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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Trujillo, Lourdes Macroeconomic Effects of Private Sector Participation in Latin America's Infrastructure
    Keywords: Airports ; Costs ; Good Transport ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Privatization ; Infrastructure Projects ; Infrastructure Reform ; Infrastructures ; Investments ; Policies ; Railways ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Airports ; Costs ; Good Transport ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Privatization ; Infrastructure Projects ; Infrastructure Reform ; Infrastructures ; Investments ; Policies ; Railways ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Airports ; Costs ; Good Transport ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Privatization ; Infrastructure Projects ; Infrastructure Reform ; Infrastructures ; Investments ; Policies ; Railways ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Trujillo, Martín, Estache, and Campos provide empirical evidence on the impact that private participation in infrastructure has had on key macroeconomic variables in a sample of 21 Latin American countries from 1985–98. Specifically, they look at the effects on GDP per capita, current public expenditures, public investment, and private investment, controlling for country effects and institutional factors. The authors also investigate the relevance of the specific contractual form of private participation contracts on these variables and show differentiated effects according to contract types. The results suggest that: • Private sector involvement in utilities and transport have some, but not impressive, positive effects on GDP per capita. • There is some degree of crowding-out of private investment resulting from greenfield projects in utilities, and delayed crowding-in from concessions in transport. There is crowding-in of public investment by private participation in utilities, while there is crowding-out by increased private investment in transport. • Private participation in utilities decreases recurrent expenditures, while in transport it results in an increase. The net effect on the public sector account is uncertain, but this uncertainty is a major risk. The revelation of this risk may be the main contribution of this paper since it is inconsistent with the fiscal gains expected by many policymakers as they engage in infrastructure privatization programs. This paper—a product of the Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute, and Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in the Bank to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (52 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Processes, Information, and Accounting Gaps in the Regulation of Argentina's Private Railways
    Keywords: Commuter Railroad ; Costs ; Freight ; Freight Services ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructures ; Intercity Passenger ; Passenger Services ; Private Railways ; Rail ; Rail Sector ; Railroad ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Commuter Railroad ; Costs ; Freight ; Freight Services ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructures ; Intercity Passenger ; Passenger Services ; Private Railways ; Rail ; Rail Sector ; Railroad ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Commuter Railroad ; Costs ; Freight ; Freight Services ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructures ; Intercity Passenger ; Passenger Services ; Private Railways ; Rail ; Rail Sector ; Railroad ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: July 2001 - How do you set up a regulatory accounting system for a sector no longer under the government's direct control, after railways have been turned over to concessions in varied circumstances and where available information is provided mainly by private operators? As a result of inexperience in setting up concession agreements, the agreements did not clearly define the information needed for oversight and regulation. Almost a decade after Argentina began privatizing its railways, resolution of the conflicts between regulators, users, and operators continues to take longer, and to be more difficult, than expected. Campos-Méndez, Estache, and Trujillo contend that many of these conflicts arose because there are no rules for interactions between the key stakeholders: government, regulators, users, unions, and the media. One result of inexperience in setting up concession agreements has been that the agreements did not clearly define the information needed for oversight and regulation. Argentine rail concession contracts were supposed to be specific about the way tariffs, quality, investment, exclusivity, and so on, would change over time. And the newly created regulatory bodies were given some discretion about adjusting the contracts in the face of unforeseen developments. However, initial privatizations were carried out in such a way that there was no time to refine terms, so many loopholes remained. Those unforeseen events have happened, and the regulatory agency, the CNRT, has had to adapt its procedures and decisions to available information. In some cases, alleged modifications of the operating environment have led to renegotiations. Changes have been introduced in the approach to furnishing information to the government for oversight and regulatory accounting. The changes center on clearer definitions in connection with four major issues: • The harmonization and comparison of accounting data. • The measurement of efficiency. • Access prices. • The financial model. Circumstances in the Argentine rail industry early in 2001 did not favor dramatic changes, but current renegotiations could be used to adjust information requirements to reflect what has been learned through six years of experience. This paper—a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute—is part of a larger effort in the institute to promote best practice in the regulation of privatized infrastructure. Antonio Estache may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Multidimensionality And Renegotiation
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award criteria. Using auction data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the probability of renegotiation this paper estimates by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. The findings show that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that such political considerations could hinder efficiency and transparency in auctions. The analysis also shows that the renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good governance, particularly anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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