may contribute to close the research gap mentioned above. These differences allow us to compare the four cases along the research questions concerning border control, filtering and unequal access to mobility.

This research project asks how mobility is controlled at fortified borders. With four borders and eight countries, the scope of the analysis is very broad, and it was not possible to do in-depth and long-term field research in every country. Therefore, expert interviews were the most adequate method to get sufficient information and material on each case within the limited time and resources available. Researching national borders means to analyze state policies. In order to get first-hand information on them, interviews with state representatives or institutions close to the government were chosen as the most promising method. However, state actors tend to have a biased perspective on their own policies and, furthermore, they do not necessarily have first-hand information on irregular movements across their borders nor on the effects of fortification on migrants or border populations. For these reasons, I also conducted interviews with civil society actors and with representatives of international organizations, namely the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The civil society actors knew much more about irregular movement at the border and about the impact of border control on migrants and border populations, and they often challenged the official arguments for fortification. The international organizations knew the state perspective as well as the migrants' situation and often tried to adopt a neutral perspective. Overall, 41 formal interviews were conducted with these 3 groups of actors; a list of all interview partners is provided in Annex I. Numerous additional informal conversations helped prepare the interviews and, furthermore, allowed us to discuss some of the very sensitive topics of research more freely and openly than it was possible in the formal (and recorded) interviews. The interviews were conducted between October 2018 and October 2020. Most of the fieldwork took place in the respective capitals—as this is where most organizations and institutions are based—but was also carried out in some border cities.

Field access proved to be difficult on many levels. Doing research in countries with fortified borders entailed that some of them had very conflictual relations and that the security situation was unstable. Therefore, some of the border regions were not safe to travel to due to border conflicts or, in the Mexican case, due to a very high crime rate. Conducting field research in conflict regions and on conflictual or security-related topics also implied some complications in organizing the field trips: My visa application for Algeria was rejected, which was probably related to the popular uprising that started in 2019 and the very tense political situation resulting from it. The research visits to India and Pakistan had to be delayed twice due to the very conflictual situation between the neighboring states and finally had to be cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the interviews for the Pakistani, Indian and Algerian cases had to be conducted remotely via phone or internet (apart from

two interviews with Algerians that took place in Marseilles). In other cases, namely the USA and Mexico, interview appointments with policymakers were canceled at very short notice presumably due to diplomatic tensions. Field access thus turned out to be laborious, which is certainly a consequence of the sensitivity of the subject: Access to the field is essential, but very challenging in the field of border research (Vollmer and Düvell 2021, 325).

Switching to remote interviews in three countries led to losing some established and valuable interview contacts. This concerned, on the one hand, bureaucratic actors who were not willing to conduct interviews from a distance (for example, the Algerian police who, contrary to all assumptions, were willing to conduct an interview but then canceled when I asked for a phone interview), and, on the other hand, some of the local non-governmental actors who were presumably more comfortable with face-to-face communication (for instance, a small organization at the border in Pakistan who had invited me to lunch in response to my interview request and then did not respond anymore when I had to ask for a telephone interview). This led to a bias in the selection of interview partners in the sense that actors who could not or did not want to conduct interviews remotely were excluded. The interviews that were conducted digitally suffered in part from technical difficulties such as poor internet or phone connection, but nevertheless worked very well in most cases. Furthermore, since there were serious security concerns in Algeria and Pakistan in particular, the remote interviews may have eased the situation in this respect for the interviewer and even more so for the interviewees.

Beside the difficulties in organizing the field trips, field access was also challenging due to the sensitivity of the subject. Many governmental actors simply did not respond to any interview request. Therefore, I proceeded in two ways. First, in order to ensure comparability, I systematically contacted the same relevant actors in each country, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the border police, the IOM, and the UNHCR. Since these inquiries did not always lead to results, I furthermore contacted various actors and asked them for possible contacts and interview partners. The German political party foundations in the respective countries were particularly helpful here; in other cases, personal or research related contacts were likewise of great use. Naturally, this approach via gate keepers limits the comparability of the field access, as it led to different interview partners in each country. It was nevertheless a very successful procedure since it allowed me to conduct many interviews in this difficult field. Furthermore, the fact that many interviews were arranged through contact persons created a stronger relationship of confidence, which was extremely relevant for conducting the interviews successfully.

Confidence is always important in interviews but, in this case, even more so due to the security- and conflict-related topic. Non-governmental actors were in some cases very cautious to respond to questions concerning state action. State actors also refused to respond to certain questions, and some

of them had a very biased perspective on border conflicts or policies. This leads back to the choice of expert interviews and their characteristics: The research field of fortified borders is related to conflicts, security and diplomatic issues. Therefore, it is a peculiarity of this field that the actors are often involved both personally and professionally, some as state representatives and some as human rights advocates. Thus, on the one hand, the interviewees were indeed experts as they were representatives of organizations or otherwise professionally involved with the topic and had a lot of information and a macro perspective. On the other hand, they were also biased in part precisely because of their affiliation with certain organizations. Although experts have specific institutional knowledge, the person does not disappear behind the expert and, consequently, the interviews have to be interpreted with this in mind (Witzel and Reiter 2012). Since a completely neutral perspective is difficult to find here, the strategy I applied was to include a broad range of actors. In some cases, the interviewees were representatives of organizations but at the same time personally affected by border policies because of their own migration experiences or because they lived at the border. In these cases, their direct experiences could be included in the interviews and added another very valuable dimension to the analysis.

The interviews were structured using an interview guide, which included questions on the reasons for border fencing, the effects of fortification on mobility across the border, such as how mobility changed with tighter controls, and the relationship between the neighbors. The questions had to be adapted to the respective cases and interview partners. For example, the topic of migration was not crucial at the Indian-Pakistani border, whereas it played a central role in the other cases. Some interview partners were experts on the topic of migration, while others were mostly concerned with border politics; accordingly, the interview guide had to be adapted. One of these guides is provided as an example in Annex II. The analysis of the interview material followed the principles of qualitative content analysis (Gläser and Laudel 2010). All the interviews were fully transcribed and coded in MAXQDA in order to structure the material and relate it to theoretical concepts. The coding method was mostly deductive but was completed with inductive codes during the process. Deductive codes were derived from the research questions and concerned, for example, the effects of fortification on migrants, border populations and the neighboring state. An example for inductive codes is the topic of asylum, which turned out to be very relevant at the Hungarian and the U.S. border fences and was therefore included in the coding. Following a thematic cross-case analysis, every additional case was interpreted against the background of the cases before, which implied with every additional step of analysis a potential re-analysis of the former cases (Witzel and Reiter 2012).

In addition to the coding process, other techniques such as field notes and memos helped to structure and systematize the analysis. A report from memory was created for each interview, including the

interview situation and its particularities as well as a short summary of the interview content. For the non-formal and/or non-recorded conversations, this was supplemented by much more detailed notes on the interview topics. Daily reports in the field journal helped capture first impressions and thoughts preparing the analysis. Memos, that is, short reflections on a specific topic or question, structured and focused these ideas that emerged during the field research and the process of analysis (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2013, 206). In addition, the interview material was supplemented with a document analysis. To this end, 243 documents such as press releases, policy papers and newspaper articles were collected and analyzed. A summary was written for each of them (except for very short ones) in order to get an overview. As governmental actors were particularly difficult to reach, official documents were useful to further examine the state perspective. Furthermore, the documents provided valuable insights into the debates concerning borders, bilateral conflicts and cross-border mobility in the respective countries. The document analysis thus served as a complement to the interviews, and it helped to get a better idea of the situation and debates in the respective country. The main focus of the systematic analysis, however, was on the interview material. This material was thoroughly coded and analyzed, whereas the other material was used as additional background information. *Table 2* gives an overview on the material as well as its usage and position in the analysis.

After presenting and discussing methods and field research in general in this section, the next one will explain the specific thematic and empirical focus of each paper.

<i>Material</i>	<i>Role and usage in the analysis</i>
Interview transcripts (or notes)	Central element of analysis; coded in MAXQDA
Interview reports	Capture interview situation and topics as background information and for overview; included in MAXQDA
Informal conversations (notes)	Background information, especially on sensitive questions
Field notes/ journal	Retain impressions from the field and analytical ideas as starting points for the analysis
Memos	Develop thoughts on specific questions and topics to prepare the systematic analysis
Documents (press articles, official documents, reports etc.)	Compile background information; summarized for overview

Table 2: Overview on material used for analysis

1.5 Dissertation Outline

The dissertation is comprised of three single authored and peer-reviewed papers. The empirical material presented in chapter 1.4 is the base for all three papers, but they use it in different ways. The first paper is a case study of the Hungarian-Serbian border. The second paper compares two borders, the Hungarian-Serbian and the U.S. American-Mexican, while the third one compares all four cases. This way, the analysis gradually zooms out from a detailed case study whose context is closely examined to a comparative look at different cases as *figure 2* illustrates.




Figure 2: Dissertation Papers and Case Studies

The first paper (2.1) starts to explore the topic of border and migration control, stating the relevance of the notion of control for the trend towards fortification and rebordering. Focusing on this recently fortified border and analyzing its broader context in detail, the topics of migration control and domestic politics are highlighted. The control function of the border becomes manifest in two ways here: First, the border selects who is allowed to enter, fencing out those who are defined as “the other.” Second, the fortification is related to a tighter control of the interior, symbolically “fencing in” the society living inside. Third, the paper analyzes the international entanglement of this border, framing it as not simply a demarcation line of one state versus its neighbor but rather within a broader international context. The article thereby helps us to better understand the control and the filter function of border fortifications and contributes to border research by underlining the international as well as the domestic context. It covers the reasons for border fortification as well as its context.

The second paper (2.2) compares two cases that are quite similar in many regards as both borders are situated in the global North, intersect with major migratory routes and constitute economic disparity

lines. As in the first paper, migration control is a key issue with a more precise focus on the topic of asylum. After highlighting the domestic dimension and the international entanglement of border fortifications in the first article, the focus is shifted here to the struggle on movement at the border line. The article analyzes how physical border fortification interacts with other forms of border and migration control, such as policies and laws. The fencing is understood as being part of a larger border regime. This helps us to better understand the importance of the border line (and therefore border fortification) despite trends of externalization and shifting borders. The paper contributes to border research by concluding that the border line (and thereby the fence) is still important for migration control, especially for asylum as states do not *either* shift *or* fortify their borders but rather combine both strategies in order to stop and deter migrants. It highlights different aspects of the control and filtering functions of fortified borders with a focus on asylum, and it analyzes reasons for as well as effects of fortification.

The third article (2.3) further zooms out by analyzing four cases that are quite different in regard to their geographic positions as well as their respective contexts. This broader perspective allows us to examine the functions of border fortifications on a more general and comparative level. Here, the focus is not only on migration but more generally on (im-)mobility, considering migrants as well as border populations. While the first two articles focus on the filter function of borders, this article compares different forms of border control—either filtering or blocking mobility—and explains the different contexts they are related to. It states that fortified borders are not a uniform category, as often assumed in studies on rebordering, and draws more attention to the social and human effects of border fortification on both migrants and border populations, a topic that is not much discussed in border research so far. It thus contributes to border research by identifying different forms of mobility control at fortified borders and analyzing their effects.

Figure 3 shows which of the border functions described above are addressed in the three papers. These papers follow in the subsequent sections.




Figure 3: Border functions addressed in the three papers

2 EMPIRICAL PAPERS

2.1 “Who is the Animal in the Zoo?” Fencing in and Fencing out at the Hungarian-Serbian Border. A Qualitative Case Study

Published in: Journal of Borderlands Studies, 37(3):453-474, 2020.

DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2020.1787188

Final version available under a CC BY Licence

Abstract: In 2015, Hungary commenced the building of a fence at its border with Serbia. The current article investigates the Hungarian-Serbian border fence in terms of its meaning in the two countries. Building on recent re-bordering research, it analyzes the context within which the fencing took place, stressing both the domestic and the international dimension. Based on qualitative interviews and a document analysis for Hungary and Serbia, it argues that the fence did not create a conflict between the two neighbors – instead, the international entanglement of the border led to a complex bordering process that extended bilateral relations. In Hungary, the border fortification was used for internal political motives and at the same time aimed to exclude non-European migrants. Due to political circumstances and the filter function of the fence, the Serbian government likewise managed to exploit the border fortification to its advantage. The article introduces the concept of “fencing in and fencing out” in order to analyze the control function that the fence performs on both sides of the border.

Keywords

Migration control, fortified borders, Hungary, Serbia, re-bordering, Othering

1. Introduction

In 2015, migration became an omnipresent topic of public debate in Europe. The arrival of large numbers of Syrian refugees led to the formalization of the so-called Balkan route, which allowed refugees to transit through several European countries legally (for a more detailed description of these events, see Sicurella 2018, 58–60). As some countries ceased to control their borders, migration movements across Europe continued to increase and at the same time became much more visible (Speer 2017, 2).

These events caused growing tensions between EU member states and attracted enormous media attention. Images of large groups of people marching on railway tracks and highways were central to the framing of this period as “the refugee crisis” (for a critical discussion of this term, see Rajaram 2015a; Cantat 2016, 2017). While the debate on the EU’s borders had previously focused on the Mediterranean area, the Balkan states now became – at least for a while – the new “hotspot” and the center of public attention.

In this context, the Hungarian government started to construct a fence at its border with Serbia. The 164 km long border, which traverses mainly flat and partly marshy terrain, was entirely sealed by a double fence. Until then, the EU’s southern border had been barely visible and was manifest only through images of overcrowded refugee boats. Now, the Hungarian border fence created very concrete images of physical border reinforcement, illustrating “fortress Europe” more clearly than ever. Hence, this relatively small and quite recent part of the EU’s external borders – Hungary only joined the EU in 2004 – became a new symbol of the conflict over migration to Europe.

While attracting a great deal of attention in Europe and beyond, the fence is just one of a series of newly fortified borders worldwide. Indeed, it is not only the total number of border fences and walls that is increasing, but also the rate of barrier construction, with the barriers also becoming increasingly longer (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). In 2017, Carter and Poast found that “out of the sixty-two total man-made border walls constructed since 1800, twenty-eight have been constructed since 2000” (Carter and Poast 2017, 240). Taking this phenomenon into account, research on national borders has shifted from the idea of a “borderless world” (Ohmae 1990), which was predominant in the 1990s, to a debate on the process of re-bordering (Rosière and Jones 2012; Vallet and David 2012; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Brown 2017; Carter and Poast 2017; Dzihic and Günay 2018).

This article analyzes the Hungarian border fence as a case study that exemplifies the broader trend of re-bordering. The relatively recent fortification of this border makes it possible to investigate the

motives expressed by the actors involved, the functions that the fence fulfills for them, and the context of the border closure. The research is based on interviews with governmental and nongovernmental actors in Hungary and Serbia. Thus, by comparing perspectives from both sides of the border, the case study contributes to a better understanding of what takes place on each side of a newly fortified border.

The article is structured as follows. After a brief overview of ongoing debates in border research (Section 2) the data and methods are explained (Section 3). Section 4 then describes the context of the border fortification. The empirical results are presented and discussed in the subsequent parts (Sections 5 and 6), before concluding in the last section (Section 7).

2. Rethinking the Line: Research on Borders and Re-bordering

Although the sphere of border studies has a strong tradition in geography, the current research on borders is diverse and can be found in very different fields (Johnson et al. 2011). The disciplines of geopolitics, political science, economics, sociology, security studies, history, and social and cultural anthropology have all contributed to the current research on borders. Case studies, often focusing on regions such as the southern and northern United States borders (Rodriguez 2006) or the Finnish border regions (Paasi and Prokkola 2008), are very common and typically address questions concerning borderlands, cross-border relations, or the link between physical and symbolic boundaries (for an overview, see Newman 2012).

In the 1990s, along with a wave of literature on globalization, the perspective on borders and territoriality changed, raising the question of whether border research was still necessary in a world where borders were seemingly becoming insignificant (Newman 2006a, 172). Yet after a period of debate on the effects of globalization, when many assumed that national borders would become permeable or would even disappear, research on borders has experienced a renaissance. It is now obvious that borders still play a role as “the lines that continue to separate us” (Newman 2006b). The “reclosing of borders” (Newman 2006a, 171) has been strongly linked to security and securitization and – especially in the USA – to the events of 9/11 and the global “war on terror” (Newman 2006a; Ackleson 2012; Jones 2012).

Recent literature dealing with borders includes debates on not only the phenomenon of these new border fortifications, but also the process of simultaneous de-bordering and re-bordering: while the

number of border fences and walls is increasing worldwide, some people are nevertheless experiencing borders as more and more permeable. This has led to a situation where parts of the world's population can move quite freely across borders whereas others experience borders as barriers that block their movement (Mau et al. 2015). Borders work as "semi-permeable filters" (Mau et al. 2006, 18) that allow some movements while blocking others.

Starting from these observations, recent literature has consequently sought to answer the question of "why do states build walls?" (Carter and Poast 2017). Different authors have sought to understand what types of states construct walls and what the driving factors for constructing them are. Hassner and Wittenberg define the new border fortifications as follows:

Fortified boundaries share three qualities that distinguish them from other types of borders or fortifications. First, their primary function is border control, not military or territorial demarcation. Second, they are physical barriers opposed to virtual, symbolic, or declaratory boundaries. Third, they are asymmetrical in origin and intent. (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015, 160)

In a quantitative study, the authors compared states worldwide in order to understand the motives for border fortification. They concluded that "the primary motivation for constructing fortified barriers is not territory or security but economics" (158). Carter and Poast (2017) reached a similar conclusion, stating that economic disparities are the main reason for border fortification:

Wall construction is explained by cross-border economic disparities. [...] We find that economic disparities have a substantial and significant effect on the presence of a physical wall that is independent of formal border disputes and concerns over instability from civil wars in neighbors. (Carter and Poast 2017, 240. With regard to economic disparity and fortified borders, see also Moré 2011)

Similarly, Rosière and Jones (2012) emphasize the economic aspect of new border barriers. They introduce the concept of "teichopolitics," defined as "the politics of building barriers," and state: "Each new barrier is constructed on a border that is meant to differentiate between two different spaces of economic, cultural, or political privilege" (Rosière and Jones 2012, 220). To a greater extent than the previously mentioned studies, they also underline the importance of migratory movements for border fencing, declaring that "contemporary teichopolitics is primarily linked with controlling migrations" (221). In contrast to other articles that focus exclusively on the relationship between the states on each side of the border, Jones speaks of walls against the global poor, thus moving the perspective to

border control as a “conflict between states and the people who move” (Jones 2016, 69). Andreas (2003) has analyzed border control as a means to deny access to what he calls “clandestine transnational actors” (CTAs), including smugglers, refugees, and terrorists. Terrorism, which has mostly been discussed in the context of securitization, has also recently been invoked as a factor in states’ cost–benefit analyses when deciding for and against building border barriers (cf. Jellissen and Gottheil 2013). Avdan (2019) has discussed the importance of terrorist threats versus economic considerations, stating that while economic ties reduce the likelihood of fortified barriers, terrorist violence results in harder borders when a state’s own citizens are targeted. Others have argued that terrorism, and especially the events of 9/11, has not caused, but instead ratified the return of the wall (Vallet and David 2014).

While these analyses make a very important contribution to understanding the current trends of re-bordering, they mostly focus on external effects, such as economic disparities, the (perceived) threat of terrorism, or the prevention of migration as reasons for border fencing. Domestic motives for fortifying borders have been neglected. One exception is Wendy Brown, who has identified the desperate search for sovereignty as the main reason for building walls. She regards contemporary wall building as “theater pieces for national populations specifically unsettled by global forces threatening sovereignty and identity at both the state and individual level” (Brown 2017, 9).

What Brown has addressed in her work is the importance of identity for border fencing. The link between borders and identity has been discussed extensively in research. As identity is not possible without creating boundaries (Barth 1996), humans need to use categories to differentiate one group from another (Jenkins 2004) and “the Other” thereby serves as the antithesis of their own community (Said 1979). Othering is both a condition for and a result of bordering. State boundaries, which are both material and symbolic, can be used to create the us and the Other (Newman and Paasi 1998). More recently, in the framework of the “global war on terror,” the image of the enemy other has been used to legitimize tougher security and border policies: the framing of terrorism as a global problem linked to allegedly threatening groups such as Muslims has allowed states to militarize and close their borders (Jones 2009).

Drawing on this overview on border literature, one could argue that the Hungarian-Serbian border is in some respects a typical example of the newly fortified borders. It fits the definition provided by Hassner and Wittenberg, being a physical barrier that was unilaterally erected by Hungary for the purposes of border control. It is likewise linked to migration control and is being used to create a negative image of the Other, as discussed in greater detail in the following sections. Lastly, it is

consistent with the concept of *teichopolitics*, being an unequal border: the gap in GDP between Serbia and Hungary is significant (Rosière and Jones 2012; The World Bank 2019), their border marks the end of the European Union, and the fence is connected with immigration control.

On the other hand, this literature review shows that comparative quantitative studies on re-bordering often focus on the relationship between two neighboring states, and assume that fortified borders necessarily indicate conflict between neighbors. The analysis of economic disparities suggests a precise divide between the poor and the rich that manifests itself at “economic or social discontinuity lines” (Rosière and Jones 2012, 217). These divide clearly distinguishable spaces: the wealthy and the poor, the “barrier builder” and the “barrier target” (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015, 158). In this regard, the Hungarian-Serbian case is much more complex, as this article will show. This case study aims to shed light on one of the “discontinuity lines” and to better understand the relation between “barrier builder” and “barrier target.” If we assume that “the new nation-state walls [...] divide richer from poorer parts of the globe” (Brown 2017, 36), how is this division managed and negotiated on both sides of the line? More precisely, this article aims to contribute to the re-bordering debate by showing the complexity of a bordering process, therefore adding domestic factors and international linkages to the often-stressed economic and security dimensions.

Research on border regimes, especially in the European context, emphasizes the complexity of border and migration control as well as the international context and the cooperation with neighboring states (Heimeshoff et al. 2014; Hess and Kasperek 2019). Moreover, the agency and the strategies of migrants are highlighted: state border and migration policy always need to be understood as a reaction to migratory movements (Hess 2016, 2017; De Genova 2017). In this context, the European border and migration regime is described as “an unstable ensemble, characterized by the heterogeneity of its actors, institutions and discourses, its shifting alliances and allegiances” (Hess and Kasperek 2019, 2). The present analysis aims to contribute to this debate by describing the complex process of bordering, and by examining the strategies of the participating states. While the cooperation and third-country policy of the EU has already been analyzed thoroughly (Janicki and Böwing 2010; Hess et al. 2014; Dünnwald 2015; Mrozek 2017; Schwarz 2017; Soykan 2017), the reactions and the positioning of a country behind the border fortification merit more research. Therefore, the following analysis of state policies and strategies on both sides of a recently fortified border can help us to better understand border regimes as a whole. Overall, border literature discusses various aspects of bordering, economic disparities, migration, populism, and so on, but often focuses on only one of these aspects. It may therefore enrich the debate to discuss internal and external factors, international entanglement, and state practices on both sides of a border fence as being part of the same bordering process.

3. Data and Methods

This case study is based on field research in Hungary (Budapest and the border town of Szeged) and in Serbia (Belgrade). The data include 13 problem-centered interviews, which are complemented by several informal conversations and a document analysis of policy papers and press articles. The interview topics included the reasons for building the fence, the effects of the border fortification on migration, the Hungarian and Serbian migration and border policies, the relationship and cooperation between the two countries, and the situation of migrants¹ in both countries before and after building the fence. Some additional topics came up during the interviews and were included in the analysis, for example the importance of legal changes for the effectiveness of border control or the impact of the border closure and the accompanying policies on Hungarian (civil) society.

The qualitative semi-structured interviews were fully transcribed and then coded in MAXQDA. The coding method was mostly deductive, but was completed with inductive codes during the process. The interpretation followed the qualitative content analysis method (Mayring 2002; Gläser and Laudel 2010). The codes were used to structure the data and their creation was based on the research questions and the interview topics. The analysis was developed by comparing the coding of the different interviews. In addition, field notes and theoretical memos were used to develop the essential points of the analysis.

The focus of the interviews was on the actions and strategies of both governments regarding the border fence. However, in Hungary, it proved very difficult to reach and interview state actors. Staff from The Ministry of Interior, the Border Police, and the Immigration and Asylum Office were not available for interviews, and we were referred to the University of Public Service – which trains the border police – as well as to the Migration Research Institute, which is close to the governing Fidesz party. Moreover, some of the interviewees in Hungary were very reluctant to be quoted using the name of their organization; one stated off the record that he/she did not want to risk damaging their relationship with the Hungarian government. By contrast, in Serbia, the Ministry of Interior and the Commissariat for Refugees agreed for interviews to take place and none of the interviewees considered it a problem if the organization's name was published. Understanding the difficulties in field access as a part of the research provides an insight into the social and political climate in Hungary. Altogether, the broad spectrum of interview partners, including state actors, civil society organizations, and international institutions, allowed an in-depth, multi-perspective analysis in both countries (see Table 1). By asking both governmental and non-governmental actors about the governments' actions and strategies, we were able to collect very different perspectives on these aspects.

Table 1. Actors Interviewed in Hungary and Serbia.

	Governmental actors/actors close to the government	International or intra-state organizations	NGO/civil society
<i>Hungary</i>	1. University of Public Service, Border Police Department 4. Migration Research Institute, Budapest	2. UNHCR Budapest 5. UNHCR Szeged 7. International Organization for Migration, Budapest	3. Hungarian Helsinki Committee (human rights organization), Budapest 6. Migszol (migrant solidarity group), Szeged 8. An independent researcher in migration studies, Budapest
<i>Serbia</i>	9. Commissariat for Refugees, Belgrade 12. Ministry of Interior, Border Police Directorate, Belgrade	10. International Organization for Migration, Belgrade	11. Info Park (migrant support group) 13. Belgrade Center for Human Rights

In addition to the interviews, we used press releases, official statements, and other documents concerning migration and the border fence in order to analyze the governments' official positions.

4. The “Summer of Migration”: Migratory Movements to Europe and the Reactions of Hungary and Serbia

Immigration is not a new phenomenon in Europe, but the events of 2015 were remarkable, as indicated by the labeling of that year's summer as “the summer of migration.” The number of migrants increased significantly, first of all because of the migratory movements from war-torn Syria, but also due to high numbers of people from Afghanistan and Iraq claiming refugee status in Europe. Out of one million registered arrivals in Europe in 2015, some 50 percent were Syrian citizens, 20 percent Afghans, and 7 percent Iraqis (IOM 2015, 3). The most substantial movement towards Europe started in Syria; the migrants then crossed Turkey and the Balkans in order to reach the EU. Hungary occupied a strategic position on the Balkan route, being geographically positioned at the heart of the migration route and being embedded in the European Union as well as in the Schengen space (Kallius 2016).

The summer of migration naturally affected Hungary, as hundreds of thousands of people crossed the country. During the course of 2015, some 411,515 migrants and asylum seekers were registered in Hungary (IOM 2015, 14). The number of asylum applications submitted in Hungary increased to almost 180,000, but the majority of asylum seekers did not stay there: at the end of 2015, only 900–1000 of them were still in the country (Juhász, Hunyadi, and Zgut 2015, 10; Eurostat 2019). This was the context in which Hungary started constructing a fence at its border with Serbia in 2015.

While the fence was the most visible action taken by the Hungarian authorities, it was certainly not the only one. When starting to fortify its border with Serbia, the Hungarian government made sure to

provide information about whom the fence was intended to keep out. Using different media and information channels, it cited mass migration as the reason for building the fence and depicted the migrants themselves as dangerous, criminal, culturally different, and threatening (Kallius 2017a, 141). Prime Minister Victor Orbán clearly distinguished between on the one hand, the positive image of Hungarian emigrants living in other European countries and Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, and on the other hand, the negative image of the Other: that is, non-European migrants (Lamour and Varga 2017). Starting in 2015, a massive so-called “information campaign” spread the message that Hungary was under threat from immigrants and needed the fence in order to defend itself. Government-financed billboards disseminated anti-immigration slogans all over the country. They accompanied a so-called “national consultation on immigration and terrorism” that consisted of sending a questionnaire to every adult citizen in Hungary. The questionnaire itself asked mostly biased questions, such as “Did you know that economic migrants cross the Hungarian border illegally, and that recently the number of immigrants in Hungary has increased twentyfold?” (The complete questionnaire is available online at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/national-consultation-on-immigration-to-begin>). After the fence had been completed, Victor Orbán once again used harsh words to evoke a threat that necessitated maintaining it:

Hungary is encircled, and if things continue like this, we will be scalped by tens of thousands [...] who want to make off with Hungarians’ money. (Hungarian Government 2017)

The construction of the border fence was thus accompanied by the rhetorical exclusion of unwanted migrants. However, it was also linked to legal changes that enforced the physical and symbolic barrier. In 2015, Hungary introduced new laws on immigration and border crossing that it has continued to change ever since (see Table 2). For example, irregular border crossings have become a criminal act punishable by detention; the so-called “push-backs” (the immediate return – without any procedure – of people who irregularly cross the border) have become official policy, integration and housing programs for recognized refugees have been cut, and Serbia has been declared a “safe third country.” The “push-backs” to Serbia have been applied across the entire Hungarian territory, leading to cases where people who entered Hungary by other means and had never been in Serbia were nevertheless pushed back to the Serbian side of the fence. The two so-called transit zones integrated into the border fence have become the only way to claim asylum in Hungary. To enter these transit zones, a person has to make it to the top of an opaquely-managed waiting list in Serbia. Hungary does not decide who can enter the transit zones, but just sets the number of people who are allowed to enter. This quota, which has never been made official, dropped from about one hundred per day in 2015 to one person

per transit zone per working day in 2018. Moreover, a law on “inadmissibility” was introduced. It states that every asylum seeker has to prove that he/she was in danger in every country he/she had passed through on their journey and that he/she was not able to claim asylum in any of these countries. If this could not be proved, the asylum claim was not processed.²

Table 2. Overview of Some of the Changes in Hungarian Immigration Law 2015–2018.

2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Serbia is designated as a safe third country for asylum seekers, resulting in the quasi-automatic rejection of over 99% of asylum claims. – Transit zones, where immigration and asylum cases are processed, are introduced. – Extremely accelerated asylum processes. The very tight deadline of the admissibility procedure is further shortened: the asylum authority has to deliver a decision in a maximum of eight calendar days. – Rejected asylum seekers are immediately expelled, with a ban on entry and visiting for one or two years. – Criminal sanctions are introduced for illegal border crossing through the border fence.
2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Police are obliged to automatically push back to the external side of the border fence any asylum seekers who are apprehended within 8 km of either the Serbian-Hungarian or the Croatian-Hungarian border, without a legal trial or the opportunity to challenge this measure
2017	<p>The “State of Crisis due to Mass Migration” is extended, leading to the following legal changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Push-backs are expanded from the border zone to the entire Hungarian territory. – Asylum applications can only be submitted in the transit zones at the border. Asylum seekers are to be held in the transit zones for the entire asylum procedure without a legal basis for detention or judicial remedies. – All vulnerable persons and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children over 14 years of age will also be automatically detained. – The deadlines for seeking judicial review against admissibility decisions and rejections of asylum are shortened to three days, hindering the applicants’ ability to challenge these decisions in court.
2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – A new law on inadmissibility is introduced. – Criminal sanctions are introduced for giving assistance to asylum seekers. – Food is denied to asylum seekers in the transit zones who challenge the decision on their asylum claim.

Source: Hungarian Helsinki Committee, www.helsinki.hu

While Hungary is already a member of the EU and shapes its migration policy against this background, Serbia is an EU candidate country, currently undergoing the process of EU accession. Serbian migration and border policy thus has to be analyzed in this context. Serbia implemented an independent asylum system and asylum law relatively recently, in 2008. This took place simultaneously with the liberalization of visas for Serbian citizens, who from that point on had easier access to EU countries. Both processes are linked, as Serbia had to adopt a specific border and migration policy as a prerequisite with regard to visa liberalization for its citizens (Stojic-Mitrovic 2014). Under the 2008 Asylum Law, any person that arrived in Serbia and stated the intention to ask for asylum had to be provided with a so-called “72-hours paper.” This permitted a legal stay in Serbia for 72 hours; within this timeframe, the person had to register in one of the asylum centers, otherwise his/her stay became illegal (Beznec, Speer, and Stojić Mitrović 2016, 36). The number of people indicating the intention to ask for asylum augmented steadily and rapidly from 77 in 2008 to 16,490 in 2016; the number of people actually transiting Serbia was probably much higher (ibid., 36–37). Many of those who stated the intention to seek asylum did so in order to legalize their stay and to have access to accommodation

and other services, but not necessarily with the intention to stay for long. Yet even those who intended to seek protection by requesting asylum in Serbia were unable to obtain it, as a result of the “highly dysfunctional system” (ibid., 37).

In contrast to the harsh Hungarian rhetoric, Serbia underlined the humanitarian approach of its migration policy. The Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, explicitly welcomed migrants in 2015 and the Serbian government provided the infrastructure to facilitate migrants’ transit through the country. In 2015, many migrants who were transiting Serbia considered the country as a better place compared with other countries such as Bulgaria (Bez nec, Speer, and Stojić Mitrović 2016, 49). The Serbian government stated in November 2015: “Government solves problem of large waves of migrants humanely” (minrzs.gov.rs. 2015). When Hungary started building the fence, Vučić reacted “surprised and shocked,” stating that “Building walls is not the solution. [...] Serbia will not build walls. It will not isolate itself” (Aljazeera 2015). However, even though Serbia criticized the Hungarian fence in order to underline its own different approach, both governments also emphasized their strong cooperation. They underlined their common role as “transit countries” and the importance of good bilateral relations, while at the same time stressing that Hungary actively supported Serbia’s European integration (Government of Serbia 2015a, 2015b). Starting from 2016, the Serbian rhetoric became more securitarian. The official discourse shifted from protecting human rights to protecting borders. This took place as a reaction to the Hungarian border closure, and particularly the legal changes in Hungary, but it can also be understood in the frame of the Serbian negotiations with the EU (Bez nec, Speer, and Stojić Mitrović 2016). At the same time, Serbia modified its asylum law, which entered into force in 2018. These changes, along with other more restrictive practices, made it even more difficult for asylum seekers to stay in Serbia, as is discussed in more detail below.

The following paragraphs present and discuss the empirical results. Section 5 shows the exploitation of the border fence by the Hungarian government. Section 6 then analyses the reaction to the fence by the Serbian government. While the usefulness of the border fence for the Hungarian government seems quite evident, its usefulness for the Serbian government is only possible due to the international entanglement of the border, which is also analyzed throughout Section 6.

5. The Two-Sided Fence: Deterring Migration, Preserving Power

This section focusses on how the Hungarian government used the fence for its own purposes. It therefore discusses the perspectives of our interview partners on why the fence was built and how the effects of the fence served the government's interests.

One major finding from our interviews is the importance of the domestic dimension in Hungary. The fence came in a period of internal political tensions and power struggles, and is clearly linked to this situation. Several interviewees mentioned the government's campaign and rhetoric that claimed to protect (white) Christianity and European culture and values, and warned against migrants as culturally different and dangerous. Interestingly, almost all the Hungarian interviewees talked about domestic motives first as the reason for building the fence, before – or instead of – speaking about migration and border control. They mentioned the need of the governing Fidesz party to win the next parliamentary elections (which took place in 2018), the pressure from the right-wing party, Jobbik, and the fact that the single-issue campaign on migration had supplanted other pressing topics such as social problems and healthcare in Hungary. Indeed, the election campaign for the parliamentary elections in 2018 was very much focused on the topic of migration. With regard to the election, Victor Orbán warned that “if we end up with an internationalist government instead of a nationalistic one, they will dismantle the fence protecting Hungary, approve Brussels' dictate with which they want to settle migrants in Hungary and Hungary's transformation will be under way” (Béni 2018). Consistent with this, the interview partners considered the fence a political success for the Fidesz party, which was re-elected in 2018.

Politically, it was very useful for them. I mean, if you look at the election results since 2015, the Hungarian government has been using this campaign very successfully to gain votes in parliament. Just recently in 2018 in the latest election, they've secured a two-thirds majority for the third time. And they themselves will admit that the issue of migration and stopping migration played a huge part in that. (Interview 7, International Organization for Migration, Budapest)

Apart from this direct impact on the election results, there were other effects on Hungarian society that came along with the fence. Kallius (2017a) and others have underlined the links between the fence, with its anti-immigration discourse and legislation, and the discourse and policy against “unwanted populations” (Kallius 2017a, 142) within the country, such as Roma or homeless people (Kallius, Monterescu, and Rajaram 2016). With regard to common marginalization, see also Rajaram

2015b). Moreover, anti-NGO campaigns were launched and new laws concerning NGOs implemented together with anti-immigration laws. Against this backdrop, our difficulties in finding interview partners and their reluctance to be quoted seem less surprising.

The fence, the accompanying “information campaign,” and the legal changes influenced the social climate in Hungary. One result was that experiences of everyday racism increased, as one interviewee observed:

All of this has obviously also translated into more and more everyday practices of racism against people identified as nonbelonging or identified as others. This, I think, is something many of the migrants and refugees in the country, including some who’ve been here for ten years, have really been noticing. I’ve had some friends telling me that after living in the same building for ten, fifteen years, for the first time they go home and there’s a message on their door like “go back to your country” or whatever. It’s really pervasive and sort of impacting on sociality. (Interview 8, researcher in migration studies, Budapest)

Another interviewee stated that the fence did not cause any direct inconvenience to the majority of Hungarians in their daily life, but had a negative effect on Hungary’s relations with EU institutions and many EU member states. He illustrated this situation using a purported quote from Serbian president Vučić:

And so initially Vučić criticized, he said something funny about the fence, like, it’s not quite apparent who is the animal in the zoo, so from which side you see the fence, it’s like Serbia that’s fenced out by Hungary, but it’s Hungary that’s actually, you know, closing itself into a cage. (Interview 6, Migszol, Szeged)

These insights show how much the message of the fence, while naming a target on the outside, was at the same time oriented towards the interior, addressing and affecting Hungarian society and, in a way, “closing it into a cage” (for a discussion on the domestic motives and effects of the fence, see also Pap and Reményi 2017). Brown’s idea of border walls as “theater pieces for national populations” (Brown 2017, 9) and as an attempt to restore national sovereignty does indeed apply here. In its attempt to remain in power, the government used the fence to create the positive us and the negative Other. In order to analyze the purposes of the border fence, it is thus important to understand not

only against whom (or what) the fence was built, but also for whom it was built – in this case, potential Hungarian voters.

The above presented motives for building the fence as well as the changes in Hungary that accompanied it show that the bordering process transformed the Hungarian society, which is “fenced in” by the border fortification. This aspect of fencing in has not yet been paid much attention in border research. This analysis shows, however, that the domestic dimension needs to be taken into account as part of the complex process of bordering.

The preceding paragraphs discuss the domestic motives for building a fence, as well as its effects on the Hungarian society. However, these findings do not imply that the fence has no external motives and no effect on the outside. Apart from the symbolic function of the fence, there is a very real, physical border fortification and a real conflict between those who try to control the border and those who try to cross it. At the level of communications, the government invested a substantial amount of money and effort into pointing out those who are unwanted. On the ground, a complex system is maintained in order to exclude these unwanted people. The border fortification is the most visible part of it: It consists of two fences that are about four meters high and are fitted with barbed wire. Parts of it are electrified and reinforced with welded wire mesh and a concrete foundation, and it is also equipped with heat sensors and cameras. The border is controlled by the police, the army, and the newly created “Border Hunters.” There have been numerous reports of extreme police violence against migrants at the border (Dearden 2017). Yet the fence itself is not enough to stop migration:

So, I mean the fence in itself is not stopping people. The legislation that is also coming along with it, that's what's stopping people. And the push-backs and all the other measures. (Interview 3, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Budapest)

The massive legal changes concerning migration and border crossing completed and reinforced the physical barrier, making it much riskier for migrants to enter Hungary. Considering the domestic dimension and the aspect of Othering as well as the physical and legal border fortification, it is clear that the fence operates in two directions. On the one hand, it is directed outwards, sending a message to migrants that they are not wanted in Hungary and everything will be done to keep them out; on the other hand, it is simultaneously directed inwards, sending a message to the Hungarian people, explaining that they have to be protected from a danger from outside and that the government is there to protect them. I conceptualize this phenomenon using the terms “fencing in” and “fencing out”: They show that a fence can have intentions towards and effects on both sides of the border, exercising

control inwards and outwards. In other words, it works by “reminding those inside that they are fenced in, and those outside that they are not welcome” (Moré 2011, 4). The role of fences in controlling and governing populations (Pallister-Wilkins 2015) merits more attention in border research. The debate on re-bordering often focusses either on external motives and effects, for example bilateral relations or migration control, or – more rarely – on internal motives, for example populist governments and internal power struggles. The concept of “fencing in and fencing out” is to show that we need to analyze both aspects at the same time as being part of the complex process of bordering. The Hungarian case illustrates that controlling the exterior comes along with controlling the interior, and that the motives to build a fence as well as its effects may affect both sides of the border. The debate on re-bordering would benefit from discussing the internal and external motives and effects of bordering simultaneously, and from considering both processes as being linked to each other.

6. Alliances across the Fence: Ensuring Good Neighborly Relations Despite a Fortified Border

While, as discussed above, the Hungarian government managed to use the building of the fence to its advantage, the Serbian authorities did not opt for fencing the border but just reacted to it. The current section therefore focuses on the meaning of the border fence for Serbia and the reactions of the Serbian government to the Hungarian fence. However, the Hungarian-Serbian relationship and Serbia’s reactions and policies cannot be understood without considering the broader context of the bordering. Therefore, this section also analyses the international entanglement of the border and the effects of this embeddedness.

With respect to the question of against whom the fence was built, it is remarkable that the fence did not provoke a conflict between the governments on either side of the border. After a temporary protest against the fence by the Serbian government, both sides reverted to good relations. Victor Orbán, following a meeting with the Serbian prime minister, stated with regard to the fence: “I attempted to reassure the Honourable Prime Minister that this measure is in no way directed against Serbia, or the Serbian people” (Hungarian Government 2015). The Serbian minister in charge of European integration also stated in November 2015 that

good and open bilateral relations can overcome some outstanding issues and occasional problems. [...] This can be best seen on the example of the migrant crisis, when the representatives of the two countries sat down and talked as good neighbors and partners. (Government of Serbia 2015a)

Our interviewees on both sides of the border likewise underlined the good relationship between the two governments, and our interviewee in the Serbian Ministry of Interior spoke of “perfect cooperation” with their “Hungarian colleagues” (Interview 12, Ministry of Interior, Belgrade). This shows that even though the two countries are separated by a highly fortified border, the fence does not divide them. Instead, there is some sort of complicity, where both governments try to benefit from the existence of the border fence and its consequences. Whereas, in Hungary, the Fidesz party won the elections after building the fence, the Serbian government and authorities frequently underlined their positive image and capacity to deal with immigration in a professional and EU-compliant way, which should advance the process of EU admission. Even if Serbia initially criticized Hungary for building the fence, the criticism was framed in terms of the EU, and accused Hungary of “non-European behavior,” while promising to “protect European values” (tagesschau.de 2015). Our governmental interviewees in Serbia explicitly underlined the importance of the EU and the international context for dealing with migration:

Serbia is still a transit country so they pass through here onto their final destinations, wherever they may be in Western/Northern Europe, but while they’re here, we take very good care of them and the international community praised us for our good treatment of families, especially children go to school. We, as a country, with the tremendous help of the European Union, we do everything to make their accommodation and their prolonged stay as bearable as possible. (Interview 9, Commissariat for Refugees, Belgrade)

There are 3500 people now in the centers in Serbia. [...] It is a big task, but we deal with it very successfully and we get very good grades from our European partners. (Interview 12, Ministry of Interior, Belgrade)

So, instead of being “fenced out,” the Serbian government has tried to benefit from the situation by projecting a positive image to the EU and the international community. The specific context of the European Union has created a situation in which the country behind the fence does not necessarily have to suffer due to the fortification. The first reason for this is that Serbia is eager to obtain EU membership and thus to follow EU standards. Second, it is because the EU financially supports the refugee camps in Serbia, making it less costly for the Serbian government to accommodate migrants. The third reason is that Serbian citizens can travel visa free to the EU and thus will not be blocked by the border fortification (however, this is not the case for Kosovars).

Moreover, while Serbia is underlining its humane way of dealing with immigrants, this does not mean that they are welcome to stay. State actors emphasized that Serbia is just a transit country:

Ninety-nine percent of them do not want to stay in Serbia; we are just a transit country. They just want to go to Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium, Denmark. [...] Ninety-nine percent don't want to stay in Serbia; that is the main fact. (Interview 12, Ministry of Interior, Belgrade)

This idea of merely being a transit country has also freed Serbian authorities from undertaking tasks beyond providing temporary accommodation:

And the authorities also like to see that as a transit country. You will hear that narrative over and over again, which gives them also this attitude of not really being responsible for applying the procedure properly because the people don't want to stay, so they also put themselves in a situation where they say: Well, um, if they wanted to stay we would, of course, provide all services and all the other procedures – but they don't want to. (Interview 10, International Organization for Migration, Belgrade)

Indeed, while many interview partners agreed that the majority of people want to move on to Northern Europe, the asylum system does not make it easy for those who wish to stay in Serbia. Perhaps because most migrants preferred to move on to other countries or perhaps because of the complexity of the Serbian asylum process, only 104 people were ultimately granted asylum or subsidiary protection in Serbia from when the Law on Asylum was established in 2008 up to December 2017. In 2018, a new law on asylum was introduced, increasing the obstacles for asylum seekers. It introduced a tight deadline for submitting asylum claims after arrival, but the authorities did not inform people about this deadline on their arrival. Moreover, out of 13 refugee camps, there were only five where people could submit an asylum claim. The form that had to be used was not distributed by the authorities and was not available in the camps (or on the Internet). Further, it was only available in Serbian (in Cyrillic script). Because of this new law on asylum and especially the newly introduced deadlines, many people became stuck in a “legal limbo” and could not submit asylum claims anymore (Interview 13, Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Belgrade). As a result, most migrants therefore tried to move on to other countries and the impact of the fence on Serbia was limited:

Still, even if the borders are closed as I already mentioned, people managed to move. It didn't affect Serbia that much in a way that a lot of people got stuck here, no. Some of them got stuck, the people who lacked money and

who didn't have enough money to pay a good smuggler, yes, they were stuck but it didn't change much and, in my opinion, it didn't affect Serbia. (Interview 13, Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Belgrade)

This situation may explain why the border fence did not create a conflict between Hungary and Serbia, and why both the Hungarian and Serbian authorities emphasized their good relations and cooperation. Due to the specific context at the border of the EU, both governments managed to benefit politically from the situation, creating some sort of win-win situation.

In addition to the above-mentioned factors, other international linkages were highlighted in our interviews. Several interview partners on the two sides of the border regarded the deal between the EU and Turkey on immigration control as a crucial factor that changed the situation at the Serbian-Hungarian border. Following the agreement coming into force, migratory movements decreased: "It's clear that it's not the Hungarian fence that has stopped the Balkan route, but more the EU-Turkey agreement" (Interview 6, Migszol, Szeged). The inadmissibility rule and the laws on safe third countries also linked the situation at the border to other places, some of them as far away as Turkey: as migrants have to prove that they could not claim asylum in any country they transited through, their chances of being granted asylum in Hungary are connected with migration policies and the general situation in other countries. At the EU level, the Dublin regulation created links between EU member states by giving them the option to send migrants back to the EU state where they were first registered. The border police department of the University of Public Service in Budapest (Interview 1) explicitly named the Dublin regulation as a justification for building the fence, saying that, on the one hand, Greece was not respecting its obligations by not registering migrants and, on the other hand, other European countries were using the Dublin regulation to send people back to Hungary. The role of the EU with regard to border control was described as very ambiguous: some EU representatives and member states criticized Hungary for building a fence, but at the same time, successful border control was expected from EU member states (for a detailed analysis of this contradictory relationship, see also Kallius 2016, 2017a, 2017b). Closely linked to the debate on the EU external borders, the Schengen Agreement also played an important role in the discussions on border control. The Hungarian authorities referred to the agreement as a reason for closing the border:

The other thing is that the EU could not do anything with the Hungarian argument that claimed that: We are a Schengen country and we are reinforcing border control. For that, we need fences. This was a strong argument by the government because, indeed, it's a Schengen border, it's an external border, and for the Hungarian authorities and government, it was

very easy to point at the Greek/Italian governments not fulfilling their obligations. And they said: if this is the price, we have to do this, and we are more European than you who criticized our government. (Interview 4, Migration Research Institute, Budapest)

Another interviewee, however, highlighted the Hungarian “public information campaign” to demonstrate that the Hungarian government had other objectives than simply protecting the Schengen area:

Hungary claims that what we do is not more and not less than doing our duties as members of the Schengen zone, protect the external borders, which is true but if that’s only doing your duty then you don’t build a three and a half years long multi-billion funded campaign in doing this. (Interview 6, Migszol, Szeged)

These references to the EU and the Schengen zone are further examples of the interaction between external and internal factors in border control policies, and the international entanglement of the Hungarian-Serbian border.

The closing of the Hungarian border was also related to other countries’ border policies: Several countries closed their borders in response to other countries closing theirs, leading to chain reactions. For example, Germany and Austria introduced border controls at their southern borders in 2015, and Hungary and Slovenia referred to these when tightening the controls at their own southern borders. Further, when Hungary closed its border with Serbia, other countries such as Macedonia also reinforced their border controls. At the same time, there was international cooperation on border control. While the Hungarian-Serbian border was controlled with the support of Frontex, Hungary sent police to Serbia and Macedonia to control their southern borders. With regard to migrants, the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border forced them to take other routes and to cross other countries – most of our interviewees agreed that the fence did not stop migratory movements but instead diverted them. The majority of the migrants moved on to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where many of them became stuck under very difficult conditions. As a final point, the migratory movements involved crossing long distances and numerous countries before reaching Serbia or Hungary. All these factors meant that the Hungarian-Serbian border was internationally entangled in a way that went far beyond an exclusively bi-national relationship (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: International Entanglement of the Hungarian-Serbian Border

The international entanglement of the border illustrated here has contributed to a situation where the border fence does not create a conflict between neighbors. Yet while the analysis above may show how both governments managed to exploit the border fortification to their advantage, their disparities in wealth and power should not be neglected. Although the two governments have praised each other, it is an unequal relationship: Hungary has the power to support Serbian EU accession and to propose help for controlling Serbia's southern borders (Béni 2018). The economic disparity between the countries and the fact that Hungary is an EU member state while Serbia is not qualifies the border as a typical "discontinuity line" (Rosière and Jones 2012, 217) and as one of the walls that "divide richer from poorer parts of the globe" (Brown 2017, 36). However, even if the fence marks a border of prosperity, the economic disparity between Hungary and Serbia is not the driving factor for the border fortification. The differences in wealth, power, and political privilege certainly made it easier to build the fence without much protest from Serbia, but it was not built against the poorer neighboring country. Serbia is not "fenced out," but tries to use the fence to move closer to the EU. This observation ties in with the existing literature on externalization and EU migration policy, for example Stojić-Mitrović has underlined the influence of the EU integration process on migration policy in Serbia (Stojic-Mitrovic 2012). Serbia's reaction to Hungary's fence, as analyzed in this paper, confirms the importance of external factors for Serbia's policy and shows that even a border closure can be used to advance the process of EU accession. At the same time, Hungary's relations with some EU institutions and EU member states degenerated due to the fence building and Hungary in some ways "fenced itself

out.” The situations of both Serbia and Hungary are linked to the context and the international entanglement of the fence. This case study thus illustrates that comparing neighboring countries certainly provides valuable explications for border fortification, but looking more closely at a specific case and the context of the bordering process may reveal a different picture and is thus essential to understand current trends of re-bordering.

7. Conclusion

Existing literature on re-bordering points out that most of the new border walls are not built because of territorial conflicts between nation states, as was the case in earlier times, but because of other factors, such as economic disparities, (fear of) terrorism, or securitization. The Hungarian-Serbian case shows that although these factors definitely play a role, an analysis of fortified borders should encompass more dimensions. A fortified border does not have to result from, or create, a conflict between neighboring countries. The relationship between the states on each side of a border wall can be more complex than them merely being “barrier builders” and “barrier targets,” and the real targets of the barrier may be somewhere other than just behind the fence. In the Hungarian case, the fence targets Hungarian society on the one hand, and on the other, the “global poor” (Jones 2016). The former has been affected by a massive government campaign on migration, the re-election of the Fidesz party, difficult relations with EU institutions, and numerous legal changes. The latter have been blocked by the physical barrier and the legislation that comes along with it, but also by its symbolic effect as a “symbol of deterrence” (Interview 12, Ministry of Interior, Belgrade), which is intended to have an impact far beyond Serbia.

The Hungarian example shows that a border fence is not always something that exists just between two nation states. It is linked to other places and other borders, such as migrants’ countries of origin, the EU, and transit countries including Turkey and Greece, and it is oriented as much towards the interior as the exterior. Research on re-bordering shows that predictions of a borderless, globalized world have not come true. Instead, the Hungarian-Serbian border can be seen as an example of a “globalized border.” Whereas the message of the fence is a nationalist one in terms of fencing the Other out and fencing the Hungarians in as a homogenous group protected by the government and the fence, the fence in itself is international: it is connected to other parts of the world and to other borders, as well as to the EU’s political system. A great deal of the literature on re-bordering is still very much focused on a simple comparison between the wall builder and the neighboring state; it thus tends to neglect the relevance of domestic aspects as well as of international linkages. The current

article moreover emphasizes the importance of understanding not only the intentions of the wall builder, but also of analyzing the neighbor, which is not just passive but may influence the situation with its practices and strategies.

The Hungarian-Serbian case is an example of a newly fortified border. It confirms the concept of “teichopolitics,” being a barrier constructed on a “border that is meant to differentiate between two different spaces of economic, cultural, or political privilege” (Rosière and Jones 2012, 220). What we can learn from this case study is that these different spaces are not always clearly separated by one line. Due to the filter function of the Hungarian- Serbian border, the fence does not penalize the neighboring country, but instead differentiates between a privileged space on one side, a less privileged space on the other side, and a non-privileged space far away. This finding may contribute to understanding how a fence can operate where the spaces of privilege are not easy to separate and where there are degrees of wealth, power, and privilege. The concept of “fencing in and fencing out” presented here furthermore helps us to understand the meaning of a border fence for the different actors on each side of the fence. Using these terms may help to sharpen the perspective on the functions of exclusion, inclusion, and control that a fortified border can perform. Moreover, it may show who can profit from a border fortification and under which circumstances. To ask who is fenced in and who is fenced out by a border fence can help to challenge the simple dichotomy between “fence builder” and “fence target.”

While the functions of borders and border fences may differ, a very common definition of a border stresses its capacity to mark a difference:

All borders either create or reflect difference, be they spatial categories or cultural affiliations and identities. All borders are initially constructed as a means through which groups – be they states, religions or social classes – can be ordered, hierarchized, managed and controlled by power elites. [...] This ties in with the fact that most borders, by their very definition, create binary distinctions between the here and there, the us and them, the included and the excluded. (Newman 2012, 44)

The current case study shows that if border fences indeed mark a difference, it is not necessarily (or exclusively) the difference between one and the other side of a border. The fence between Hungary and Serbia creates a distinction, but even though the differences between Hungary and Serbia or the EU and the rest should not be neglected, the main distinction it creates is the difference from a common Other. The two governments treat migrants in very different ways, but both likewise try to

make sure – on a rhetorical and a practical level – that these people will not stay. The fence has two sides. If one of its functions is to convince the Hungarian people that they need the government to protect them from a danger from outside, another one is to serve as a “symbol of deterrence” for those who might try to cross the border and, combined with specific laws and other measures, to apply the idea of exclusion effectively on the ground.

Notes

1. The word “migrant” is used here as a generic term for all people who migrate or flee from one place to another. I do not distinguish between “migrant” and “refugee.” These terms are often used to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate movements and they are, moreover, not very precise as it is difficult to tell if a person “flees” or “migrates.”
2. For an up-to-date overview of the legal changes, see the Hungarian Helsinki Committee:
https://www.helsinki.hu/en/refugees_and_migrants/news/

References

- Ackleson, Jason. 2012. The Emerging Politics of Border Management: Policy and Research Considerations. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. D. Wastl-Walter, 245–61. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Aljazeera. 2015. Serbia Angered by Hungary's Proposed Anti-Migrant Wall. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/serbia-angered-hungary-proposed-anti-migrant-wall-150618035111047.html> (accessed March 25, 2020).
- Andreas, Peter. 2003. Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century. *International Security* 28, no. 2: 78–111.
- Avdan, Nazli. 2019. *Visas and Walls. Border Security in the Age of Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Barth, Frederik. 1996. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. In *Ethnicity*, eds. John Hutchinson, and Anthony D. Smith, 75–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Béni, Alexandra. 2018. Viktor Orbán: Hungary, Serbia Need to Protect Border Together. *Daily News Hungary*. February 9. <https://dailynewshungary.com/viktor-orban-hungary-serbia-need-protect-border-together/> (accessed October 22, 2019).
- Beznec, Barbara, Marc Speer, and Marta Stojić Mitrović. 2016. *Governing the Balkan Route: Maceonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime*. In *Research Paper Series*. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe.
- Brown, Wendy. 2017. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books.
- Cantat, Céline. 2016. Rethinking Mobilities: Solidarity and Migrant Struggles Beyond Narratives of Crisis. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* 2, no. 4: 11–32.
- Cantat, Céline. 2017. *The Hungarian Border Spectacle: Migration, Repression and Solidarity in Two Hungarian Border Cities*. CPS Working Paper Series 03/2017.
- Carter, David B., and Paul Poast. 2017. Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 2: 239–70.

Dearden, Lizzie. 2017. Hungarian Border Guards 'Taking Selfies with Beaten Migrants' as Crackdown Against Refugees Intensifies. In *The Independent* London: Independent News & Media.

De Genova, Nicholas. 2017. *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Dünnwald, Stephan. 2015. Remote Control? Europäisches Migrationsmanagement in Mauretanien und Mali [European Migration Management in Mauritania and Mali], *Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung* 1, no. 1: 1–32.

Dzhic, Cedran, and Cengiz Günay. 2018. Die Rückkehr der Grenzen: Globale Trends, regionale Spiegelungen [The Return of Borders: Global Trends, Regional Reflections]. In *Migration und Globalisierung in Zeiten des Umbruchs*, ed. F. Altenburg, 209–15. Krems: Edition Donau Universität Krems.

Eurostat. 2019. Asylum and first time asylum applicants-annual aggregated data European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00191&plugin=1> (accessed June 30, 2020).

Gläser, Jochen, and Grit Laudel. 2010. *Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse [Expert Interviews and Qualitative Content Analysis]*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Government of Serbia. 2015a. Hungary Actively Supports European Integration of Serbia. <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/112751/hungary-actively-supports-european-integration-of-serbia.php> (accessed March 25, 2020).

Government of Serbia. 2015b. Police Cooperation Between Serbia, Hungary in Addressing Migrant Crisis. <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/111286/police-cooperation-between-serbia-hungary-in-addressing-migrant-crisis.php> (accessed March 25, 2020).

Hassner, Ron E., and Jason Wittenberg. 2015. Barriers to Entry. Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why? *International Security* 40, no. 1: 157–90. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00206.

Heimeshoff, Lisa-Marie, Sabine Hess, Stefanie Kron, Helen Schwenken, and Miriam Trzeciak. 2014. *Grenzregime II: Migration-Kontrolle-Wissen. Transnationale Perspektiven [Border Regimes II: Migration-Control-Knowledge. Transnational Perspectives.]*. Berlin; Hamburg: Assoziation A.

Hess, Sabine. 2016. Citizens on the Road: Migration, Grenze und Rekonstruktion von Citizenship in Europa [Migration, Border and Reconstruction of Citizenship in Europe.]. *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* 112, no. 1: 3–18.

Hess, Sabine. 2017. Border Crossing as Act of Resistance. The Autonomy of Migration as Theoretical Intervention into Border Studies. In *Resistance. Subjects, Representations, Contexts*, eds. Martin Butler, Paul Mecheril, and Lea Bernningmeyer, 87–100. Bielefeld: transcript.

Hess, Sabine, Lisa-Marie Heimeshoff, Stefanie Kron, Helen Schwenken, and Miriam Trzeciak. 2014. Einleitung [Introduction]. In *Grenzregime II: Migration-Kontrolle-Wissen. Transnationale Perspektiven*, eds. Lisa-Marie Heimeshoff, Sabine Hess, Stefanie Kron, Helen Schwenken, Miriam Trzeciak, 9–40. Berlin, Hamburg: Assoziation A.

Hess, Sabine, and Bernd Kasperek. 2019. The Post-2015 European Border Regime. *New Approaches in a Shifting Field. Archivio antropologico mediterraneo* 21, no. 2: 1–16. doi: 10.4000/aam.1812.

Hungarian Government. 2015. Prime Minister Victor Orbán's Press Conference after His Talks with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic. <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-press-conference-after-his-talks-with-serbian-prime-minister-aleksandar-vucic> (accessed March 25, 2020).

Hungarian Government. 2017. Hungarians' Long-Term Safety Assured. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/hungarians-long-term-safety-assured> (accessed October 22, 2019).

IOM. 2015. Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond, Compilation of Available Data and Information, Reporting Period 2015. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/Mixed-Flows-Mediterranean-and-Beyond-Compilation-Overview-2015.pdf (accessed October 22, 2019).

Janicki, Jill Jana, and Thomas Böwing. 2010. Europäische Migrationskontrolle im Sahel [European Migration Control in the Sahel Region]. In *Grenzregime. Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa*, eds. Bernd Kasperek, Sabine Hess, 127–143. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Jellissen, Susan M., and Fred M. Gottheil. 2013. On the Utility of Security Fences along International Borders. *Defense & Security Analysis* 29, no. 4: 266–79. doi:10.1080/14751798.2013.842707.

Jenkins, Richard. 2004. *Social Identity*. London: Routledge.

Johnson, Corey, Reece Jones, Anssi Paasi, Louise Amoore, Alison Mountz, Mark Salter, and Chris Rumford. 2011. Interventions on Rethinking 'the Border' in Border Studies. *Political Geography* 30: 61-9.

Jones, Reece. 2009. Geopolitical Boundary Narratives, the Global War on Terror and Border Fencing in India. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 34: 290–304.

Jones, Reece. 2012. Why Build a Border Wall? *Nacla Report on the Americas* 45, no. 3: 70–2.

Jones, Reece. 2016. *Violent Borders. Refugees and the Right to Move*. London: Verso.

Juhász, Attila, Bulcsú Hunyadi, and Edit Zgut. 2015. *Focus on Hungary. Refugees, Asylum, Migration*. Prague: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Political capital Kft.

Kallius, Annastiina. 2016. Rupture and Continuity: Positioning Hungarian Border Policy in the European Union. *Intersections* 2, no. 4: 134–51. doi:10.17356/ieejsp.v2i4.282.

Kallius, Annastiina. 2017a. The East-South Axis: Legitimizing the "Hungarian Solution to Migration". *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 33, no. 2&3: 133–55.

Kallius, Annastiina. 2017b. The Speaking Fence. *Anthropology Now* 9, no. 3: 16–23. doi:10.1080/19428200.2017.1390909.

Kallius, Annastiina, Daniel Monterescu, and Prem Kumar Rajaram. 2016. Immobilizing Mobility: Border Ethnography, Illiberal Democracy, and the Politics of the "Refugee Crisis" in Hungary. *American Ethnologist* 43, no. 1: 25–37. doi:10.1111/amet.12260.

Lamour, Christian, and Renáta Varga. 2017. The Border as a Resource in Right-Wing Populist Discourse: Viktor Orbán and the Diasporas in a Multi-Scalar Europe. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 1–16. doi:10.1080/08865655.2017.1402200.

Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, Lena Laube, and Natascha Zaun. 2015. The Global Mobility Divide: How Visa Policies Have Evolved over Time. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 8: 1192–213. doi:10.1080/1369183x.2015.1005007.

Mau, Steffen, Sonja Wrobel, Jan Hendrik Kamlage, and Till Kathmann. 2006. Territoriality, Border Controls and the Mobility of Persons in a Globalised World. *Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 17, no. 4: 16–36.

Mayring, Philipp. 2002. Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung [Introduction to Qualitative Social Research]. Weinheim und Basel: Beltz Verlag.

minrzs.gov.rs. 2015. Government Solves Problem of Large Waves of Migrants Humanely. Belgrade: The Government of the Republic of Serbia. <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/112746/government-solves-problem-of-large-waves-of-migrants-humanely.php>.

Moré, Iñigo. 2011. The Borders of Inequality. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.

Mrozek, Anna. 2017. Joint Border Surveillance at the External Borders of 'Fortress Europe' – Taking a Step 'Further' with the European Border and Coastal Guard. In *Der lange Sommer der Migration. Grenzregime III*, eds. Sabine Hess, Bernd Kasperek, Stefanie Kron, Mathias Rodatz, Maria Schwertl, Simon Sontowski, 84–96. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Newman, David. 2006a. Borders and Bordering. Toward an Interdisciplinary Dialogue. *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2: 171–86.

Newman, David. 2006b. The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our 'Borderless' World. *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 2: 143–61.

Newman, David. 2012. Contemporary Research Agendas in Border Studies: An Overview. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. D. Wastl-Walter, 33–47. Routledge: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Newman, David, and Anssi Paasi. 1998. Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography. *Progress in Human Geography* 22, no. 2: 186–2007.

Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. *The Borderless World*. New York: Harper Collins.

Paasi, Anssi, and Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola. 2008. Territorial Dynamics, Cross-Border Work and Everyday Life in the Finnish-Swedish Border Area. *Space and Polity* 12, no. 8: 13–29. doi:10.1080/13562570801969366.

Pallister-Wilkins, Polly. 2015. Bridging the Divide: Middle Eastern Walls and Fences and the Spatial Governance of Problem Populations. *Geopolitics* 20, no. 2: 438–59. doi:10.1080/14650045.2015.1005287.

Pap, Norbert, and Péter Reményi. 2017. Re-bordering of the Hungarian South: Geopolitics of the Hungarian Border Fence. *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66, no. 3: 235–50.

Rajaram, Prem Kumar. 2015a. Beyond Crisis: Rethinking the Population Movements at Europe's Border. In *FocaalBlog*.

Rajaram, Prem Kumar. 2015b. Common Marginalizations: Neoliberalism, Undocumented Migrants and Other Surplus Populations. *Migration, Mobility, & Displacement* 1, no. 1: 67–80.

Rodriguez, Nestor. 2006. Die Soziale Konstruktion Der US-mexikanischen Grenze [The Social Construction of the US-Mexican Border]. In *Grenzsoziologie*, eds. Georg Vobruba, Monika Eigmüller, 89–111. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Rosière, Stéphane, and Reece Jones. 2012. Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences. *Geopolitics* 17, no. 1: 217–34.

Said, Edward. 1979. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.

Schwarz, Nina Violetta. 2017. Kämpfe um Bewegung in Marokko: Grenzmanagement und Widerstand [Fights for Movement in Morocco: Border Management and Resistance]. In *Der lange Sommer der Migration. Grenzregime III*, eds. Sabine Hess, Bernd Kasperek, Stefanie Kron, Mathias Rodatz, Maria Schwertl, Simon Sontowski, 61–71. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Sicurella, Federico Giulio. 2018. The Language of Walls Along the Balkan Route. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 16, no. 1-2: 57–75.

Soykan, Cavidan. 2017. Turkey as Europe's Gatekeeper – Recent Developements in the Field of Migration and Asylum and the EU-Turkey Deal of 2016. In *Der lange Sommer der Migration. Grenzregime III*, eds. Sabine Hess, Bernd Kasperek, Stefanie Kron, Mathias Rodatz, Maria Schwertl, Simon Sontowski, 52–60. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Speer, Marc. 2017. Die Geschichte des formalisierten Korridors. Erosion und Restrukturierung des europäischen Grenzregimes auf dem Balkan. [The History of the Formalized Corridor. Erosion and Restructuring of the European Border Regime in the Balkans.] München: bordermonitorin- g.eu. e.V.

Stojic-Mitrovic, Marta. 2012. Externalization of European Borders and the Emergence of Improvised Migrants' Settlements in Serbia. *Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke* 139: 237–48.

Stojic-Mitrovic, Marta. 2014. Serbian Migration Policy Concerning Irregular Migration and Asylum in the Context of the EU Integration Process. *Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology* 9, no. 4: 1105–20. doi:10.21301/eap.v9i4.15.

tagesschau.de. 2015. Tränengas, Minengefahr, neue Zäune. Flüchtlinge auf der Balkanroute. [Tear Gas, Danger of Mines, New Fences. Refugees on the Balkan Route.] <https://www.tagesschau.de/newsticker/ungarn-fluechtlinge-163.html> (accessed August 7, 2018).

Vallet, Élisabeth, and Charles-Philippe David. 2012. Introduction: The (Re)building of the Wall in International Relations. *Journal of Borderland Studies* 27, no. 2: 111–9.

Vallet, Élisabeth, and Charles-Philippe David. 2014. Walls of Money: Securitization of Border Discourse and Militarization of Markets. In *Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity?*, ed. Élisabeth Vallet, 155–168. London: Routledge.

The World Bank. 2019. GDP (current US\$). The World Bank Group. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> (accessed August 14, 2019).

2.2 “So, if you ask Whether Fences Work: They Work”—the Role of Border Fortifications for Migration Control and Access to Asylum. Comparing Hungary and the USA

Submitted to: Comparative Migration Studies

Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of border fortifications for migration control, selectivity, and access to asylum based on two case studies: the Hungarian–Serbian and U.S. American–Mexican borders. The research is based on qualitative interviews on both sides of the borders. The analysis shows that despite practices of externalization, the border line still plays an important role, especially for asylum seekers. Border fortifications fulfill different functions here: a material, a symbolic and a filtering function. In regard to all three functions, border fortifications and policies of migration control interact as part of the border regime. The various functions contribute in different ways to prevent migrants from crossing the border. Refugees are thus deprived of the opportunity to apply for asylum. In this way, the global inequality of mobility rights is further reinforced.

Keywords: Border fortification, migration control, asylum, symbolic borders, filter borders, border fence, border regime

1. Introduction: Border Fences in a Modern World

Borders are back: academic predictions that we would soon live in a borderless world have not proven true. Instead, the debate has turned to questions of how borders are shaped today, what new phenomena have emerged, and what trends of border control might prevail in the future. Borders are also omnipresent in public debates. The EU's highly contested external borders have triggered much debate; so has irregular immigration along the U.S.'s vast border with Mexico. While these debates focus on dramatic events, such as migrant caravans or the numerous deaths along highly controlled borders, borderlines are at the same time places where a part of humanity can enter and leave without difficulties and without attracting much attention.

This points to a fundamental characteristic of many modern borders: they are neither designed to provide smooth mobility for all people, nor to prevent all mobility. Rather, most borders filter between desirable and undesirable; between permitted and unauthorized mobility. It thus came as a shock when borders were suddenly closed worldwide as a consequence of the COVID-19 outbreak in spring 2020. However, borders were in fact not wide open before and not abruptly closed upon the emergence of the coronavirus — they were always open for some and closed for many beforehand. What caught people by surprise was the fact that the pandemic caused borders to be closed even to the privileged ones who are used to crossing them without any difficulty. The often invisible filter function of borders was suspended for a period of time.

The current paper explores questions of mobility control at fortified borders. Although we live in a globalized world where some goods and people travel far and frequently, this same world is increasingly building border fences and walls (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). Today, modern technologies, legislative arrangements, and alliances with third countries make it possible to control migration far away from the actual border (Shachar 2020). Nevertheless, states still use such archaic forms of control as fences and walls. Building on border literature, where the reasons for this trend of rebordering are vividly debated (Simmons 2019), this paper uses the example of two fortified borders, the U.S.–Mexican and the Hungarian–Serbian, to examine the role of border fences in mobility control and access to asylum.

The Hungarian–Serbian and the U.S.–Mexican borders are interesting case studies for investigating how mobility is controlled today. Both cases are examples of 'migration borders': migration is a central issue at these borders, and the topic is widely debated in the media and in domestic politics both in Hungary and the USA. Both cases are also examples of borders that have been fortified by fences — the Hungarian–Serbian border is completely fenced; the U.S.–Mexican border is partially fenced, and

the fortification will probably be expanded in the future. And both borders are clearly filter borders, allowing some people to cross while keeping others out. This paper analyzes the two borders to identify common practices and strategies in migration control, as well as differences between them. In both cases, asylum has recently been at the center of the struggle over migration control. The question of asylum is closely linked to the relevance of border fortification, as will be shown in more detail below.

The article is structured as follows: The next section (2) presents the central concepts and approaches of current border research to which I refer in this article. Section 3 explains the data and methods, section 4 then presents the two cases and their respective context. Sections 5, 6, and 7 detail the analysis and empirical outcome of the study. Finally, the conclusion (8) summarizes the main points of the paper.

2. Borders Today: Fortified, Selective, Shifting, Smart

This section outlines the current research debates on the characteristics and functions of modern borders, with a focus on how they control human mobility today. Recent developments in border control include simultaneous trends of re-bordering and de-bordering, the trend to filter mobility, the trend to externalize or shift border control away from the geographical border line, and lastly the trend to digitalize or “smartify” borders.

In the 1990s, a future “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1990) seemed possible, as a consequence of globalization and modernization. This thesis is obsolete today, and instead we can observe a worldwide “(Re)Building of the Wall” (Vallet and David 2012). Quantitative studies show that the number of border fortifications is increasing around the globe, and they identify cross-border economic disparity as the primary motivation for building border barriers (Carter and Poast 2017; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). Yet while some declare a veritable “flurry of wall building” (Brown 2017: 16), the trend of de-bordering has not completely vanished. The European Union is a model example of a region where borders between member states have become relatively discreet and almost invisible; however, these open internal borders come along with heavily fortified external ones. We do not live in a borderless world, but “in a world of compartments and borders which may be more fluid and elastic, easier to cross than in the past, but they are out there all the same” (Newman 2006: 183).

Borders being more fluid and easier to cross than in the past may be true for some travelers, but not for everyone. Along with simultaneous re-bordering and de-bordering comes unequal access to

mobility. Borders affect the people who wish to move in very different ways: while some can travel freely, others are blocked. While some passports provide access to almost all countries in the world, others allow entry to only very few countries (see www.passportindex.org). This inequality through “powerful passports” (Simmons 2019: 17) or visa waivers creates a “global mobility divide” (Mau, Gülzau, Laube, and Zaun 2015); that is, an unequal distribution of mobility rights around the world. Of those without powerful passports, the governments of immigration countries select highly skilled people, thus further reinforcing the trend toward a regime of “stratified mobility” (Shachar 2016). In this context of unequal mobility, the main task of borders is filtering, that is “implementing a mix of policies, structures, and symbols that facilitate and block exit and entry selectively” (Simmons 2019: 16). These tools for selecting people — powerful passports and the issuance of visas — are deployed in embassies and consular offices, thus often far away from the border line.

While borders seem to harden with the trend of fortification, they become more flexible at the same time due to externalization practices. States shift border control further and further away from the actual border line (Zaiotti 2016; Laube 2019). Control is relocated to other countries that people transit through before arriving at the border, or even to the places where people start their journey (Shachar 2020). Yet borders are not only externalized, but also moved to the interior of the country: new legislation allows the control of people who have already crossed a border, treating them as if they were still behind the border line (Shachar 2020). Thus, the border is moving to the exterior as well as to the interior, becoming a “shifting border” (Shachar 2007; 2020). The practices of border shifting show the importance of laws for border control, as detaching control from the actual border line is only possible by legally re-defining what is considered as the border. These new policies of externalization and shifting borders have serious implications for access to asylum (FitzGerald 2019; Shachar 2020). Generally, a state grants rights to asylum seekers only when they are already at or within that state’s borders. Therefore, governments use policies of externalization or “remote control” to try to prevent refugees from arriving at their borders (FitzGerald 2020; for a critical discussion of the concept of remote control, see Ostrand and Statham 2020).

The last trend to be highlighted here is the digitalization and “smartification” of borders. States use information technology to create a smart border, defined as “a diffuse border that cannot be geographically localized, but rather relies on numerous physical and virtual locations of control and surveillance, which are connected through a digital data network” (Kuster and Tsianos 2013: 1). The smart border is connected to the shifting border, because states collect data not only directly at the border, but also at airports or in countries of origin and transit. Therefore, smart borders rely on cooperation with other states and with non-state actors such as airlines and other companies (Koslowski 2005). Smart borders also contribute to filtering mobility: pre-inspections are used more

and more effectively to select some travelers for smooth passage while blocking others for stricter controls (Shachar 2020). While changes in legislation make it possible to shift border control away from the border line in a process of externalization, as argued above, modern technologies make it possible to render the border line almost invisible in a process of smartification.

The trends discussed here show a multi-layered and somewhat contradictory picture: borders become more open and more closed at the same time. They become invisible and visible simultaneously. They shift away from the border line and at the same time they become manifest through fences and walls at this same border line. Starting from the observation that borders become more complex, ambivalent and contradictory (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Balibar 2017; Brown 2017), this paper analyzes the functions of fortifications for current border and migration control. Border literature vividly discusses the trend to more fortification (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Carter and Poast 2017; Vallet 2021), but the reasons for hardening borders remain disputed (Simmons 2019). The current paper contributes to this debate by using the Hungarian–Serbian and the U.S.–Mexican borders as case studies in order to examine how states use fortifications to control migration and what this implies for access to asylum.

3. Data and Methods

This study is based on field research in four countries: Hungary, Serbia, Mexico, and the USA. The data includes 22 problem-centered interviews (Witzel and Reiter 2012), which are complemented by several informal conversations and a document analysis. Most of the interviews were carried out in English, although this was not the native language of most interviewees or the interviewer. For this reason, some of the quotations have been slightly adjusted linguistically, but without changing the meaning. In Mexico, the interview language was mostly Spanish and the interviews were translated simultaneously with the help of an interpreter.

The interview partners included experts from ministries and authorities, civil society, and international institutions. The interview partners were chosen for their expertise on the topic, but also with the objective of obtaining a broad spectrum of information and positions. Securing interviews on the very sensitive topic of border control turned out to be difficult, and the responses to interview requests varied. Despite the difficult field access, the broad spectrum of interview partners allowed an in-depth, multi-perspective analysis for both cases. By asking both governmental and non-governmental actors about government actions and strategies, we were able to collect very different perspectives on these aspects. Altogether, the interviews allow for a multifaceted perspective on the respective border. They permit to analyze the border from two sides: from the perspective of the “border builders” and those

“behind” the border. Furthermore, the very different actors offer various perspectives on both borders.

The interviews were fully transcribed and then coded in MAXQDA. In a few cases, the interview partners did not agree to being recorded and the interviewer therefore took notes. The coding method was mostly deductive, but it was complemented with inductive codes during the coding process. The interpretation followed the method of qualitative content analysis (Gläser and Laudel 2010; Mayring 2002). The codes were used to structure the data and their creation was based on the research questions and the interview topics. The analysis was developed by comparing the coding of the different interviews. In addition, field notes and theoretical memos were used to develop the essential points of the analysis. The main focus of the analysis was on the interview material, which was thoroughly coded and analyzed, whereas the document analysis served as background information which helped to get a better idea of the context and situation in the respective country.

The two case studies were chosen for being similar in many regards, but also exposing some differences that made them interesting for comparison. The following section presents the two cases and points some similarities and differences that are relevant for the ensuing analysis.

4. Hungary–Serbia and U.S.–Mexico: Two Fortified Borders as Case Studies

This section introduces the case studies, giving a brief overview of the characteristics of the two borders as well as the most relevant similarities and differences. It is not the aim to provide a complete history of the four countries and their common borders, but to focus on basic information concerning the fortifications and on the changes that have occurred at the two borders in recent years.

The *Hungarian–Serbian* border is relatively short (164 kilometers), and the border fortifications extend along its entire length. There are border crossings that allow and control the circulation of people and goods. The fence was built in 2015–2017, in response to increased migration movements to Europe via the “Balkan route” (Beznec, Speer, and Stojić Mitrović 2016), when large numbers of mostly Syrian refugees arrived in Europe seeking asylum. In Hungary, the closure of the border was accompanied by an extensive “information campaign” from the Hungarian government that warned of the dangers of immigration and alienation, using racist stereotypes (Kallius 2017). While the Hungarian government stated protection against immigration and terrorism as motives for the border fortification, our interviewees — even those close to the government — mainly mentioned domestic political reasons for the construction of the fence. In fact, although Hungary was affected by the so-called refugee crisis

with hundreds of thousands of people crossing the country, the effect was limited because the great majority of these people only transited through Hungary. The high costs of the border fortifications and the political campaign that lasted several years can instead be explained by domestic power-related goals (Páp and Remény 2017; Scott 2021).

The Hungarian government has applied increasingly populist and illiberal policies in recent years, which have often focused on — although not exclusively — migration and integration. The construction of the fence was accompanied by stricter policies and laws in the frame of a “state of crisis due to mass migration.” The combination of a physical barrier and tightened legislation eventually led to a sharp drop in transit migration through Hungary. Many of the migrants were initially stranded in Serbia and then had to move to other countries — mainly Bosnia-Herzegovina — and use different routes (Korte 2020). Serbian citizens were not significantly affected by the border fortification, as they can enter Hungary and thus the EU without a visa at the border crossings (with the exception of people from Kosovo). The border is thus a typical filter border, which is intended to facilitate the movement of goods and the desired mobility of people, but to deny entry to unwanted persons. Moreover, the Hungarian-Serbian border represents part of the external border of the EU and the Schengen area and has to be understood against this background (Kallius 2016).

The border between the *USA and Mexico* differs from the Hungarian–Serbian border simply by nature of its length and geographical characteristics: it stretches 3,169 kilometers partly through inaccessible terrain. The border was relatively open throughout the 19th century and the first concerted federal immigration enforcement efforts were introduced in the beginning of the 20th century, mostly related to Chinese immigration (Shirk 2021). Most fencing then started in the 1990s and over the course of several decades, the border has been gradually fortified by different U.S. governments (Saddiki 2017). Today, about a third of its total length is fortified with fences, especially around the urban centers. Other parts of the border are not fenced, but still very difficult to cross because of natural barriers such as the Rio Grande, the desert, and mountains. The reasons given for fortifying the border mostly involve irregular migration and smuggling (Jones 2016). Terrorism, securitization, and othering likewise play a role: after the 9/11 attacks, the historically grounded demarcation of Mexico as the dangerous “other” intensified (Jones 2012). The management of illegal migration and drug trafficking was paired with the security threat of terrorism (Andreas 2003) and as a consequence more barriers were constructed in the 2000s (Rosière and Jones 2012). President Donald Trump, who had been in office since 2017, then made the construction of a wall along the entire border one of his key election pledges. As justifications, he cited migration, crime, and terrorism (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017). Similar to the fence in Hungary, this (potential) wall thus was accompanied by spreading a

negative image of immigrants and the “caravans” of Central Americans were named as one reason to fortify the border (The White House 2019).

Intensive trade and passenger traffic between the USA and Mexico takes place via numerous border crossings; it is the most heavily crossed border in the world (Nail 2016: 167). The massive amount of trade makes both countries dependent on exchange and on the border being at least partially open. Due to the large prosperity gap, however, Mexico is much more dependent on the USA than vice versa. This became very clear when President Trump was able to force Mexico's government to tighten its migration and border policy in 2019, with the threat of punitive tariffs. In addition to close trade relations, there is also a long history of Mexican labor migration to the USA. Mexican migrants used to move back and forth across the border, but increased fortification forced them to settle permanently in the U.S. (Vernon and Zimmermann 2019). Nevertheless, migration from Mexico to the USA has declined in recent years, and it is now mainly Central Americans who try to reach the U.S. via Mexico. While immigrants from Mexico were mostly single men attempting to cross the border undetected in order to find work, migration from Central America consisted of many families and unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. Due to its length and impassable terrain alone, the U.S.–Mexican border is considered almost impossible to control completely. However, the border fortifications force migrants to take more dangerous routes through the desert (Chambers et al. 2021). Like that between Hungary and Serbia, the border between the USA and Mexico is a filter border that allows the circulation of trade and desired persons, but is intended to prevent irregular migration and smuggling. On such a long and busy border, however, the filtering and control function is more difficult to enforce.

The two cases show some important similarities and differences. Differences concern their length, their role as destination or immigration country and their geographical position. The Hungarian fence stretches along the entire border and is much more difficult to cross irregularly than the very long and only partly fenced U.S. border. While the U.S. border has been fortified over decades, the Hungarian fence was only built in 2015. Another difference is the fact that the USA continues to be a destination country for Mexican migrants, whereas there is no significant migration from Serbia to Hungary. Moreover, the USA is an immigration country, while Hungary has been mostly a transit country in recent times. Hungary's particular location at the EU's external border versus the USA as one of the most powerful and wealthy countries of the world represents another particularity. Both cases have in common that they experienced a recent change in migratory movements. For the Hungarian–Serbian case, the change came with the so-called refugee crisis in 2015. At the U.S.–Mexican border, the situation changed in the period around 2013–2014, when large groups (the “caravans”) of Central American refugees started to arrive at the U.S. border. In both cases, large numbers of people aimed to apply for asylum at the respective border. Therefore, the issue of asylum became crucial for border

control in both cases. Choosing these two cases and focusing on these specific events allows us to investigate the reactions of two modern Western democracies facing the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers and thereby analyze how fortification, border control and asylum are related.

5. “So, if you ask Whether Fences Work: They Work” – the Material Function

This first part of the analysis discusses how fortifications, combined with other measures, block asylum seekers at the border line. The subsequent section (6) focuses on the symbolic function of border fortifications, and section 7 then analyzes how fences contribute to the filtering function of borders.

As a starting point for the analysis, this section deals with the question of how the fences contributed to preventing asylum seekers from crossing the borders. Not surprisingly, our various interview partners evaluated the border fortifications somewhat differently. The Serbian Ministry of Interior stated that in 2015 “the only way to stop that flow was to radically close the border and build the fence” (Interview, Ministry of Interior, Serbia). However, one frequently mentioned assessment was that fences alone would not stop migrants, even more so for the U.S. American fence. Because of its length and nature, the U.S.–Mexican border is thought by many experts to not be completely controllable. Nevertheless, the already existing fence has some effect:

So there's the fence and then there was also a significant increase in Border Patrol agents and both of those combined [made] it [...] a lot harder to cross obviously for undocumented migrants. (Interview Washington Office on Latin America I, USA)

While the already existing fencing around urban areas (combined with other measures) was considered having an effect on migration, the planned wall along the entire border was considered to have no such material function, as a fortification in more remote areas could not be monitored and would therefore not stop or deter migration. The Hungarian–Serbian border is much shorter, but many interview partners still considered that the fence alone would not be able to block entry. Indeed, we can observe various measures being combined in order to control migration in both cases. In addition to the border fortification, there are constant changes in law, new policies, and frightening measures such as police violence; all aimed at controlling migration. Their combination makes the effort to cross the border irregularly much more difficult and dangerous. In the Hungarian case, this combination seems to have stopped, or diverted, the migratory movement from Serbia to Hungary: “So, if you ask [whether] fences work: they work. [...] Of course they do. The dogs, the fence. All of it works” (Interview, International Organization for Migration, Serbia).

The interviews clearly show the importance of laws and policies for migration control, even at highly fortified borders. One of these new migration control measures is the establishment of transit zones and waiting lists at the border. The parallels between the two borders are remarkable. Two transit zones were set up at the Hungarian–Serbian border, which eventually became the only way to apply for asylum in Hungary. Access to these zones was only possible via waiting lists, which were managed in Serbia. Similarly, the U.S. government has established the practice of “metering,” which limits the number of individuals permitted to access the asylum process each day and delegates the question of who is admitted first to waiting lists in Mexico. In both cases, fences in combination with border police prevent migrants from crossing the border, while waiting lists create the illusion that it is worth it to wait behind the fence. In the Hungarian case, laws support the efficiency of the fortification: the fact that irregular entry became a criminal offense is only one example out of many. At the same time, the fence helps enforce these laws, as people can be stopped and pursued more easily. In the U.S. case, the border is only partly fenced and the fences do not effectively stop migration. However, combined with new laws and policies the fences make it more difficult for migrants to cross the border; migration movements are diverted to more remote and dangerous parts of it. Legislation and policies are both essential here to make fortifications work. In turn, the border fortification is constitutive for the functioning of policies of migration control.

Another example demonstrates the importance of the geographical border line, and thereby the role of border fortifications. One interviewee in Hungary told the story of a Ukrainian migrant who arrived in Hungary in order to apply for asylum. He was deported by the Hungarian police to the Serbian side of the fence (although he had arrived from Ukraine and not from Serbia). As the Hungarian fence is not exactly at the border line, but some meters inside Hungarian territory, he stayed next to the fence, insisting on his right to apply for asylum as he was on Hungarian soil. In the end, Hungary agreed to let him enter the transit zone and apply for asylum. This reaction was exceptional, as migrants who were deported to the Serbian side of the fence (but still on Hungarian territory) usually had to give up and return to Serbia. Hungary used the fact that there is a distance of a few meters between the fence and the border line to deport migrants to this space behind the fence, stating that they had not been deported to Serbia. In the U.S., the situation was somehow different. One interviewee stated that a wall would not make sense for migration control, as a wall built by the U.S. would have to be on American territory and asylum seekers could just wait behind that wall (but on U.S. territory) for the border patrol and then apply for asylum. He insisted that the USA is committed to international conventions and would not just ignore refugees who were already on its territory, as Hungary does. Nevertheless, the U.S. fences and the policies such as waiting lists (“metering”) similarly force asylum seekers who initially just aimed to arrive at the border line in order to apply for asylum to use other, illegal, and more dangerous routes instead in order to cross the border.

The metering pushes migrants to try to cross the border elsewhere, not at the ports of entry, because otherwise they have to wait for a long time before being able to claim asylum. So they try to cross elsewhere, enter unauthorized, and make a defensive asylum claim. (Interview, Wilson Center, USA)

In theory, migrants could apply for asylum at any border crossing. However, when large groups of asylum seekers from Central America arrived, U.S. border guards stood in some places at the official border line and stopped them before arriving at the ports of entry, where they could have requested asylum (Coronado 2021: 200). These examples show that even in times of “the shifting border” (Shachar 2020), the border line is still a contested place where struggles for asylum and rights take place. It is fundamental for the question of asylum: while “people do not have a right to cross international borders,” at the same time “refugees should not be penalized for otherwise illegal entry or stay” (Simmons 2019: 18f.). Indeed, international law grants every person the right to seek asylum and not to be pushed back to countries where their life may be at risk (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). In this complex situation — refugees have to cross borders in order to obtain asylum, but do not have the right to cross them, and further they should not be penalized for having crossed borders — states try to prevent asylum seekers from arriving at or crossing their borders. Border fortifications play a role here as part of the border regime. Hungary uses the fence to deny the right to seek protection by just ignoring the people behind the fence, thus circumventing international conventions. In the U.S., fences are used to make border crossing more difficult and dangerous, while policies further complicate access to asylum for those who arrive at the border. In this way, both states “are proving endlessly enterprising in trying to ‘release’ themselves from the domestic, regional and international legal protection obligations they have undertaken, without formally withdrawing from them” (Shachar 2020: 72).

The preceding paragraphs show the importance of border fortifications for access to asylum. While border literature rightly emphasizes the exterritorialization of border control, the cases analyzed here show that simultaneously, there is a hyper-territorialization (FitzGerald 2020) taking place, as the state territory is extremely important for questions of asylum. As an example, the significance of some meters of space between the border line and the border fence shows the relevance of territory, “as access to rights is conditioned on a foreigner’s position in space” (FitzGerald 2020: 16). Comparing the two borders shows that both governments reacted in very similar ways to the arrival of large groups of asylum seekers by combining border fortification with policy measures that further reinforced the border line and blocked people from access to asylum. However, as the Hungarian border is much

shorter, the material function of the fence is much more powerful here. The U.S. border is too long to be effectively controlled, even with fortifications, but they still contribute to make border crossing and access to asylum more difficult.

6. “It’s a Mess” – the Symbolic Function

This section focusses on the symbolic function of border fences. As mentioned above, both governments used the arrival of migrants to exploit the situation politically. The symbolic meaning is an important factor in the already existing Hungarian fence as well as to the proposed U.S. wall:

I think it was a political message given to the neighboring countries and also the migrants. It was a strong political statement that irregular movements will not be tolerated, and as a tool for regulating this, or limiting this, the fence was considered to be the more poignant display. (Interview, International Organization for Migration, Serbia)

Why a wall rather than other measures? I think it just sells politically much easier [...]. There are absolutely lots who would propose technology instead of physical infrastructure, staffing rather than physical infrastructure, but there's just nothing quite as strong in just political symbolism as saying that we're going to build infrastructure to stop whatever is bad [...] from entering our country. (Interview Wilson Center, USA)

As a reaction to the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers, the Hungarian government fenced off its entire border with Serbia, and the U.S. government threatened to build a wall in addition to the fencing that already existed. Considering the fact that Hungary was mostly a transit country on the migratory route, building a fence along the entire border is a highly symbolic measure. The USA on the other hand is indeed an immigration country. However, as most experts considered that building a wall would not have any considerable effect on migration, the wall is a clearly symbolic project.

In addition to the fortifications, both governments introduced new laws and policies and kept changing them, creating a situation with very unclear rules. Just as fences and policies work together to stop migrants physically, on the symbolic level they form a “boundary regime” to “both demarcate *and* regulate subjects” (Yurdakul and Korteweg 2020: 2). The above-mentioned waiting lists may illustrate how fences and policies are also intertwined symbolically. The creation of waiting lists led to chaotic and unclear situations. In Hungary, the government did not control who was on these lists and who was admitted into the transit zones, but only determined how many people were admitted every day.

This quota, however, was never officially stated. The number was continuously reduced (without any reasons being given), and at times nobody was admitted into the transit zones at all. There was no reliable information about who managed these lists — some interviewees stated that it was the migrants themselves, or so-called community leaders, while others named Serbian authorities, NGOs, or the UNHCR as being in charge. Officially, the lists were to be established in order of arrival, but corruption had a substantial influence on the listings. Sometimes, nationality or special needs for protection were also mentioned as criteria. At the U.S.–Mexican border, the system was somewhat more transparent, but still chaotic and corruptible. When asked about the waiting lists, two interviewees in the USA spontaneously responded: “It’s a mess” (Interviews, Washington Office on Latin America I; Washington Office on Latin America II, USA). Each of the lists was managed differently by various actors: some by Mexican authorities, some by civil society organizations, and some by migrants (Leutert et al. 2018). In the same way as in Hungary, the USA only determined how many people were allowed to cross the border, changing the number from day to day, and left the management of the lists to the neighboring country. This created an unclear situation, as there were no consistent criteria of who should be prioritized to get onto the lists. Furthermore, bribery played a role in some cases, as those who could pay for it arrived at the top of the list (Interview, Washington Office on Latin America I, USA).

As highlighted above, both countries responded to the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers by building (or announcing) fences and introducing waiting lists, among other new practices of migration control. Officially, this approach was intended to stop migrants and then ensure that asylum applications could be processed in a regulated manner. In practice, however, it severely limited access to asylum. In Hungary, the expected waiting time for access to the transit zones, and thereby to an asylum procedure, was 1.5 to 2 years in 2018. At the same time, Hungarian authorities stated:

Basically the illegal immigrants don't want to enter legally into the Schengen territory. If somebody [...] would like to enter into the Schengen Area legally, they could, and can, enter legally at the border crossing points. (Interview University of Public Service, Border Police Department, Hungary)

At the U.S.–Mexican border, the waiting time was up to several months or even years in 2019. Migrants who intended to apply for asylum were forced to stay in the very dangerous Mexican border cities without any support, or to try to cross the border undetected. In both cases, the official logic said that fencing and waiting lists should separate the deserving and compliant refugees from the criminal and unwanted migrants, but civil society organizations criticized these practices for instead blocking everyone:

There's this frequently recurring logic of saying that those who knock on the door politely [...] are welcome, but this is not really the case 'cause, you know, the transit zones at the border, they are the gateways to these people officially, but the number of people admitted was dramatically decreased. [...] So actually it turns out, at the end of the day, that nobody is welcome and the good ones are us and it's just purely us and them. (Interview, Migrant Solidarity Group of Hungary, Hungary)

In this context, the intertwinement of border fortifications and other practices (laws and policies) enabled the governments to transmit different and contradictory messages. Fortifications spread the message that “nobody is welcome” and that the border is under control. At the same time, policies such as waiting lists gave the pretense that there was a way for those “who knock on the door politely” and who obeyed the rules; they just had to wait their turn. If border research poses the question “Why don’t asylum seekers just get into line to come legally?” (FitzGerald 2020: 5), the practices of fencing and waiting lists show that in fact there *is* no line that effectively provides access to asylum. However, it is no coincidence that there is something that *looks like* a line. Governments that are committed to human rights and the rule of law cannot simply acknowledge that they do not respect them. Policies such as waiting lists — combined with fences — are therefore used to create an image of legality and order.

People in the United States don’t like illegality. They like to have people wait in a line rather than jump the fence. But there's no line for everybody. Not enough people are permitted to cross the line, so we're stuck in this conundrum. (Interview, Wilson Center, USA)

Creating a line that leads nowhere is a way for governments to block access to asylum without openly admitting it. It is a strategy for states to deal with “the challenge of doing justice to their own liberal ethics and related obligations, on the one hand, and, on the other, the interest of limiting and controlling migration and mobility” (Mau 2020: 157). While fortifications are used to enforce the border line, changing laws are used to blur the same line when it comes to human rights, especially the rights to protection and access to asylum. This combination of hard borders and unclear rules allows states to ignore refugee rights without openly denying them.

7. “At the End of the Day it’s Purely Us and Them” – the Filter Function

After highlighting the physical and symbolic functions of border fortifications, this last section of the analysis discusses the implications of fences for filtering mobility. The U.S.–Mexican and the Hungarian–Serbian borders clearly work as filter borders: they allow regular movement and aim to provide smooth passage to those with papers and the right nationality, yet they involve substantial effort in order to deny entry to those defined as unwanted. The Hungarian and U.S. governments depict these undesired travelers as dangerous, criminal, and illegal. Yet in both cases, the state practices at the border prevent procedures that might prove whether or not a person has the right to stay. Asylum claims are not processed, and consequently the proclaimed illegality and criminality is not being investigated. At the Hungarian border, the majority of migrants in 2015 were most probably legitimate asylum seekers. However, due to the border fortification combined with practices such as waiting lists and transit zones, their claims were not processed:

With the fence, the major issue is [...] that even though the original idea or the original rhetoric was that it will simply channel irregular migration and then people will still have a means to submit asylum claims, this is not really happening at the moment. So, people are unable to submit an asylum claim. [...] And we know that a relatively large percentage of the population that was arriving to the border fence since 2015 [...] could have applied for asylum and probably would have been receiving international protection. [...] So, the fence itself is not to individually select people who would need help. [...] The main issue with the fence is that people are not allowed to actually go to the transit zones and submit their asylum claims. (Interview, International Organization for Migration, Hungary)

Many of the migrants who arrived at the U.S. border during recent years were people fleeing from violence and danger in Central America. The policy of waiting lists, or metering, prevented them from making asylum claims at the border and instead forced them to wait for long periods on the Mexican side before being given access to an asylum procedure:

Before metering, everybody [could] go on U.S. soil and then go a few feet to where all the lines were, where all the CBP [border police] were. [...] then if you said no, I fear to go back to my country, then you’d be assigned an asylum case. Now you can’t get on U.S. soil at the port of entry because there are CBP guards right at the line looking at your ID, and if you don’t have the proper ID

they say come back later and then it's up to whatever waitlist system exists on the Mexican side. (Interview, Washington Office on Latin America II, USA)

This creates a situation where the borders filter mobility in some respects, by letting through people with powerful passports and visas. However, they do not allow that the right to asylum or refugee status could be considered and particularly vulnerable people could be selected. In this way, the filter function works to sustain the “global mobility divide” (Mau et al. 2015), without considering human rights and the need for protection. Furthermore, bribery at both borders adds to the filtering function, as those who can afford to pay will get a better place on the waiting list and cross the border much faster. The others have to wait or to take more dangerous routes, which adds another layer of selectivity, as it requires capability and fitness. The filter function is deeply intertwined with the other functions of border fences: it requires the material function, which physically stops people in order to filter them, and the symbolic function, which legitimizes the filtering as well as the non-treatment of asylum claims.

Research on the externalization of border control shows that an important part of filtering mobility takes place in embassies and consulates where passports and visas are issued, therefore far from the border line (Simmons 2019). As a consequence, for people who are unlucky in the “birthright lottery” (Shachar 2009) the only option is to arrive at the border line and cross it illegally, especially if they are seeking asylum. Since the Refugee Convention stipulates that refugees should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay, states try to preempt the territorial entry by intercepting migrants prior to arrival (Simmons 2019: 19), using the externalization of migration control to keep asylum seekers at a distance (Zaiotti 2016). In the two cases presented here, border fortifications are being used to block those refugees who still made it to the border line, depriving them of the opportunity to make an asylum claim. By *not* selecting when it comes to rights for protection, fortified borders create more inequality. It is true that externalizing migration control makes it easier for states to circumvent human rights obligations (Shachar 2020), but the focus on remote control tends to neglect the practices at the border line — fortification as well as other policies — that likewise constitute state strategies to sustain stratified mobility. Both Hungary and the USA do not either apply externalization or fortification practices — they combine both in order to more effectively stop or deter migrants.

8. Conclusion

This paper analyzes two fortified borders in order to investigate the role of fortifications for migration control, selectivity, and access to asylum. It shows that despite the current trend of shifting borders, fortifications play an important role, especially for the question of asylum. They fulfil three functions here: as a physical barrier that enforces the border line, as a symbol of deterrence and order, and as a tool for filtering wanted from unwanted mobility. When Hungary and the USA faced similar situations with large groups of asylum seekers arriving at their borders, the three functions worked in combination in both cases: The material function contributed to physically block the migrants from accessing the territory, the symbolic function helped to blur and to legitimize the fact that access to asylum was not possible and the filtering function assured that authorized movement could continue to flow while at the same time asylum seekers were excluded from any procedure at the border.

With regard to all three functions, fortifications and policies of migration control interact as part of the border regime. Border fences are necessary to make waiting lists and other practices work, and vice versa, fences only work when combined with other practices. This shows that shifting and smart borders do not replace border fortifications, but that the different strategies are used simultaneously. While states tend to shift border control away from the geographical border through externalization policies, the border line is at the same time intentionally enforced. States such as Hungary and the USA do not want invisible borders, but instead clearly visible fortifications designed to discourage migrants and to reassure the population inside the territory. Border fences are therefore not a sign of the loss of state control (Brown 2017), nor are they a proof of absolute state power. Instead, fortifications indicate the permanent struggle of different actors — governments, migrants, civil societies, courts, and the international community — over questions of mobility rights, border control, moral and legal obligations, and human rights.

One particularity of the two cases presented here is that populist governments have been in power in both countries during the research period, and both have used the topics of migration and border control to mobilize their voters. Therefore, the reactions of these governments to the arrival of asylum seekers may be more extreme and bold than in other contemporary democracies. However, different cases such as Australia and some Southern European countries show that other governments can apply somewhat more discrete, but no less restrictive migration control policies. The borders discussed here allow us to see as if through a lens the ambivalent reactions of democratic states to the dilemma of being bound both morally and legally to asylum law and human rights, and at the same time striving to seal off their borders.

Concerning the question of actors and agency, the current paper focuses on the state practices and strategies of border control. However, the role and strategies of migrants and other actors are just as important to understand the struggles on movement and control, and therefore merit more research. Moreover, the paper highlights the implications of border fortifications and migration control practices for the right to asylum. This is not to neglect the impact of fortified borders on other forms of migration and human rights, which also needs to be analyzed in more detail. Lastly, the functions of border fortifications described here are certainly not the only conceivable functions – neither is asylum an issue at all fortified borders, nor are all fences built by democratic or populist governments. This paper offers an analysis of how governments use fortifications to control migration; other functions of border fences may and should be researched in future studies.

References

- Andreas, Peter. 2003. "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century." *International Security* 28 (2):78-111.
- Balibar, Étienne 2017. "Reinventing the Stranger: Walls all over the World, and How to Tear them Down." *symplokē (University of Nebraska Press)* 25 (1-2):25-41.
- Beznec, Barbara, Marc Speer, and Marta Stojić Mitrović. 2016. "Governing the Balkan Route: Maceonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime." In *Research Paper Series*. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe.
- Brown, Wendy. 2017. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. 2nd ed. New York: Zone Books.
- Carter, David B., and Paul Poast. 2017. "Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (2):239-70.
- Chambers, Samuel Norton, Geoffrey Alan Boyce, Sarah Launius, and Alicia Dinsmore. 2021. "Mortality, Surveillance and the Tertiary "Funnel Effect" on the U.S.-Mexico Border: A Geospatial Modeling of the Geography of Deterrence." *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 36 (3):443-68.
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 1951. In: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189. doi: <https://doi.org/10.18356/d04314eb-en-fr>
- Coronado, Irasema. 2021. "Promoting social change through Acompañamiento Internacional at the US-Mexico border." In: *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, edited by Andréanne Bissonnette and Élisabeth Vallet, 199-212. New York: Routledge.
- FitzGerald, David Scott. 2019. *Refuge beyond reach : how rich democracies repel asylum seekers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2020. "Remote control of migration: theorising territoriality, shared coercion, and deterrence." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (1):4-22.
- Gläser, Jochen, and Grit Laudel. 2010. *Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse [Expert interviews and qualitative content analysis]*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
- Hassner, Ron E., and Jason Wittenberg. 2015. "Barriers to Entry. Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?" *International Security* 40 (1):157-90.
- Jones, Reece. 2012. *Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India, and Israel*. London: Zed Books.
- . 2016. *Violent Borders. Refugees and the Right to Move*. London: Verso.
- Kallius, Annastiina. 2016. "Rupture and Continuity: Positioning Hungarian Border Policy in the European Union." *Intersections* 2 (4):134-51.

- . 2017. "The East-South Axis: Legitimizing the "Hungarian Solution to Migration"." *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 33 (2&3):133-55.
- Korte, Kristina. 2020. "'Who Is the Animal in the Zoo?' Fencing In and Fencing Out at the Hungarian-Serbian Border. A Qualitative Case Study." *Journal of Borderlands Studies*:1-22.
- Koslowski, Rey. 2005. "Smart Borders, Virtual Borders or No Borders: Homeland Security Choices for the United States and Canada." *Law and Business Review of the Americas* 11(3): 527-550.
- Kuster, Brigitta, and Vassilis S. Tsianos. 2013. "Erase them! Euro-dac and digital deportability." In *transversal* 13 (3).
- Laube, Lena. 2019. "The relational dimension of externalizing border control: selective visa policies in migration and border diplomacy." *Comparative Migration Studies* 7 (1):29.
- Lamont, Michèle, Bo Yun Park, and Elena Ayala-Hurtado. 2017. "Trump's electoral speeches and his appeal to the American white working class." *The British Journal of Sociology* 68 (S1):S153-S80.
- Leutert, Stephanie, Ellie Ezzell, Savitry Arvey, Gabriella Sanchez, Caitlyn Yates, and Paul Kuhne. 2018. "Asylum Processing and Waitlists at the U.S. – Mexico Border." Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law. Available at:
<https://www.strausscenter.org/publications/asylum-processing-and-waitlists-at-the-u-s-mexico-border/>
- Mau, Steffen. 2020. "Borders that stay, move, and expand." In *The Shifting Border*, edited by Ayelet Shachar, 140-58. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, Lena Laube, and Natascha Zaun. 2015. "The Global Mobility Divide: How Visa Policies Have Evolved over Time." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (8):1192-213.
- Mayring, Philipp. 2002. *Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung [Introduction to qualitative social research]*. Weinheim und Basel: Beltz Verlag.
- Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2013. *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*.
- Nail, Thomas. 2016. *Theory of the Border*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, David. 2006. "Borders and Bordering. Toward an Interdisciplinary Dialogue." *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 (2):171-86.
- Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. *The Borderless World*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Ostrand, Nicole, and Paul Statham. 2020. "'Street-level' agents operating beyond 'remote control': how overseas liaison officers and foreign state officials shape UK extraterritorial migration management." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*:1-21.
- Páp, Norbert, and Péter Reményi. 2017. "Re-bordering of the Hungarian South: Geopolitics of the Hungarian border fence." *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66 (3):235-50.

- Rosière, Stéphane, and Reece Jones. 2012. "Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences." *Geopolitics* 17 (1):217-34.
- Saddiki, Said. 2017. *World of Walls: Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*.
- Scott, James. 2021. "Beyond the Border Fence: The Emergence of Hungary's Contemporary Bordering Regime." In *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, edited by Élisabeth Vallet and Andréanne Bissonnette, 117-33. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Shirk, David A. 2021. "The Escalation of U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement." In *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, edited by Élisabeth Vallet and Andréanne Bissonnette, 27-48. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Shachar, Ayelet. 2007. "The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation." *Stanford Journal of Civic Rights and Civil Liberties* 3 (8):165-93.
- . 2009. *The Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Inequality*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- . 2016. "Selecting by merit: The brave new world of stratified mobility." In *Migration in political theory: The ethics of movement and membership*, edited by S. Fine and L. Ypi, 175-201. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2020. *The Shifting Border: Legal Cartographies of Migration and Mobility*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2019. "Border Rules." *International Studies Review* 21 (2):256-83.
- The White House. 2019. "President Donald J. Trump's Address to the Nation on the Crisis at the Border." In, edited by The White House. Washington, DC: The White House.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948. Paris: UN General Assembly.
- Vallet, Élisabeth, and Charles-Phillippe David. 2012. "Introduction: The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations." *Journal of Borderland Studies* 27 (2):111-9.
- Vallet, Élisabeth. 2021. "State of Border Walls in a Globalized World." In *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, edited by Élisabeth Vallet and Andréanne Bissonnette, 7-24. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Vernon, Victoria, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. 2019. "Walls and Fences: A Journey Through History and Economics." *GLO Discussion Paper* (330):1-25.
- Witzel, Andreas, and Herwig Reiter. 2012. *The problem-centred interview*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Yurdakul, Gökçe, and Anna C. Korteweg. 2020. "Boundary Regimes and the Gendered Racialized Production of Muslim Masculinities: Cases from Canada and Germany." *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*:1-16.

Zaiotti, Ruben. 2016. "Externalizing Migration Management. Europe, North America and the spread of 'remote control' practices." In *Routledge Research in Place, Space and Politics*, edited by Clive Barnett. London, New York: Routledge.

2.3 Filtering or Blocking Mobility. Inequalities, Marginalization and Power Relations at Fortified Borders

Published in: Historical Social Research, special issue "Borders as Places of Control: Fixing, shifting and reinventing state borders", 46(3):49-77, 2021.

DOI: 10.12759/hsr.46.2021.3.49-77

Final version available under a CC BY Licence

Abstract: This paper investigates four fortified borders: those between Hungary and Serbia, the USA and Mexico, Algeria and Morocco, and Pakistan and India. Starting from current border research, it asks how fortified borders control mobility, who is affected by fortifications, and how. Based on qualitative interviews, the paper finds that although all four borders are similarly fortified, they control mobility in different ways: while the Hungarian and the U.S. border fences filter mobility, the two other borders instead block all forms of circulation. The paper conceptualizes these different types as filter borders and deadlock borders. It then examines their effects and analyzes how they are related to inequalities and power relations, but also how they can be used as resources. The filter borders reinforce the global gap in mobility rights by blocking migrants, whereas the deadlock borders also lead to increasing inequality within a country—between the capital and the border population—by cutting economic, social, and familial ties across the border line. The two border types also indicate different relations between neighboring states: filter borders are related to a clear gap in wealth and power, with one state exploiting the fortification to its advantage. By contrast, at the deadlock borders, the power balance is more ambiguous and contested.

Keywords: Fortified borders, mobility control, border control, cross-border relations, migration

1. Introduction

Borders structure our world. Looking at a globe, it is divided by lines drawn between nations; however, looking at the real world, the situation is much more complex. Borders are not as clean and uniform as the lines on a map—instead, their shapes and functions are diverse, complex, and in a state of constant change. This became very clear with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when previously open borders were closed very suddenly. Newspaper headlines such as “Coronavirus: Europe plans full border closure in virus battle” (BBC 2020) or “Canada extends U.S. border closure until Dec. 21” (McMahon 2020) would not have been imaginable just months before. These rapid changes in border policy and rules of entry show how much borders still matter today. Moreover, they reveal some of the essential functions of modern borders: to control, prevent, allow, and structure human mobility. However, if borders are diverse in terms of shape and function, they also vary in how they control mobility.

The current paper engages with the relevance and functioning of borders today, with a focus on mobility control and cross-border relations. It examines fortified borders, which are clearly designed for mobility control and therefore allow us to better understand the functions and effects of restricting mobility. Historically, fortifications have been used as delimitations to restrict the neighboring state, and were often related to struggles over territory, power, and domination. This form of separation by fortification has become rare today, but still exists. An example of this is the Pakistan-Indian border fence, which is a result of an unresolved conflict over territory and regional hegemony. Quite different from such cases of territorial conflict, many fortifications today are tools to control, filter, and regulate mobility flows. Often equipped with high-tech infrastructure, these twenty-first century fortifications are designed to divide wanted from unwanted travelers, and in most cases they aim to keep out migrants. One of the most recent examples is the Hungarian fence built at the Serbian border against mostly Syrian refugees in 2015. Both forms of fortified borders—the still-existing cases of separation from the neighbor and the many recent cases of dividing wanted from unwanted mobility—indicate that as opposed to the assumption that hard borders will disappear in the course of globalization, the age of fortification is far from being over.

In line with this, research shows that border fortifications are on the rise in the post-cold-war era, contrary to former expectations of a borderless world (Ohmae 1990). Today, the world’s borders are more fortified than ever, and the number of border walls and fences is still increasing (Vallet 2021). Consequently, recent border literature has examined which states build new fortifications and why they do so (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Carter and Poast 2017). The current paper adds to these debates by taking a closer look at some of these fortifications, stating that fortified borders do not

form a uniform category but instead may differ in a number of ways (with regard to the variety, see also Balibar 2017). The analysis presented here identifies different types of fortified borders and studies their functions, as well as their effects on mobility and beyond. For this paper, function refers to the purpose and mode of operation of a border, whereas effect means the de facto consequences, whether intended or not.

The paper analyzes four fortified borders: those between India and Pakistan, Morocco and Algeria, Serbia and Hungary, and Mexico and the USA. The analysis is based on qualitative interviews in all eight countries, and thus includes perspectives on both sides of the respective borders. All four borders are fenced, and all aim to control and limit mobility. At the same time, they exhibit major differences, as explained in more detail below. The paper introduces a new typology, distinguishing between “filter borders” and “deadlock borders,” which adds to understanding of the different contexts and effects of fortifications. The paper is structured as follows: The next part (Section 2) discusses research on border fortification and re-bordering, then establishes the research questions for the subsequent analysis. In Section 3, the data, methods, and cases are presented, followed in Section 4 by an analysis of the empirical material and its implications for current debates in border research. Lastly, Section 5 concludes the paper by bringing together its key points.

2. Researching Border Fences and Walls

This is a busy time for border research. Border walls are on the increase all over the world, migrants continue to challenge the closure of state borders, and more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to radical changes in border policies, calling into question the very idea of open borders. Fortifications have become an essential dimension of the political (Balibar 2017). Consequently, much of the recent border research has focused on the phenomenon of new border fortifications and the factors that have led to more fencing. The following paragraphs give some indications of the trend toward fortification and the reasons for building fences, and then present some research into their effects; in particular on mobility.

Several recent studies have illustrated the global trend of building new walls and fences (Vallet and David 2012; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Carter and Poast 2017). They not only show that the numbers of border fortifications are on the rise, but also that their construction is taking place at an accelerating pace, especially since the events of 9/11. Moreover, in particular since the 1990s, the newly built barriers have become significantly longer (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). The physical structures are as diverse as the motives for building them, and they are constructed by both

democratic and authoritarian states, and failed and healthy ones (Vallet and David 2012). However, while border fortification can be considered as a global trend, there are significant regional differences, with most new fortifications being constructed in Asia and Europe (Mau, Gülzau, and Korte 2021). As these studies take a comparative and global perspective on fortified borders, they mostly treat them as a homogenous group without considering differences in their forms or functions. Others have argued that with regard to their function to control mobility, fortifications should not be considered as monolithic and merely immobilizing, but rather as a means to modulate mobility (Denman 2020). This refers to the fact that most barriers are not supposed to suppress all crossing, but to selectively allow mobility (Rosière and Jones 2012) and that most borders are not simply either open or closed, but operate as differentiated border control regimes (Ackleson 2012, 248). However, a more nuanced view of how fortified borders control mobility is still missing.

Observing the trend of re-bordering by fortification naturally raises the question of why states build new fences and walls. In response, quantitative studies have reached the conclusion that economic disparities are the most relevant driving factors for states to fortify their borders (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). Migratory movements often aim to cross these “economic or social discontinuity lines” (Rosière and Jones 2012) and border fortifications are meant to prevent this. Another factor in border closures is the heightened importance of security issues, which are considered deeply relevant for border politics—notably as a consequence of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks (Avdan 2019). Andreas (2003) uses the term “transnational clandestine actors” to describe a diverse group of people—including migrants, smugglers, or terrorist fighters—that states aim to stop at their borders. According to Vallet (2021, 11), the most relevant official motives for wall building are immigration (42 percent) and security (29 percent), followed by smuggling (20 percent) and peacekeeping (9 percent). However, these numbers have to be treated with caution: there may be more than one reason to fortify a border, the reasons for keeping it closed may change over time, and the officially stated motives may differ from unofficial reasons. These unofficial reasons often touch on symbolic and domestic aspects of fortification: walls and fences can be means for political leaders to suggest sovereignty (Brown 2017) and to retain power (Korte 2020). Fortified borders are thus related to foreign policy via the importance of territorial control and power relations (Paasi 2009; Newman 2003), but also to domestic policy via the symbolic image of the wall (Vallet and David 2012, 115). They are linked to relations of force on the one hand and to representations of identity on the other (Balibar 2010, 73).

While there is lively debate about the reasons for border fortifications, less attention has been paid to their effects. With regard to security, Avdan and Gelpi (2016) conclude that fences may reduce the relative risk of terrorist attacks, while scholars in international studies have examined spillover effects

of international violent militancy and the effectiveness of border fences in reducing them (Linebarger and Braithwaite 2020). These works focus on the effectiveness of border fences in terms of security and violence, but they do not seek to understand their broader—and possibly unintended—effects. With regard to economic dynamics, research finds that “walls appear to have significant and negative effects on commercial trade” (Carter and Poast 2019, 182). This points toward the possibly unintended effects of fortification, as by building fences, states probably aim to reduce smuggling, but not legal trade. Vallet (2017) states that border walls have high economic and human costs, while being barely effective in permanently eliminating smuggling activities. Further studies discuss the effects of border fencing on economics (Allen, Dobbin, and Morten 2018) or on smuggling (Getmansky, Grossman, and Wright 2019), but are restricted to single cases. In a somewhat broader cost-benefit analysis, Vernon and Zimmermann (2019) conclude that there is little evidence that walls effectively reduce smuggling, terrorism, or migration, and they suggest that opening borders would have positive economic effects. Many of these very recent studies on the effects of fortifications call for further research. As economics and international studies primarily discuss border effects on trade and labor, the impact on the people who are blocked by these borders are mentioned only in passing.

This leads to the questions: what are the effects of fortifications on “border crossers,” and how do they affect different groups in different ways? Studies into the U.S.-Mexican border find that enforcement has made the journey more expensive and potentially deadly for migrants, but has not changed the demand for smugglers (Gathmann 2008) and that border enforcement in some U.S. states has mainly had the effect of shifting migratory movements to other parts of the border (Bohn and Pugatch 2015). In Israel and Europe, the efforts to “secure” borders against migration have clearly not been effective, as Medizini and Ari (2018) conclude. A broader (and less empirical) perspective points to the problematic implications of border walls for human rights, calling for further research (Simmons 2019). Indeed, a more systematic analysis of the social and human effects of fortifications is still missing. Moreover, the literature on these effects mostly focuses on migrants. Some texts consider the effects on border populations (Klatt 2021; Daoudi 2015; Kormoll 2021), but effects on both groups are not considered jointly, nor are they related to specific types and functions of fortifications.

Research on mobility control has also pointed out its effects on inequality (Ackleson 2012). Mau et al. (2015) highlight the unequal mobility rights resulting from visa waiver agreements, while Shachar (2009) discusses the “birthright lottery” and the privileging of the rich and the gifted when issuing visas. The notion of “Teichopolitics” (Rosière and Jones 2012) emphasizes the link between border fences and inequality (with regard to this link, see also Moré 2011), and Jones considers border fences as barriers against the “global poor,” stating that “borders are not natural divisions [...] they create and exacerbate inequalities” (Jones 2016, 70). The filter function of many borders (Cooper and Perkins

2012; Walters 2006) is another means of reinforcing inequality. At the same time, global inequality is a reason for border fencing: “The main driving factor of undocumented migration—and therefore walls—is inequality” (Vernon and Zimmermann 2019, 13). As social and spatial mobility are related, international mobility can be considered as “capital” (Kaufmann, Bergman, and Joye 2004, 745) that is unequally distributed, or as a “resource that grants access to other resources” (Huysmans et al. 2021, 40). In this sense, borders can likewise be understood as resources (Sohn 2014); mainly for governments (Lamour and Varga 2017), but also for border populations (Daoudi 2015) that may profit from trade or smuggling. Whether people can use borders as resources, however, depends on the possibilities to cross them, and these are restricted selectively by border control and fortification.

As demonstrated above, there is some literature examining the effects of border fencing on mobility and inequality, but a greater amount of empirical work on these effects is needed. In particular, the effects of border fencing on different populations and the “human costs” of fortifications (Vallet 2017, 3) merit greater attention. The current paper highlights and analyzes these effects. It contributes to the debate on border fortifications by presenting a comparative analysis of four qualitative case studies in order to identify different types of fortifications and their varying effects on mobility. Thereby, the aim is to show the variety of functions and effects of fortified borders in order to better understand their social impact. These reflections lead to three interrelated research questions, which are discussed in the three parts of the analysis: First, how do border fences control mobility? Second, who is affected by border fortifications and how? Third, what are the possible explanations for the different functions and effects of fortified borders?

Using four borders as case studies makes it possible to analyze the variety of fortified borders and their respective effects, while also permitting a systematization of this variety. As an introduction to the empirical material, the following section presents the data, explains the methodological approach, and introduces the four cases.

3. Data, Methodology, and Cases

This study is based on field research and qualitative topic-centered expert interviews in eight countries situated on the two sides of four different nation state borders. Given the comparative approach of the research design, interviewing experts made it possible to obtain information about the respective borders and to adopt a macro perspective. Overall, 41 formal interviews were conducted with various actors: representatives of state institutions, think tanks, civil society, and international organizations (the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees). A list of all the interview partners is provided in the annex. This very diverse group of interviewees allowed a multifaceted perspective on the topic. Moreover, as the subject of fortified borders touches on very sensitive diplomatic issues, state actors in particular often had a biased perspective on the respective border or conflict. Therefore, it was useful to compare the perspectives from both sides of a border, as well as the viewpoints of very different actors. This enabled a more nuanced analysis, contrasting different statements and viewpoints. As field access proved to be difficult, numerous additional informal conversations helped prepare the interviews and moreover made it easier to discuss some of the very sensitive topics of research more freely and openly than was possible in the formal (and recorded) interviews.

Although most interview partners were chosen as experts and representatives of organizations, many of them had also personal connections to or experiences of the respective borders. Moreover, the many informal conversations in addition to the interviews helped to provide more first-hand information about the situation at the borders. Nevertheless, the interview material varies from case to case. For example, while in Morocco I was able to speak to people who had crossed the border as migrants or were living close to it, the interviews from the U.S. exclusively relied on second-hand expert information (although some of the interviewees had frequently visited the border and carried out in-depth research there). Consequently, the analysis cannot provide detailed and first-hand information about the people directly concerned by borders. It can, however compare the impacts of fortification by discussing some relevant (and limited) comparative elements.

The interviews were conducted between October 2018 and October 2020. Most of the fieldwork took place in the respective capitals—as this is where most organizations and institutions are based—but was also carried out in some border cities. Several unforeseen events made the field research more challenging: the popular uprising in Algeria in 2019, the terrorist attack in Indian Kashmir in February 2019—as well as the subsequent tensions between India and Pakistan—and lastly the global COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. As a result of these difficulties, the interviews with the Pakistani and Indian experts, as well as some of the Algerian ones, had to be conducted digitally.

The interviews were carried out using a semi-structured guide. Some additional topics came up during the interviews and were included in the research. As different subjects were relevant at the different borders, it turned out to be appropriate to change some of the questions and topics from case to case: for example, while migration was the dominant topic for the U.S.-Mexican border, it played almost no role concerning the Pakistani-Indian one, where the Kashmir conflict dominated the interviews. The interviews were conducted in English, French, and Spanish, and thus in most cases not in the native language of the interviewees. As a consequence, some of the quotations needed to be slightly revised

linguistically, although without changing their meaning. All the interviews were fully transcribed and coded in MAXQDA. The analysis was in line with the principles of qualitative content analysis (Gläser and Laudel 2010) and the coding method was mostly deductive, but was completed with inductive codes during the process. Other techniques such as field notes and memos helped to structure and systematize the analysis. In the paper, the quotations are cited in a way that preserves the interviewees' anonymity, but the names of the organizations are used. The interview material was supplemented with a document analysis. To this end, 243 documents—such as press releases, policy papers, and newspaper articles—were collected and analyzed. As governmental actors were particularly difficult to reach, official documents were useful to further examine the state perspective. Moreover, the documents provided valuable insights into the debates concerning borders, border conflicts, and cross-border mobility in the respective countries.

The four borders were chosen for their common features of being physically fortified and heavily secured. At the same time, they differ in many respects. They are geographically distributed over four continents and thus have very different regional settings. Further differences include the time period of and reasons for fortification, the relationship and economic disparity between the neighbor states, and the mode of border closure. The particularities of each case mentioned here are shown in Table 1 and their context is outlined in greater detail in the following paragraphs. These differences will then be linked to aspects of mobility control, inequality, and power relations in the analyses.

	<i>Length</i>	<i>Type of fortification</i>	<i>Motives for fortification</i>	<i>Relationship between neighbor states</i>	<i>Mode of closure (Land Border)</i>	<i>Date of fortification</i>	<i>GDP per capita (US \$) in 2019</i>
DZA-MAR	1559 km	Fence (MAR). Ditch and rampart (DZA)	Territorial conflict, smuggling, migration	Conflict, no cooperation	Completely closed	Since 2014 (1957 French barrier)	3974 (DZA), 3204 (MAR)
IND-PAK	3190 km	Double fence (IND)	Territorial conflict, smuggling, terrorism	Conflict, fragile ceasefire	Closed except for 1–2 border crossings	Since 1980	2099 (IND), 1284 (PAK)
USA-MEX	3169 km	Fences, barriers (USA)	Smuggling, migration, criminality, domestic policy	Strong trade relations	Many border crossings, difficult to control	Since the 1990s	65297 (USA), 9946 (MEX)
HUN-SRB	164 km	Double fence (HUN)	Domestic policy, migration	Cooperative	Closed except few border crossings	2015–2017	16729 (HUN), 7411 (SRB)

Table 1: Overview of Characteristics of the Four Cases

The Hungarian-Serbian border is 164 kilometers long, with border fortifications running along its entire length. There are several border crossings that enable and control the circulation of people and goods.

The fence was built between 2015 and 2017 as a response to increased migration movements to Europe via the so-called Balkan route (Bez nec, Speer, and Stojić Mitrović 2016). The Hungarian government cited protection against immigration and terrorism as motives for the border fortification. However, although Hungary was affected by the so-called refugee crisis in the sense that hundreds of thousands of people entered the country, the effect was limited, since the majority of them only transited through it. The cost and effort expended on the fortifications can thus instead be attributed to domestic political aims and as a tool for the government to retain power (Cantat 2020; Pap and Reményi 2017). The fortification acquires a symbolic function here, in terms of defining non-European migrants as the dangerous “other” that Hungary must be protected from (Cantat 2017).

The border between the United States and Mexico differs from the Hungarian-Serbian one in the first instance in its length and geographical composition: it is 3,169 kilometers long and spans deserts and high mountains. The border has been fortified by different U.S. governments over the course of several decades. Today, about a third of its total length is equipped with fences, mostly located around urban centers. The reasons given for the fortification of the border mainly revolve around irregular migration and smuggling. Terrorism, securitization, and othering also play a role. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the historically established demarcation of Mexico as the dangerous “other” intensified once again (Jones 2012, 31-45), with border security and a hardline policy against irregular immigration becoming key elements of the “war on terror” (Saddiki 2017, 88). In his 2016 election campaign, Donald Trump promised to build a wall along the entire border, and as justifications, he cited migration, crime, and terrorism (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017). Similar to Hungary, this (potential) wall also has a symbolic function, serving to distinguish between the dangerous world beyond the border and an interior worthy of protection (Brown 2018).

The Algerian-Moroccan border is 1,559 kilometers long. It has been officially closed since 1994, when the trigger for the closure was a terrorist attack in Marrakesh. Since then, both sides have fortified parts of the border: Algeria has dug trenches, while Morocco has constructed a fence (Saddiki 2021). In contrast to the two previously mentioned examples, there is no open crossing on the entire Algerian-Moroccan border, and it is not possible to (legally) cross it by land. The closure of the border was a result of political tensions, as the relationship between the two countries has been marked by competition and rivalry for decades (de Larramendi 2018). In contrast to the Serbia-Hungary and Mexico-U.S. cases, Algeria and Morocco do not differ significantly in their economic power. A long-running conflict and rivalry between the two neighboring states, related to the long-term effects of colonial rule, have been the main determinants for the border fortification. The conflict over the Western Sahara plays a particularly important role, as Morocco regards the region as part of its territory, whereas Algeria supports its independence. Moreover, there is no final agreement on the

course of the border. The border line was determined by the French occupying power during the colonial era and was not accepted by the Moroccan side, with the countries having fought two wars over it (Stora 2003). In addition to these historical aspects, there are other reasons for the continued closure of the border. In Algeria, gasoline and food are subsidized, which has led to intensive smuggling of these goods into Morocco. Drugs and other goods are moved illicitly in the other direction. Moreover, the migratory route towards Europe crosses this border.

Pakistan and India are separated by a border approximately 3,190 kilometers in length. The northern section runs through the Kashmir region, and is not a recognized border but merely constitutes the status quo of the current territorial control, the so-called Line of Control. Since both countries have laid claim to the Kashmir region, there is no official border and the Line of Control acts as the ceasefire line in the conflict over the territory. The southern, officially recognized part of the border is termed the International Border. It is fortified on the Indian side with a fence 1,926 kilometers long, and there are only two crossings on the entire border. The Line of Control is likewise fortified, although the terrain is very rough and difficult to control. The dispute between India and Pakistan is dominated by the Kashmir conflict, dating back to the time of British colonial rule. At the end of its reign over the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Great Britain defined the border between India and Pakistan, mainly according to religious criteria. This was accompanied by extensive and violent resettlement, which was intended to create religiously uniform populations on both sides of the border—Muslim in Pakistan and predominantly Hindu in India—causing historical trauma in both countries (Murshed and Mamoon 2010, 464). Both the Pakistani and Indian governments then claimed Kashmir, and the conflict over the territory continues to the present day. As in the Algerian-Moroccan case, colonial history thus plays an important role in the enduring border dispute. Religion also remains an important aspect of the conflict: the border, defined according to religious criteria, remains rigid; Islam is the state religion in Pakistan, and although India is a secular state, it increasingly considers Muslims as not belonging to the nation (Jones 2009). In the context of the territorial conflict, security concerns—and in particular the prevention of infiltration by Kashmiri fighters—have been stated as the main reasons for India to fence the border (Saddiki 2017, 53). There are several terrorist groups based in both Pakistan and India (Cohen 2003, 32), making security concerns pertinent. The territorial conflict is moreover related to the contrasting national identities of the two states, as well as to competition over regional power status (Paul 2006, 610-612).

As indicated above, the cases were selected as a result of some main features and differences that make them interesting for comparison: while the Indian-Pakistani and the Algerian-Moroccan border have been closed due to territorial and political conflicts (related to their colonial past), in the other two cases, the closures are linked more to migration and domestic political interests. The cases

moreover vary concerning the economic disparity (gap in GDP) between the neighboring states, as well as their relationships. The following analysis proposes a conceptual framing of these differences and then examines their effects on mobility and beyond.

4. Filter Borders and Deadlock Borders

The preceding section shows that the four borders examined here are all physically fortified and tightly controlled, but have very different contexts and histories. While in border research, walled borders are often considered as one uniform category, these cases show a variety that is important to acknowledge in order to gain an understanding of the functions of fortifications, as well as their effects. One important difference among the examples concerns the questions of if and to what extent circulation is authorized, and who is allowed to cross the borders and who is not. The analysis therefore focusses on questions of (human) mobility, but also considers other aspects. It is structured as follows: Section 4.1. introduces the concepts of filter borders and deadlock borders, explaining their main functions and differences. Section 4.2. then describes in greater detail how fortification affects cross border mobility and how this is related to inequalities. Lastly, Section 4.3. discusses the state level and power relations, then bringing together the effects on two levels (people's mobility and the state) by using the concept of borders as resources.

4.1 Filtering or Blocking Mobility

Fortifications are designed to control mobility, but they can do so in very different ways. The following paragraphs examine different forms of mobility control at the four borders in question.

At the Hungarian-Serbian border, the fence and the tightened legislation that came along with it led to a sharp drop in transit migration through Hungary. Many of the migrants were initially stranded in Serbia and eventually tried to move to other countries, taking different routes—mostly to Bosnia-Herzegovina and from there on to Croatia. It is notable that Serbia only cautiously criticized the border fencing, and that the construction of the fence did not cause any significant conflict between the two neighboring countries. This lack of concern is related to the fact that the closure of the border did not seriously affect Serbia. Many of the migrants moved on to other countries, and the accommodation of migrants staying in Serbia was financially supported by the EU. Moreover, the border fence did not block Serbian citizens, as they could enter Hungary (and thus the EU) at border crossing points without

a visa, with the exception of people from Kosovo. The Hungarian fence was not intended to restrict people from the neighboring country, but to target non-European migrants (Korte 2020). As an EU member candidate, Serbia was not interested in starting a conflict with Hungary, and was aiming to follow the expectations of the EU (Stojić-Mitrović 2014). The fence thus enabled the Hungarian government to filter desired from undesired mobility and to gain votes, but without negatively affecting Serbia or Serbian citizens.

The USA-Mexican border has several border crossings, which are very highly utilized. Despite the fortification, the border is extremely busy. There is a substantial volume of trade and passenger traffic at the border crossings, to the extent that it is the most heavily frequented border in the world (Nail 2016, 167). The extensive trade between the neighbors makes both countries dependent on exchange and reliant on the border being at least partially open. Due to the large wealth gap, however, Mexico is much more dependent on the United States than vice versa. This became apparent when, with the threat of punitive tariffs, U.S. President Trump was able to force Mexico's government to tighten its migration and border policies in 2019. In addition to strong trade relations, there is also a long history of Mexican labor migration to the United States, although this has declined in recent years. At the same time, migration from Central America has increased. Mexico has thus shifted from being an origin country for migration, to being a transit and receiving country. Due to its length and partly inaccessible terrain, the U.S.-Mexican border is considered to be very hard to control. Therefore, the fortification does not stop migration flows, but it forces migrants to take very dangerous routes through the desert. Similar to the Hungarian-Serbian case, the barrier between the USA and Mexico filters mobility, but the filtering function is more difficult to implement due to the difficulty in controlling the border. In contrast to the Hungarian fence, the U.S. fortification also affects Mexican citizens, who need a visa to enter the United States.

These two borders are designed to enable authorized crossing and at the same time block all undesired movement, especially that of migrants. They have in common that they select mobility, thus being typical filter borders that block some forms of mobility while allowing others (Cooper and Perkins 2012; Walters 2006). One important difference between the two cases is that Serbian citizens can cross the Hungarian border without difficulty, whereas Mexican citizens are blocked by the U.S. border unless they have a visa. Both U.S. and Hungarian citizens can easily cross their borders to the South. Another difference between the two borders is their length: as the Hungarian-Serbian one is relatively short, border control is more effective and clandestine crossing has become very difficult, whereas the U.S.-Mexican one is much harder to control along its entire length.

In contrast to these filter borders, the Algerian-Moroccan border has no open border crossing points at all. Traveling by air or by sea is possible, but the land border is completely sealed. Moroccan and Algerian citizens do not need visas to visit the neighboring country, but the people living near the border have to take long and costly detours via the capital or the closest airport. One particularity of the Algerian-Moroccan border is that it separates two countries with much in common—linguistically, culturally, religiously, and historically (Stora 2003), the connections between the border populations are particularly strong. However, the border fortification blocks not only the border population, but also migrants. The migration route from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe crosses this border and migrants thus depend on the possibility of crossing into Morocco from the Algerian side. While Algeria is still mostly a transit country on this route, Morocco is increasingly also becoming a country of immigration (de Haas 2014), as a result of the ever tighter controls at the EU's external borders.

Between Indian and Pakistan, there are almost no crossing points on the very long and entirely fortified border. There have been attempts in the past to open the Line of Control in Kashmir to the local population through several border crossings (Singh 2013), but these attempts have failed due to the recent tensions between the two countries. Bilateral relations have further deteriorated in the last decade, which is also evidenced by an increase in violent incidents along the Line of Control (Thompson n.d.). As a consequence, there are only two crossing points along the entire border, which are also closed at times. While it is theoretically possible to cross the border at these points or by air, both Indian and Pakistani citizens need a visa to travel to the neighboring country, and this is very difficult for most of them to obtain. Travel restrictions, visa regulations, the absence of direct flights between the countries, and restrictions in communications make border crossing very difficult.

Both the Moroccan-Algerian and the Pakistani-Indian borders are designed to prevent almost all forms of mobility. These two borders are therefore conceptualized here as “deadlock borders”; that is, borders that block almost all forms of circulation, including people from the neighboring country. Migrants are affected in the same way by deadlock borders: the migratory route from sub-Saharan Africa via Morocco to Europe crosses the Algerian-Moroccan border, and is consequently blocked by the border fortification. There is no significant migratory route that would cross the Pakistani-Indian border, but any potential migrants would anyway probably be blocked by the fencing. Both cases have in common that the borders are closed due to longstanding political conflicts; hence, the term “deadlock border” describes both a completely or almost completely sealed border line, and a deadlocked political situation that keeps the border closed. By contrast, the governments at filter borders have relations that are more cooperative. Another difference concerning the cross-border relations is that while the two filter borders were fortified unilaterally by one state without the consent of its neighbor, the two deadlock borders were closed—and in the Moroccan-Algerian case also

fenced—to some extent by both sides. Moreover, while the two filter borders are related to a clear differential in wealth and power between the neighbors, the situation at the two deadlock borders is more ambiguous: Algeria and Morocco are “roughly equal in capabilities” (Saddiki 2021, 114), and while India is more powerful in many regards, Pakistan’s asymmetric strategies and tactics—as well as its possession of nuclear weapons, among other factors—make it impossible for India to decisively end the conflict in its favor (Paul 2006, 601). The difference in GDP per capita is also much more significant between the USA and Mexico or Hungary and Serbia than it is between India and Pakistan or Algeria and Morocco (The World Bank 2019; Moré 2011, 145-150).

Figure 1 illustrates the different forms of mobility control in the four cases. At the Hungarian-Serbian border, migratory movements are blocked, while Hungarians and Serbians are able to cross the border. At the U.S.-Mexican border, Mexicans as well as migrants from Central America are blocked, while U.S. citizens can cross. The Moroccan-Algerian and the Pakistani-Indian border are closed to everyone. In the Moroccan-Algerian case, this blocks Moroccan and Algerian citizens as well as sub-Saharan migrants. In the Indian-Pakistani case, there are almost no migrants, so those primarily affected are Indian and Pakistani citizens. As the current paper focuses on the mobility of people, flows of goods are not taken into consideration here, although trade and smuggling play an important role at all four borders. Moreover, tourist flows are not shown in the figure for reasons of simplicity. Tourists can cross the two filter borders and, under certain circumstances, the Indian-Pakistani border.




Figure 1: Cross-Border Movements at Four Fortified Borders

The differentiation between two functions of fortified borders introduced here—blocking or filtering mobility—connects with current debates on re-bordering. The filter function of modern borders has

been rightly emphasized (Mau et al. 2012; Mezzadra and Neillson 2013), however, not all fortifications are designed to enable mobility—their function as barriers should not be overlooked (Newman 2012). More importantly, there are degrees of openness or closedness, and of filtering and blocking, at every fortified border. This aspect has important implications, as will be shown in the following. As new border fences emerge all around today's world, it is worth taking a closer look at the context of the respective border fences; and more precisely understanding their functioning as well as their effects. This will be examined in the following sections.

4.2 “Whenever you Build Barriers, the Most Vulnerable Will Suffer as a Result.” Effects of Fortified Borders

After discussing how border fences control mobility in different ways, this section covers the impact of these different forms of control in greater detail. To put it simply: who is most affected by border fortifications in the respective cases, and how?

Migrants are affected by both types of fortified borders. In the case of filter borders, it is evident that the migrants who are targeted by the border fortifications also suffer due to them. The Algerian-Moroccan border was not initially fortified due to migration, but the fence nevertheless has severe effects on migrants, and the two governments “play ping-pong” with the migrants (Interview ASCOMS, Morocco) by deporting them back and forth across the border. In all the cases, border fences and the policies that go along with them do not manage to completely stop the movement of migrants. However, they have the effect of slowing people down, making them wait, and forcing them to adopt other strategies or change their routes. This frequently forces migrants to take more dangerous and potentially deadly alternatives. In the U.S. case, migrants need to cross the desert, where many die. In the Hungarian case, many migrants move to other countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they are again blocked and forced to wait under extremely harsh conditions. Moreover, even migrants who had planned to cross the borders legally by applying for asylum are forced to undertake illegal border crossings in order to progress. As a consequence of border fencing, “people more [often] decide to turn to the irregular pathway” (Interview, Info Park, Serbia). In addition, as fortifications make irregular border crossing more complicated, they also make it more expensive. Migrants are more likely to be compelled to cross the border with the assistance of smugglers, and the more challenging border crossing becomes, the more the prices for smuggling rise. This has the effect that those who have enough money can pay smugglers to organize ways to cross the border, while those who cannot afford the prices have to wait or try more dangerous and less promising routes. In this way, border fences

reinforce the economic inequality between migrants: those who are the most economically disadvantaged have to risk their lives or give up the journey.

For those who have money, it's easy to organize the journey, to pay a smuggler, or to pay a hotel and to pay for a plane or car, because it's like a safe passage. [...] But if not, [...] then you're going to stay somewhere in limbo, stranded for long periods of time and you won't know what to do. (Interview, Info Park, Serbia)

It used to be easy to cross, but now it is difficult, [...] the prices have gone up exponentially. Not all the sub-Saharanans can afford to pay €1000 to cross the border. Before, they used to travel alone, but now they go to the South even though it is more risky and they can be caught easily. (Journalist II, Algeria)

The filter borders, as well as the Algerian-Moroccan one, thus hit migrants from the global south and most severely affect the most disadvantaged among them, both economically and physically. The deadlock borders also have very serious effects on border populations. Borderlands are often considered as peripheral and marginalized spaces, given less importance than the center of a national territory (Vallet 2021; Gerst and Krämer 2021). Borders hold negative economic consequences for borderlands, making them economically disadvantaged, but at the same time, they can create a specific border economy (Klatt 2021). Border populations often live on trade, or—as in the Moroccan-Algerian case—on tolerated small-scale smuggling across the border (Daoudi 2015). Smuggling has for a long time been an important source of income for the population living near this border (ibid.). With the borders not only officially closed, but also heavily fortified and controlled, the border population loses a very important source of income, which may be its only significant opportunity to create revenue—to the extent that in the Moroccan case, interviewees speak of an “economic crisis” resulting from the fortification of the border (Interview, Journalist, Morocco). In India and Pakistan, the border populations are likewise very poor and politically marginalized and they are further disadvantaged by the fortification (for India see also Kormoll 2021). In addition to these economic effects, the deadlock borders have severe social effects, as they cut familial and social relations. The populations living near these borders depend on the possibility to cross them for a variety of purposes. They maintain strong social, cultural, and familial ties across the borders. Border closures disrupt these ties, forcing people to make very long, costly, and difficult journeys in order to visit each other.

What is really sad is that between the two countries [...] there are mixed families, a lot of them. [...] Humanely speaking it is a scandal. (Interview, Journalist II, Algeria)

For those who have [...] families across the border [...] it's a problem, it's a challenge [...] they're not able to meet their families. (Interview, Faces, Pakistan)

As a consequence, the border populations in Morocco and Algeria have protested against the ongoing closure (The North Africa Post 2018). At both deadlock borders, the border populations are already marginalized economically as well as politically, and the fact that the border closure has put further strain on them is given little significance in national politics. In the case of deadlock borders, even if the fortifications do not target these populations, their suffering is accordingly accepted as a form of collateral damage.

The villages that were living from the trafficking are almost on hold, there is a real economic crisis but nobody cares, people are not really interested in it. [...] People are organizing demonstrations or marches, and since they are far from the center, from Casablanca, from Rabat, we do not know much. Since the journalists from the center of the country barely go there, we do not have much information about it, although it is a region in a very critical situation. (Interview, Journalist, Morocco)

People along these contested borders continue to be marginalized, continue to be disadvantaged, and continue to be brutalized. [...] But in the scale of the populations of India and Pakistan, these are very small numbers. These are very poor people and because they're disadvantaged, they have almost no ability to influence national and international politics. (Interview, Writer and Historian, India)

At the two deadlock borders, the fence thus does not operate as a filter, but as a blockade that cuts across social and economic practices in the border regions. Although it does not come as a surprise that a closed border also blocks the border population, this fact—as well as its implications for these populations—is often overlooked in literature on fortified borders. In all four cases, the border fences impact on vulnerable populations: either migrants or border populations, or in the Moroccan-Algerian case, both. This supports viewpoints that consider migration control as a means to reinforce inequality and to develop a differentiated citizenship (Amaya-Castro 2017), as border fortifications here indeed have the effect of intensifying inequalities that already exist. As former research on borders and inequality has importantly stated, border fences both reflect and exacerbate inequalities (Jones 2016; Vernon and Zimmermann 2019). Nevertheless, it is important to note that at the filter borders, inequality is deliberately produced (by excluding certain groups and allowing others), while at the deadlock borders, the fact that certain groups are further marginalized by the fortifications is accepted as a form of collateral damage. The social and human costs of fortifications (Vallet 2017) differ between filter and deadlock borders. The filter borders increase the inequality between the global north and

the global south, by blocking people from the global south while allowing movement of those from the global north. Moreover, inequality is amplified by disadvantaging the weaker neighboring state in cases where the border represents a clear line of economic discontinuity. The deadlock borders reinforce the inequality inside the respective countries, between the center and the margins, by disadvantaging those living close to the borders; people who already constitute economically and politically marginalized populations. Moreover, all the fortifications increase the economic inequality between migrants, placing further strain on those who cannot afford to pay the rising prices for smugglers. These different forms of marginalization confirm that “whenever you build up barriers, the most vulnerable ones [will be] in a more difficult situation as a result” (Interview, IOM, Hungary).

4.3 Borders as Resources: Winning and Losing Through Fortifications

So far, this paper has analyzed the different functions of fortified borders and their effects on different groups of border crossers, highlighting inequality and marginalization. However, not everyone loses from fortifications. Therefore, the current section focuses on the state level, discussing the strategic and power-related use of borders (Scott 2021). Borders are considered as being resources (Sohn 2014), constituting opportunity structures for states that use their borders strategically to generate value from cross-border interactions. Despite major changes in border control, states are still crucial actors in terms of territorial control, and borders are therefore closely related to power (Paasi 2009; Newman 2003). This leads to the question: in what ways do the governments “use” their borders in the case studies presented here? The Hungarian government uses “the issues related to securing the southern border of Hungary [...] as political resources to achieve domestic political- and power-related goals” (Pap and Reményi 2017, 235). In this way, “borders [...] serve as a (geo)political resource in Hungary” (Scott 2021, 117). However, as Serbian citizens can cross the border without difficulties, the fence has no significant disadvantages for Serbia. Due to political circumstances (such as its position as an EU member candidate) and the filter function of the fence, the Serbian government has actually managed to exploit the border fortification to its advantage, seeking to project a positive image to the EU of its handling of the situation. Although Serbia did not agree to the fortification, the circumstances allowed the establishment of an effective win-win situation, with both governments using the border strategically (Korte 2020).

Serbia was actually also kind of making an advantage out of this situation because they're aiming for EU membership. As it turned out that Hungary is the “bad boy,” they wanted to be the “good boy,” so they realized that taking good care of a few thousand people who got

stranded there is worth a great deal with regard to international reputation. [...] But for people living on either side of the border fence, not much has changed. (Interview, Migszol, Hungary)

In the U.S.-Mexican case, the U.S. government used the border fence to its own advantage by filtering wanted from unwanted mobility and by trying to win votes with the promise of a border wall. The Mexican government was forced to accept U.S. policies and even to adapt their own policies as the weaker trade partner. Border towns in the USA have not been unaffected by the fortification, but it hit the Mexican side much harder.

You can imagine the pressure on the municipalities that are at the border with the U.S. because of people in transit from Central America, as well as people who are returning to Mexico [from the United States]. [...] This year, both those returning and in those in transit make up around 50,000 people who are either waiting to cross to the U.S. or for their migration situation to be resolved. (Interview, Ministry of Interior, Mexico)

Here, the border fence creates a “win-lose” situation, playing out to the advantage of the U.S. and to the disadvantage of Mexico. It is thus an example of the “mobilisation of the border as a differential benefit [...] to generate value out of asymmetric cross-border interactions” (Sohn 2014, 587).

In the cases of Morocco-Algeria and Pakistan-India, the complete sealing of the borders disadvantages all four countries economically, and moreover hinders regional cooperation. Limiting trade and regional integration weakens the states on both sides of the two borders. In the Indian-Pakistani case, most interview partners agreed that the closed border causes economic damage in both countries and has a negative impact on regional cooperation. Due to the border conflict, there is no direct trade between India and Pakistan; it is only possible via third countries.

The impact of closing the border is the following. The trade that used to take place between India and Pakistan [...] and the connecting roads and the railways: everything has been cut. [...] Most of the India-Pakistan trade is via Dubai. [...] And the other big consequence of the India-Pakistan border dispute and the proxy war is the fact that it has negatively affected the regional relationship amongst the regional countries and the SAARC, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation. (Interview, General II, India)

In the Algerian-Moroccan case, many interview partners were of the opinion that the economies of both countries are suffering as a result of the border closure, but that Morocco loses more from the situation than Algeria. As an oil-producing country, Algeria is less dependent on trade and cooperation with its neighbors than Morocco.

Both sides used to live from trade. People used to bring back goods, fruit, vegetables, semolina, medical drugs. It was a really fruitful trade and it provided work for people on both sides of the border. But now it is finished. On the Algerian side, the situation is the same but there are many social benefits, aid for young people, so it is less painful. (Journalist II, Algeria)

Therefore, although it was Morocco that initially closed and fenced the border, the Moroccan government has recently started to call for its re-opening (Bazza 2018). However, the Algerian side has questioned the sincerity of this demand (The New Arab 2018). For Algeria, the closed border remains an important means of exerting pressure in the conflict over Western Sahara (Zoubir 2012).

Similar to the India-Pakistan case, the interview partners in Morocco and Algeria highlighted the negative impact on both states' economies, as well as on regional cooperation and integration. In this case, it is the Arab Maghreb Union that has never been able to function properly because of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict. All four governments at the deadlock borders have—or had—strategic reasons to close the borders; for example, to put pressure on the neighboring country concerning their respective conflicts and rivalries. However, taking into consideration the important economic and political disadvantages resulting from the closed borders, it is—at least to a certain degree—possible to speak of a “lose-lose” situation as a result of border fortification. The different ways in which the governments use their fortifications as resources again affect mobility at the borders. Comparing the situation at filter and deadlock borders, Table 2 provides an overview of the varying effects of border fortifications, also including the impact on border crossers that was discussed in the previous sections in order to give a more complete picture.

	<i>Filter borders</i>		<i>Deadlock borders</i>	
	Hungary-Serbia	USA-Mexico	Algeria-Morocco	India-Pakistan
State level: gains and losses	win-(win)	win-lose	(lose)-lose	lose-lose
Mobility: who is excluded	migrants	migrants, Mexican border population	migrants, border populations	border populations

Table 2: Winning and Losing Through Fortified Borders

The single cases are of course more complex than this table is able to illustrate. In all the cases, there are certainly internal conflicts between the advantages and disadvantages of border fencing. Nevertheless, this rough classification demonstrates that the mere existence of a border fence does not indicate the relationship or the power balance between the neighboring countries, or the effects

on the neighboring states or on border crossers. Filter borders and win-lose situations may be the most common case today—most modern walls are built along an economically asymmetric border (Vallet 2021, 12)—but they are not the only possible situation at fortified borders. This is important, because the different functions of fortified borders, filtering or blocking mobility, have very different implications, as shown above.

In all four cases, governments use borders and their fortification as political and strategic resources. Due to the gap in wealth and power between them and their neighbors, the Hungarian and the U.S. governments are able to use their borders as a resource to filter desired from undesired mobility; to select which people they want to allow to enter and which ones they aim to exclude. Moreover, they can use the building of fences as a means to preserve domestic power without having to face significant disadvantages from the fortifications. In the two other cases, the power and economic balance is somewhat less clear, and the governments are involved in longstanding conflicts that consume their resources. Here, the borders are likewise used strategically, but at the cost of economic disadvantages and the suffering of their own (border) populations—confirming that the situation of a border region depends on the relations between the neighboring states (Klatt 2021). The question of how borders work as resources in cases of deadlock borders, where all mobility is blocked and the power balance is reasonably equal, would merit more research. At the very least, the statement that “walls are never built against an equivalent power” (Saddiki 2017, 4) needs to be questioned.

Borders can be resources for governments (Lamour and Varga 2017), but also for border populations (Daoudi 2015). The latter often live from small-scale smuggling, which is not only tolerated, but sometimes even institutionalized by the state power (Gallien 2020; Daoudi 2015). This becomes more difficult the more fortified a border is. While open or partly closed borders may thus function as resources for some populations, fortified borders may serve some governments, but not the border crossers, especially in the cases of deadlock borders. In these cases, fortified borders are definitively not what has been described as “a border for the people” (Laube and Roos 2010, 31), but are instead borders against them.

5. Conclusions

This paper has examined how fortified borders control mobility and related the different forms of mobility control to inequality and power relations. In order to analyze the effects of fortifications it is useful to precisely define their different functions. The case studies demonstrate that different types of fortified borders exist, conceptualized here as “filter borders” for the Serbian-Hungarian and the

Mexican-U.S. cases, and as “deadlock borders” for the Pakistan-Indian and Algerian-Moroccan ones. Filter borders separate desired from undesired mobility, they are fortified by one (wealthier and more powerful) state without the consent of its neighbor, and although the fortification may cause tensions between the neighboring states, they still maintain economic and political ties. Deadlock borders prohibit almost all forms of mobility, they are associated with longstanding political conflicts and little cooperation between neighbors, and their closure is advanced (to different extents) by both sides. Although the four cases presented here do not allow for generalization, it could be suggested that filter borders (and thus mostly win-lose situations) are more likely to appear where there is a strong disparity in wealth and power, and the stronger state can therefore use the border as a resource. By contrast, deadlock borders (and thus probably lose-lose situations) are more likely to exist where the power balance is actively disputed.

These two types of fortifications have different effects on mobility. In all four cases, borders—and border fences—can be used as resources by the respective governments. Sometimes they are tools to control mobility, and sometimes they are used to gain votes or to put pressure on the neighboring country. The political use of borders (Scott 2021) nevertheless differs: while wealthier and more powerful states can use these resources without serious negative consequences, others face adverse economic and political effects from closed borders. In all cases, border fences penalize the people who are constrained from crossing the borders: migrants as well as border populations. Limiting their mobility, further disadvantages already marginalized populations. As much as fortified borders may be used as resources by governments, these same fortifications prevent the most vulnerable populations from using mobility as capital (Kaufmann, Bergman, and Joye 2004). The social and human effects of border fortification have not yet been investigated in depth, and further research on this topic would make an important contribution to current border research. As the current paper is based on a qualitative comparative research design using expert interviews, it cannot provide an in-depth analysis of the effects that border control has on migrants or border populations, nor can it make quantitative statements concerning border types and effects. Instead, it has an explorative intent, presenting new ideas about the implications of fortification. More quantitative studies, as well as more ethnographic research at the borders and with the people who are affected by them, would be relevant to test and develop the conclusions drawn here.

Most fortified borders today are filter borders, appearing at economic and social discontinuity lines (Vallet 2021). The cases examined in the current paper, however, show the variety of border fencing: The win-win case points to the fact that a fence does not always have to be built against the neighbor or to its disadvantage (the discontinuity lines may be elsewhere). The lose-lose cases, by contrast, indicate that where the power balance is reasonably equal, both neighbors can use the border as a

resource in some ways, but with significant disadvantages. These cases are less frequent, but comparing their differences provides information about the forms and functions of control—filtering or blocking mobility—as well as their effects and implications. Carrying out more research on these functions would help to add knowledge about how different forms of border control affect different groups of people, and to better understand the “burning political issue” (Balibar 2017) that border fortifications represent today.

Literature

- Ackleson, Jason. 2012. The Emerging Politics of Border Management: Policy and Research Considerations. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Wastl-Walter, D, 245-261. Routledge: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Allen, Treb, Cauê de Castro Dobbin, and Melanie Morten. 2018. Border Walls. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series* No. 25267:1-59.
- Amaya-Castro, Juan M. 2017. 'In its majestic inequality'. Migration control and differentiated citizenship. In *The Transformation of Citizenship*, ed. Mackert, Jürgen and Bryan S. Turner. London: Routledge.
- Andreas, Peter. 2003. Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century. *International Security* 28 2:78-111.
- Avdan, Nazli. 2019. *Visas and Walls. Border Security in the Age of Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Avdan, Nazli, and Christopher F. Gelpi. 2016. Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence. *International Studies Quarterly* 61 1:14-27.
- Balibar, Etienne. 2010. At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation? 13 3:315-322.
- Balibar, Étienne 2017. Reinventing the Stranger: Walls all over the World, and How to Tear them Down. *symplokē (University of Nebraska Press)* 25 1-2:25-41.
- Bazza, Tarek. 2018. King Mohammed VI: Morocco Ready to Open Morocco-Algeria Border. *Morocco World News*, 06/11/2018.
- BBC. 2020. Coronavirus: Europe plans full border closure in virus battle. *BBC*, March 17, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51918596>.
- Beznec, Barbara, Marc Speer, and Marta Stojić Mitrović. 2016. Governing the Balkan Route: Maceonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime. In *Research Paper Series: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe*.
- Bohn, S., and T. Pugatch. 2015. U.S. Border Enforcement and Mexican Immigrant Location Choice. *Demography* 52 5:1543-70.
- Brown, Wendy. 2017. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. 2nd ed. New York: Zone Books.
- Brown, Wendy. 2018. Mauern. Die neue Abschottung und der Niedergang der Souveränität, 167-245. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Cantat, Céline. 2017. The Hungarian Border Spectacle: Migration, Repression and Solidarity in two Hungarian Border Cities. *CPS Working Paper Series* 03/2017.

- Cantat, Céline. 2020. Governing Migrants and Refugees in Hungary: Politics of Spectacle, Negligence and Solidarity in a Securitising State. In *Politics of (Dis)Integration*, ed. Schweitzer, R. and S. Hilger, 183-199. Cham: Springer Open.
- Carter, David B., and Paul Poast. 2017. Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 2:239-270.
- Carter, David B., and Paul Poast. 2019. Barriers to Trade: How Border Walls Affect Trade Relations. *International Organization* 74 1:165-185.
- Cohen, Stephen Philip. 2003. The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan. *The Washington Quarterly* 26 3:5-25.
- Cooper, Anthony, and Chris Perkins. 2012. Borders and status-functions: An institutional approach to the study of borders. *European Journal of Social Theory* 15 1:55-71.
- Daoudi, Fatiha. 2015. *Vécu frontalier algéro-marocain depuis 1994. Quotidien d'une population séparée*. [Algerian-Moroccan border experience since 1994. Daily life of a separated population]. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- de Haas, Hein. 2014. Morocco: Setting the Stage for Becoming a Migration Transition Country? : Migration Policy Institute.
- de Larramendi, Miguel Hernando. 2018. Doomed regionalism in a redrawn Maghreb? The changing shape of the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco in the post-2011 era. *The Journal of North African Studies*.
- Denman, Derek S. 2020. On fortification: Military architecture, geometric power, and defensive design. 51 2-3:231-247.
- Gallien, Max. 2020. Informal Institutions and the Regulation of Smuggling in North Africa. *Perspectives on Politics* 18 2:492-508.
- Gathmann, Christina. 2008. Effects of enforcement on illegal markets: Evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border. *Journal of Public Economics* 92 10-11:1926-1941.
- Gerst, Dominik, and Hannes Krämer. 2021. Methodologie der Grenzforschung. [Methodology of border research]. In *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, ed. Gerst, Dominik M. A., Maria M. A. Klessmann and Hannes Krämer, 121-140. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
- Getmansky, Anna, Guy Grossman, and Austin L. Wright. 2019. Border Walls and Smuggling Spillovers. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 14 3:329-347.
- Gläser, Jochen, and Grit Laudel. 2010. *Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse*. [Expert interviews and qualitative content analysis]. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
- Hassner, Ron E., and Jason Wittenberg. 2015. Barriers to Entry. Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why? *International Security* 40 1:157-190.

- Huysmans, Jef, Claudia Aradau, Stephan Scheel, and M Tazzioli. 2021. Mobility/Movement. In *Minor keywords of political theory: Migration as a critical standpoint A collaborative project of collective writing* edited by De Genova, N and M Tazzioli.
- Jones, Reece. 2009. Geopolitical boundary narratives, the global war on terror and border fencing in India. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 34:290-304.
- Jones, Reece. 2012. *Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India, and Israel*. London: Zed Books.
- Jones, Reece. 2016. *Violent Borders. Refugees and the Right to Move*. London: Verso.
- Kaufmann, Vincent, Manfred Max Bergman, and Dominique Joye. 2004. Motility: Mobility as Capital. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 28:745-756.
- Klatt, Martin. 2021. Diesseits und jenseits der Grenze – das Konzept der Grenzregion. [On this side of the border and beyond – the concept of border region]. In *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, ed. Gerst, Dominik M. A., Maria M. A. Klessmann and Hannes Krämer, 141-155. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
- Kormoll, Raphaela. 2021. Spaces of Exclusion: Negotiating Access to Land Beyond the Border Fence in Indian Punjab. In *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, ed. Vallet, Élisabeth and Andréanne Bissonnette, 166-84. Routledge Geopolitics Series, London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Korte, Kristina. 2020. "Who Is the Animal in the Zoo?" Fencing In and Fencing Out at the Hungarian-Serbian Border. A Qualitative Case Study. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*:1-22.
- Lamont, Michèle, Bo Yun Park, and Elena Ayala-Hurtado. 2017. Trump's electoral speeches and his appeal to the American white working class. *The British Journal of Sociology* 68 S1:153-180.
- Lamour, Christian, and Renáta Varga. 2017. The Border as a Resource in Right-wing Populist Discourse: Viktor Orbán and the Diasporas in a Multi-scalar Europe. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*:1-16.
- Laube, Lena, and Christof Roos. 2010. A "border for the people"? Narratives on changing eastern borders in Finland and Austria. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 25 3-4:31-49.
- Linebarger, Christopher, and Alex Braithwaite. 2020. Do Walls Work? The Effectiveness of Border Barriers in Containing the Cross-Border Spread of Violent Militancy. *International Studies Quarterly* 64 3:487-498.
- Mau, Steffen, Heike Brabandt, Lena Laube, and Christof Roos. 2012. *Liberal States and the Freedom of Movement. Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility*. Edited by Hurrelmann, Achim, Stephan Leibfried, Kerstin Martens and Peter Mayer, *Transformations of the State*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, and Kristina Korte. 2021. Grenzen erkunden. Grenzinfrastrukturen und die Rolle fortifizierter Grenzen im globalen Kontext. [Exploring borders. Border infrastructures and

- the role of fortified borders in the global context]. In *Am Ende der Globalisierung*, ed. Löw, Martina, Volkan Sayman, Jona Schwerer and Hannah Wolf, 1-13. Bielefeld: Transcript.
- Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, Lena Laube, and Natascha Zaun. 2015. The Global Mobility Divide: How Visa Policies Have Evolved over Time. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 8:1192-1213.
- McMahon, Shannon. 2020. Canada extends U.S. border closure until Dec. 21. *The Washington Post*, November 20, 2020. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/travel/2020/11/20/us-canada-border-closure-covid/>.
- Medizini, Arnon, and Lilach Lev Ari. 2018. Can Borders, Walls and Fences deter forced Migrants? Comparison of Future Policy Trajectories and Implications in Europe and Israel. *European Journal of Geography* 9 2:81-99.
- Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neillson. 2013. *Border as Method. Or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Moré, Iñigo. 2011. *The Borders of Inequality*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.
- Murshed, Syed Mansoob, and Dawood Mamoon. 2010. Not loving thy neighbour as thyself: Trade, democracy and military expenditure explanations underlying India—Pakistan rivalry. *Journal of Peace Research* 47 4:463-476.
- Nail, Thomas. 2016. *Theory of the Border*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, David. 2003. On borders and power: A theoretical framework. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18 1:13-25.
- Newman, David. 2012. Contemporary Research Agendas in Border Studies: An Overview. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Wastl-Walter, D, 33-47. Routledge: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. *The Borderless World*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Paasi, Anssi. 2009. Bounded spaces in a 'borderless world': border studies, power and the anatomy of territory. *Journal of Power* 2 2:213-234
- Pap, Norbert, and Péter Reményi. 2017. Re-bordering of the Hungarian South: Geopolitics of the Hungarian border fence. *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66 3:235-250.
- Paul, Thazha V. 2006. Why has the India-Pakistan rivalry been so enduring? Power asymmetry and an intractable conflict. *Security Studies* 15 4:600-630.
- Rosière, Stéphane, and Reece Jones. 2012. Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences. *Geopolitics* 17 1:217-234.
- Saddiki, Said. 2017. *World of Walls: Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*.
- Saddiki, Said. 2021. Border Walls in a Regional Context: The Case of Morocco and Algeria. In *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, ed. Vallet, Élisabeth and Andréanne Bissonnette, 106-116. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

- Scott, James 2021. Beyond the Border Fence: The Emergence of Hungary's Contemporary Bordering Regime. In *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, ed. Vallet, Élisabeth and Andréanne Bissonnette, 117-133. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Shachar, Ayelet. 2009. *The Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Inequality*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2019. Border Rules. *International Studies Review* 21 2:256-283.
- Singh, Priyanka. 2013. Prospects of Travel and Trade across the India–Pakistan Line of Control (LoC). *International Studies* 50 1-2:71-91.
- Sohn, Christophe. 2014. Modelling Cross-Border Integration: The Role of Borders as a Resource. *Geopolitics* 19.
- Stojić-Mitrović, Marta. 2014. Serbian migration policy concerning irregular migration and asylum in the context of the EU integration process. *Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology* 9 4:1105-20.
- Stora, Benjamin. 2003. Algeria/Morocco: the passions of the past. Representations of the nation that unite and divide. *The Journal of North African Studies* 8 1:14-34.
- The World Bank. GDP per capita (current US\$).
<<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd>> (Accessed August 14, 2019).
- The New Arab. 2018. Algeria president 'ignores' Morocco king's attempts to end rift. The New Arab, 19/11/2018.
- The North Africa Post. 2018. Popular Demands Put Pressure on Algeria to Open Borders with Morocco. The North Africa Post, 13/07/2018.
- Thompson, Julia. n.d. The Dynamics of Violence along the Kashmir Divide, 2003-2015. Stimson Center. <https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/dynamics-violence-kashmir-divide.pdf>.
- Vallet, Élisabeth. 2017. Border walls are ineffective, costly and fatal — but we keep building them. *The Conversation*, 03/07/2017.
- Vallet, Élisabeth. 2021. State of Border Walls in a Globalized World. In *Borders and Border Walls. In-Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities*, ed. Vallet, Élisabeth and Andréanne Bissonnette, 7-24. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Vallet, Élisabeth, and Charles-Phillippe David. 2012. Introduction: The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations. *Journal of Borderland Studies* 27 2:111-119.
- Vernon, Victoria, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. 2019. Walls and Fences: A Journey Through History and Economics. *GLO Discussion Paper* 330:1-25.
- Walters, William. 2006. Border/Control. *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 2:187-203.
- Zoubir, Yahia H. 2012. Tipping the Balance Towards Intra-Maghreb Unity in Light of the Arab Spring. *The International Spectator* 47 3:83-99.

Annex: Interview partners

	<i>Governmental actors/actors close to the government</i>	<i>International or intra-state organizations</i>	<i>NGO/civil society</i>
Hungary	1. University of Public Service, Border Police Department (NUPS)	2. UNHCR Budapest	3. Hungarian Helsinki Committee (human rights organization), Budapest
	4. Migration Research Institute, Budapest	5. UNHCR Szeged	6. Migszol (<i>migrant solidarity group</i>), Szeged
		7. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Budapest	8. An independent researcher in migration studies, Budapest
Serbia	9. Commissariat for Refugees, Belgrade	10. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Belgrade	11. Info Park (<i>migrant support group</i>)
	12. Ministry of Interior, Border Police Directorate, Belgrade		13. Belgrade Center for Human Rights
USA			14. Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) I
			15. Washington Office on Latin America II
			16. Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington D.C.
			17. Wilson Center (<i>research center</i>), Washington D.C.
Mexico	18. Ministry of Interior, Mexico City		19. Asylum Access (<i>migrant support organization</i>), Mexico City
	20. CNDH (National Human Rights Commission), Mexico City		21. IMUMI (<i>institute for migrant women</i>), Mexico City
			22. Casa Refugiados (<i>shelter for migrants</i>), Mexico City
Morocco	28. Ministry of Migration, Rabat	25. UNHCR Morocco, Rabat	23. Platform of sub-Saharan associations and communities in Morocco (ASCOMS), Rabat
	27. Royal Institute for Strategic Studies (IRES), Rabat		24. Rabat Social Studies Institute (RSSI Rabat), Rabat
			26. Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), Rabat
			29. Journalist, Rabat
Algeria			30. Journalist I, Alger
			31. Researcher I, Alger
			32. Researcher II, Marseilles
			33. Journalist II, Maghnia
India	34. General I		35. Aaghaz-e-dosti (<i>peacebuilding association</i>)
	36. General II		37. Historian, Writer, New Delhi
Pakistan	38. Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)	41. IOM Pakistan	39. Institute for Regional Studies, Islamabad
			40. Faces Pakistan (<i>peacebuilding association</i>), Lahore

3 CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK

This dissertation set out to analyze how fortified borders control mobility. Fortifications are a clear sign of state control efforts, and thereby good to research in order to understand mobility control at borders. The conclusions drawn from these cases may thus provide insights on border control efforts, their functioning and effects. It has been said that borders enable us to maintain some sort of order in this chaotic world through the construction of difference (Newman 2003). Looking at how borders control and filter mobility and how this is linked to power relations, inequality and marginalization helps to understand what price has to be paid for maintaining this order and who pays it. This concluding section will sum up the results of the research and relate the responses of the previously stated research questions to current border theory. It then discusses methodological considerations resulting from the empirical work and finally proposes recommendations for further research before ending with some concluding remarks.

3.1 Contribution to Theory—Control, Mobility, Inequality

It has been rightly stated that the complexity of borders cannot be the conclusion of border research but should instead be considered as a starting point and a challenge that needs to be systematically tackled (Laine 2021). In line with this idea, this thesis has not only empirically confirmed the complexity of borders but also analyzed it thoroughly. This way, it contributes to border research by not only stating how central the control function is to borders but also looking closely at how it works; in other words, it not only states the importance of fortifications for border control but also examines in detail what they represent and how they shape border control regimes.

Starting from the question of how fortified borders control mobility, this dissertation attempts to provide a precise and extensive analysis of the control function of borders: The fact that borders control (mobility) has been stated many times, but the control function has not been spelled out by considering and comparing different forms of control. The comprehensive understanding of border control proposed here includes analyzing reasons for fortification and control as well as its implications and effects; it analyzes the idea that borders control the inside as well as the outside, the role of fortification in controlling migration and restricting asylum and different forms of mobility control by either blocking or filtering mobility. The questions of how borders filter mobility and how this impacts unequal access to mobility will be discussed in more detail below. First, I will present the results on the more global question of how mobility is controlled.

Control is one of the main functions of borders. Researchers, however, disagree on the question if fortified borders are a sign of more control (Jones 2016) or of a loss of control (Brown 2017). In response to that debate, I state here that fortifications are neither necessarily a sign of loss of control nor are they evidence of successful control. Instead, they indicate the desire to control. In other words, they are an expression of government control *efforts* with very different results. These control efforts can have different targets: They can be an attempt to control and discipline their own society more strongly (“fencing in”), and they can aim at controlling an (imagined) other behind the border (“fencing out”) or the neighboring country. The mere existence of a fortification neither indicates how successful the effort to control is nor does it indicate who or what is to be controlled; it does not exclusively target migrants (as migration research often suggests, see e.g. Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) nor the neighboring state as some quantitative studies indicate (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015).

Another result to be highlighted here is the importance of the context and the international entanglement of the border as shown in the first paper. While studies on the reasons for fortification are often limited to indicators concerning the two neighboring countries, the Hungarian-Serbian case shows how relevant it is to consider the broader context of the fortification process. The first paper, furthermore, reflects on how a fortification can affect not only the people being blocked by it on the outside but also the society on the inside. This effect of fortification is grasped with the concept of “fencing in and fencing out.” Another aspect of the control function is discussed in the second paper in which fortifications are analyzed as part of a broader border regime. Control is exercised by combining different elements: physical fortifications, policies, legal changes and police enforcement. Fortifications play an important role in this border control complex by helping to divert or slow down migratory movements, by preventing asylum seekers from crossing the borderline—and thereby obtaining access to asylum—and by symbolically enforcing the image of a dangerous other behind the fence. The third paper then identifies different forms of mobility control at fortified borders and frames them within the terms of filter and deadlock borders. The term “deadlock border” indicates the important role of power relations for processes of fortification and control. It challenges the assumption that fortified borders are per definition asymmetrical in origin and intent (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). The role of power is discussed in the first paper regarding the international entanglement of the Hungarian-Serbian (filter) border, and it is an even more central part of the analysis in the third paper. Whether a fortified border rather works as a filter or as a deadlock is closely linked to the relations between the neighbors. These different aspects of the control function of borders demonstrate that border control is not limited to “the effort to restrict territorial access” (Andreas 2003, 78), but the control function is far more complex and comprehensive. Furthermore, considering both filter and deadlock borders demonstrate that walls are not just barriers as it is often

assumed (Newman 2003), but can have different functions. This is why it is important to consider physical border infrastructure not as the end point of the analysis but rather as a starting point for a closer look at how control is exercised at and through fortified borders and to consider both their form (that is their physical infrastructure) and their functions (that is the way they work).

Filtering is one way to implement the control function. The four cases studied here suggest that filtering is more presuppositional than outright blocking all mobility; it requires power and resources as well as cooperation from the neighboring country. Therefore, it is likely to occur at “discontinuity lines” (Rosière and Jones 2012, 217): borders where the power imbalance is clear and one state is wealthy and powerful enough to enforce the filter function. Examples of states which prevent their own citizens from moving are extremely rare today; while the GDR is a famous historical example, North Korea remains as a rare contemporary example. Instead, most states have an interest in allowing their own citizens to travel and also in allowing certain desirable groups of people to enter (tourists, but also qualified migrants, see Shachar 2016) while excluding other groups. Imposing this selective border control on the neighboring state and implementing it logistically requires power and resources that not all states at fortified borders have at their disposal. It should not be mistaken that the more closed the border is, the more powerful the state closing it is. Filtering brings less disadvantages than closing the borders completely, which not only disadvantages the border population but also hits the country’s economy by blocking trade and potentially hampering regional cooperation and integration. Filtering, then, is a means for powerful states to impose their preferences of desired and undesired mobility. Just as the control function is always challenged, the filtering function is constantly contested by migratory movements and other unauthorized forms of mobility. Nevertheless, it is a powerful instrument of control. Fortifications make border crossing more expensive and difficult and thereby work as a filter by halting those who do not have the means and possibilities to overcome these difficulties. They can also be used to prevent asylum seekers from crossing the border and apply for asylum as the Hungarian and the U.S. American fences demonstrate. This shows that tighter border control is not a means to select authorized from unauthorized mobility, as governments often state, but rather to enforce the defense against all undesired travelers. It also highlights the fact that the line between legal and illegal movement is less clear than often suggested by actors of border control, as asylum seekers have to cross borders illegally in order to get access to their legal right to asylum.

The relationship between borders and inequality has been highlighted by many researchers and from very different angles. Some identify economic inequality as the main driver for new fortifications (Carter and Poast 2017). Others consider unequal access to mobility as a “place-based version of humanity” (Jones 2016, 167) that is comparative to other forms of discrimination such as racism or sexism. However, “surprisingly little literature addresses the role of social inequalities with respect to

the overall picture of the causes, drivers, dynamics, and consequences of cross-border migration” (Faist 2018, 2). Building on these debates on borders, fortifications, and inequality, this dissertation contributes an analysis of how border fortifications impact unequal access to mobility. They do so in different ways: by filtering mobility and excluding migrants, by blocking asylum seekers—who need to cross the border to get access to asylum—and by further disadvantaging already marginalized populations. This concerns the most vulnerable migrants as well as economically and politically marginalized border populations. The situation of a border region depends on the relationship between neighboring countries (Varol and Soylemez 2017) and on the way the border is controlled. As fortifications make migration more expensive and risky, they enforce the already existing phenomena of (self-)selectivity: The poorest migrants do not even cross national borders, and the richer migrants have (in relative terms) a greater tendency to migrate to faraway countries (Faist 2018). Furthermore, fortifications reinforce an already existing trend of migration becoming more and more expensive (ibid.).

Different forms of border control, blocking or filtering mobility have different effects, but in both cases they reinforce inequality. In spatial terms, they reinforce the inequality between the global North and the global South (in the case of filter borders) as well as between the center and the margins within countries (in the case of deadlock borders). It has been argued that the acceptance of global inequality can only be understood from a spatial perspective as we have learned to distinguish privileged citizens here from discriminated ones far away (Scheibelhofer 2011). If inequality is easier to ignore when spatially separated, then border fortifications contribute to maintaining this inequality by keeping the unprivileged ones at a distance. At the same time, it is precisely at these fortifications that inequality becomes visible when migrants struggle to cross the borders. Analyzing borders as resources (Sohn 2014a) permits us to shed light on further aspects of inequality. While Sohn uses the concept only in regard to governments, I further develop it by examining under which circumstances borders can constitute resources for both the people and the state. First, my results show that mobility is a resource that is unequally distributed, and borders are tools to restrict this privilege to some. Second, they show that governments use borders as resources, and this has effects on the people. Filter borders stop migrants and deadlock borders block border populations, as the governments accept their disadvantage as collateral damage for achieving political goals. Borders are thus places of struggle over rights to mobility and over access to resources, and these struggles are the most intense and visible at fortified borders.

3.2 Methodological Considerations

Some methodological considerations arise from the empirical work carried out here. Border studies are in the first place an empirical field of study, but explicit methodological reflections are still at the beginning (Gerst and Krämer 2021). Therefore, these considerations also serve as propositions for further reflection and discussion on methods in qualitative border research. Three main points will be discussed in the following. The first point considers the question of experts and expert interviews. The field research has shown that the position and role of an expert is not as clear-cut as one might expect, at least not in the research field that is under study here. This is due to the fact that the topic is very sensitive from a diplomatic point of view and is charged with humanitarian concerns. This may challenge the assumption that interviewing experts automatically means to gather neutral information (Gläser and Laudel 2009). This does not mean, of course, that expert interviews are not worth being used; it just indicates that the role and position of experts need to be reflected. While the interview partners in this study can be considered as experts in terms of having specific knowledge on the topic, as representatives of relevant institutions in the field or as professionals involved with the subject, they did not necessarily provide neutral and interchangeable information in all cases. This difficulty was addressed by choosing very different interview partners having contrasting perspectives, such as governmental versus civil society actors, and by adding a document analysis. Considering the ambitious research design applied here, expert interviews were the adequate means to obtain the relevant data needed to respond to the research question in the limited time available. However, in future research it would be worthwhile to reflect more on how to deal with the question of experts in sensitive fields like border fortification and to consider the advantages and difficulties of this approach. Instead of taking it for granted, the role and positioning of experts in this field could be the main focus of future research.

The second point regards the research design that is comprised of four cases and thereby eight countries. Including eight countries in the analysis raises methodological difficulties, starting from the challenge to sufficiently understand eight different national systems and contexts and to work on cases without being an expert on the specific region or country. This adds to the difficulty that arises from the fact that the research is done from a Western-European position and, furthermore, has a focus on nation-states and their actors. The danger of succumbing to methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) is mitigated by the involvement of local experts, including many non-state actors. However, this remains as a challenge: If methods in border studies are unfinished processes that are politically and ethically charged (Aparna et al. 2020), then this is especially true for field research at several borders in different regions of the world. At the same time, the approach of comparing four

borders provides considerable advantages and permits new findings. Quantitative studies as well as single case studies are manifold in the field of border studies. A comparative research design that is qualitative but also allows us to compare different cases systematically and further joins perspectives from both sides of the respective border is rare. It allows us to analyze different forms of border control in different parts of the world. Methodologically, the question of how to compare such diverse cases without losing important aspects of the respective regional context would be an interesting subject of further reflections.

Finally, field research showed that the topics of migration (or mobility) on the one hand and borders on the other hand are disconnected in the field. This is an interesting analogy to theory, which also tends to treat borders and migration separately, as discussed in chapter 1. When looking for interview partners, I noticed that most experts were either designated as experts for migration or for borders. During the interviews, this impression was affirmed as most actors were either responsible for—and willing to speak about—either borders or migration. This applied especially, but not exclusively, to state actors who sometime refused to respond to interview questions that I had assumed were relevant to their work. For example, the border police in Hungary refused to speak about migration because they considered themselves as being in charge of controlling the border but not for any questions concerning migrants. On the other side of the border, the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees refused to speak about the border, as they felt responsible for migrants being stranded in Serbia but not for questions on if and how the migrants were blocked by the Hungarian border fortification. Other actors, mostly those who were not institutionally bound, were more willing to consider both subjects as being related. These observations demonstrate that lessons learned from field research may help to better understand how the fields of borders and migration are related (or not) on a practical, methodological and theoretical level.

3.3 Recommendations for Further Research

This dissertation explored the topic of mobility control at fortified borders based on qualitative topic-focused interviews on four cases. It analyzed state policies concerning border control from a top-down perspective. The results are therefore limited on several levels: The case selection allows for some systematization but not for general statements on all borders or fortifications as this would require a quantitative research design including more cases. Furthermore, the research design is based on interviews at a specific moment in time and does not provide first-hand information on effects over

time caused by fortification or changes in border policies—this would require long-term studies at the border and with the people being directly affected by it.

Border fortifications are on the rise. Observing their numbers as well as the changes in their physical infrastructure is essential. It is, however, just as important to closely observe what functions these fortifications fulfill, how they work and what effects they have on whom. As borders persist and become more and more secured, we need to closely observe how they change and what role fortifications play in the transformation of border and mobility control. In addition, more research is needed on what the ongoing fortification of the world implies. How does it affect people both on the “outside” and on the “inside” of border fences? How is a society changed that “fences itself in” (even though its own citizens may travel freely)? How do power relations and inequalities impact fortifications—and vice versa? Who is excluded and marginalized, and what does that mean for these groups? In the view of future pandemics as well as conflicts and migratory movements resulting from the effects of climate change, it is to be expected that more walls will be built, and border control will get even tougher. Consequently, we need to better understand the impact of these fences. Furthermore, it is important to differentiate between different forms and functions of fortifications in order to better understand which of these forms and functions have which effects and to consider these different functions more systematically. The terms of filter and deadlock borders can be a starting point for further reflection and systematization.

Another area for further research is the topic of border communities. What kind of border control brings advantages and disadvantages for them, and which amount of border control (and fortification) is useful for them? These questions have not been investigated sufficiently in border research. As discussed above, more exchange between the different strands of research would advance the analysis of fortification and its implications. Connecting different disciplines and methods always requires extra effort, but as questions concerning the why and how of fortification are debated in different fields of research, it is worthwhile to connect them. Lastly, more research on borders in different regions of the world, including the global South, is necessary to get a more complete picture on the phenomenon of fortification, its reasons, contexts and effects. Quantitative studies include all borders worldwide, but they do not consider topics that relate specifically to the global South, in particular, colonialism (for an exception see Gülzau and Mau 2021). Border regime analysis on the other hand mostly focuses on European borders and, for this reason, does not include colonial history or other subjects specific to the global South. While this dissertation filled a research gap by including and comparing borders in the global North and the global South—and by examining colonial history as a reason for border conflicts specific to the global South—these issues were not the central point of the analysis and could therefore not be investigated in depth. More research on border fortification and postcolonialism,

relating it to postcolonial theory, would contribute to better understanding the global trend of rebordering.

The question of how borders work is probably the most fundamental one in border research. It has been argued here that they have manifold functions, but one of the most central ones is to control and filter mobility. By doing so, they sustain and reinforce different forms of inequality and marginalization. However, as border control is always contested, power relations and struggles are important elements of how borders function. Consequently, borders can be resources as much as they can be instruments of power and drivers of inequality. The prediction of a borderless world has not come true. Instead, the world is becoming more fortified than ever before. It has been shown that this trend of border fortification is related to global inequality and to power relations. To observe and to understand these trends in fortification and unequal mobility is imperative for both research and society.

LITERATURE

- Altay, Tunay, Gökçe Yurdakul, and Anna C. Korteweg. 2021. "Crossing borders: the intersectional marginalisation of Bulgarian Muslim trans*immigrant sex workers in Berlin." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47 (9):1922-39.
- Amjahid, Mohamed 2015. "Ungarns neuer eiserner Vorhang." In *Zeit Online*.
- Andreas, Peter. 2003. "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century." *International Security* 28 (2):78-111.
- Aparna, K., J. Schapendonk, and C. Merlín-Escorza. 2020. "Method as Border: Tuning in to the Cacophony of Academic Backstages of Migration, Mobility and Border Studies." *Social Inclusion* 8 (4):110-5.
- Avdan, Nazli. 2019. *Visas and Walls. Border Security in the Age of Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Bærenholdt, Jørgen. 2013. "Governmobility: The Powers of Mobility." *Mobilities* 8:20-34.
- Balibar, Etienne. 2010. "At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation?" *European Journal of Social Theory* 13(3): 315-322.
- . 2017. "Reinventing the Stranger: Walls all over the World, and How to Tear them Down." *symplokē (University of Nebraska Press)* 25 (1-2):25-41.
- Brown, Wendy. 2017. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books.
- Carter, David B., and Paul Poast. 2017. "Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (2):239-70.
- Cooper, Anthony, and Chris Perkins. 2012. "Borders and status-functions: An institutional approach to the study of borders." *European Journal of Social Theory* 15 (1):55-71.
- Daoudi, Fatiha. 2015. *Vécu frontalier algéro-marocain depuis 1994. Quotidien d'une population séparée*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2013. "'We are of the connections': migration, methodological nationalism, and 'militant research'." *Postcolonial Studies* 16 (3):250-8.
- Faist, Thomas. 2018. *The Transnationalized Social Question: Migration and the Politics of Social Inequalities in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Friedman, Thomas L. 2006. *The world is flat. A Brief History of the twenty-first century*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
- Gerst, Dominik. 2017. "Relationality in practice: Doing spatial categorization at the German-Polish border." In *Proceedings of the I. International Conference Europe in Discourse. Identity, Diversity, Borders*, edited by Juliane House and Themis Kaniklidou, 489-502. Athens: Hellenic American University.

- Gerst, Dominik, and Hannes Krämer. 2021. "Methodologie der Grenzforschung." In *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, edited by Dominik M. A. Gerst, Maria M. A. Klessmann and Hannes Krämer, 121-40. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
- Gläser, Jochen, and Grit Laudel. 2010. *Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
- Gülzau, Fabian, and Steffen Mau. 2021. "Walls, Barriers, Checkpoints, Landmarks, and 'No Man's Land'. A Quantitative Typology of Border Control Infrastructure." *Historical Social Research*. (forthcoming)
- Hassner, Ron E., and Jason Wittenberg. 2015. "Barriers to Entry. Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?" *International Security* 40 (1):157-90.
- Hess, Sabine, and Bernd Kasperek. 2017. "Under Control? Or Border (as) Conflict: Reflections on the European Border Regime." *Social Inclusion* 5:58.
- . 2019. "The Post-2015 European Border Regime. New Approaches in a Shifting Field." *Archivio antropologico mediterraneo* 21 (2):1-16.
- Huysmans, Jef, Claudia Aradau, Stephan Scheel, and Martina Tazzioli. 2021. "Mobility/Movement." In *Minor keywords of political theory: Migration as a critical standpoint A collaborative project of collective writing* edited by N De Genova and M Tazzioli.
- Jones, Reece. 2009. "Geopolitical boundary narratives, the global war on terror and border fencing in India." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 34:290-304.
- . 2016. *Violent Borders. Refugees and the Right to Move*. London: Verso.
- Jones, Reece, and Corey Johnson. 2014. *Placing the Border in Everyday Life*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Kolosov, V.A., M.V. Zotova, and A.B. Sebestov. 2016. "The Barrier Function of Russia's Borders." *Regional research of Russia* 6 (4):387-97.
- Laine, Jussi P. 2021. "Foreword." In *Identities and Methodologies of Border Studies: Recent Empirical and Conceptual Approaches*, edited by Christian Wille, Dominik Gerst and Hannes Krämer, 7-10. Luxembourg: UniGR-Center for Border Studies.
- Löw, Martina, and Gunter Weidenhaus. 2017. "Borders that relate: Conceptualizing boundaries in relational space." *Current Sociology Monograph* 65 (4):553-70.
- Mau, Steffen, Heike Brabandt, Lena Laube, and Christof Roos. 2012. *Liberal States and the Freedom of Movement. Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility*. Edited by Achim Hurrelmann, Stephan Leibfried, Kerstin Martens and Peter Mayer, *Transformations of the State*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, and Kristina Korte. 2021. "Introduction: Borders as Places of Control. Fixing, shifting and reinventing state borders." *Historical Social Research*. (forthcoming)

- Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, Lena Laube, and Natascha Zaun. 2015. "The Global Mobility Divide: How Visa Policies Have Evolved over Time." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (8):1192-213.
- Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2013. *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Newman, David. 2003. "On borders and power: A theoretical framework." *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18 (1):13-25.
- . 2006. "Borders and Bordering. Toward an Interdisciplinary Dialogue." *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 (2):171-86.
- . 2012. "Contemporary Research Agendas in Border Studies: An Overview." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, edited by D Wastl-Walter, 33-47. Routledge: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Newman, David, and Anssi Paasi. 1998. "Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography." *Progress in Human Geography* 22 (2):186-207.
- Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. *The Borderless World*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Paasi, Anssi. 2005. "The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries. Mapping the Backgrounds, Contexts and Contents." In *B/Ordering Space*, edited by H.V. Houtum, O. Kramsch and W. Ziehofer, 17–32. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- . 2009. "Bounded spaces in a 'borderless world': border studies, power and the anatomy of territory." *Journal of Power* 2 (2):213-34
- Pallister-Wilkins, Polly. 2016. "How walls do work: Security barriers as devices of interruption and data capture." *Security Dialogue* 47 (2):151-64.
- Parker, Noel, and Nick Vaughan-Williams. 2009. "Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies." *Geopolitics* 14 (3):582-7.
- Przyborski, Aglaja, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr. 2013. *Qualitative Sozialforschung*: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag.
- Recchi, Ettore, Emanuel Deutschmann, Lorenzo Gabrielli, and Nodira Kholmatova. 2021. "The global visa cost divide: How and why the price for travel permits varies worldwide." *Political Geography* 86:102350.
- Richardson, Tim. 2013. "Borders and Mobilities: Introduction to the Special Issue." *Mobilities* 8 (1):1-6.
- Rosière, Stéphane, and Reece Jones. 2012. "Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences." *Geopolitics* 17 (1):217-34.
- Rumford, Chris. 2006. "Theorizing Borders." *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 (2):155-69.

- Salter, Mark B. 2013. "To Make Move and Let Stop: Mobility and the Assemblage of Circulation." *Mobilities* 8 (1):7-19.
- Scheibelhofer, Elisabeth. 2011. *Raumsensible Migrationsforschung. Methodologische Überlegungen und ihre empirische Relevanz für die Migrationssoziologie*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Schindler, Larissa. 2021. "Grenze und Mobilität – ein vielfältiges Forschungsgebiet." In *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, edited by Dominik M. A. Gerst, Maria M. A. Klessmann and Hannes Krämer, 331-44. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
- Shachar, Ayelet. 2007. "The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation." *Stanford Journal of Civic Rights and Civil Liberties* 3 (8):165-93.
- . 2016. "Selecting by merit: The brave new world of stratified mobility." In *Migration in political theory: The ethics of movement and membership*, edited by S. Fine and L. Ypi, 175-201. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2020. *The Shifting Border: Legal Cartographies of Migration and Mobility*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2019a. "Border Rules." *International Studies Review* 21 (2):256-83.
- . 2019b. "On the Border of Anxiety." *The Wilson Quarterly* (Fall 2019).
- Sohn, Christophe. 2014a. "Modelling Cross-Border Integration: The Role of Borders as a Resource." *Geopolitics* 19.
- . 2014b. *On borders' multiplicity: A perspective from assemblage theory*. Working Paper 10, Borderscapes
- Soja, E.W. 2005. "Borders Unbound. Globalization, Regionalism, and the Postmetropolitan Transition." In *B/Ordering Space*, edited by H.V. Houtum, O. Kramsch and W. Ziehofer, 33–46. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Torpey, John. 1998. "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate "Means of Movement"." *Sociological theory* 16 (3):239-59.
- Urry, John. 2007. *Mobilities*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Vallet, Élisabeth, and Charles-Phillippe David. 2014. "Walls of Money: Securitization of Border Discourse and Militarization of Markets." In *Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity?*, edited by Élisabeth Vallet, 143-56. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Van Houtum, Henk, and Ton Van Naerssen. 2002. "Bordering, Ordering and Othering." *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 93 (2):125-36.
- Varol, Cigdem , and Emrah Soylemez. 2017. " Border permeability and socio-spatial interaction in Turkish and the EU border regions." *Regional Science Policy and Practice* 10:283-97.

- Vollmer, Bastian A., and Franck Düvell. 2021. "Grenzen und Migration – eine dynamische Interdependenz." In *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, edited by Dominik M. A. Gerst, Maria M. A. Klessmann and Hannes Krämer, 316-30. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
- Walters, William. 2006. "Border/Control." *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 (2):187-203.
- Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. "Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, migration and the social sciences." *Global Networks* 2 (4):301-34.
- Witzel, Andreas, and Herwig Reiter. 2012. *The problem-centred interview*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira, Georgie Wemyss, and Kathryn Cassidy. 2019. *Bordering*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Zaiotti, Ruben. 2016a. "Externalizing Migration Management. Europe, North America and the spread of 'remote control' practices." In *Routledge Research in Place, Space and Politics*, edited by Clive Barnett. London, New York: Routledge.
- . 2016b. "Mapping remote control: the externalization of migration management in the 21st century." In *Externalizing Migration Management. Europe, North America and the spread of 'remote control' practices*, edited by Ruben Zaiotti, 3-30. Abingdon: Routledge.

ANNEX

Annex I: Interview partners

	<i>Governmental actors/actors close to the government</i>	<i>International or intra-state organizations</i>	<i>Civil society</i>
<i>Hungary</i>	1. University of Public Service, Border Police Department (NUPS)	2. UNHCR Budapest	3. Hungarian Helsinki Committee (human rights organization), Budapest
	4. Migration Research Institute, Budapest	5. UNHCR Szeged	6. Migszol (<i>migrant solidarity group</i>), Szeged
		7. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Budapest	8. An independent researcher in migration studies, Budapest
<i>Serbia</i>	9. Commissariat for Refugees, Belgrade	10. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Belgrade	11. Info Park (<i>migrant support group</i>)
	12. Ministry of Interior, Border Police Directorate, Belgrade		13. Belgrade Center for Human Rights
<i>USA</i>			14. Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) I
			15. Washington Office on Latin America II
			16. Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington D.C.
			17. Wilson Center (<i>research center</i>), Washington D.C.
<i>Mexico</i>	18. Ministry of Interior, Mexico City		19. Asylum Access (<i>migrant support organization</i>), Mexico City
	20. CNDH (National Human Rights Commission), Mexico City		21. IMUMI (<i>institute for migrant women</i>), Mexico City
			22. Casa Refugiados (<i>shelter for migrants</i>), Mexico City
<i>Morocco</i>	28. Ministry of Migration, Rabat	25. UNHCR Morocco, Rabat	23. Platform of sub-Saharan associations and communities in Morocco (ASCOMS), Rabat
	27. Royal Institute for Strategic Studies (IRES), Rabat		24. Rabat Social Studies Institute (RSSI Rabat), Rabat
			26. Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), Rabat
			29. Journalist, Rabat
<i>Algeria</i>			30. Journalist I, Alger
			31. Researcher I, Alger
			32. Researcher II, Marseilles
			33. Journalist II, Maghnia
<i>India</i>	34. General I		35. Aaghaz-e-dosti (<i>peacebuilding association</i>)
	36. General II		37. Historian, Writer, New Delhi
<i>Pakistan</i>	38. Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)	41. IOM Pakistan	39. Institute for Regional Studies, Islamabad
			40. Faces Pakistan (<i>peacebuilding association</i>), Lahore

Annex II: Exemplary Interview Guideline

Interview Guide Expert Interviews Morocco

Introduction: *Our research project analyses borders and mobility worldwide. We are especially interested in some borders as case studies – one of these is the Moroccan-Algerian border. Therefore, we interview experts of border and migration issues in Morocco and Algeria. Thank you very much for being available for this interview.*

Opening question:

1. Please tell me in a few words about the work/tasks of (your organisation/ Ministry/...) in regard to border and migration control.

a) Why the fence was built:

2. I'm interested in knowing more about the Moroccan-Algerian border. Could you tell me what you know about the history of this border?
3. *(If not mentioned:)* For what reason the border was closed?
4. Large parts of the border are fortified by a fence. Can you describe how the border fortification looks like? *(If not mentioned: Are there parts of the border that are not, or less, fortified?)*
5. What is the position of the Moroccan government concerning the border?

b) Effects and impact of the fence

6. Can you describe what changed after the fence was built?
(6a: How do you think the situation would look like today if there would be no fence?)

(If not mentioned 6b:) How do you evaluate the impact of the border fence – (have the aims leading to its construction been achieved?)

(If not mentioned 6c: How did the fence effect Algeria?)
7. How is the situation concerning irregular border crossing today? (Do people still cross the Moroccan-Algerian border illegally?)
(If not mentioned, 7a) Do people enter the country illegally by other means? (Where, how?)
8. Where do the people who are prevented from entering Morocco move to?

9. How did the Algerian government react to the construction of the fence?
10. How did other governments in the region react to the construction of the fence? (What happened?)
11. How does the Moroccan and the Algerian governments cooperate concerning border control and migration?
12. Do you see negative effects of the fence?
13. So far we only talked about the Algerian border – how is border control exercised at the other external borders of Morocco?

c) Mobility and selectivity

14. You mentioned (/the government states) that the fence was built for security reasons. Can you explain which threats played a role? *If migrants are mentioned:* Concerning the people who try to cross the border, can you explain further who may affect Morocco's security and how?
15. I am also interested to know how the official border crossing points operate. Who is allowed to enter Morocco by these border crossings?
(*Maybe 15a: How does the police manage to enable those who are allowed to cross the border and to stop those who are not?*)
16. You mentioned the people who try to cross the Moroccan border illegally – can you describe who are these people?)

Closing questions:

17. As a last question I would like to know how you evaluate the situation concerning borders and migration in Morocco today – what challenges do you see for the present and the future?
18. Thank you for answering my questions. Would you like to add something we did not talk about yet?

Annex III: Summary

This dissertation investigates mobility control at fortified borders. Border fortifications are on the rise today and will most probably shape the future of nation states and global mobility. Whereas in the past border fences were often associated with military conflict, the new walls are mostly designed to control and filter mobility. In light of these developments, the thesis analyzes four case studies, namely the Hungarian-Serbian, the U.S. American-Mexican, the Pakistani-Indian and the Algerian-Moroccan borders. Starting with the question of how fortified borders control mobility, it attempts to provide a precise and extensive analysis of the control function of borders.

The thesis is comprised of three papers. The first examines the Hungarian-Serbian border, highlighting the topics of migration control and domestic politics. It describes how the Hungarian fence “fences out” unwanted migrants and symbolically “fences in” the Hungarian society. Furthermore, the article emphasizes the international entanglements of this border, concluding that it needs to be understood within a broader international context.

The second paper compares two fences, namely the U.S. American and the Hungarian. It examines migration control with a focus on the issue of asylum. The article emphasizes that physical border fortification interacts with other forms of border and migration control, such as policies and laws. It asserts that fortifications fulfil a material, a symbolical and a filtering function in order to prevent refugees from crossing the border, thereby restricting access to asylum.

The third article compares all four cases. Here, the focus is not only on migration but more generally on mobility, taking both migrants as well as border populations into account. While the first two articles examine the filter function of borders, this paper compares different forms of border control—either filtering or blocking mobility—and clarifies the different contexts they relate to. It concludes that fortified borders increase inequalities on both the global and the local level, triggering severe social and human effects on both migrants and border populations.

In sum, the dissertation explores the topics of border control, selectivity, power relations and inequality by analyzing four fortified borders. It sheds light on different aspects of border control, including the reasons for fortifications as well as their context and impact. It argues that by controlling and filtering mobility, fortified borders sustain and reinforce different forms of inequality and marginalization. As the world’s borders are becoming more and more fortified, these topics are highly relevant and require further research.

Annex IV: Zusammenfassung

Die Dissertation untersucht die Kontrolle von Mobilität an fortifizierten Grenzen. Auch in Zeiten der Globalisierung steigt die Zahl von Grenzzäunen weltweit rapide an. Während Grenzbefestigungen in der Vergangenheit oft mit militärischen Konflikten in Verbindung standen, dienen sie heute in erster Linie der Kontrolle von Mobilität. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Entwicklungen analysiert die Arbeit vier Fallstudien: die ungarisch-serbische, die US-amerikanisch-mexikanische, die pakistanisch-indische und die algerisch-marokkanische Grenze. Ausgehend von der Frage, wie an befestigten Grenzen Mobilität kontrolliert wird, werden die Funktionsweisen von Grenzen herausgearbeitet.

Die vorgelegte Arbeit besteht aus drei Artikeln. Der erste untersucht anhand der ungarisch-serbischen Grenze die Wirkung der Fortifizierung auf Migrationskontrolle und Innenpolitik. Er beschreibt, wie der ungarische Zaun unerwünschte Migranten "ausgrenzt" und die ungarische Gesellschaft symbolisch "einzäunt". Darüber hinaus betont der Artikel die internationalen Verflechtungen dieser Grenze und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass sie in einem breiteren internationalen Kontext verstanden werden muss. Der zweite Beitrag vergleicht zwei Zäune, den US-amerikanischen und den ungarischen. Er untersucht Migrationskontrolle mit einem Fokus auf Asyl und zeigt, dass die physische Grenzbefestigung mit anderen Formen der Grenz- und Migrationskontrolle, wie Gesetzesänderungen, zusammenwirkt. Fortifizierungen erfüllen hier eine materielle, eine symbolische und eine Filterfunktion, um MigrantInnen am Überschreiten der Grenze zu hindern und damit den Zugang zu Asyl zu beschränken. Der dritte Artikel vergleicht alle vier Fälle. Hier liegt der Schwerpunkt nicht nur auf Migration, sondern allgemeiner auf Mobilität, was sowohl MigrantInnen als auch die Grenzbevölkerung einschließt. Während die ersten beiden Artikel die Filterfunktion von Grenzen untersuchen, vergleicht dieser Beitrag verschiedene Formen der Grenzkontrolle - durch Filtern oder Blockieren von Mobilität - und beschreibt Gründe für diese Unterschiede. Er kommt zu dem Schluss, dass befestigte Grenzen die Ungleichheiten sowohl auf globaler als auch auf lokaler Ebene verstärken und dabei sowohl MigrantInnen als auch die Grenzbevölkerung benachteiligen.

Zusammenfassend untersucht die Dissertation die Themen Grenzkontrolle, Selektivität, Machtbeziehungen und Ungleichheit anhand von vier befestigten Grenzen. Sie beleuchtet verschiedene Aspekte der Kontrolle, darunter die Gründe für die Grenzbefestigungen sowie deren Kontext und Auswirkungen. Befestigte Grenzen verstärken durch Kontrolle und Filtern von Mobilität verschiedene Formen von Ungleichheit und Marginalisierung. Da die Grenzen der Welt immer stärker fortifiziert werden, sind diese Themen höchst aktuell und bedürfen weiterer Forschung.