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  • 1
    Online-Ressource
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    Management perspectives pertaining to Root Cause Analyses of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches : contractor motivations and anticipating breaches (2014)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    ISBN: 9780833087393 , 0833090089 , 0833087398 , 9780833090089
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xxvi, 108 pages)
    Paralleltitel: Print version Arena, Mark V Management perspectives pertaining to root cause analyses of Nunn-McCurdy breaches. Volume 6 : Contractor motivations and anticipating breaches
    Schlagwort(e): United States Procurement ; United States ; Government contractors ; Motivation (Psychology) ; Defense contracts Cost effectiveness ; Government contractors ; Motivation (Psychology) ; Defense contracts ; Government contractors ; United States ; Motivation (Psychology) ; Military & Naval Science ; United States ; Law, Politics & Government ; Armed Forces ; Procurement ; Armies ; POLITICAL SCIENCE ; Political Freedom ; Electronic books
    Kurzfassung: With an eye to making defense acquisition more effective and efficient, the authors explore defense contractor motivations in pursuing defense contracts and identify mechanisms that might more closely align those incentives with Department of Defense goals. They enumerate several motivations that drive contractors, most of which center on the financial aspects of running an enterprise. Then, they turn to the other side of the negotiating table and identify areas of influence or levers that the government can use to align the contracting process more closely with contractor motivations. They also analyze major defense acquisition programs to determine if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a future Nunn-McCurdy breach by reviewing a number of acquisition programs that have incurred breaches in the past and analyzing them for common characteristics. Their analytic framework enables oversight officials to identify programs with a greater risk of incurring a critical cost breach, which enables officials to focus more intently on a smaller set of programs and which provides hypotheses about what to look for in these programs
    Kurzfassung: With an eye to making defense acquisition more effective and efficient, the authors explore defense contractor motivations in pursuing defense contracts and identify mechanisms that might more closely align those incentives with Department of Defense goals. They enumerate several motivations that drive contractors, most of which center on the financial aspects of running an enterprise. Then, they turn to the other side of the negotiating table and identify areas of influence or levers that the government can use to align the contracting process more closely with contractor motivations. They also analyze major defense acquisition programs to determine if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a future Nunn-McCurdy breach by reviewing a number of acquisition programs that have incurred breaches in the past and analyzing them for common characteristics. Their analytic framework enables oversight officials to identify programs with a greater risk of incurring a critical cost breach, which enables officials to focus more intently on a smaller set of programs and which provides hypotheses about what to look for in these programs
    Anmerkung: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was sponsored by OSD PARCA and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Includes bibliographical references (pages 103-108)
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    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 2
    Online-Ressource
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    Learning from experience : Volume II: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia submarine programs (2011)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    ISBN: 9780833059031 , 0833059033 , 9780833077561 , 0833077562 , 9780833058966 , 0833058967
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xxxi, 121 pages)
    DDC: 623.82574
    Schlagwort(e): United States Procurement ; Seawolf (Submarine) ; United States ; Seawolf (Submarine) ; Nuclear submarines Design and construction ; Shipbuilding industry Management ; Nuclear submarines Planning ; Nuclear submarines ; Shipbuilding industry ; Nuclear submarines ; United States ; Seawolf (Submarine) ; United States ; Armed Forces ; Procurement ; Shipbuilding industry ; Management ; Electronic books
    Kurzfassung: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas--funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders
    Kurzfassung: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas--funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders
    Anmerkung: "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Pg. IV , "RAND National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 117-121)
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  • 3
    Online-Ressource
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    Learning from experience : Volume III: Lessons from the submarine programs of the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program (2011)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    ISBN: 9780833059031 , 0833059033 , 9780833077554 , 0833077554 , 9780833058973 , 0833058975
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 81 pages)
    DDC: 623.825/7
    Schlagwort(e): Great Britain Procurement ; Great Britain ; Shipbuilding industry Management ; Nuclear submarines Planning ; Nuclear submarines Design and construction ; Shipbuilding industry ; Nuclear submarines ; Nuclear submarines ; Great Britain ; Great Britain ; Shipbuilding industry ; Management ; Armed Forces ; Procurement ; Electronic books
    Kurzfassung: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MOD) asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from its Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. RAND reviewed the history of UK nuclear submarines, investigated how operational requirements were set for the Astute class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the Astute program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the Astute. The impact of the substantial time gap between the design and build of the Astute and its predecessor nuclear submarines was greatly underestimated by the private sector and the MOD, and both parties underestimated the impact of the MOD's decision to shift responsibilities to the private sector. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party--the shipbuilder or the government--is best positioned to manage risks
    Kurzfassung: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MOD) asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from its Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. RAND reviewed the history of UK nuclear submarines, investigated how operational requirements were set for the Astute class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the Astute program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the Astute. The impact of the substantial time gap between the design and build of the Astute and its predecessor nuclear submarines was greatly underestimated by the private sector and the MOD, and both parties underestimated the impact of the MOD's decision to shift responsibilities to the private sector. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party--the shipbuilder or the government--is best positioned to manage risks
    Anmerkung: "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Pg. IV , "RAND National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 79-81)
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  • 4
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    Learning from experience : Volume IV: Lessons from Australia's Collins submarine programs (2011)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    ISBN: 9780833059031 , 0833059033 , 9780833077578 , 0833077570 , 9780833058980 , 0833058983
    Sprache: Englisch
    Seiten: 1 Online-Ressource (xxvi, 59 pages)
    DDC: 359.03
    Schlagwort(e): Australia Procurement ; Collins Class (Submarine) ; Australia ; Collins Class (Submarine) ; Submarines (Ships) Planning ; Submarines (Ships) Design and construction ; Shipbuilding industry Management ; Submarines (Ships) ; Submarines (Ships) ; Shipbuilding industry ; Australia ; Australia ; Shipbuilding industry ; Management ; Submarines (Ships) ; Design and construction ; Armed Forces ; Procurement ; Electronic books
    Kurzfassung: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the Australian government asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from its Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class. Although Australia had intended to take an evolutionary approach in procuring the Collins class by using an existing design, no design was suitable, so the program pursued a developmental platform and a developmental combat system. This introduced a high degree of risk into the program, particularly in the combat system technology. Among the important lessons: All appropriate organizations should be involved in a new submarine program from its inception, the majority of the design drawings should be completed before construction begins, and a thorough and adequate testing program should be developed. Because designing and building a submarine is one of the most complex undertakings for a new program, they require careful management and oversight
    Kurzfassung: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the Australian government asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from its Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class. Although Australia had intended to take an evolutionary approach in procuring the Collins class by using an existing design, no design was suitable, so the program pursued a developmental platform and a developmental combat system. This introduced a high degree of risk into the program, particularly in the combat system technology. Among the important lessons: All appropriate organizations should be involved in a new submarine program from its inception, the majority of the design drawings should be completed before construction begins, and a thorough and adequate testing program should be developed. Because designing and building a submarine is one of the most complex undertakings for a new program, they require careful management and oversight
    Anmerkung: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Pg. IV , Includes bibliographical references (pages 57-59)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
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