

## Chapter 2

# Proper Proactive Training to Terrorist Presence and Operations in Friendly Urban Environments

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### Introduction

As police organizations in democratic countries struggle to mount a proper reactive and proactive approach to the internal and external terrorist threats, the variety of responses in counter-terrorism (C-T) range from innovative to inadequate or simply misguided.

This chapter examines various attempts of law enforcement agencies around the world to rapidly reorganize their infrastructure to provide, at minimum, a feeling of safety and security to the public, which does not always translate into effective tactics and strategies. Suggestions for change of directions and new training modules together with reorganization of certain field units will constitute the backbone of a proper proactive response in the friendly urban environments.

### *Reacting to Terrorism*

Only four major countries' police forces in democratic society have had in place a sustained package of training, awareness, and investigative actions vis-à-vis terrorist activities prior to September 11, 2001.

- Spain (democratic only since the death of El Caudillo General Francisco Franco in November 1975) had been faced with sustained attacks in urban centers (mostly Madrid) of the Basques (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* or ETA). When ETA declared a cease fire in the Spring of 2006, 31 years of law enforcement response came to an end only to be replaced with strong law enforcement responses needed

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against Islamic Fundamentalist terrorists that killed over 200 people in simultaneous commuter train bombings in 2004. However, based on the information gathered during the field research trip to Spain in 2005, the local law enforcement will concentrate on more of a militaristic – storm the building approach to training – rather than the much broader in scope proactive training that will be introduced and discussed further down in this chapter. In addition the response will differ based on the specific force as standardized training for police forces in Spain is nonexistent and is basically regional and force specific; therefore, by default, it hampers the effectiveness of a unified response, so much needed in the case of an effective and comprehensive C-T training.

- Italy faced during the 1970–1985 period the violence and murderous spree of the Maoist-inspired Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*). The Red Brigades were credited with 14,000 acts of violence in the 1970s alone and in 1978 kidnapped and murdered former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. In addition, Italy's highly diverse police forces faced the actions of the various organized crime gangs (*Cosa Nostra* and others) who fought against prosecution with terror-like killings of police officers, politicians, and prosecutor. Same as in Spain, the C-T response is in the hands of multiple forces that are not subjected to any uniformed standard of training.
- Germany – which has a form of democracy that can only be defined as imposed from the outside and followed as a dictate (in the writers' view, democracy is not truly inherent to the Germans) – faced a wave of terrorism in the 1970s that started with the extremely violent Bader-Meinhoff Gang. In addition, Germany's police forces have attempted to combat the latent terror tendencies of the extreme right wing or Neo-Nazis as well as imported terrorism from Armenians, Turks, and gangsters from countries of the former Yugoslavia. Same as Spain and Italy, police forces are trained in 16 federal training centers that do not have a uniformed module for the C-T training.
- The United Kingdom had a highly refined terror response, honed in over 50 years of combat against the Irish Republic Army (IRA) and its various offshoots. Lately, the police forces of Her Majesty have tried to apply those lessons to the present terror threat of primarily homegrown Islamic fundamentalism. The situation in the United Kingdom is much better than in Spain, Italy, and Germany since its 43 police forces are exposed to national standards – with exception for C-T training, where regional constraints, chief among them the budgetary considerations, do not allow for uniformity of training in this area, therefore, again, hampering the effective and proactive response. Recent report published by the British authorities identified such weaknesses and recommended consolidation of the forces, especially the smaller forces, and putting the total number of police forces in Britain at 12; however, nothing final has been decided in this regard and the deliberations will, probably, continue into the more distant future. In addition, British C-T efforts have almost always been in close coordination with regular police and military forces (Haberfeld, 2004/2006).

Other nations have faced terrorism and evolved their own unique counter-terrorism stance. One is the State of Israel, which has confronted terrorism in some

form or other since 1948. Yet for the purposes of this chapter, Israel's experience – while ultra useful for other police forces – must be seen in the stark light that Israel has almost been permanently at war since 1948. It is this “war stance” that has shaped Israel's counter-terrorism response. In addition, Israel has adapted the somewhat questionable British methods (such as the destruction of houses of actual and suspected terrorists) that would not work in North America or Europe. Day-to-day tactics learned from Israel do, however, have a major lesson value, particularly with the United States now essentially on a war footing (which when observing shoppers at Bloomingdales in New York City is hard to believe).

We also have to distinguish between the ways Israelis deal with the C-T training in the occupied territories and the response in Israel itself, which differs in a significant way from the one used in the occupied territories. The issues related to the friction between the ideas of democratic policing vis-à-vis effective C-T training can be easily demonstrated while observing the two, distinctively different, approaches.

Japan has been faced with a few incidents of terrorism. Most notable is the 1995 Sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult. Beyond that Japan has been relatively free of terrorism. The well-known Japanese Red Army has operated almost exclusively outside of the borders of this island nation. As a highly homogenous population, subject to extreme traditional discipline, few proactive steps by the well-trained Japanese police forces are required. Nonetheless, the revelations of North Korean kidnappings of Japanese from Japanese shores over many decades and North Korean missile firings are yet to be fully understood effects on the Japanese views of terrorism and national defense.

However, Japan has a strong history of modeling its police forces after certain European countries and it is only a matter of time before they can be expected to adopt one of the C-T modules of the European forces and, again, the thin line between democracy and effective policing will be put to a test.

In terms of counter-terrorism actions in democratic societies, the recent experiences in Russia cannot be included here. That country operates on a level of democracy that is not recognizable by “western standards” and is slipping back into a dictatorship-like climate.

### ***Proactive Law Enforcement Response***

One of the most complex problems in developing proper counter-terrorism stances in democratic police forces is the traditional police mindset. Police forces are – by training and culture – more inclined to react to a crime rather than take proactive steps to prevent a crime.

On a micro level, the typical police force will respond to reports of a crime. For instance, in the case of a burglary, the police will respond and then investigate. Only if there are multiple burglaries in a certain neighborhood and a pattern emerges will police forces attempt to take proactive steps to prevent future burglaries and get to the root cause of the societal problem.

Initiatives such as various forms of community policing and extensive data tracking as evolved by New York City Police Commissioner William

Bratton – COMPSTAT (Computer Comparison Statistics) – were supposed to “fix” some of these problems. In some cities this has worked. For instance, the “impact squads” of the New York Police Department, which target specific high-crime incidents, are such a positive development. Yet is this all applicable to terrorism and is this the proper response?

We must not ignore the fact that aggressive street policing is always a threat to democratic values, especially in countries where one person’s problem is another person’s constitutional right.

Definition is one root cause of the lack of effective response to terrorism. The general public as well as most democratic police forces see terrorism as a phenomenon *sui generis*. However, treating terrorism as a crime would and should help rapidly reshape the law enforcement response.

For instance, the at time high-intensity war against narcotics in major urban centers such as Amsterdam, London, Paris, Rome, New York, Los Angeles, and Atlanta (among others) is an action quite similar to the stance, we believe, law enforcement should take vis-à-vis terrorism. The actions of drug dealers – operating often in highly trained, well-financed, and quite sophisticated gangs – do parallel actions by terrorists. Additionally two other factors could help guide police response:

- Narcotics are probably the second largest source of funding for Islamic fundamentalists, apart from the various “charities.” The poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, as one example, means that the drug consumer on Manhattan’s Upper West Side or in the elegant streets of Paris essentially makes a “donation” to various Islamic extremists. Note further that in the United States the bulk of the true successes against terrorism came from the US Drug Enforcement Agency, which managed to interdict numerous times since September 11, 2001 the flow of drugs and money that would have been of benefit to terror groups.
- Traditional terror groups such as Columbia’s FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) have emerged as major drug dealers on the own. With estimated annual sales just below US\$1 billion, FARC does rely on the drug trade to sustain traditional terrorist operations (von Hassell and Haberfeld, 2005/2006, Personal communication).

## ***Responses that Fail***

Using the old military maxim that superior firepower will defeat the enemy, democratic police forces have resorted to response mechanisms that do little in terms of actual counter-terrorism and are, at times, downright ridiculous.

It has become the almost automatic reaction of big-city and small-town police forces to react to terror incidents as follows: flood the streets with police officers, often heavily armed with submachine guns or military-quality carbines; police officers in heavy armor patrol airports, bridges, public spaces, transportation systems (such as subways and commuter rails), inspect bags at random, and create a very visible presence on urban streets. This reaction is common now in Europe and in the United States.

While this *may* help reassure the public – and a study on this would be a worthwhile academic undertaking – such efforts do next to nothing in reducing terror threats. They are costly – NYPD’s Hercules and Atlas units consume substantial portions of limited budgets – and are often put in place for just a few days or maybe weeks. Possibly the most extreme (and patently ridiculous) such deployment was the multiyear stationing of heavily armored military vehicles equipped with 50-caliber machine guns on the major highways leading toward the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Apart from utterly demoralizing the soldiers assigned to this meaningless boring duty, it would have had – even in extreme cases – no real impact on any terrorist attack planning.

Similarly the annual security effort that surround the United Nations General Session opening session in September in New York has evolved into an extremely expensive and highly questionable form of use of law enforcement power to protect against terrorism. It would be highly unlikely that New York – headquarters of the United Nations (an unlikely target to begin with) – would be attacked during this time period when world leaders, including representative from nations who are well-known sponsors of state terrorism (i.e., Iran), assemble in New York. Yet still, over 10,000 law enforcement officers blockade the streets.

## ***Why?***

Terrorists have no known record of attacking into an alert. Counter-measures are analyzed by terrorists and their tactics will be adjusted. For instance, the first attempt at New York City’s World Trade Center in 1993 used a car bomb in a garage below the center. Since that attack, the trade center incorporated sophisticated counter-measures against future bomb-laden track entering the garage. Yet the terrorists, fully aware of this, worked around this and developed a new method: using airplanes as giant bombs.

In some countries – mostly Saudi Arabia – Al-Qaeda and related groups will issue warnings of impending attacks. Typically and inside of 2 weeks, such a warning will be followed by an actual attack. Yet the warnings are sufficiently vague to prevent any effective counter-measures in terms of physical security. Globally, Islamic terror groups will issue routine threats, often highly vague. The only result of such threats is to instill a “feeling of terror” in the general populace and a scurrying about by intelligence services and law enforcement looking for what this vague threat could mean. Alert levels are routinely increased (and then lowered a few weeks later).

## ***Suggested Mechanism for Effective Law Enforcement Counter-Terrorism***

A careful study of counter-terrorism programs in England, Northern Ireland, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, Turkey, Poland, and the Netherlands, as well as actual work with

the New York City Police Department, suggests a series of measures that may help in this current time of crisis (Haberfeld, 2005–2006).

Do note that the proactive stance of the London Metropolitan Police that led to the arrest of two dozen suspected bombers this past August was based in part on this approach.

- Police officers require solid training
  - History of terrorism and terrorists groups: just like cops study the background and M.O. of criminals, terror groups must be subjected to the same analysis. This requires training or more adequately college level educational modules, with all the nuances and biases carefully examined and surgically addressed.
  - Exposure to how past terrorist attacks evolved and what their root causes are will help develop a deeper understanding that can, if done right, translate into improved day-to-day policing.
  - Simulation: we believe police officers should boost training levels by (a) simulating possible attacks and (b) learn to get into the mindset of the “terrorist criminal” by studying a group and then planning an attack themselves.
  - However, training cannot be overdone: an excessively intensive exposure to terror issue will translate into mental overload.
  - Training on how terrorists operate will help street cops in community policing to spot developments that could assist in the overall intelligence gathering effort.
- Intelligence gathering is critical yet not emphasized enough
  - Few police departments do a good job in collecting intelligence. Major exemptions are both the London Metropolitan Police and the New York Police Department. The latter has a multilingual and well-trained intelligence unit in place that works these issues and present a “must follow” example for other urban centers. However, New York’s intelligence unit is hampered by the lack of proper coordination with federal sources as well as the lack of sufficient police officers with high-enough security clearances to actually see the stream of information collected.
- Interagency cooperation must finally reach the levels mandated by the US Congress as well as by the appalling lack of such cooperation prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks.
  - The culture war between the various law enforcement agencies and intelligence gathering units in the United States continues. None of the Congressional mandates have been able to overcome decades of resentment. This problem has been identified some time ago with regard to nonterrorist-related activities, just the “plain” 101 traditional crime activities and is referred to in the police literature as “linkage blindness.” We simply became blind to the importance of cooperation and sharing that is the vital and most essential link to effective enforcement.

- For instance, computer systems between the FBI and the CIA are virtually incompatible. Free exchange of information between the FBI and the CIA remains an occasional activity.
- Key units in the front lines in the Global War on Terror – such as the US Drug Enforcement Administration – are not even included in the national intelligence sharing network.

## *Definitions*

It is very hard to create any type of effective C-T training or any other training for that matter without having a clearly defined and operationalized target, against which we want to train our forces.

With regard to various C-T definitions, it is impossible to adopt one or even a few of the myriad of the definitions existing out there and customize any effective training module/s that will address all the complexities involved in multiple definitions and approaches.

After scanning and surveying the infinite number of such definitions, the authors opt to propose one of their own – a definition that is broad enough in its scope and overreaches other definitions. This definition will enable us to create a training response that is not myopic and skewed toward particular political goal or orientation. It will allow for a much more comprehensive approach to C-T training.

The concept of *Haves versus Have Nots* has been popularized in social sciences for many, many decades. It goes back to the Marxist theories of power and control that led to defining and labeling certain groups and individuals and their behaviors as criminals and crimes. The “Haves” were the ones with the means and the power and the “Have Nots” the ones without.

Borrowing from this concept but reversing its order, we propose to define the terrorist phenomenon as a struggle between the Have Nots and the Haves. The Have Nots will encompass a very broad number of individuals of various ethnic, racial, religious backgrounds who harbor various grievances against the Haves.

There are two recent examples that support the validity of this definition:

- Northern Ireland has started to boom economically in the past decade: this removed one key element from the traditional war between the IRA and London, a war that was often based on claims of economic discrimination. The improvements in the economy of Northern Ireland (in part a spillover of the economic miracle of the Irish Republic) had, in the authors’ view, much to do with the cease fire declared by the IRA. In a sense the IRA as a fighter for economic justice became irrelevant and lost its popular support.
- Similarly, in Spain the massive economic buildup in the Basque region – paid for in part with generous grants of the European Union – robbed the ETA of its *raison d’être* and led to the cease fire in 2006.

There is always something that one of the Have Nots is missing from his/her life that the Haves possess – be it a separatist movement that wants its own piece of land, separate from the mainland, a religious fanatic who wants his/her religion to be the one that guides and restricts the behaviors and freedoms of the Haves, or the cause-oriented mercenary who will perform any heinous act for the cause – and this cause will be to get the money that he himself does not have – but the Haves definitely do.

Borrowing another concept from the social sciences – “the paradox of the dispossession” – which basically spells out that the less one has to lose the less one is threatened by the authority. If you feel that you have nothing to lose, nothing will deter you – not your own death and certainly not the death of the others (Muir, 1977).

It would be opportune for C-T police officers to fully understand Mao Tse Tung’s concept of insurgent warfare – which is based on more than 3,000 years of military thinking in China. Mao basically said that guerillas (or in modern parlance, insurgents or terrorists) must swim like fish in the sea: they must be embraced by the general (impoverished) population – and use that as a place to hide and sustain themselves (Mao, 1963). The economic booms in Northern Ireland and in the Basque regions essentially led to “the sea” (i.e., the aggrieved population) to reject “the fish” (i.e., the insurgents or terrorists). This, in all likelihood, may be one useful concept for the situation in Iraq: note here that the economically sound Kurdish region has little or no problems with insurgency.

In other words, we need to look for those many different individuals and groups whose claim to fail is some real or perceived injury caused by the Haves or those who the Haves represent. Such an approach will allow us to step back and away from the misguided preoccupation with one religion and one or two groups who are defined as the major threat to any given law enforcement agency. This broadening of the scope of our academic inquiries into a somewhat amorphous and esoteric definition of the phenomenon of terrorism will allow the practitioners to focus on the following – very pragmatic approach to C-T training.

### ***What Can We Do? – A Two-Prong Approach***

The authors propose – based on having studied C-T efforts of police forces around the globe and trained between them well over 1,500 police officers in C-T tactics – a two-prong approach to C-T training.

The first “prong” is *Programmatic/Strategic*:

- (a) What is the next stage in training? – “the paradox of the dispossession” – and
- (b) What are the new criteria for deployment?

The second “prong” is *Operational/Tactical*. This involves multiple steps:

- (a) Who are the new partners? (i.e., local law enforcement coordinates efforts with national assets and the military as well as the national intelligence community).
- (b) Who will continue with the traditional law enforcement? – Care must be taken that standard police work does not suffer from the additional burden of C-T efforts.



- (c) Who will gather and disseminate the information? This is probably the most sensitive and complex issue: who controls intelligence and who is allowed to gather it.

To lead police forces in C-T – without degrading standard police work – police leaders must proactively engage in increasing C-T awareness (i.e., communicate); decreasing overreaction (i.e., extreme “flooding” of the streets with cops), and customizing a police department’s response to local needs, risks, and capabilities.

The final or maybe the opening statements that epitomize the importance of proper proactive training will have to deal with the implementation of an effective C-T training in a country that refers to its form of government as a democratic one. Police scholars have argued over the years that policing is hard on democracy or in reverse, democracy is hard on policing. Police after all is about use of force – and the basic principles of a democratic government are not grounded in coercion. C-T training, by default, connotes the ideas of use of force – by the police (the arm of the Haves) against certain minority members (the Have Nots) who reside amongst larger communities (of the Haves).

There is a very thin line and a very delicate balance that needs to be maintained in order to prevent the larger passive sympathizers of the Have Nots from crossing the line of passive into active. The more civilized we become as a society, the more we resent the idea of use of force against us – even when such use of force is authorized by the legitimately elected governments.

C-T training *must* balance the softer – more academic approach with the best of the police street operational work. In order to achieve this mix, we must carefully design the training modules, the ones created for the generalists and the ones for the specialized unit. This careful design cannot be properly achieved without cross-pollination between the academics and the practitioners. This approach has been already utilized in a number of countries but the key to a successful training scenario is not just the amalgamation of the academics with the practitioners but the proper blend of the right academics with the right practitioners. As enigmatic as this last statement might sound, it has a very simple translation – not everybody who is a member of a given profession knows what he/she is doing.

Being a college professor who specializes in a given field does not automatically makes one a good match with any practitioner whose major qualifications are the number of years spent on the force. Without getting into any specific details – we have seen this happen, both in the United States and in other countries. Matching the two right individuals – the academic and the practitioner – is a science in itself.

### ***Proper Proactive Training to Terrorist Presence and Operations in Friendly Urban Environments***

This could and should be addressed as a two-prong approach:

1. A proactive training devised for each and every law enforcement officer as they are not only the first respondents but the true eyes and ears of any police organization.

2. Focus on devising proper proactive training for specialized units that deal with counter-terrorism and Intel gathering as their primary specialization.

What we are seeing around the world is a strong focus on the training of the specialized units with almost peripheral or nonexistent allocation of resources to the street officers or all the other officers in a given department.

Why is this preoccupation with the specialized units and the allocation of the majority of resources toward their training priorities? To understand this misguided approach (at least in the eyes of the authors of this chapter), one needs to understand that our response to the terrorism phenomenon is grounded in the history of training and organizational structures of police departments.

O.W. Wilson studied the relationship between effective organizational structure of police agency and specialization. While he did not find much of a benefit in specialized units for smaller police departments, since their patrol officers appear to be jacks of all trades, he identified a number of advantages for large police agencies:

- placement of responsibility
- development of expertise
- promotion of group esprit de corps
- increased efficiency and effectiveness (Wilson & McLaren, 1972)

However, most police departments in the United States are small, and these are the ones who according to the above would not benefit from a specialized training. In addition, the idea of a generalist training, one that will create a well-rounded officer who is equally knowledgeable in Community-Oriented Policing, Conflict Resolution, Parking Ordinances, Protection of Wild Animals, and the local terrorist cells, gained a lot of popularity in the local law enforcement.

Proponents of the idea of generalist point to a number of problems associated with specialization; it appears to

- create increased friction and conflict between the units;
- create loyalty to the specialized unit instead of the department;
- contribute to a decrease in overall job performance due to job factionalism; and
- hamper the development of a well-rounded police program (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2001).

Based on the above history of two extreme approaches to police training, we either will continue to follow the controversy by creating only specialized C-T units and providing training modules that are very narrowly defined or will go with the generalist approach and create modules that are so general and reactive in nature that will render most, if not all, of this training as a CYA concept rather than something truly proactive and effective.

Unfortunately, if on the one hand, the idea of a “generalist” approach to C-T training will prevail in American policing and furthermore, gain some momentum, especially for the small departments and on the other hand, the idea of specialized

units will take over the role of fighting the phenomenon of terrorism in urban environments and only leftover resources will be allocated to the generalists, we predict a very troublesome future.

We do not give our officers the necessary tools to perform their profession, as the basic academy training cannot and will not offer them these tools (if it continues to offer modules of training that are inadequate both in length and content), and the so-called specialized and developmental training creates an impression, in many instances, of a further deterioration of the idea of professionalism for law enforcement.

The length of the training, in itself, is seldom a fully inclusive indicator of the quality of a given training module. However, coupled with the six answers to the following questions the picture is quite clear.

The basic questions to be answered about the quality of specialized, counter-terrorist training are the following:

1. What?
2. When?
3. Where?
4. Who?
5. By whom?
6. How much?

The multitude of topics and themes that needs to be covered during truly proactive counter-terrorism training points to the complexity of a proper police response. This complexity necessitates a serious and structured approach. An old and well-known adage says: with force you can be successful against a specific terrorist but you will not win the war against terrorism.

One of the more prominent events that highlighted the need for specialized training can be traced to the early 1960s. In August 1966, an incident occurred in Austin, Texas, that contrary to other incidents pushed law enforcement toward assessment of their capabilities in handling high-risk situations. After killing his wife and mother, Charles Whitman went to the rooftop of the University of Texas and began a shooting spree, killing 15 people and wounding 30 others. This event contributed to the establishment of special police teams to handle high-risk situations (Haberfeld, 2002).

9/11 was a similar catalyst in the area of counter-terrorist/intelligence training. However, when one analyzes the themes of police specialized training in the above areas, it appears that the inter-relations between history, religion, social justice and real or perceived injustice, economic trends, migration trends paired with the increase in violent crimes, high-technology crimes, the increased number of high-risk repeat offenders (an outcome of prison overcrowding), the overall sophistication of criminal element, diversity-related issues and a host of additional problems which create the need for a very carefully designed specialized and developmental training approach generate, at best, what these authors would call a “post hoc training” approach.

Police scholars, when describing police subcultures, refer to the concept of “post hoc morality” when dealing with explanations for unethical or questionable behaviors. The post hoc morality provides an alibi, an explanation, or/and a justification for officer’s behavior, after the fact (Crank, 1998).

The quality and the quantity of various approaches to C-T and intelligence training, both during the academy and later on in-service in the form of specialized and developmental training courses, seem to be providing the similar outlet for police agency as the adoption of post hoc morality. There is, indeed, an element of alibi, explanation, and justification in the various specialized and developmental courses offered to law enforcement officer; there is, however, no trace of an element of a true expertise.

A two-day course dealing with the history of terrorism or the phenomenon of suicide bombers or the more “in-depth” approach to the study of the Islam (like if it was the only terrorist-related religion) certainly serves as an alibi for a department that needs to enhance its officers people skills or prepare for accusations of indifference toward a certain group of victims or profiling of certain communities; however, it will not provide the adequate tools to deal with these problems, not even in a semi-effective manner.

The authors of this chapter (both college professors) realize quite too well that after 15 weeks of instruction, with two and half hours a week, which amounts to about 38 h (38–40 h of instructions are considered to be an average length of a course in any college environment), the knowledge of counter-terrorism response and policies for law enforcement is, at best, comparable to scratching a tip of an iceberg. However, 40 h of instructions allocated to C-T training for the generalists in the field is rarely in existence in police departments around the country or the world for that matter.

But, any and all that is delivered to police officers in these areas provides an alibi for a given police organization and a false sense of security for the officers in the field. We must and actually have an obligation to look at the history of specialized training in this country and learn from our mistakes. Gould (1997) conducted a research study to evaluate the experiences of police officers exposed to a specialized Community-Oriented Training offered in-service to officers with some level of seniority in the field. The experienced officers felt that the course was a waste of time, and their criticism was summarized in five points:

1. a feeling that the community did not understand or appreciate what the officers were trying to accomplish;
2. a feeling that most police administrators and many supervisors had lost touch with the reality of policing as the officers face it today;
3. a feeling that many police administrators and community politicians were looking for a quick-and-dirty scapegoat, therefore often blaming police officers for things over which they have no control;
4. that the “rules of the street” far too often weighted against the police;
5. that there is a divergence between what is being taught in the course and what society actually asks a police officer to do (Gould, 1997, p. 351).

Gould's finding could be probably directly replicated if somebody had surveyed the C-T training offered to l/e officers today in the America and around the world. Gould suggested some policies to be considered, based on the findings of his study. Some of his suggestions about the venues to improve community-oriented training were customized by these authors for the benefit of improvement of the C-T training. Following are the points that should be taken into profound consideration when a given agency puts together C-T modules that will be looked upon as proactive and not post hoc:

1. It should be remembered that teaching C-T concepts also means the "unteaching" of some already existing culturally intensive attitudes, prejudice, biases, and behaviors.
2. A change in behavior of a given police officer will not generally result from sitting through one C-T course, no matter how extensive in scope and intensity.
3. For the training to have its greatest effect, it should be tailored to meet the needs of the officers as well as the community. In other words, it is not enough to train officers in understanding the problems, grievances, and other issues related to a particular community that might be perceived as "the assailant community" without having a real input from this community. For example, the authors spoke to a number of minority members in England. Some of them expressed a certain degree of satisfaction with the way police treated them, the others were vocally militant in their hatred toward the police.
4. The training of experienced officers should include the training of administrators in the same classroom setting. Decision making still takes place on the top and the decision makers who do not walk the streets not always understand what is happening on the streets and how the realities of life changed since they stood in the rain. For example, an officer in Madrid told one of the authors that his bosses have no clue with regard to what is happening in this area in terms of possible counter-terrorism threat and that only those who patrol this neighborhoods realize in what direction things are deteriorating; however, they are not the ones who have any influence over training or policy making of the department.
5. C-T training should begin early in an officer's career, during the basic academy, and should include basic modules on intelligence gathering. When the authors spoke to police officers in England and asked them how come they had no clue about the July (2005) bombers and their activities in the respective communities, they were told that this is not the police business but rather the Security Service's. The authors cannot disagree more.
6. The training should be reinforced throughout the officer's career and especially given the almost daily developments in the C-T area – it is almost mandatory to bring it above the level of the roll-call FYI routine into a more specialized and periodically offered in-service modules.

American society is still preoccupied with race, ethnicity, and diverse cultural orientations. The 9/11 events and the explosion of the C-T militaristic orientation within the local law enforcement will continue to divide and define our society. Law

enforcement, in its essence, can be complex, painful, and problematic regardless of the multicultural dimensions. The goal of the C-T training modules should be to analyze the concepts of racial, ethnic, and cultural stereotypes and evaluate the impact of prejudice on police professionalism.

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