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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth Team
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8363
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Bachas, Pierre Size-Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance: Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications
    Keywords: Finanzverwaltung ; Steuermoral ; Steuerfahndung ; Rechtsdurchsetzung ; Produktivitätsentwicklung ; Welt ; Graue Literatur
    Abstract: This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries' average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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