Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Universal Service Obligations in Utility Concession Contracts and the Needs of the Poor in Argentina's Privatizations
    Keywords: Bank ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Consumer ; Consumers ; Customers ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Disabilities ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Expenses ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Housing and Human Habitats ; Income ; Income Level ; Industry ; Investment ; Lack Of Interest ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Pensioners ; Population ; Private Sector Development ; Profits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Savings ; Subsidies ; Supply ; Technology Industry ; Valuable ; Valuation ; Worth ; Bank ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Consumer ; Consumers ; Customers ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Disabilities ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Expenses ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Housing and Human Habitats ; Income ; Income Level ; Industry ; Investment ; Lack Of Interest ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Pensioners ; Population ; Private Sector Development ; Profits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Savings ; Subsidies ; Supply ; Technology Industry ; Valuable ; Valuation ; Worth
    Abstract: The structural changes that come with privatization may induce a reconsideration of the regulations defined during the early stages of privatization. - Chisari and Estache summarize the main lessons emerging from Argentina's experience, including universal service obligations in concession contracts. They discuss free-riding risks, moral hazard problems, and other issues that arise when social concerns are delegated to private operators. After reporting on Argentina's experience, Chisari and Estache suggest some guidelines: · Anticipate interjurisdictional externalities. Users' mobility makes targeting service obligations difficult. · Minimize the risks imposed by elusive demand. In providing new services, a gradual policy may work better than a shock. · Realize that unemployment leads to delinquency and lower expected tariffs. Elasticity of fixed and usage charges is important. · Deal with the fact that the poor have limited access to credit. Ultimately, plans that included credit for the payment of infrastructure charges were not that successful. · Coordinate regulatory, employment, and social policy. One successful plan to provide universal service involved employing workers from poor families in infrastructure extension works. · Beware of the latent opportunism of users who benefit from special programs. Special treatment of a sector may encourage free-riding (for example, pensioners overused the telephone until a limit was placed on the number of subsidized phone calls they could make). · Fixed allocations for payment of services do not ensure that universal service obligations will be met. How do you deal with the problem that many pensioners do not pay their bills? · Anticipate that operators will have more information than regulators do. If companies exaggerate supply costs in remote areas, direct interaction with poor users there may lead to the selection of more cost-effective technologies. · Tailored programs are often much more effective than standardized programs. They are clearly more expensive but, when demand-driven, are also more effective. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at ochisariuade.edu or aestache@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (38 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio The Rise, the Fall, and . . . the Emerging Recovery of Project Finance in Transport
    Keywords: Bank Debt ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bond ; Capital Structures ; Debt Markets ; Debt Servicing ; Emerging Bond Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Performance ; Good ; Infrastructure Finance ; Interest ; Interest Rate ; Interest Rate Risk ; Investing ; Market ; Pension ; Pension Assets ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Revenues ; Short-Term Debt ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Bank Debt ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bond ; Capital Structures ; Debt Markets ; Debt Servicing ; Emerging Bond Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Performance ; Good ; Infrastructure Finance ; Interest ; Interest Rate ; Interest Rate Risk ; Investing ; Market ; Pension ; Pension Assets ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Revenues ; Short-Term Debt ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: July 2000 - Many transport projects undertaken during the boom period of the 1990s came to a crashing halt in 1997, and conditions in emerging markets worsened in 1998 and 1999. Many projects failed, victim of everything from overoptimistic forecasts to excessive debt to an inability to refinance bridge loans. As available financing dried up, many projects went bankrupt, had to be renegotiated, or were taken over by the government. What have we learned from all this? Recent developments in emerging financial markets have dramatically changed the appetite for (and terms of) transport infrastructure projects. As a result of defaults in Asia and Russia and devaluations in Asia, Brazil, and Russia, political and currency and exchange risk premia have increased dramatically. Given large needs for sovereign debt financing, infrastructure project finance will be seeking guarantees at the same time as governments are issuing primary securities. Large portfolio outflows in emerging market funds mean that the sources of both equity and debt capital that became available in the mid-1990s are drying up for all but the most creditworthy projects. Moreover, real economic effects from financial events have consequences in the transport sector, since transport is a derived demand. Any decline in real economic activity is felt quickly in traffic levels and revenues. Currency devaluations that help spur exports may generate higher volumes for seaports and air cargo activity. These effects vary by sector, especially over the medium to longer term. Declines in real economic activity make matters especially difficult for toll roads, as drivers shift to free alternatives and reduce the number of trips taken. What does all this mean for project finance in transport? Risks have increased. Debt finance costs more. The available tenor of debt instruments has shortened and more equity is required for projects. The sources and availability of equity finance have changed. Project finance efforts have shifted from new projects to the privatization, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing facilities. And a superclass of sponsors, bankers, and investors has emerged. Failures and mistakes in project finance deals in the 1990s were sharp and persistent. But much has been learned about sound project economics, conservative financial structures, comprehensive sensitivity analysis, the effects of macroeconomic factors, and the need for proper incentives and sound institutional and regulatory arrangements. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (24 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement
    Keywords: Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure
    Abstract: Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Multidimensionality And Renegotiation
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award criteria. Using auction data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the probability of renegotiation this paper estimates by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. The findings show that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that such political considerations could hinder efficiency and transparency in auctions. The analysis also shows that the renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good governance, particularly anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (44 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Joint Bidding In Infrastructure Procurement
    Keywords: Access to Markets ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Bidding ; Competition ; Competition policy ; Decentralization ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Foreign companies ; Foreign firms ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Public disclosure ; Access to Markets ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Bidding ; Competition ; Competition policy ; Decentralization ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Foreign companies ; Foreign firms ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Public disclosure ; Access to Markets ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Bidding ; Competition ; Competition policy ; Decentralization ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Foreign companies ; Foreign firms ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Public disclosure
    Abstract: To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official Development Assistance procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-competitive
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...